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EDITORS:
T. F. TORRANCE, M.B.E., D.D., D.THEOL.
J. K. S. REID, B.D.

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PROLEGOMENA TO A CHRISTIAN ETHIC

by Professor JOHN MACMURRAY

It has been for many years a hope of mine that I might find the time to formulate, in a systematic fashion, the ethical teaching of the New Testament, and particularly of the Gospels. This would be a major undertaking, and what I write now falls far short of this. But it is not unrelated to it; for it arises from repeated, if unsystematic, reflection upon the conditions of fulfilling such a project. Certain problems have presented themselves for solution which I cannot solve. Certain possible conclusions, between which a choice must be made, compete with one another for acceptance. Certain valuations which seem to differentiate the teaching of the Gospels from other ethical attitudes have focused themselves in my attention, without achieving systematic relation to one another. It is something of all this that I have in mind to express; no firm conclusion, certainly, but rather certain *prolegomena* to any conclusion which may eventually become possible.

Firstly, there is a very real question whether there can indeed be such a thing as a Christian ethic. One's answer to this question depends greatly upon what one means by an 'ethic': and this might seem to be a question of words. But it is much more than this; as indeed most questions about words, if they give rise to controversy, must be. For the meanings we give to words—the ways in which we use them—depend upon our place in real situations. Most of us, I suppose, think of an 'ethic' as a system of principles, or rules, in accordance with which everyone ought to behave. A Christian ethic would mean, in that case, a formulation of the rules, principles or laws in accordance with which a Christian should live; and since a Christian must claim that these rules are part of the truth, they must, it would seem, be the valid rules of conduct for all men under all circumstances. What I wish to draw attention to here is the connexion, in our minds, between the idea of the ethical and the idea of acting in accordance with a law; which, as a moral law, is both

universal and obligatory. The idea of doing one's duty, of recognising a moral obligation which binds us to act in certain ways, whether or not we are so inclined, is another, perhaps a more formal way of expressing the same conception.

In *this* notion of a Christian ethic there are two assumptions which call for examination. In the first place there is the assumption that the Christian way of life is the right way of life for everyone; that the rules of a Christian ethic are the universally binding moral rules, whether this is recognised by the non-Christian world or not. Now I find this assumption a doubtful one. It seems to me possible that principles of Christian behaviour, if such can be formulated, may be rules for carrying out a special purpose, the salvation of the world; and that they are then obligatory only on the ἐκκλησία or those who are chosen and set apart for the service of this purpose: in the first place the children of Israel—the chosen people: and in the second, the Church, chosen from among all the nations when the Jews, rejecting the Christ, had refused to carry out their mission.

Take, for example, the teaching in the Gospels about forgiveness. Any Christian ethic must surely contain a rule of forgiveness, as the proper way of behaving in the face of injury. Now to forgive an injury is not compatible with punishing the guilty party. One cannot have it both ways; if I ought to forgive, then I ought *not* to demand reparation. If this principle is universally binding, it is incompatible with all punishment, with the recognition of civil law, and indeed, with the very existence of the State. But it may well be binding upon a special group of persons who have voluntarily accepted the task of reconciliation. As a means to reconciliation the rule of forgiveness is simply common sense. For if two of us are at enmity and the injured party desires a reconciliation, the only way open to him is to forgive the other. To insist on justice, or to demand reparation can only serve to perpetuate and to embitter the alienation which he deplores. Seen from the point of view of a mediating group—the Church—whose function is reconciliation, many of the so-called 'ethical' teachings of our Lord, far from being ideal standards of human behaviour, are common sense indications of the necessary means for accomplishing a specific task.

If one were to accept this view in general, it would imply that

Christians are committed to a type of conduct which is not obligatory, as a universal ethic, upon men who are not chosen for the Christian task; and that their commitment to this way of life follows logically from their special function—as the necessary means to the end which they seek to realise. Such a position reminds us of the double standard of behaviour recognised in medieval thought—though that holds as between clerical and lay members of the Church. We may also recall that Jesus recognises a 'righteousness' of the Scribes and Pharisees which is not good enough for His disciples.

This is the first of the preliminary questions which must, it seems to me, be faced by everyone who wishes to formulate a 'Christian' ethic. It seems to presuppose different moral levels, relative to different conditions or functions; and to imply that any Christian ethic there may be is an ethic binding only on members of the Church, and not on other men.

The second assumption that should be examined is, I think, one which goes deeper and is of more consequence. Is the notion of acting in accordance with rules—the idea of duty and obedience to a moral law—compatible with Christianity? If it is not, and if this is what is formulated in an ethic, then there can be no Christian ethic. If then a Christian ethic is to be possible, we must accept one of two alternatives. Either Christianity can provide us with a moral law which we must obey; a set of duties which as Christians we are under a moral obligation to perform; or else there can be an ethic which dispenses with the idea of law, duty and obligation.

We must, I think, reject the first alternative. If there is a Christian ethic, it is not thinkable in terms of duty and obligation. My reasons for this conclusion are as follows: First, it is characteristic of the teaching of our Lord, as we find it in the Gospels, that He does not formulate general rules of conduct. His 'commandments' are not general moral rules. 'Be ye perfect, as your father which is in heaven is perfect'; this is clearly not within our power to perform. If 'ought implies can', then this cannot be a duty. 'A new commandment I give unto you, that ye love one another.' To this the moralist will reply, 'I may have a duty to act as if I loved my fellows. I cannot have a duty to love them.' This avoidance of the form of law in His teaching cannot have been other than deliberate. For the idea

of the law, and of obedience to the law, is characteristic of the whole of the Hebrew tradition in which He was brought up. It seems to follow that to reverse this and to formulate a Christian ethic in terms of general rules of Christian duty is to miss something that is characteristically Christian. The Pauline conception that we are freed by the Gospel from the law, and from the hopeless attempt to obey the law, does clearly reflect what is characteristic of the Gospel teaching. To formulate a Christian moral law *is* 'to be entangled again with the yoke of bondage'.

In the second place, though the idea of duty is conspicuous by its absence in the Gospel teaching, there *is* one little parable of which it is the theme. The farmer coming home from the fields with his servants does not invite them to supper with him. No, he tells them to get him his supper: after that they can have their own. Jesus comments on this, 'So likewise ye: when ye have done all things that were commanded you say, We are unprofitable servants; we have merely done our duty.' Like the righteousness of the scribes and pharisees, doing one's duty isn't good enough! This comes very near to being a categorical rejection of the morality of duty.

Finally, it is clear that a Christian ethic, if there be such a thing, is an 'ethic of love'. This means that it is based, not upon reason but upon emotion. (I use this contrast, not as approving it, but as appropriate to any discussion of the morality of obedience to rule.) The ethic of duty, both in its ancient Stoic form and its modern Kantian, explicitly depends on the suppression of feeling as the motive of action in favour of a 'pure rationality'. It is, therefore, in principle, incompatible with an ethic of love. Kant is at pains, you will recall, to distinguish ethical from pathological love in order to square the command to love one's neighbour with his notion of obedience to the command of reason. Kant wishes to say that 'loving one's neighbour' means acting 'as if' you loved him. Pathological love is simply love that is *felt*, in contrast to a benevolence which is *thought* as obligatory. The Kantian ethic, then, resting on a totally different principle from the Christian ethic, is incompatible with it.

We are then thrown back upon the second alternative—if we are to have a Christian ethic—that the idea of an ethic is not necessarily bound up with the notion of obedience to rules, and

that the ethic which is organised, as by Kant, round the idea of duty or moral obligation, is only one type, and not necessarily the correct type of ethic. Can this be allowed? It seems not merely that it can, but that it must; if only because classical Greek ethics, as we find it in Plato or Aristotle, is, at least as much as Christianity, innocent of the idea of duty and of the ideas of 'the Will' and of 'the moral law' which are bound up with it. Whatever our judgment may be upon the value or the validity of the classical Greek ethic, it would be very peculiar to deny that there is such a thing. After all, it was the Greek philosophers who invented ethics. If we are prepared to use the term 'ethics' to include the moral theories of Plato and Aristotle, then there can be no objection to talking of a Christian ethic, on the ground that it is incompatible with a morality of rules, the notion of duty, or the conception of a moral law. On this issue Greek and Christian stand together. (It may be urged that the Greek has not yet reached the idea of a moral law, and that Christianity has gone beyond it. I have no inclination to deny this; but it is irrelevant to the present issue.)

At this point I should like to speak for a little, not as a Christian, but as a moral philosopher, about the three types of ethic which I find it necessary to recognise. But before doing this there are one or two points I should like to mention which may make it easier to follow my argument, and which may provide a transition from the first section of my prolegomena to the second. The first point is this. If we can agree that there can be a Christian ethic which does not rest upon the idea of obedience to rules, and requires not a 'rational'—which means really intellectual—but rather an 'emotional' basis, then the first ground for doubting that there can be a Christian ethic is much weakened. That doubt rested upon the consideration that the moral demands laid upon the Christian might be relative to his special task; so that they could not be universalised as binding upon all men. But this demand for an absolute ethic, applicable to all men, is clearly itself bound up with the idea of a system of rules universally obligatory. If this sort of ethics is not necessarily the only sort; if there can be an 'ethic of love' which is not an 'ethic of law' then much of the force of the first objection is lost.

The second point I have in mind is one which makes clear

something that has already been implicit. When people talk about a Christian ethic, whether they are Christians themselves or not, they tend to mean a set of moral beliefs which have become traditional in the teaching of the Western churches, that is to say, in the Roman Church and its Protestant offshoots. We tend to assume, somewhat gratuitously, that there is an ethical orthodoxy which has remained stable, except perhaps in some relatively unimportant details, throughout the centuries of Christian history. This view is tenable, if at all, only at a high level of generality; through the sort of abstractness which enables some moralists to maintain that the differences between all systems of morality are minor and inconsiderable. The closer we approach to the substance of actual living, the greater and the more glaring become the contrasts between the 'ways of life' which the Christian churches, at different periods of history and among different peoples, have sanctified and sought to maintain. But even if there were such an orthodoxy, it would be necessary to distinguish between the ethic of Christendom and a Christian ethic. What we habitually denote by the term 'Christian morality' is so mixed with conceptions drawn from Greek philosophy, Roman law and Old Testament sources, that if we took it as our *datum* our first task would be to distinguish within it what is Christian from what is pre-Christian or pagan. Yet to make such an analysis we should have to know already what distinguishes a Christian from other types of ethic. My personal view of the ethic of Western Christendom, for what it is worth, is that it is, in the main, not Christian but Stoic.

Speaking now as a student of moral philosophy, I wish to maintain that what essentially distinguishes one ethic from another is not a variation in the general types of conduct which they approve or condemn. It consists rather in two related factors; first, the attitude to life which underlies and sustains them; and second, the distribution of emotional emphasis within each. This second factor is simpler to deal with, and easier to understand, so we may dispose of it in a few sentences before tackling the other, which is more difficult. What is meant by 'the distribution of emotional emphasis' is this. The types of conduct which are disapproved by any ethical doctrine are condemned with very different degrees of moral repugnance. Likewise the virtues which are esteemed are felt to be praise-

worthy with differing intensities of approval. Some offences are venial and are readily forgiven; others know no forgiveness. This distribution of emotional emphasis varies greatly; and can be measured by the social penalties which attend the breaking of the code in this particular or that. In seeking to determine, then, the unique peculiarity of a particular ethic, one of the first questions to be asked is this: 'What is its unforgivable sin? What sort of moral offence does it consider the most serious?'

Turning now to the first factor which I have mentioned—the attitude to life which underlies and sustains a particular ethic, we face a more elusive issue, which is also, in a broad and fundamental sense, emotional rather than intellectual. An 'attitude of mind'—or as we may call it more technically, a 'form of apperception'—is the fundamental subjective factor determining human behaviour. The objective factor is a knowledge of the facts. We act in a situation through knowledge of the situation. Even if our knowledge of the facts, however, were comprehensive and exact—as of course it never is—this in itself would not suffice to indicate what should be done. For that a valuation is required which goes beyond the facts and which selects an objective. Thus the same facts can be taken in different ways. A serious difficulty to be faced which will stimulate one man to wrestle with it and overcome it, may bring discouragement and despair to another. This difference depends, not on what the facts are, but on how they are taken, envisaged or *apperceived.* Apperception is really a form of selection by concentration of attention in terms of a predominant interest. The way things 'look' to us depends upon this selection.

Now most apperception is empirical: by which is meant that the interest in terms of which we attend to a situation is one we have acquired in the course of our experience. But there are three forms of apperception which deserve to be called categorial, in that they anticipate particular experience and belong to the original structure of human nature. Thus they determine the form of *all* human experience. For all of us, the original structure of experience involves complete dependence upon another human being. In consequence the original and the primary reference of these categorial forms of apperception is to the relations between persons. They dictate the possible ways of taking (or 'apperceiving') our relations to our fellows:

and since these inter-personal relations are *in fact* the central organising principles of human life, whether we admit this or are even aware of it, the categorical structure of our relations to other people determines our relation to the 'Other' in general, that is, to the world.

In its most formal expression, our relation to our fellows may be either positive or negative, either one of attraction or one of repulsion. These two opposite attitudes may be identified through their most mature expressions in personal life in the antithesis of 'love' and 'fear'; but it is important to remember that these two terms must be taken in the widest possible sense. Indeed as categorial they determine the form of our experience in general and are consequently normally 'unconscious'; not elements within our experience. The detailed analysis of them is out of place here, even if it were particularly relevant. The distinction, for our purposes, may be best expressed if we say that two opposite attitudes of mind are possible towards any set of conditions in which we must act, one of trust and confidence and one of distrust and suspicion. The latter, if it is dominant, throws us on the defensive and dictates, as our general (if unconscious) objective, security. The former is best defined by contrast as the opposite of this, in which behaviour in relation to the Other is spontaneous, free and unconstrained.

It may be well to consider at once a point which has considerable importance for all ethical studies. If we are to talk about what is 'natural' in human behaviour, then we must say that the positive, trustful and confident attitude is 'natural' to man, while the negative, defensive attitude is 'unnatural'. This is sufficiently shown by the fact that the purely negative relation, if it were unchecked, must aim at the destruction of the relation either by the destruction of the Other or of the self; either by murder or by suicide. Nevertheless this natural state is very far from being the actual state of human relations. We are therefore fallen beings; in whom there is evident a loss of their true nature. But this loss is not complete; otherwise the only relation possible between people would be Hobbes' war of each against all, resulting in the self-destruction of the human race.

There are three, and not two categorial forms of apperception because of the ambivalence of the negative attitude. A

negative attitude to the Other necessitates a policy of self-defence. But this may either take the form of a withdrawal from the Other or of aggression against the Other. If I fear someone I must either conceal myself from him or secure power over him. Now, in general, I cannot actually withdraw from my relation to the world, since my life consists in this relation. What I can do is to conform to a pattern of habitual activity which the Other accepts, while finding my real life within myself, as a life of the mind, of the imagination, or as it is often called, a spiritual life. In this attitude to life I conform to the demands made upon me by the world; I submit to the Other, but only in fact, not in intention. My real self is not involved in my material activity but is 'withdrawn'. The alternative to this is a self-assertion which seeks power to compel the Other to conform to my demands; and so compels the Other to do likewise.

Now these three possible attitudes to life tend to give rise to three different types of ethic; and where one of them is dominant in a cultural tradition it will actually do so. The positive apperception, because it provides a motive for realising personal relations of trust and confidence is itself constitutive of a fellowship in community. The two negative apperceptions tend to the destruction of fellowship; as they are inherently self-centred. Nevertheless, because social co-operation and social confidence is necessary to human existence, they must give rise to some form of behaviour which makes social cohesion possible in spite of the tendency to personal antagonism which underlies it; and to do this they must base their ethic upon the self-interest of the individual agent.

The two negative apperceptions give rise to two types of ethic with which we are familiar. The defence by submission and withdrawal produces an ethic of good form; of conformity to an accepted pattern of social behaviour. This is really an aesthetic notion, which makes morality the Art of Living. From the standpoint of the individual, the good life is achieved by a balanced and harmonious satisfaction of the natural impulses in such a way that a man's life as a whole is as it were a work of art, satisfying to contemplate. From the social side, individuals are the elements out of which an organic social whole is realised: each, like any element in a work of art, has

a function in the life of the whole, and his goodness consists in the performance of his function. This ethic seeks to combine these two points of view through a process of education which 'forms' the character of the growing child so that the pattern of its habitual life fits the function he is to perform, and so that his vision of the good life for himself is that which his society requires. This conformity becomes automatic; and what satisfies the individual also serves the community.

The other negative apperception—that of defence by aggression—seeks security through power. Now if power is the end aimed at, since power is just the general term for the means of achieving anything, the attitude to life must be a technological one. Its ethic, therefore, is a technological ethic. Practical achievement comes through discovering and acting upon rules. It requires above all the capacity to maintain a policy; and to subordinate one's momentary satisfaction to the attainment of a practical objective. The corresponding ethic, then, must be an ethic of *self*-control; and the good life must be one which is lived in accordance with the right rules, that is to say, in obedience to the moral law. This is the familiar ethic of acting from duty; of doing what we ought to do and not what we want to do. It dictates a morality of obligation.

This may serve, I hope, to identify the two types of ethic which I have in mind; and at the same time to clarify what I mean by a difference of apperception. I have introduced this rather abstract discussion, indeed, not for its own sake, but to provide a contrast with the apperception that underlies the teaching of the Gospels, and to which any Christian ethic, if there be a Christian ethic, must conform. It is to this contrast which I wish now to draw attention. The first point, and perhaps the most fundamental one, in the contrast is that both these negative types of ethic assume that the tension between individuals, and the resulting tension within the individual between impulse and moral demand is 'natural' to man, and an unchanging condition of human existence. Consequently they envisage the moral problem as one of making personal intercourse and social co-operation possible in spite of the underlying impulses which threaten it. In contrast to this, Christianity refuses to recognise this enmity which arises from fear of the Other as natural, though it recognises it as actual. Consequently, the

moral problem is not one of countering the effects of the destructive tendencies in us in one way or another, but instead the problem of eliminating these tendencies themselves. Christianity finds men at enmity with one another and concludes that which is required is a reconciliation. It thinks in terms of regeneration, of the salvation of the world, of the transformation of human motives. The natural state of man is one of fellowship in love and trust; if that is not his actual state then something has gone wrong which ought to be put right; which must on no account be accepted as proper, or natural or normal. We might perhaps express the contrast by saying that to the question: 'Why can we not do as we please?' the Christian answer is: 'Yes, why can't we? Let us find out and put it right.'

This contrast in apperception seems to me to be the first consideration which should underlie any attempt to formulate a Christian ethic. If we believe that human motives can be transformed, the whole conception of right action or of good conduct is affected. The good life is neither a life which exhibits a harmonious unity of structure, nor one which conforms to certain eternal principles. It is the life of fellowship: and actions are right as they contribute to the creation, the extension and the maintenance of fellowship.

With this there is bound up another aspect of the contrast. Because fellowship is the good, a Christian ethic cannot be egocentric, as the negative types of ethic are. Fear necessarily makes the self the centre of reference, and goodness an achievement which in some sense or other satisfies the self. But love transfers the centre of reference beyond the self to the Other and action which expresses love is for the sake of the Other, not for the sake of the self. It is a mistake which flows from the negativity of our own normal apperception, when we say that Christianity teaches the infinite value of the individual. It would be more correct to say that from the Christian point of view the individual has no value in himself as an individual, but only in relation to God and therefore in relation to his fellows.

I should, perhaps, refer to the evidence there is in the New Testament for this whole treatment of the subject. There is first, the continual contrast, in the teaching of Jesus, between fear and faith. I find this sufficiently striking to make the con-

trast serve as the definition of faith—as that state of mind which is the contrary of fear—not the logical contrary which is courage, but the psychological which is trust or confidence. I should even be inclined to say that our Lord considers fear to be the condition from which we require to be rescued. This is confirmed when we remember that a major theme of His teaching is the utter condemnation of the defensive attitude to life. The parable of the talents is, perhaps, its most extreme expression. It is the man who played for safety by burying his talent who is cast into outer darkness; and this has its fullest formulation in the statement that he that saveth his life shall lose it. This may suffice to indicate the direction in which I should look for justification of my suggestion that the positive form of apperception in my analysis is in fact that which underlies and so conditions any possible Christian ethic.

Since our own dominant ethic is the ethic of law and duty, it is perhaps proper that I should consider, if only tentatively, whether the contrast I have drawn completely excludes the idea of duty and of moral law from a Christian ethic. I find myself wishing to stand with St. Paul on this, when he says 'All things are lawful for me; but all things are not expedient'; and when he goes on to relate this expediency to the conscience of the weaker brother. Put in the language of the schools this means, I believe, that the Christian attitude is incompatible with a belief in absolute and unchangeable moral laws. An ethic of love cannot *be* an ethic of law. But there is room for such an ethic to make use of rules; though these must be relative and changeable. Above all it must be quite wrong to think that it is possible to substitute an ethic of duty for the ethic of love; or to formulate rules of conduct which express the Christian view of what constitutes good behaviour. The reason is simple enough. In any personal relation the bond of unity lies in the fact that we behave to one another in the way that expresses our care for one another. To substitute for this conduct which is determined by a rule, and so to act dutifully, is to put an end to the fellowship. Rules, however, may be useful, provided they are, in St. Paul's term, rules of expediency. The ethic of duty as obedience to a moral law rests upon a confusion between moral value and politico-economic value; and the morality of form and function confuses moral with aesthetic value.

I said earlier that types of ethic were differentiated not only by the form of apperception which sustains them, but also by the distribution of emotional emphasis within them. I should like to conclude by using this test to differentiate the Christian ethic from the other types we have discussed. To do this I should refer to the violent condemnations drawn from Jesus by what He called the 'hypocrisy' or 'play-acting' of the Pharisees. This type of behaviour seems to qualify fairly well as that moral evil which is, from the Christian point of view, the most unforgivable. In what does this vice consist? In 'acting a part', or in 'playing a role'; that is to say, in behaviour which is calculated and not spontaneous, in which the way we behave does not flow from and express our real state of mind. It is a sort of insincerity in behaviour, which has the effect of concealing the real man from those with whom he comes in contact. As compared with this sin, the sins of the flesh are venial, and easy to forgive. This distribution of moral emphasis seems to me a distinguishing characteristic of any possible Christian ethic. But my main purpose in drawing attention to it is this. The other two types of ethic we distinguished make morality itself a systematic play-acting; for both, though in different ways, are concerned to achieve a type of outward conduct that conceals and disguises the real character of the inner life. And this is indeed inevitable, since they accept the enmity between men as natural, and yet seek to produce, in public, the semblance of fellowship.

THE AUTHORITY OF THE BIBLE

by The Rev. Professor J. R. MACPHAIL and OTHERS[1]

I. The Canon of Scripture[2]

1. THE CANON OF THE NEW TESTAMENT

The *Primacy of the Church.* Christianity is often called the religion of the Book: this is because it is based on things that happened in history. Jesus did not leave behind Him, so far as we know, a single written word. We hear of His writing only once, and then it was on the dust of the floor of the temple (John 8.6). What He did leave was a community—the eleven faithful Apostles, the ministering women, His mother and brothers—about 120 persons in all (Acts 1.15), who met daily for worship because they loved Jesus and believed that God had raised Him from among the dead. When they had to fill the place of the traitor Judas, Peter said: 'Of the men therefore which have companied with us all the time that the Lord Jesus went in and out among us, beginning from the baptism of John, unto the day that he was received up from us, of these must one become a witness with us of his resurrection' (Acts 1.21f). And Matthias was chosen, with all possible care. Six weeks later the company was wonderfully strengthened and increased by the outpouring of the Spirit, and the Church began to spread from Jerusalem to 'all Judaea and Samaria, and unto the uttermost part of the earth' (Acts 1.8).

The Oral Tradition. In all the New Testament there is no hint that the first few generations of Christians felt the need of any sacred book apart from the Old Testament. They had among them the 'witnesses that were chosen before of God'—witnesses that is of the resurrection (Acts 10.41)—and that was enough. They read the Old Testament when they met for worship; Peter could quote it with wonderful appositeness at Pentecost

[1] This paper was prepared for a Joint Theological Commission in South India under the convenership of Bishop L. Newbigin.

[2] See Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible,* articles 'Canon of the New Testament' and 'Canon of the Old Testament'.

(Acts 2.16). But when they wanted to recall the words of Jesus, they relied on oral tradition. Paul bids the elders of Ephesus remember how the Lord said 'It is more blessed to give than to receive' (Acts 20.35), a saying not recorded in the Gospels. In his surviving letters he does not often quote the words of Jesus as such—perhaps three times[1]; but often, especially in practical and hortatory passages like 1 Thess. 4f, Rom. 12-14, he interweaves into his argument, without naming Jesus, sayings very like sayings in the Gospels (compare Jas. 5.12), and shows that he has made the tradition of the teaching of Jesus very much his own. On a particular topic, moreover, he can say that there is no saying of Jesus that is relevant (1 Cor. 7.25), which shows that the tradition he goes by is well-defined. Perhaps he had a written list of those sayings of Jesus that a missionary would want to use most often, such as we read of in writers of a later period (Clement of Rome, about A.D. 95; Polycarp bishop of Smyrna, A.D. 110-156; the *Teaching of the Twelve*, ? early second century); but he may have trusted his memory. He must have heard many of Jesus' sayings during His fortnight with Peter in Jerusalem (Gal. 1.18): and he would remember them. Like the other apostolic writers, he quotes the actual words of Jesus, as a rule, not in order to prove a point of doctrine, but to give guidance or ruling in everyday practical affairs.[2]

It is interesting that Paul boldly uses the rabbinic term 'the Tradition', with the related verb 'I have received' (2 Thess. 2.15, 3.6; 1 Cor. 11.23; Gal. 1.9, 12), though in the Gospels the word Tradition is used only in the bad sense, the 'tradition of men' contrasted with the commandment of God (Mark 7.8f, 13).[3]

In quoting Jesus, Paul never appeals to the authority of a book. Ignatius (bishop of Antioch, about A.D. 112) seems to be

[1] 1 Cor. 7.10, 'That the wife depart not from her husband', etc.; compare Mark 10.9 and parallels. 1 Cor. 9.14, 'That they which proclaim the gospel should live of the gospel'; compare Matt. 10.10 = Luke 10.7. 1 Cor. 11.23-25, the account of the Last Supper, including Jesus' own words about the bread and the cup. A doubtful case is 1 Thess. 4.15, when he says he speaks 'by the word of the Lord', apparently with reference to the following verse, which resembles Mark 13.26f and parallels: but it has been argued that he means that the words in question came to him by a special revelation.

[2] These statements about Paul and the words of Jesus are a summary of Chapter 5 of *Paul and his Predecessors*, by A. M. Hunter (1940).

[3] O. Cullmann, *Scottish Journal of Theology*, III.2 (June 1950). Cullmann argues that for Paul 'the Lord' and 'the tradition' are interchangeable terms, 'that which is handed down' being identified with the Spirit of the Lord making Himself known directly in the life and worship of the Church.

the first who plainly quotes a written Gospel; the word Gospel is first used as the title of a book by Justin Martyr (about A.D. 150).

The 'Testimonies' and 'Q'. There are signs that two Christian books were written at an early date, say within twenty years of the resurrection. One was a collection of texts from the Old Testament which were taken as predicting various incidents in the life of Jesus: it disappeared, after being largely used by the evangelists, especially Matthew. The other was a collection of the 'logia' or sayings of Jesus, with the minimum of narrative: this also disappeared, but it was largely, perhaps wholly, incorporated by Matthew and Luke, so that we can reconstruct it with some confidence.

The Letters of Paul. The earliest documents which survive are letters from Paul to various churches, the earliest of them probably written at least twenty years after the resurrection. They are all addressed to particular congregations or to particular members of them, deal with actual situations, and end with personal messages. Paul sometimes asked that they should be read aloud to the congregations they were sent to (Col. 4.16), but there is no sign that he expected them to be read regularly; and he might have been surprised, or even shocked, if anyone had suggested to him that one day they would be put at least on a level with the Old Testament. The letters are practical in intention; they are not essays, or even sermons, planned and worked out at leisure; most of them were written so as if possible to make certain people do a certain thing immediately. Even Romans, the most considered, is not conceived as a textbook of theology: it is addressed to the Church in Rome, whom as a body Paul has not met, so that when he comes among them, as he hopes soon to do, he and they may understand one another.

The Gospels. The first of the Gospels to reach its present form was Mark, and it was written about thirty years after the resurrection; the other three Gospels are later, perhaps much later. The material of course had been handed down, partly at least, by word of mouth, as the saying about giving and receiving was. There has been much speculation during the last thirty or forty years, especially among German scholars, on how the stories and sayings were preserved, how they were used and how adapted, how they were selected and arranged, and how they

may now be distinguished from one another and classed in 'forms' or types. And this 'form-criticism' has at least shown how misleading it is to think of the Gospels as being composed by literary men working in isolation: it would be nearer the truth to say that they gradually arose out of the life and worship of the Church, and what the various writers did was to edit the teaching of the Church as a whole. Revelation is not so to speak let down, complete and perfect, into a vacuum: it comes by an inter-action between the acts of God and the life of His people. And when at last the Gospels were written, they probably circulated at first only in the churches in which they originated, and then in a slowly-widening circle of churches round them.

The Manuscripts. The documents were copied by hand, often carelessly and with many mistakes, at first on papyrus, which seldom lasts long. There are a few scraps of the New Testament written on papyrus that survive from the second century, but most of the MSS. that we have today date from the fourth century or later—usually much later. There are more than 3000 MSS. in Greek alone, apart from versions in other languages: and no two of them agree in wording throughout.

The Canon. The first attempt to draw up a list of Christian Scriptures, so far as we know, was made by Marcion, in the middle of the second century. But from other writers of the same period it can be gathered that our four Gospels, the Acts, thirteen letters by Paul (all those attributed to him in the Authorised Version, except Hebrews), 1 John, and 1 Peter, were accepted everywhere; Hebrews, Revelation, 2 and 3 John, 2 Peter, James, and Jude, were accepted in some churches but not in others; while a few books which did not in the end find their way into the New Testament (the Apocalypse of Peter, the *Shepherd* of Hermas, the letters of Clement of Rome and Barnabas) were sometimes treated as Scripture. Even in Rome, with its reverence for rules, there was no rule (or 'canon') about Christian Scriptures till about A.D. 200; and long after that the sifting and debating were still going on. The process may have been speeded by the persecutions of Diocletian (about A.D. 300), in which a systematic attempt was made to destroy all Christian books. One of the royal acts of the Christian Emperor Constantine was to give Bishop Eusebius money to prepare fifty

copies of the Bible in Greek. But the great Churches in Rome, Syria, Egypt, and North Africa, most of them founded by apostles, were independent of each other; they sometimes met for conferences on other subjects, but never on the canon. They had their differences: Hebrews was not accepted in the West till nearly A.D. 400; Revelation and some shorter letters were not accepted in the East till nearly A.D. 700.

The Criterion. In all this long-drawn-out debate, there was no attempt to compare books on their merits, or to prove that the books to be accepted were 'inspired' and the rest were not: that was a way of talking that came in only with the Reformation. The one question asked about a book, when the canon was being considered, was like the question asked when the place of Judas had to be filled: did it embody the teaching and witness of the Apostles? Hebrews and Revelation were kept on the waiting-list, not because they were untrue or unedifying, but because it was regarded as doubtful who wrote them; and they were at last accepted, not indeed because that point was settled, but because the books were seen to be, whoever wrote them, well within the apostolic tradition.

The Foundation. We are back where we started. The central and fundamental thing, for Christian people, is the testimony of the Apostles to all that Jesus did and suffered among men. So long as there survived a single witness of the saving acts of God in Jesus, there was no need for any other authority—other, that is, than the Old Testament, the record of God's preparation of Israel for just these acts. As the last living witnesses were taken one by one from among men, the Church set itself carefully and patiently to gather and to set apart a little library of books in which their testimony was preserved.

The determining thing, for Christians, is one particular series of events: the life of Jesus from the Annunciation to the Ascension, with all that in God's providence led to it in the experiences and adventures of His people Israel, and with the witness borne to Him, after the outpouring of the Holy Spirit, by the Apostles. When the Church had once made up its mind, with all possible care and deliberation, as to what was the authentic record of those events, the Bible was in being. It is a unique book, not because it is better than other books in the same way, but because it is the original record of a unique story.

2. THE CANON OF THE OLD TESTAMENT

It is interesting, by the way, that the Christians left it to the non-Christian Jews to decide for them what was and what was not the Old Testament. In the time of Jesus all Jews accepted the five books of the Law as 'canonical', i.e. as set apart by rule so as to be the rule of life, worship, and doctrine. Most of them accepted also the other history-books, Joshua, Judges, Samuel, and Kings; Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and the Twelve Prophets; and the Psalms. But they differed about many other books. When Jerusalem and the temple were destroyed in A.D. 70, the scholars set themselves to draw up an authoritative list, and this was done at the Council of Jamnia (near Joppa or Jaffa), about A.D. 90. But the debate about marginal cases (e.g. Ecclesiastes and Esther) went on for another century at least.

The Apocrypha. Even then there remained fourteen books which were in the Greek Old Testament (the Septuagint version, made in Egypt in the third century B.C.) but not in the Hebrew. And these books, called traditionally 'the Apocrypha' (though there is nothing hidden about them), are still under dispute today. The Roman Church, since the Council of Trent, declares that they are a part of the Old Testament, and of the same authority; the Presbyterians (at the Westminster Assembly, A.D. 1648) declared that they are 'not to be otherwise approved, or made use of, than any other human writings'; while the Church of England characteristically takes up a midway position, gently rebuking both extremes: it lays down (Article VI) that the Apocrypha are to be read 'for example of life and instruction of manners', but are not to be applied 'to establish any doctrine'.

Interesting as this question is, it cannot be said that the teaching of the Bible differs substantially according as these books are put into the Bible, left out, or given a place of their own. But so long as the difference remains, Christians cannot say quite positively what the Bible is.

3. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CANON[1]

So the Church made up its mind, slowly and cautiously, which are the books that really tell us what happened during

[1] See O. Cullmann, 'Scripture and Tradition', *Scottish Journal of Theology*, VI.2 (June 1953).

the lifetime of Jesus and his Apostles. It rejected some books which claimed to be historical, and it accepted some that did not. We may fail sometimes to see why it decided as it did. But the action taken in the early centuries is a definite thing, and it cannot be altered. In fixing the canon of the New Testament the Church was recognising and setting up a standard which remains a given thing for always. The act was decisive.

'*Then*' *and* '*Now*'. With the drawing up of the New Testament Canon, a new stage of history began. The period of the Incarnation was over; we are living in the period between the Incarnation and the End. The events which made up the period of the Incarnation, and the accepted record of them, remain decisive, a standard that cannot be altered till the End come. But this does not mean that about A.D. 150 revelation closed, or the Spirit withdrew Himself. He is amongst us and in us now. But His work is now different: He must teach us how to understand and to show forth *now* the plan of salvation that was revealed *then*. We have to discern and decide and act, to live and work and worship, in our actual environment, by the light of the Incarnation. Our successors must think and act for themselves, when their time comes, in immediate dependence on the Spirit; they will not be bound by our witness, as they and we are bound by the witness of the Apostles. The Spirit is in the Church, giving light and strength, increasing and nourishing it by the sacraments, and within the Church interpreting for today the Word of Life which, as the period of the Incarnation closed, He gave to the Church. He is in the Church *today*. Salvation will not come, for ourselves and for others, by our withdrawing from the world around us, in order to live with the Christ of the past or with the Christ of the future: Christ for us is the Christ who lives and works today. We are called to hear and obey where we are, serving faithfully and waiting patiently till our Lord come; for by the operation of the Spirit we are Christ's body, and it is normally through us that He exercises His sovereignty over the world, and shows forth His power and glory. In ways that we cannot fathom He is also at work outside the Church (in any sense of the word) altogether: but for Christian people the meeting-place with God is the Church, and 'we are bound, though God is not bound'.

Scripture and Tradition. But we can make sense of the present (and of the past and future) only in the light of the period of the Incarnation. That is the focus of history: all that happened before led up to it; all that has happened since, all that is happening now, and all that shall happen till the End, flows from it. We can meet God today only in the measure in which we meet Him in Scripture; and we can meet Him in Scripture only in the measure in which we are meeting Him today.

For Christian people the understanding of the Bible, as of everything else big and little, must be referred to Christ. He is the standard and touchstone. If He is to have any place at all in our life and thought, it must be the central place. Knowledge comes to us in many ways, but the truth and the importance of every bit or kind of knowledge depend on its relation to our knowledge of God through Christ. As regards Scripture in particular, we have His own clear words.[1] The contents of Scripture have no meaning and no value if they are read or used apart from 'the mind that was in Christ Jesus'. *Christus scripturae interpres*: Christ is the interpreter of Scripture.

There is the tradition, the handing-down, which rests on the testimony of the eyewitnesses of the resurrection; and there is the tradition of the living Church, made up by the day-to-day actions and decisions of its ministers and members. (Some recent Pope has said, more or less, 'We value tradition so highly that we make new traditions as fast as we can.') And this second tradition in any age can receive and give life only in the measure in which it is faithful to the first tradition. The Church of the bishops, as Cullmann puts it, must always be subordinate to the Church of the Apostles. Cullmann also cites John 17 as distinguishing three stages in the Divine History: Christ, the Apostles, and the disciples of the Apostles; and he says boldly that the witness of the Apostles is continued not by the Church, but within the Church by the apostolic writings.

II. God's Method

For Christians, doctrine must always rest on 'the majesty of what has happened' (Karl Heim): God acts in history, so as to

[1] 'Ye search the scriptures, because ye think that in them ye have eternal life; and these are they which bear witness of me' (John 5.39). 'And beginning from Moses and from all the prophets, he interpreted to them in all the scriptures the things concerning himself' (Luke 24.27).

show to all who will look (but not to others) His nature and His purposes; theology is the attempt to understand and to interpret His actions. Christian theology must never become abstract, speculative, or self-sufficient. We must approach the Bible, not in the light of our own opinions and traditions, but in the light of the events that bring it to us, such as the formation of the canon—a story of treasure in an earthen vessel (2 Cor. 4.7).

Inspiration in the Old Testament. The story shows us how God works. There is no suggestion here of a magical book that comes down ready-made out of heaven, or is dictated to a man in a trance, his mind playing a small and wholly instrumental part; a book therefore that must be read always in the original language, and must be preserved without the change of a word, or even of a comma. It is Muhammad that tells that kind of story. And there is no suggestion that inspiration works mechanically, coming through a man's mind as water flows through a pipe, or music through a flute: that is a Hellenistic idea.[1] The mistake of regarding the Bible as something wholly superhuman, fixed, and final, so that men had and have nothing to do about it but to accept in blind obedience, is due to human weakness. We all have a longing for a sort of charm or *mantra* that will save us from all evil in some outward way, so that we have only to appropriate or profess or claim it by some ritual, and then we shall sail through all that frightens us as if we had been made invisible. But in the Bible, inspiration does not work outside man: inspiration (2 Tim. 3.16) is typified by the in-breathing of the clay, by which a man becomes 'a living soul' (Gen. 2.7). And this is borne out by the history of the canon.

The Transmission of the Bible. At every stage of the long process by which I come today to hold in my hand a copy of the Bible in my mother-tongue, God is at work in the same way. At every stage men are called upon to do their best, as personal, responsible beings acknowledging their obligation to God, and at the same time to look to Him in faith for help to fulfil it, praying to Him, with Augustine, 'Give what thou commandest, and command what thou wilt.'[2] At the beginning of this long chain are the men who wrote the various parts of the book, and those who put them together; after them, those who copied

[1] Richardson, *Christian Apologetics* (1947), Chap. 9. [2] *Confessions*, X [xxix] 40.

the MS.; then those who selected and sealed from the accumulating literature those books that are of authority; then those who translated the book into other languages. In our own time there are all those who set up the type and read the proofs: the Bible is a long and sometimes difficult book, and yet one seldom finds a misprint. And at the end of the ever-lengthening chain, at the moment, are we who read. Every member of this great and growing company has to use all he has of memory, imagination, knowledge, judgment, and concentration of will: and he must use them in faith, praying to the Spirit for help as one who is helpless without Him. And the prayer is answered! All are helped, if they will, by the Holy Spirit: for Christian people that is one of the certainties of life. And all are helped on the same terms: they are not made incapable of error, they do not become mechanical instruments of supernatural power, they are not absolved of moral responsibility for what they do. They must do their best, even while they most thoroughly depend on divine assistance. They make mistakes. And in spite of their mistakes, God's word is spoken and heard and done.

The story of the Bible is not a story of something that appears fully-grown among men who have nothing to do with its coming, or of something that grows by natural accretion. It is a profoundly human story of effort and error, of hard-won gains and inexplicable set-backs. It is also a story of God strengthening and guiding men with infinite patience in countless ways, and always working so as to make men more themselves, not less, taking them as they are, considering their gifts and limitations, not blotting them out as persons nor treating them as interchangeable parts. The two stories, however—the story of man's efforts and the story of God's grace—are mysteriously made one: and the only analogy that throws any light on this mystery is that other still greater mystery of 'perfect God, and perfect man'.

The Holy Spirit and the Reading of the Bible. It is important, surely, to pay attention to this fact, that when we read the Bible with faith, our reading is inspired as truly as the original writing of it was. The word of God is spoken or written 'by the Spirit': it is also read or heard 'by the Spirit'. The Bible is only so many marks on paper, or so many noises in the air, unless God Himself enables us to hear Him speak to us through it.

Nobody but God can authenticate the Word of God. There is no human standard or authority by which His revelation of Himself can be tested and certified. In His light only can we see light (Ps. 36.9). The experience of Ezekiel is typical for us all: 'And he said to me, Son of man, stand upon thy feet, and I will speak with thee. And the Spirit entered into me when he spake unto me, and set me upon my feet; and I heard him that spake unto me' (Ezek. 2.1f.).

The 'Secret Testimony of the Spirit'. The doctrine of the inner or secret testimony of the Holy Spirit is usually associated with Calvin, as a Reformation insight.[1] But Richardson shows (op. cit., p. 212) that the experience and the doctrine are pretty well universal: 'Indeed, if ever there was a doctrine of the Church to which the Vincentian canon[2] was strictly applicable, it is the Church's doctrine of the quickening work of the Holy Spirit through the hearing or reading of the words of the Holy Bible.'

When we hear or read the Bible in faith, in obedience, and within the fellowship of the Church, we are not made perfect or infallible: but when we recognise the truth of what we hear or read, we are not under the impression that we experience only some opinion of our own making, or the conclusion of our own private thoughts: our reason and conscience are not destroyed or superseded, but they are raised or transfigured into something we could not make by any powers of our own, any more than we could manufacture physical life for ourselves. Such

[1] 'If, then, we would consult most effectually for our consciences, and save them from being driven about in a whirl of uncertainty, from wavering, and even stumbling at the smallest obstacle, our conviction of the truth of Scripture must be derived from a higher source than human conjectures, judgments, or reasons; namely, the secret testimony of the Spirit. . . . If we look at [the volume of sacred Scripture] with clear eyes and unbiased judgment, it will forthwith present itself with a divine majesty which will subdue our presumptuous opposition, and force us to do it homage. . . . For as God alone can properly bear witness to His own words, so these words will not obtain full credit in the hearts of men, until they are sealed by the inward testimony of the Spirit. The same Spirit, therefore, who spoke by the mouth of the prophets, must penetrate our hearts, in order to convince us that they faithfully delivered the message with which they were divinely entrusted. . . . Some worthy persons feel discontented, because, while the wicked murmur with impunity at the word of God, they have not a clear proof at hand to silence them, forgetting that the Spirit is called an earnest and seal to confirm the faith of the godly, for this very reason, that, until He enlightens their minds, they are tossed to and fro in a sea of doubts' (Calvin, *The Institutes*, I.vii.4, tr. J. Beveridge).

[2] 'Now in the Catholic Church itself we take the greatest care to hold that which has been believed everywhere, always and by all' (Vincent of Lerins, A.D. 434, in *Documents of the Christian Church*, ed. Bettenson, World's Classics, p. 119).

reassurance—it may be said in all reverence and humility—comes like Christ's answer to Peter who first called him Christ: 'Blessed art thou, Simon Bar-Jonah: for flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but my Father which is in heaven' (Matt. 16.17).[1] For God makes Himself known to us, not like a teacher who is content to give a lesson that would satisfy some imaginary expert, but like one who uses all his powers to make it good for the pupils he is actually teaching. In the language of Paul, revelation happens *in* us rather than *to* us (Gal. 1.16).[2]

Private Judgment and the Authority of the Church. Solitary study, and hearing or reading as members of a worshipping community —which is more important? It does not matter, for both are necessary. The one may be called Evangelical, and the other Catholic, and as usual they are not contradictory but complementary. No sane person would think of tearing apart a Bible and putting it together again, with books left out or added by himself, however he may trust his own faculty for recognising inspiration when he sees it. Luther calls the Epistle of James a book of straw, but he does not leave it out of his translation. The Bible is not my book only, but the book of the Church, through the ages and across the oceans.

And if it be true, as has been said already, that the Bible can be understood only with reference to Christ, it follows that it can be understood only within the Church. The Spirit who

[1] Compare 'Hereby know ye the Spirit of God: every spirit which confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is of God' (1 John 4.2); 'The things of God none knoweth, save the Spirit of God', etc. (1 Cor. 2.10-13). 'There are those to whom it will appear meaningless subtlety to distinguish between having your own opinion and submitting to the truth as it comes to you. But somewhere thereabouts lies the difference between an irreligious and a religious attitude to life—and men of science are often in this sense more religious than theologians' (Dodd, *The Authority of the Bible*, 1938, p. 21).

[2] 'The authority of the holy scripture, for which it ought to be believed and obeyed, dependeth not upon the testimony of any man or church, but wholly upon God (who is truth itself), the author thereof; and therefore it is to be received, because it is the word of God.

'We may be moved and induced by the testimony of the Church to an high and reverend esteem of the holy scripture, and the heavenliness of the matter, the efficacy of the doctrine, the majesty of the style, the consent of all the parts, the scope of the whole (which is to give all glory to God), the full discovery it makes of the only way to man's salvation, the many other incomparable excellencies, and the entire perfection thereof, are arguments whereby it doth abundantly evidence itself to be the word of God; yet notwithstanding our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth, and divine authority thereof, is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the word in our hearts.' (*Westminster Confession*, I.4, 5.)

'bears witness by and with the word in our hearts' is the same Spirit who incorporates all the followers of Christ as His body. The man who claims Christ as His Lord and Saviour cannot read the Bible, or do anything else either, as a solitary individual who has nothing to receive from others and nothing to give them: he can think and pray and work and live only as a committed member of a worshipping and witnessing community. 'The Bible knows nothing of solitary religion'; and solitary religion can know but little of the Bible.

And on the other hand no one in fact reads the Bible only because some one else, however important—pastor or Pope or Council—has told him that he should: we know that it is good for us as well as we know that a glass of water is good when we are thirsty.

Our Duty to the Bible. What we are to do with the Bible, then, is not—in the first place—to draw up doctrines about it, but to read it. To read it in every possible way: alone and with others, at home and in church and in study-circle, as a study and as a devotion. To read it, not without presuppositions (for that would be impossible), but with only provisional ones; considering what men have said about it, but considering still more what it says to man; honestly trying always to find out what it actually is, and testing all theories about it by that. Always in obedience to God. 'Apply thyself, all of thyself, to the matter (*rem*); apply the matter, all of it, to thyself' (Bengel). We must use all our powers to the full, all our imagination and judgment, all our knowledge of language and literature, of history and philosophy and science; taking nothing for granted, and glossing over nothing; believing (if we can) that God wills to save all mankind from sin and death through Jesus Christ, and making that our final standard in truth and in life. We must read as members or limbs of the body of Christ, and as individuals ready to hear and obey. 'If any man willeth to do his will, he shall know of the teaching, whether it be of God' (John 7.17).

III. Authority and the Authorities

There is an interesting correspondence between the development of science and the development of Christian theology.[1]

[1] C. H. Dodd, op. cit., p. 18.

Like most analogies, it must be followed warily, for if taken too literally it might easily mislead. Medieval science depended on 'authorities', on certain text-books, notably the works of Aristotle; these were canonised, and scientific study consisted in proving them right all over again, explaining away any apparent contradictions. For of course there were contradictions, and some errors that no one could swallow: and what happened was that a conventional body of dogmas was imposed on students, and was justified by texts from the canon selected and interpreted in a traditional way; the tradition was modified a little from generation to generation, naturally and imperceptibly, but in any given period students could still think quite honestly that they were following Aristotle.

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, however, more and more students of science began to think that their business was not primarily to compare the authorities with one another: their business was primarily to compare all the authorities with the subject-matter. They began to check statements hitherto accepted as laws of nature, not with the pronouncements of the various law-givers, but with nature. The laws must be found out by induction, not by deduction; they must be referred not to traditional generalisations, but to the facts discovered and tested by observation and experiment. Laws out of facts, not facts out of laws. And Galileo, about A.D. 1600, dropped a heavy object and a light object at the same moment from the top of the Leaning Tower of Pisa, and showed everybody that they hit the ground at the same moment, thus demonstrating that Aristotle could be wrong, for Aristotle had proved from his general principles that if one object was six times heavier than another, it would fall through the air six times faster.

A little later the Royal Society of London for the Promotion of Natural Knowledge was formed, by charter from Charles II, with this purpose:

> To make faithful records of all the works of nature, or art, which can come within their reach; that so the present age, and posterity, may be able to put a mark on the errors, which have been strengthened by long prescription; to restore the truths, that have lain neglected; to push on those, which are already known, to more various uses; and to make the way more passable, to what remains unrevealed.[1]

[1] Bishop Sprat; quoted by J. Robert Oppenheimer, *The Listener*, 19th November 1953, p. 862.

They took as their motto *Nullius in verbo*, or 'By nobody's report', meaning: 'We won't be bound by what any man says: we will try together to find out for ourselves, experimenting and testing and proving.' They were seeking the authority behind the authorities.

For centuries, the new principle must have seemed revolutionary, and many thinking people must have been scared, saying: 'If we don't know whom to believe, how can we know what to believe?' And yet what followed, as the new principle was put into practice, was not chaos, but an assured and ever-growing body of knowledge, such as anyone who took the trouble could test for himself at any point; knowledge fascinating in itself, and (if wisely used) endlessly useful for man. And moreover Aristotle came to be respected more than ever, because with greater discrimination. Of these scientific 'seekers after a city' it may be said, as of Abraham, that 'God is not ashamed of them, to be called their God: for he hath prepared for them a city' (Heb. 11.16).

The same sort of revolution was carried out about two centuries later in biblical theology, as the theologians realised and applied the principle that there are no 'authorities' apart from the one authority, the truth; and that in religion the truth is not to be thought of as an interlocking system of statements or propositions, but as a living will, a person; and that his revelation of himself authenticates itself, and is not to be authenticated by anything said or written about it.

This revolution in biblical theology has to be carried on constantly, and constantly renewed. The teachings of the doctors, of the Councils, of the Church itself, may come to be valued for their own sakes, till they harden into those traditions of men that come between men and the commandments of God. And the Bible may come to be read, not that we may find out what it says (or rather, what God says through it to us), but that we may prop up human ideas and traditions with texts amputated from the context. The books of the prophets and the letters of Paul have sometimes been degraded into arsenals of 'proofs of doctrine', instead of being read as the words of real men dealing as servants of God with concrete situations. The earthen vessel has been valued more than the treasure it holds.

The Bible is not a collection of 'proof-texts' that separately tell us what to believe or do, any more than it is an anthology of literary gems that we may use for the embellishment of public worship. God is not an abstract principle, but the Living God; we know Him as a person, 'in history as embodied in a real human personality, and in experience as a spiritual presence continuous with that personality'.[1] The truth as we know it in Christ is Christ Himself, who is 'the way, the truth, and the life'. It is only if the things said in the Bible have power to lift us up where we are face to face with Him, that it becomes truth to us. To know the truth is not to acquire bits of information, but to meet God. A series of propositions or rules, whatever the 'authorities' may say about them, will not save us by themselves; and if we put them in the place of the Living God, they may damn us: we may find ourselves worshipping the creature instead of the Creator, which is idolatry.

IV. God's Purpose

More important still, perhaps, the history of the canon of the Bible shows us not only how God works among men, but why He works. He gives us the Bible, not in order that we may find in it general truths or rules of conduct, as if we could extract the kernel and might then throw away the husk. Jesus, says Dodd (op. cit., p. 291), 'is Saviour and Reconciler even before He is Revealer'.

'If any one is in Christ, he is a new creation; the old has passed away, behold, the new has come. All this is from God, who through Christ reconciled us to himself' (2 Cor. 5.17f, R.S.V.). God's will is reconciliation, atonement, or in a word unity. But we must take care lest we apprehend the unity of things in God too easily. The unity of the Bible is not a smooth uniformity: it does not lie on the surface, so that we can apprehend it without an effort: it is at a height or at a depth far removed from our ordinary experiences and aspirations. It is in the will of God, who is over all, and in all; before time began, He was; and at the end of the days He will appear as He is, and all that survive that appearing will be purified and transformed or fulfilled in the light of His glory. It is not by cherishing some favourite dogmas, but by trying honestly and patiently to grasp

[1] C. H. Dodd, op. cit., p. 221.

His purpose in its concrete entirety and to make it our own, that we may hope to come face to face with Him. It is not enough to keep conning a few favourite passages, or quoting oft-quoted texts; that is to be like a lazy actor who learns his own speeches in the play, but pays no attention to the rest of it. God addresses Himself to our imagination as well as to our mind and heart; it appears that He chooses to do His work in us by simple stories as well as by lessons and commandments, and we must be ready to read like little children. We must condescend, as a religious obligation, to take pleasure in pictures of Bedouin wandering from one water-hole to another, or in the astounding feats of Samson, or in the pastoral idyll of Ruth.

God's purpose is far beyond the adding of bits of information to what we know already, or the improving of our conduct here and there. It is to reconcile us to Himself by meeting us where we are, by changing us inwardly, by lifting up our lives into His own, and by bringing our wills into harmony with His will. We use the Bible rightly, not by picking out from it statements that will confirm us in the opinions or convictions we hold already, but by submitting our lives to His obedience and by opening our hearts to His mercy and judgment. His purpose is not to correct and improve, but to remake; not to bind us, but to set us at liberty, the liberty that is to be found only, and always, where the Spirit of the Lord is. 'And we all, with veiled face, beholding the glory of the Lord, are being changed into his likeness from one degree of glory to another; for this comes from the Lord who is the Spirit' (2 Cor. 3.18, R.S.V.).

GNOSIS AND REVELATION IN THE BIBLE AND IN CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT

by The Rev. Professor ALAN RICHARDSON

The nineteenth-century revolution in historical method and its application to the study of the Bible rendered necessary a complete re-statement of the doctrine of revelation. No longer was it possible to hold a doctrine of revelation as given in propositional form at the dictation of the Holy Spirit. The object of this paper is to ask what is the biblical conception of revelation and how it can best be expressed and understood in the light of modern thought. We will begin with a very brief and necessarily inadequate summary of what the Bible means by 'revelation'.

At the outset we must note that the New Testament does not use 'revelation' in quite the way in which we frequently use it. With us the word often refers to the historical revelation culminating in Christ; we are looking backwards. The New Testament writers, however, are usually looking forwards; for them revelation is primarily a future event—the ἀποκάλυψις of the Lord Jesus Christ at the end of the Age (e.g. 1 Cor. 1.7; 2 Thess. 1.7; 1 Pet. 1.7, 4.13; etc.). The event of the Parousia is the only occasion of which the word ἀποκάλυψις can be used without qualification. Until that day every revelation or unveiling of the truth is also a veiling of it; now we see ἐν αἰνίγματι, as in a mirror, but then face to face (1 Cor. 13.12). There are, however, two passages at least in which ἀποκαλύπτειν is used of historical revelation vouchsafed to the prophets: 1 Pet. 1.10-12 and Rom. 16.25. Revelation, it is here said, was given to the prophets through the Spirit of Christ, and although they did not understand its meaning at the time, that meaning is now made clear to those who hear the preaching of the Gospel and to whom the Holy Spirit brings the illumination of faith. It would thus seem right to say that the New Testament position is that revelation has been given in history but that it requires the inner illumination of the Holy Spirit to awaken the faith by

which alone in this Age the revelation can be truly received or understood. All revelation in history is given ἐν αἰνίγματι, even the revelation in Jesus Christ Himself: God's supreme act of unveiling was also a veiling of His δόξα, since the naked light of His brightness would have blinded our eyes, had it not been that of His gracious goodness He condescended to veil it in the humanity which Christ took from the Virgin Mary His Mother. Every historical revelation is at the same time a veiling, and the veil can be penetrated only by the eyes of faith. Thus, when men without faith look at the historical Jesus they do not see what Christians see; they see only the form of a servant and do not behold the royal dignity of the Son of God. Historical revelation is thus contrasted with the revelation of the Parousia as faith is contrasted with sight; here we see by faith but only ἐν αἰνίγματι; then 'we shall see him even as he is' (1 John 3.2)—and not only 'we', but all mankind: 'every eye shall see him, and they which pierced him' (Rev. 1.7).

Let us turn from revelation to consider the biblical teaching concerning our knowledge of God. In view of what we have seen to be the conception of revelation we would expect the biblical writers to be hesitant about making large claims to know God. This in fact is precisely what we find. The biblical attitude is strongly contrasted with the sanguine confidence of the Greek mind in its own ability to 'know all mysteries and all knowledge'. 'Canst thou by searching find out God?' asks Job (11.7), expecting the answer No. The God of the Bible is the hidden God (Isa. 45.15, etc.) who is made known to men not as He is in Himself but in His mighty works; even in His self-disclosure He remains hidden and mysterious, far beyond the range of searching human eyes. As the prophets see the matter, the important and hopeful thing is that God knows Israel, not that Israel knows God. Indeed, the constant refrain of the prophets is that Israel does not know God: 'The ox knoweth his owner and the ass his master's crib; but Israel doth not know, my people doth not consider' (Isa. 1.3). Nor do the prophets themselves claim that they personally know God; C. H. Dodd says that he cannot discover a single place where a prophet expressly says that he knows God.[1] God's knowledge of man is fundamental and certain, but man's knowledge of God

[1] *Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel*, p. 163.

is problematical, an aspiration rather than an achievement.

Yet, though this is true, it must also be stressed that the Bible insists on the possibility of man's knowledge of God. Israel ought to have known God; even the heathen who know Him not and call not upon His name are censured by Jeremiah for their ignorance (Jer. 10.25). Mankind should have known God's everlasting power and divinity through His works of creation. The reason why men do not know God is their rebellion against His righteous will and disobedience to His known law. In other words, the knowledge of God which is possible to man results from obedience to His will. Knowledge of God comes not by *θεωρία*, the intellectual or even mystical contemplation of His being and attributes, for such vision is not possible in this life: it comes rather by 'hearing', that is, in Hebrew thought, 'obeying'. When Hosea declares that God desires 'the knowledge of God more than burnt offerings' (Hos. 6.6), he means, of course, obedience to God's moral law. To know God means, quite simply, to obey His will. Jeremiah expresses the matter exactly in the words which he addresses to the son of good King Josiah: 'Did not thy father eat and drink (i.e. prosper), and do judgment and justice? then it was well with him. He judged the cause of the poor and needy; then it was well. Was not this to know me? saith Jehovah' (Jer. 22.15f). Though he calls for righteousness, Jeremiah despairs of its attainment because he perceives that the heart of man is deceitful above all things and is desperately sick (17.9), yet he looks forward to the day when God shall give to men a new heart, an obedient heart, when it will no longer be necessary to say 'Know the LORD, for they shall all know me' (31.34).

It is the claim of the New Testament writers that this new heart, or new obedience, has been made possible for mankind through the establishment of the new covenant of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. He has brought to mankind a righteousness not our own (cf. Phil. 3.9), a righteousness of faith (Rom. 3.22, etc.). Because of this gift of righteousness (Rom. 5.17), a new knowledge of God is possible. Disobedient Gentiles, who did not know God, have now been brought to obedience and therefore to the knowledge of God (Gal. 4.8f, etc.). This knowledge of God, which comes by the obedience of faith (Rom. 1.5, etc.), is not *θεωρία*: it is an entering into relations of trust and

commitment upon the basis of obedience to God's will. It is not so much knowledge *about* God as knowledge *of* God, although it is clear that there cannot be knowledge of a person without a certain knowledge about Him. Knowledge *about* God is, however, entirely secondary from the biblical point of view; it is derived from a personal relation of faith and obedience towards a personal will and cannot exist apart from this personal relationship. Compared with this knowledge, all the reasoning about God which may be accepted by the intellect, even though it is elaborated into a great theological system and geared into a total world-view, is merely second-hand and derivative. It constitutes the spheres of 'creed', 'system' and 'philosophy'. It is indeed necessary that the implications of our knowledge of God should thus be worked out in systems of theology, apologetics and philosophy, but these things, though often mistaken for it, are no substitutes for the faith and obedience by which we have knowledge of God Himself.

The question now arises how this knowledge of God, which comes through personal commitment to God's revelation of His will, is to be expressed and communicated in the thought-forms of a particular age. This question is perhaps the most difficult and urgent one which confronts theologians today, because between the biblical period and our own there has occurred the greatest revolution in men's ways of thinking that has taken place in all human history. The rise of modern science in the seventeenth century has transformed man's whole attitude to the world and his whole conception of his relation to it. Before the scientific revolution the natural way of expressing man's relation to reality was in the form of mythopoeic thinking—at least for all except the very few who were trained in the disciplines of philosophy. Even the philosophers, it might be claimed, were engaged upon the task of rationalising the prevailing myths of their civilisations. But since the scientific revolution there has grown up, even amongst the masses in the industrial civilisations of today, an entirely new attitude based on the acceptance of a new dogma or assumption, namely, that any truth which can be known to be true must be capable of verification by means of the method employed in the natural sciences. This dogma is rationalised in the widely accepted philosophy known as positivism or scientific humanism. According to this school of

thought, scientific method is the only method by which we ever learn anything. It follows from this basic dogma that all religion is mere 'opinion' and that all mythological forms of thinking must be discarded in a scientific age. It is to meet the challenge of this situation that Bultmann has brought forward his proposal to 'demythologise' the Gospel in order that the *kerygma* of the New Testament might be proclaimed to men of the twentieth century without the adventitious *skandalon* of its mythological setting.

Now it is clear from our analysis of the biblical conceptions of revelation and of the knowledge of God that they must be rejected as wholly illusory by anyone who accepts the positivistic dogma that truth is only that which can be demonstrated by the scientific method of the natural sciences. For the Bible speaks of a personal or subjective knowledge of God which comes by an act of faith, commitment and obedience, and in the nature of the case the doubting, uncommitted and objective attitude of the scientist cannot lead to such knowledge. This need not surprise us, if we take the Bible seriously, for, as we have shown, the Bible does not encourage us to suppose that the ultimate mystery of God and the universe can be laid open to the inspection of the scientific intellect. In respect of ultimate truth the word which St. Augustine derived from Isaiah 7.9 still stands, 'If ye will not believe, ye shall not understand; *intellectus* is the reward of faith' (*In Joan. Evang.* xxix.6). But this consideration, though true, does not help us greatly in the task of apologetics; to convince a scientific age that there is another road to truth than that of scientific inquiry requires more than the unsupported assertion that knowledge can be reached in subjectivity as well as in objectivity. What is required is nothing less than a new statement of what we mean by revelation, since the traditional concept has been rendered incredible by the development of the scientific method in the sphere of historical and literary criticism.

What is the alternative to truth as it is known by the pursuit of the natural sciences? How did men express their awareness of God or of ultimate truth in the days before the scientific revolution, or even in the days before the Greeks had invented philosophy and the medieval world had developed it? The answer, of course, is that they expressed their awareness of

reality in the form of mythopoeic thought. This is a form of thinking—and this word must be given its full meaning—which expresses itself in myth, that is, in non-literalistic or pictorial images and parables capable of communicating an awareness of the significance of the world in which man finds himself. Myth in this sense must be carefully distinguished from legend, saga, fable and fairy-tale (*Märchen*). Nor is it to be identified with mythology, for mythology, though it doubtless stems from basic myths, is a proliferation of true myth into a complicated and rather intangible web of legends, hero-tales, fables and folk-memories. As Henri Frankfort and others have pointed out, mythopoeic thought has its own logic, its own mental discipline. It resembles poetry in that it makes use of imagery, and, moreover, imagery which is inseparable from the thought which it conveys; just as one cannot paraphrase a poem and say that its meaning is this or this, because the thought is so completely married to the words, so we cannot completely articulate the meaning of myth in philosophical or scientific language. We can only apprehend its meaning as it captures our imagination and we ourselves begin to live it. This, of course, is a very difficult thing for a modern man to do with an ancient myth; but there are modern myths as well as ancient ones, so that the experience is not entirely beyond our capacity. Though mythopoeic thought is the only type of thinking about the universe and its meaning of which primitive man is capable, it would be a mistake to suppose that it is only primitive peoples who think mythopoeically. The masses of the people in every age, including our own, think in this way, and it is only the comparatively few who are capable of applying rational or scientific criticism to the ideological myths of their own age. As with all ideology, those who are subject to the myths of their time are entirely unconscious of their character as myth. Obvious examples of myths which have been widely influential in the twentieth century would be, to name only a few, the superiority of Aryan man, the classless society, the American way of life, the welfare state, the century of the common man. Like all myths, ancient and modern, these too have a self-realising efficacy; it is not necessary that they should be true, but only that people should believe them. Then they will begin to come true. There is in all myth, as Charles Smyth has said,

an element of realised eschatology. The hoped-for future breaks into the present and realises itself in it. Myth thus has the capacity of giving to the insignificant, nameless little man a sense of his own dignity and importance amidst the great impersonal forces which enslave and overwhelm him. He therefore comforts himself by the cosy warmth of the myth all the more eagerly as the cold, harsh facts of the world crowd in upon him and threaten his security.

Thus an essential function of myth is to invest the individual with a sense of belonging to a greater whole, in relation to which his life has a meaning and his person possesses status. This is so even in a banausic and imagination-starved civilisation and it is true even of the tawdry myths which are exploited for their own sinister purposes by dictators, propagandists and demagogues. But it is a thousand times more true of the full-blooded myths of genuinely primitive societies, in which the individual is related to reality as an 'I' is related to a 'thou'. For primitive man, as Frankfort says,[1] there is no such things as an inanimate world; he confronts a living 'Thou' in nature, a 'Thou' which reveals itself in all his experience and whose revelation is enshrined in myth. Of course, we know that no development of human thought was possible in the direction of philosophy and science until the pre-Socratics had learnt to think in a new way and to suggest that reality might be water or fire or earth, and not the gods of water, fire and earth. But with every gain in the development of abstract thought, there is necessarily also loss, the loss of the sense of wholeness and of the awareness of oneself as a part of the whole. Hence it is that myths survive and do not fade away when civilisation develops and progress in abstract thinking is made. They compensate the individual for his loss of the sense of belonging to the whole and possessing status and meaning in it. Civilisations do not outgrow myth, though they may outgrow a particular mythology; they repress it, and it forces its way into consciousness again in ideological and semi-religious forms. Sometimes, indeed, the myth is restated and made the basis of a particular religious cult which offers salvation to its individual adherents or initiates.

Thus, according to Bultmann, there was current in the Hel-

[1] *Before Philosophy* (Penguin Books), p. 14.

lenistic world at the beginning of the Christian era a prevalent myth which he calls 'the Gnostic myth'. A Heavenly Man had been cast out of the world of light, either because he had been defeated by some adversary or because of some transgression on his part of the heavenly law. He had fallen down into the lower world of matter and his original unity had been smashed into a myriad fragments which had become enmeshed or entombed in matter; these fragments are now the souls of men and women, imprisoned in their earthly bodies. A second Man from Heaven comes down to earth to bring salvation; he assumes a disguise in order to conceal his identity from the daemonic rulers of this world. He communicates to those whom he will save a secret *gnosis* by which at death they can escape the planetary guardians of the world and find their way back into the heavenly sphere, the world of light. Whether Bultmann has produced evidence of the prevalence of this myth in the first century may be doubted, since all his first-century evidence is drawn from the New Testament itself, which is the very document which he calls in the myth to explain; but this is not at the moment our chief concern. In his *Theology of the New Testament* Bultmann believes that he has traced the development of the primitive Christian *kerygma* from its original background of fantastic Jewish apocalyptic to its ultimate emergence in Gnostic garb in second-century Catholicism. In order that this *kerygma* should be able to speak its saving message to the men of the twentieth century as it spoke to those of the first and second centuries, Bultmann proposes to demythologise it, that is, to strip it of its mythological form and thus to show to the modern world the true significance of the Christian Gospel.

It is not, however, our purpose here to examine Bultmann's proposal or conclusions in detail. We are concerned rather with the way in which he has raised the question of the mythopoeic expression of biblical truth, since this is a question which must be faced and answered if we are to reach a new and more satisfactory doctrine of the nature of biblical revelation. The Bible, including the New Testament, as Bultmann has emphasised, was written in a mythopoeic age by men and for men whose only means of expressing and communicating truth was under the forms of myth and picture-language. Unless we learn to read and speak this language the Bible will appear to us, as

it does to so many of our contemporaries, as nothing more than a collection of folk-memories and fairy-tales. If the men of the Bible were aware of an alternative method of seeking and expressing ultimate truth, such as the method of Greek philosophy, they rejected it utterly. Though such a view would have surprised the liberal critics of a generation ago, it seems to us today that the Book of Ecclesiastes expresses the final biblical word upon the question of pride of knowledge, which for the preacher is the most insidious and most hollow of all the pretensions of human vanity. As St. Paul would have put it, *gnosis* puffeth up and human *sophia* is foolishness with God. If God does not reveal Himself, the mystery of His being cannot be penetrated by the reason of the philosopher or the method of the scientist. It therefore behoves us to consider very carefully the question of the expression of the truth or the biblical revelation under the forms of the imagination or of mythopoeic thinking.

Myth in its purest sense is the form in which primitive man seeks to express his awareness of and relation to reality; and, furthermore, it gives rise to forms of activity or of ritual behaviour which bring about the ideal relationship with reality which the myth enshrines. This definition, which is correct as far as it goes, needs a certain qualification in the light of what we have said above, because it is not only primitive men in whom myth is thus operative. It would be better to say that myth is a basic and universal form of expression of man's awareness of reality and his relationship to it; mankind never outgrows mythopoeic thought, although a kind of sophistication arises during the development of civilisation which leads men to repress it and then to remain in ignorance of its vital activity in the subconscious mind of society. It is ready to be called into activity the moment that a demagogue arises to exploit it. Myth is in fact the means by which society in any age expresses its awareness of value and significance; but its pure and unobscured working can be seen best in primitive societies. Thus, if we want to know the relation between biblical thought and basic human mythopoeic thinking, we must study the Old Testament against its environment of myth and ritual amongst the surrounding peoples of the Fertile Crescent. We shall in all probability find some very surprising and significant facts, which

may well turn out to be signposts for our further investigations. The subject is vast and complicated, and here we can do no more than indicate where these signposts are likely to be found.

The first thing that we are likely to discover is that the Old Testament has taken over the mythopoeic imagery of the surrounding tribes and demythologised it. The precise steps by which this revolutionary process was carried through are by no means clear and will doubtless remain a matter for investigation and debate amongst Old Testament scholars for a long time to come. But the fact remains that the religious literature of Israel, as we now have it in our Old Testaments, is utterly different from that of its environment. The religion which it presents is no longer that of the so-called 'cultic pattern' of the Near East. It is true that much of the imagery and the language of Old Testament religion is borrowed from the mythology of the fertility-cults of the surrounding nations: all the elements of the ritual drama of the king's ascension and enthronement at the New Year festival, his conflict with and defeat of the powers of Chaos, the Sea, the Flood, his ritual marriage to his queen or priestess, and all the rest of the ceremony without which, it was held, the crops would not grow, the population would not multiply and the cows would not calve—all these mythological elements are found over and over again in the imagery and language of the Old Testament. After all, the Word of God, as the prophetic religion of Israel understood it, had to be expressed in the thought-forms and language of the age and had to be clothed in the everyday garments of an actual society. We need not be surprised at this if we reflect upon the fact that the biblical revelation culminates in the incarnation of the divine Word. The important point is that the old mythology from which the imagery is borrowed is completely and utterly transcended. We should exercise the greatest caution in allowing ourselves to speak of 'myths' in the Old Testament—in Genesis or in the Psalms, for example—because the Creation and Flood Stories or the so-called Ascension Psalms are not myths at all in the truly primitive sense of the word. In making use of the mythopoeic imagery of the Near East the biblical writers have stood the old myths on their head and employed them in the service of a totally different conception of the relation of God and man.

The biblical creation stories, for example, were not composed (as we find them in the Bible) for recitation in a magical fertility festival: they show, not how God can be made to serve the purposes of men, but how men are utterly dependent upon God and are responsible before Him for every word and deed. The completeness of the inversion of the old myths can be clearly perceived if we meditate upon the two statements, 'The king is god' and 'God is king'. Once this demythologising revolution has taken place, even the great prophets of Israel—the Second Isaiah, for instance—feel no difficulty in making use of the images of the old myth, such as that of the divine king and his conflict with the primeval Chaos. Once the corruptions of the high places had been brought to an end, the images could be used without fear of a relapse into paganism; after the ritual of Baal-worship has ceased, the myth itself has no potency. It follows from such considerations as these that we should cease to speak of any part of the biblical literature as the work of a 'primitive' mind. The J narrator, for example, has carried through a profound and far-reaching criticism of the primitive myth-ritual pattern, and, judged purely in the light of 'history of religion' standards, must be accounted an advanced thinker.

The second conclusion at which we are likely to arrive will doubtless be developed in answer to the question how it was that Israel, alone amongst the nations of the ancient world, achieved the revolution of demythologisation which we have described. The answer can be only that it resulted from Israel's encounter with God in her history. Why this divine-human encounter should have taken place only in Israel is a question that we must now leave to the dogmatic theologians. The fact is that Israel came to the knowledge of God through the obedience of her prophets to God's will as it was expressed in His mighty acts. Doubtless the events of the Exodus from Egypt were of decisive importance in the matter, for it would seem that we must agree with the biblical verdict that 'there hath not arisen a prophet since in Israel like unto Moses' (Deut. 34.10). Whether it was Moses or not, someone perceived the parallelism between God's work in the Creation, when He slew the hostile powers of the Sea and the Flood and by a mighty act of salvation assured the orderly life of mankind on the earth, and His work in the redemption of Israel at the Exodus, when

by another mighty act of salvation at the Red Sea he brought His people into the Promised Land of their inheritance. How daring was the assertion that God's act of Creation, when He made the world, was only the type of which His new creation of a people peculiar to Himself was the antitype. This was probably the decisive insight of biblical prophetic religion and from it the whole theology of the Bible is developed. It ensured that the whole pattern of biblical thinking would be typological, not with a merely literary typology which plays upon words and texts, but with a genuinely historical typology, that is, a discerning of real correspondences between the mighty acts of God in the different epochs of Israel's history. As the great Creation-Act of salvation was a type that was fulfilled in the Exodus, so the Second Isaiah sees the deliverance from Babylon as a new antitype of which the Exodus itself was the type, and furthermore he is able to look forward to the coming of a supreme, eschatological Antitype which would both fulfil and transcend all the types which Israel's history had contained.

We are now in a position to suggest a third conclusion which may perhaps be drawn from such considerations; it concerns the character of the imagery of the Bible. This is drawn in large measure from the mythological images of the Near East, as we have seen; but it is no longer mythological in the primitive sense. Unlike the nature-religions which the primitive myth-ritual pattern expressed, the religion of Israel, as we have said, was a historical religion. It was based on the mighty acts of God in Israel's history. Its essence was *kerygma*, the proclamation of these mighty acts of God, and all the imagery and ritual of the religion of Israel were gradually purged of all their associations with the Baal-worship of Canaan so that the myth could be used in dramatic or liturgical re-enactment of this *kerygma*. It spoke the language—the only language—which men understood, the basic human language which people of all ages, except the sophisticated, can understand. But it was no longer myth; it was the poetic, dramatic, liturgical and imaginative presentation of historical truth in its relation to the fundamental existence of men and women in every age of history. 'Thus saith the LORD, the King of Israel, and his Redeemer, the LORD of hosts'—of course the language has its roots in the ancient myth of the divine king-redeemer: 'fear ye not, neither be

afraid: have I not declared unto thee of old, and shewed it? and ye are my witnesses' (Isa. 44.6, 8). 'The LORD reigneth . . . thy throne is established of old . . . the floods lift up their waves . . . the LORD on high is mighty' (Ps. 93). The language of the myth is being used, but now it is the vehicle of the prophetic conception of the holiness and transcendence of God. We can speak, and indeed we must speak, in philosophical abstractions like 'holiness' and 'transcendence', but the Bible does not deal in abstractions of this or any other kind; its language is not the language of the philosophical consciousness but of the human heart.

We may now at last return to the New Testament and the question of the form of the revelation of which it is the record. We find that, like the Old Testament, it is concerned primarily with *kerygma*, since its main theme is God's mighty act in history. It uses the imaginative language which the Old Testament has fashioned as the means of expressing and communicating the *kerygma* of God's dealings with Israel. It, too, uses the language of the ancient myth, but its theme is not a myth in any sense of the word. It is debatable whether or how far its imagery is drawn from the so-called Gnostic myth, if such a thing was indeed current in the Hellenistic world; but it is certain that its imagery is drawn from the Old Testament redeployment of the ancient Oriental myth. The anointed King goes to His crowning and to His Ascension, and as He does so all the leading Old Testament types are fulfilled and transcended. He is the Messiah present in history, in the flesh, of the First Isaiah and of the royal Psalms, but He is also the Servant-Messiah of the Second Isaiah, a new Moses who suffers for His people whom He leads by a new Exodus into their land of promise; and He is also the divine Conqueror of the powers of the darkness of this world who receives a kingdom and the dominion and the glory, which will be revealed at the revelation of the Son of Man at the end of the Age. Can it seriously be maintained that the New Testament imagery is derived from any Hellenistic myth in face of the obvious typological nexus which binds the New Testament to the Old? Have we not in the New Testament an inspired synthesis and transformation of that Old Testament imagery which itself had already demythologised the Oriental myth?

If this line of thought is true at all, it is clear that it is a mistake to think that we must demythologise the New Testament, for the essence of the New Testament is not myth but *kerygma*, that is, testimony to what God has actually done in history. Because God's acts in history cannot be described by historians in the way that they describe the actions of earthly kings and statesmen, the form of the revelation cannot be written down in straightforward historical narrative like Caesar's *Gallic War*. God's acts are so intimately bound up with their meaning that apart from the apprehension of their meaning they are invisible or, as we said earlier, apart from faith there is no apprehension of the revelation. The *kerygma* is expressed and communicated in images, not in abstract conceptual terms, because its comprehension requires not an act of intellect alone but also an act of will—the trust and obedience which we have already seen to be in the biblical view the only means by which men can attain the knowledge of God. Once we have discarded the dogma that scientific knowledge is the only kind of truth, we shall realise that the imagination, using the word in such a way as to include the act of will, is the only means by which ultimate or existential truth can be apprehended and communicated. Our 'problem of communication', therefore, in a scientific and technological age cannot be solved by demythologising the Gospel and presenting it in the form of an abstract philosophical proposition or even in the form of an existentialist *gnosis*, but only by re-humanising the victims of a banausic civilisation and teaching them to think in the forms of the imagination once again.

It would follow from the preceding line of approach, if it should be considered valid at all, that those who in the second half of the twentieth century are concerned with the task of Christian apologetics will have to concentrate upon showing the possibility of a knowledge of God as the Bible understands such knowledge. It must be shown that this kind of ultimate knowledge is not of the order of the knowledge that is obtained by means of the method of natural science, nor can it be communicated by the techniques of scientific education. The knowledge of God is communicated in the same way as it is apprehended, that is, through obedience to and trust in the personal will of God in the tasks of everyday life; it requires an act of

personal commitment to a personal will, the response of an 'I' to a 'Thou'. The knowledge thus gained, like all truly personal knowledge, can be expressed only in the imaginative representation of the biblical *kerygma*. When this is understood, the nature of the biblical revelation will be more clearly apparent, for this revelation consists in the expression of kerygmatic truth under the forms of the imagination. Then, in all probability, the biblical typology will be seen to be the strongest apologetic argument for the truth of the revelation; it will constitute a twentieth-century restatement of the old argument from prophecy, which before the rise of modern biblical criticism was the most effective weapon in the armoury of the Christian apologist. For it will be seen that all the insights and all the longings of mankind, as expressed in the basic and truly universal forms of human mythopoeic thinking, find their fulfilment and answer in the person of the One who is proclaimed in the biblical *kerygma* as the incarnate Word of God. And the finally convincing miracle and mystery of the biblical revelation will be seen to consist in this, that all the long lines of human insight and adumbration, stretching far back as they do into the remote ages of primitive man, meet, not in some laboured and artificial compound, but in the gracious figure of Jesus of Nazareth, who speaks our human language and wears our human garments so perfectly that only the eye of faith can penetrate the mystery of who He is.

PAPIAS AND THE FOUR GOSPELS

by RUPERT ANNAND

THE object of this essay is to offer for consideration a new way of translating the fragment of Papias' Preface quoted by Eusebius, in the belief that it may show that Papias was indeed 'a man of the primitive age' (*ἀρχαῖος ἀνήρ*), who flourished about A.D. 80, and whose 'Interpretation' did not deal with Matthew's Gospel, still less with Luke's, because the First and Third Evangelists had not published their works when he wrote.

In introducing his *Interpretation of the Messianic Oracles* to his patron, Papias, I suggest, wrote as follows (Eusebius H.E.3 39):

To confirm the correctness of my interpretations, I shall not fail to link up with them for you, *first*, all the sayings which I ever learnt carefully from the Elders (Disciples) and carefully drew from my memory. For, unlike the majority, I did not delight in those who have many clever things to say, but in those who teach what is true; not in those who recall the teachings of another (Paul?) but in those who repeat the teachings given to the Faith by the Lord and springing from the Truth itself.

And, again, if anyone came who had consorted with the Elders (Disciples), I used to ask him about the sayings of the Elders (Disciples)—what Andrew or Peter had said, or Philip or Thomas, or James or John or Matthew or any other of the Lord's followers.

And thirdly (*I shall link up with my interpretations*) things which Aristion and John the Elder (Disciple), followers of the Lord, say. For I have always thought to get more help from a surviving eyewitness than from *the Books* (i.e. 'The Old Testament'; *not* 'from books').

So much for the quotation. The reader will note that I have followed J. Vernon Bartlet[1] (and J. A. Kleist[2]) in assuming that Papias used 'elders' to mean 'disciples of the Lord' regardless of whether they were Apostles or not. This corresponds to the primitive use of the title found in Acts 11.30 and Acts 21.18 ('Paul went in with us unto James; and all the *elders* were present') and was the title claimed by the author of 2 John and 3 John; these were 'the grand old men' as the Church in the

[1] Article on 'Papias' in *Dict. of Christ and the Gospels*.
[2] J. A. Kleist, 'Papias' in *Ancient Christian Writers*, Vol. 6.

eighties and nineties remembered them, the original disciples, some of whom Papias himself had known.

What I would specially draw attention to in my translation is the grammatical possibility that ἅτε 'Αριστ. κτλ. may depend upon συγκατατάξαι in the opening sentence; then καὶ ὅσα . . . is picked up by εἰ δέ που καὶ . . . and later by ἅτε 'Αρ., thus linking Papias' three sources of information.

It seems that Eusebius missed the significance of καὶ ὅσα παρὰ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων, taking it to mean 'sayings derived from the elders'. Being a careful historian, Eusebius attempted to correct the tradition of Irenaeus that Papias had been the hearer of John the Evangelist by introducing the extract from Papias' Preface with these words:

> Yet Papias himself, according to the Preface of his writings, makes it clear that he had in no way been a hearer and eyewitness of the holy Apostles but teaches that he had received the traditions of the faith from those who had known them. (Then follows the extant passage from Papias already quoted.)

Eusebius naturally did not consider that the Fourth Evangelist might have been a John other than the son of Zebedee, the Apostle; and so he never realised that Irenaeus meant that the Fourth Evangelist whom Papias indeed knew was John the Elder, of Ephesus. Thus, once and for all, Irenaeus is relieved of the charge of stupidity and carelessness, and Eusebius of prejudice against Papias; for both wrote the truth as they believed.

Eusebius goes on to discuss the question of the two Johns in Asia; and then, commenting, I believe, on the second part of the passage he had quoted from Papias' Preface, he wrote:

> The Papias with whom we are now dealing admits that he had received the sayings of the Apostles from their followers but claims that he was a hearer of Aristion and the Elder John.

That this is a direct reference back by Eusebius to the passage quoted seems proved by the way he contrasts Papias' sources, setting the two eyewitnesses Papias had known himself against the Apostles, whose traditions Eusebius said he had received second-hand. This surely suggests that Eusebius did not give the Papias passage the meaning we give it today, when we translate it as if Papias gained his information about Aristion and John by inquiries from 'those who had consorted with the

Elders'. In this then I would argue that Eusebius got nearer to Papias' original meaning than we do. The passage is far from clear in the Greek; if my suggested re-punctuation is accepted, we see why Eusebius interpreted it as he did, and also we see re-emerging the stylistic balance of Papias' two explanatory clauses ('*For* unlike the majority . . . *For* I have always thought . . . '). Papias, possibly, achieved the effect of an elaborate formal Preface; but, unfortunately, in doing so, he left his meaning obscure.

And there is another reason to suspect that there is something wrong with the accepted English translation of this passage. It was natural, if it was true, for Papias to boast that, in quoting the Disciples who were dead, he would provide as much supporting evidence for his interpretations as he could, both first-hand and second-hand. But surely if there were original eye-witnesses alive when he wrote, of whom he knew Aristion and John (the Elder) the Disciple, he would not also have taken the trouble to mention that he had collected their sayings from others, as our current translations make him.

If the paraphrase I have offered is grammatically possible, there are several conclusions to be drawn from it, for example about Papias' date of writing. It has so far been generally supposed that Papias wrote late in life round about A.D. 130, drawing on the traditions he had gathered as a young man in the eighties and nineties of the first century. But now it seems that Papias wrote his preface in the lifetime of Aristion and John the Disciple.

This surely means it was before A.D. 100 and puts him back into the age when it is likely that the Gospels of Luke, Matthew and John were being written. Indeed Papias was, it seems, not merely their contemporary but their forerunner; for I shall in due course try to show first that the several verbal echoes between Papias' fragments and Luke's Preface (which have been noticed before but never explained) can best be understood by the theory that Papias was the earlier writer; and secondly I shall maintain that Luke was referring specially to him rather than to Mark when he mentioned his predecessors.

As for Papias' comments on Mark and Matthew, the new theory of Papias' early date (as we shall see) appears to clear away a number of difficulties without raising new problems.

Luke's Gospel was not in existence when Papias wrote, nor was Matthew's. And so all that Eusebius could find to quote about Luke and Matthew was Papias' short reference to Matthew's collection of the Oracles in Aramaic. But more of this later.

At this stage I would remind the reader that J. V. Bartlet and J. Donovan (the latest scholars, as far as I know, to publish the results of a full examination of the writings of Papias) were satisfied that Papias wrote not later than A.D. 110. Both Bartlet and Donovan believed that Papias was older than his friend Polycarp (born A.D. 69) and probably a man of forty by A.D. 100. So I feel it is not altogether rash to move his date of writing back from A.D. 110 to the eighties or nineties.

And what of the Christian community in Asia in which Papias lived? Evidently when he wrote his preface he found himself one of a minority and slightly old-fashioned in his views, as Bartlet argued. I would suggest that when Papias wrote bitterly of those who had so much to say and whose traditions did not apparently go back to Jesus Himself, he was referring to fellow Christians rather than to heretics. Indeed he makes such a point of claiming to rely on the traditions of the apostles that one seems to catch a hint of the old unhappy dissensions between the Judaisers of the Jerusalem Church and Paul. (Consider Papias' attack on 'those who recall the teaching of another'.)

And we see perhaps why Papias (though he lived in Asia where Paul's followers were many) apparently ignored Paul altogether if we remember that Papias was a thorough-going eschatologist, a Christian who looked forward confidently to the early return of Jesus and the end of the world.

Now if ever there was a time in the early days of the Church when men's desire was most keen to know the facts about the Second Coming, that time I suggest was in the twenty years that followed the fall of Jerusalem.

During the siege itself the hopes of the eschatologists—both Jews and Christians—must have been at their highest. But when the city fell, a period of disillusion followed. Yet, as we know, Christians survived the test of faith; some turned more and more to the mature teachings of Paul, while others found comfort in the belief that Jesus Himself had foretold the fall of Jerusalem and that the end was not yet.

With men's hopes so keen therefore, there was no reason for a man with scholarly ability like Papias, who had studied and collected material from those who had consorted with Andrew, Peter and other apostles, to refrain from writing till he was old, specially if he had a patron. And we know that Papias addressed the Preface of his *Interpretation of the Messiah's Oracles* to an unnamed reader.

At present there is no agreement about what these Oracles (or *Logia*) were: whether indeed they were Oracles by Jesus or about Jesus. At this point I would suggest only that it is reasonable to suppose that Papias used '*Logia*' in a technical sense to mean prophetic sayings with a hidden meaning as his friend and contemporary Polycarp did. For in Polycarp's letter to the Philippians we read: 'The man who misinterprets *the oracles of the Messiah*, to indulge in his own evil desires, and says there will be neither *resurrection* nor *judgment* is the first born of Satan.' Did Papias then write 'An Interpretation of Eschatological Prophecies'?

But, before going more deeply into the question of Papias' writings, I should like to turn to Luke's Preface and consider the proposition that Luke addressed it to Theophilus in the knowledge that his patron was already familiar with Papias' works.

First I would suggest that, when Luke guaranteed to his patron to write 'accurately and (*ἀκριβῶς καθεξῆς*) methodically, in detail', he had in mind Papias' quotation of the Elder's tradition about Mark (who had written, it appears, accurately but not methodically, in detail (*ἀκριβῶς . . . οὐ μέντοι τάξει*), a point to which I shall return later). Luke in fact was promising to avoid this error. This only proves that Luke knew the Elder's tradition and not that he had necessarily read Papias.

But secondly, where Papias claimed to have cross-examined those who had 'consorted with' the disciples, Luke used the same word (*παρηκολουθηκότι*) to claim that he had himself from his youth 'consorted with' all the eyewitnesses and those who became servants of the Word (i.e. Paul) (and hence he had better qualifications to write). The double coincidence confirms the link between Papias and Luke; and Luke's passage must be secondary because it illuminates Papias more than Papias explains Luke.

Admittedly the Greek in Luke is ambiguous; and the English versions, following Origen, translate the phrase differently to mean that Luke had 'followed all *things* accurately from the beginning'. (This translation both ignores the point of *ἀκριβῶς καθεξῆς* and misses the significance of *παρηκολουθηκότι*.)

Eusebius' two paraphrases of Luke's Preface do not support our current translation; for in Book 3 Chapter 4 Eusebius wrote of 'the Gospel which Luke testified that he had planned according to the tradition received by him from those who were from the beginning eyewitnesses and servants of the Word, *all of whom also he said he had consorted with from his youth. . . .*'

Again in Book 3 Chapter 24 Eusebius wrote: 'Many others having somewhat rashly tried to compose an outline (or *interpretation*) [cf. Papias' title: '*Interpretation* of the Messianic *Logia*'] of the sayings (or stories) which had been fulfilled,[1] Luke explained that he would necessarily free us of uncertain conjecture about the other sayings (or stories), by handing on in his own gospel the sure account about those things of which he had well received the truth, *having been helped by his close association with Paul and by his conversations with the rest of the apostles.*'

Both these passages from Eusebius give support to the view that Luke was not one of those who had merely 'followed all things carefully from the beginning' but rather one who had 'consorted with all the eyewitnesses *from his youth*'. (For this use of *ἄνωθεν* by Luke compare Acts 26.5.) [Consider also the Anti-Marcionite Prologue to Luke: 'Luke was a Syrian of Antioch, a doctor by profession, *a disciple of the Apostles and later a follower of Paul. . . .*']

I am conscious that in trying to read such an exact meaning into Luke's Preface I am challenging the position reached by the great scholar L. J. Cadbury thirty years ago, when he concluded: 'A study of the language of the Preface reveals the ambiguity and uncertainty of many words and phrases in it. Clear and precise deductions . . . throw much more weight upon the sentence than it was designed to bear.' And elsewhere Cadbury wrote: 'Luke has adopted a few quite obvious and

[1] Reading *ὧν πεπληροφόρηντο λόγων* and omitting *αὐτὸς* which I suggest was wrongly inserted here in early days by a careless copyist whose eye was caught by *ὧν αὐτὸς* two lines farther on. The full passage in Eusebius is: . . . *ὧν (αὐτὸς) πεπληροφόρητο λόγων, ἀναγκαίως ἀπαλλάττων ἡμᾶς τῆς περὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀμφηρίστου ὑπολήψεως, τὸν ἀσφαλῆ λόγον ὧν αὐτὸς ἱκανῶς τὴν ἀλήθειαν κατειλήφει . .* »

superficial literary conventions without carrying through his work the standards of composition which these affiliations might seem to imply.'

But even so Cadbury cannot account for the disappearance of all traces of the writings of gospel-making predecessors of Luke (save Mark and perhaps Matthew), and I would argue that Cadbury was mistaken when he categorically stated that the word πεπληροφορημένων (= 'completed' or 'fulfilled') could not refer to the fulfilment of prophecy. In fact Luke's metaphor is probably one of *business affairs* (πράγματα) which are wound up (i.e. completed).

Faced by the virtually untranslatable passage in Eusebius on Luke's Preface (which I have ventured to emend above), Kirsopp Lake was forced to conclude that the original meaning of this same word πεπληροφορημένων in Luke's Preface had been forgotten by the fourth century, when Eusebius wrote. Kirsopp Lake too, following Cadbury, did not admit the possibility that Luke's predecessors might have been concerned with the fulfilment of prophecy.

But there seems no simple explanation of why Eusebius accuses Luke's predecessors of attempting '*rather rashly*' to compose an outline of 'the sayings which had been fulfilled', unless Eusebius knew that Luke wrote with Papias' books in mind. If he did, the reason for Eusebius' supercilious reference to the predecessors is clear, for Eusebius' dislike of Papias' interest in prophecy and eschatology is well known. A minor point this but it may be important.

But who were the predecessors whom Luke had in mind? I suggest that he counted Papias, Aristion (see Eusebius on Papias' sources), Matthew with his collection of Oracles (not the Gospel), and possibly Mark, as we shall see. If there were others, they could have included those who collected Proof Texts from the Old Testament, compilers of lists rather than books, which J. Rendell Harris, F. C. Burkitt and others suggested were probably the earliest Christian writings to appear (apart of course from the letters of Paul).

If this is true, what Luke in his Preface promises his patron to do is not to cover the ground which has been well covered by previous writers but to put in writing other stories about Jesus which have never been put down before.

The paraphrase of Luke's Preface therefore which I would offer runs as follows: 'Plenty of writers have tried to compile an outline (or interpretation) of the affairs which have been concluded in our midst as they were handed on to us by those who were the original eyewitnesses and the ministers of the Word. And so, as I too consorted with all those men and women from my youth, I have decided to write for you, most excellent Theophilus, accurately and methodically, so that you may know the truth about (other) stories which you have heard but never seen in writing before.'[1]

If this interpretation is possible, it would of course lend support to the Proto-Luke theory—that Luke produced a first version of his Gospel which did not make any use of Mark. For here Luke seems to be promising to write down only new material.

But is there any evidence to show that this was Luke's original meaning? Though commentators mostly take the view that Theophilus had been instructed in the Christian faith (reading *κατηχήθης* in the later technical sense), there is no hint of this in Eusebius' paraphrase. The relevant passage (Book 3 Chapter 24) quoted above appears to support the translation of the Preface I have offered. ('Luke explained that he necessarily *freed us of uncertain conjecture about the other stories* (N.B. not "about the other *writers*") by handing on in his own gospel *the sure account*. . . .')

Again, in favour of my theory that Luke was not concerned with covering the same ground as his predecessors, I would point to the account of the Journey to Emmaus; here Luke, after opening the story in a detailed and leisurely way, summarily states that Jesus beginning at Moses and all the prophets expounded to Cleopas and the other 'the things concerning himself in all the Scriptures'. Surely this is the method of a writer who knew that the important information he summarised was already in writing and so well-known to his reader that it was not necessary to include it? And here again there is the hint that Luke's predecessors (unlike Luke himself)were concerned with prophecy and its fulfilment.

Let us now go on to consider Papias' attitude to Mark and

[1] Or perhaps alternatively 'you may know the truth about the stories which you have heard from informers'.

Matthew. The somewhat disparaging way in which he refers to them both was stressed by Lightfoot and has been the cause of much comment since. And as long as it is believed that Papias was a second-century writer, it is tempting to argue that Papias was indirectly defending another unnamed Gospel, either Luke or John, which he believed to be superior.

But now that it seems more probable that Papias wrote well before A.D. 100, a simpler explanation of his attitude is offered to us. Papias was a scholar and author in his own right who claimed, as so many writers do, to be able to give his readers a better book than anyone before him had written.

And in his limited field Papias may well have been right. For he said that he had known two of the original disciples of Jesus, one called Aristion and the other John. Irenaeus partly confirms this by calling him the hearer of John, a companion of Polycarp and one of the very early men (*ἀρχαῖος ἀνήρ*). Eusebius too, in spite of his dislike of Papias because of his interest in eschatology, admitted Papias' very early date.

J. V. Bartlet indeed made the interesting suggestion that Eusebius' distrust of Papias may have caused him to hold back from writing about Papias as long as possible; and that Papias' true chronological position may be earlier than the end of Eusebius' Book Three (i.e. Trajan's reign). Bartlet suggested that the historian dealt with him then only because he could not put it off any longer. I note in support of this view that Eusebius in this section does not describe his other early Church writers in historical order—e.g. he dealt with Ignatius and Polycarp before he mentioned the first epistle of Clement.

I suggest that Papias' date was in fact so early that Mark's account of Peter's teaching was to him merely a book; it had not attracted any of the prestige and sanctity which the Gospels won during the second century.

Papias, we must repeat, set out as his title shows to provide an Exposition of Messianic Prophecies. And so Papias can dismiss Mark's Gospel as no rival of his books because Peter had never aimed at making a compilation of the Lord's cryptic sayings, the *Logia*.

But if Papias in fact wrote well before A.D. 100, his own witness to the accuracy of Mark's account is now worth, I suggest,

nearly as much as the tradition of 'the Elder' (who was almost certainly the Disciple known at Ephesus as John).

As for Mark's lack of '*taxis*', this is surely unlikely to refer to a lack of chronological order, for the Christians of that age were not so much concerned with the Jesus who had lived as with the Jesus who was to return. Mark, as it were, gave them the headlines of the story but not all the details.

What the Disciple (or Elder) did was to point out that Mark had made many omissions in the Gospel story in writing down Peter's teaching to inquirers. And Papias explained this by saying that Mark could only give isolated events and not the whole story, because he had not heard Jesus nor followed Him personally. [Ironically enough, when John himself came to write, he ended by admitting that he had had to leave many things unsaid—see John 20.30.]

This is surely a very important piece of tradition. If Mark relied entirely on Peter, as Papias says, for what he had memorised of the record of Jesus, it must follow that this Mark was not the John Mark of Acts, the cousin of Barnabas. John Mark after all grew up in a Christian home in Jerusalem and Peter was only one of his contacts.

If then Peter's interpreter was a second Mark (who was wrongly identified with John Mark round about A.D. 220), it means that John called Mark, presumably a youth in Jerusalem at the time of the Crucifixion, may have been the Beloved disciple of the Fourth Gospel and the Disciple John whom Papias and Polycarp knew as an old man at Ephesus. But this is not the place to follow up this possibility further.

To return to Papias' attitude towards Mark and Matthew. The passage in Mark is long enough for us to draw some definite conclusions. We can for instance be reasonably sure that Eusebius took it from Papias' Preface because the key word *Logia* links it with Papias' own title. But the Matthew fragment is so brief that it may never be possible to demonstrate convincingly what the original meaning was. The word *Logia* seems to place it in some sort of relation to the Mark passage and so to the Preface of Papias. But we do not know whether, in the original, Papias was quoting a tradition of the Disciple (the Elder) or making a statement of his own. The vague setting which Eusebius gave it has suggested to some critics that he

himself did not understand Papias' remark: 'And about Matthew this was said: "Now Matthew indeed compiled the *Logia* in the Aramaic language, and each interpreted them as best he could".'

From all this we can claim as certain it seems at least one fact: that Papias stated that Matthew had made a *Syntaxis* (compilation) of *Logia* and that Mark had not.

I should like to suggest that Papias meant by *Syntaxis* something more than a plain collection of oracles or prophecies: he implied that linked with each prophecy was the story and proof of how that prophecy had been fulfilled.

To win over opponents proofs were needed. And so J. Rendell Harris argued that in early days Matthew had made some such collection of OT Messianic prophecies; and that a dozen of these testimonies are now embedded in 'Matthew's' Gospel and identifiable because they are translations from the Hebrew Testament and not from the Greek Septuagint. Critics of this theory of J. Rendell Harris have argued that these dozen, even including the stories in which they are set, would not have been enough to make a book. But why should we believe that the earliest Christian writings (apart from Paul's epistles) need have been anything more elaborate than single sheets or short treatises?

Apart from OT Testimonies there were prophecies of another type which would have been of special interest to first-century Christians. With their hopes for the early return of Jesus, there would have been a demand for authoritative written information about what Jesus Himself had predicted and for news of any prophecies which had already been fulfilled.

It seems possible that it was this information which Papias set out to provide, judging from the summary of his writings which Eusebius has given us. If so, Papias may have meant that, while Matthew had dealt only with OT prophecies about Jesus, he would better that by also expounding predictions by Jesus including those which had already come true; valuable evidence these that the Second Coming was only delayed.

Matthew's 'compilation of the oracles in Aramaic' seems to have been written, not for private study, but for use in public worship in a community of Christian Jews. For R. O. P. Taylor has shown that the statement about each 'interpreting them as

best he could' fits best with the custom of expounding the meaning of a chosen passage in the weekly assembly. Papias of course wrote in Greek; hence the point of his reminder that Matthew's compilation of *Logia* was in Aramaic, a drawback for many.

Before closing this section of Papias on Matthew, I would remind the reader that there is no evidence that our First Gospel was in existence when Papias wrote. If 'Matthew' or Luke had access to Papias' works, then perhaps the reason why Papias was not more quoted in the early Church (though he himself was venerated as an exegete) was because all that was most important in them was also included in the Gospels.

The material peculiar to Papias which Eusebius recorded seems disappointingly legendary at first sight. But stories such as the miraculous recovery from a poisoned drink and (in another fragment) the story of the end of Judas seem to link up with definite prophecies of Jesus preserved in the Gospels. Even if they seem suspect to us, it is right to remember that Papias lived in a credulous age.

Certainly Papias' interest in the Millennium is not enough to account for Eusebius' scornful antagonism. This must surely go back to some statement of Papias which to Eusebius seemed dangerous nonsense.

I would suggest that Eusebius called Papias a man of very little intelligence because he found written down the statement preserved for us by George the Sinner[1] that 'Papias stated in

[1] George the Sinner (ninth century) substantially repeats this tradition of Papias about the deaths of James and John first recorded for us by Philip of Side in the fifth century. Philip's reliability is doubted by many scholars, who suspect that he misunderstood his authorities. (It is thought that he may have confused the sons of Zebedee with James the Just and John the Baptist his cousin.) But these critics appear to have missed the firm reason for believing that the statement about the deaths of the sons of Zebedee, James and John, appeared in Papias' second book. Eusebius had used Papias with discrimination, pointing out that he had made some obvious mistakes (which he did not list). On the other hand Philip's epitome —all that remains of his History—seems mainly concerned with statements by Papias which he himself found untrustworthy and in need of correction.

If we examine the passage in detail, Philip seems to blame Papias for misleading people by drawing their attention to another John—not the son of Zebedee—'whom he [Papias] called the Elder. As a result,' wrote Philip, 'some believe that (this) John is the author of the two short epistles which circulate under the name of John, their reason being that the men of the primitive age accept the First Epistle only.' (But I do not share their views, Philip implies.) '*Some have also wrongly believed*' (he goes on) 'that the Apocalypse is this man's work. *Papias too is in error* about the Millennium and so in consequence is Irenaeus. *Papias says* in the second book that John the Theologos and his brother James were slain by the Jews.'

Surely this last statement implies from its context that Philip believed he was

the Second Book of the Oracles of the Lord that John was killed by the Jews, fulfilling clearly with his brother the prophecy of Christ about them'. To Eusebius, who believed with his contemporaries that the John who died at a great age at Ephesus was the son of Zebedee, this was utter foolishness. There was no point in his recording a mistake or a lie, even to draw attention to it.

And as Eusebius sincerely believed that Papias had not met any of the Apostles, he would also have been justified in ignoring as a contradiction (if he knew it) the statement about John and Papias preserved by the Anti-Marcionite Prologue to the Fourth Gospel (date A.D. 160?); it reads 'The Gospel of John was published and given to the churches by John in his life-time, as Papias the Hierapolitan, the beloved disciple of John, wrote on the wrappings (that is on the outermost part of his five books)....'

I must first explain why I have departed from the usual translation here which runs 'as Papias ... wrote in the five Exegetical Books'. C. S. C. Williams has pertinently asked in the second edition of McNeile's *Introduction to the New Testament* (page 286): 'If Papias had indeed written anything resembling the above Prologue in the five Exegetical Books, why did not Eusebius, who used Papias as a source concerning Gospel origins, quote this passage? Would it have escaped the eyes of other Patristic searchers too, engaged on a similar quest?' The simple answer must be that the information was never there to find in Papias' Five Books themselves. This suggests that the Prologue writer was quoting evidence in writing which was unknown to Eusebius, perhaps because it had been destroyed; he was surely referring either to the Titulus on the cover, to writing on the original outer wrapping enclosing Papias' own Five Books, or possibly (if the whole of *id est in extremis* (*externis*?) *quinque libris* is a gloss) to the cover protecting the original copy of the Fourth Gospel. (Another possibility is that the Prologue

drawing attention to another error by Papias? If we read it this way, we may be sure that the remark was in the copy of Papias which Philip used.

For some scholars have argued that Philip was drawing on Eusebius and not on Papias himself. But this theory is not very convincing because Philip quotes names in stories from Papias which Eusebius did not give.

It therefore seems probable that Philip here preserved a genuine tradition by Papias about the death of John, the brother of James, even though he believed that Papias was 'here too in error'.

Writer was thinking of John 21 (in exotericis (=ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς) ='in the part outside the original gospel(?)') The death of the Beloved Disciple is foreshadowed but not a fact (hence 'published in his lifetime?') and the last two verses (John 21.24, 25) seem particularly relevant and may refer to Papias' work as scribe.)

These three hypotheses have one point in common; they all set the original context for the statement by Papias about the Fourth Gospel right outside Papias' own Five Books, which were well known to Eusebius and to later Church writers. Provided we refrain from treating *exotericis* as if it was a garbled misunderstanding of *exegeticis*, one of the interpretations I have offered may fit the problem.

The late R. G. Heard has built up a strong case for believing that the so-called Anti-Marcionite Prologues came from different sources and were never planned as an early self-contained group. He claimed that the Preface to John is later than Philastrius (*c.* 390) who said of Marcion: 'Devictus et fugatus a beato Iohanne evangelista et a presbyteris de civitate efesi, Romae hanc haeresim seminabat' (Haer. 45).

But Philastrius' tradition is not independent of the Anti-Marcionite Prologue as Heard thought, because it is based on the same mispunctuation of the Prologue which we have today, as I shall try to show shortly. For it was not John but Papias, long after John's death, who took the lead in driving out Marcion.

Thus, in spite of Heard's careful arguing, this Latin Preface to John is still in a class by itself, because it is based on a Greek original of unknown date. If my translation is possible, the Greek original was very early indeed.

John Mark (and not the son of Zebedee) may have been the Beloved Disciple, and the tradition about the publishing of the Fourth Gospel may be true (*pace* T. W. Manson and C. H. Dodd). And if Papias was a first-century writer as I have argued, the rest of the tradition in the prologue may be based on facts—that Papias was John's scribe when the Disciple dictated the Gospel.

Hitherto this has been held to be an untrustworthy tradition; first because Papias' date of A.D. 130 seemed to prove the statement to be foolish; and secondly because Papias' interest

in the Second Coming and in Chiliasm appeared to make him entirely out of sympathy with the ideas underlying the Fourth Gospel with its transformed eschatology.

But if Papias in fact wrote in the eighties of the first century, some time before the Fourth Gospel was written down, it is possible that in the interval his views changed because his personal hopes of the Parousia faded. Papias' 'Interpretation' indeed may have belonged to the time before he became John's personal follower. This would explain his quoting from the First Epistle of John (mentioned by Eusebius) and the apparent silence about the Gospel itself.

I would suggest that a simple emendation is called for in the second half of the Latin prologue. With a little re-punctuating it seems possible that Papias both was the scribe of John ±A.D. 100 and survived to ±A.D. 140 as a champion of orthodox Christianity who exposed the false teaching of the heretic Marcion.

I would revise the punctuation of the Anti-Marcionite Latin Prologue to John's Gospel as follows:

EVANGELIUM IOHANNIS MANIFESTUM ET DATUM EST ECCLESIIS AB IOHANNE ADHUC IN CORPORE CONSTITUTO SICUT PAPIAS NOMINE HIERAPOLITANUS DISCIPULUS IOHANNIS CARUS IN EXOTERICIS ID EST IN EXTREMIS QUINQUE LIBRIS RETULIT.

DESCRIPSIT VERO EVANGELIUM DICTANTE IOHANNE RECTE VERUM.

MARCION HERETICUS, CUM AB EO FUISSET IMPROBATUS EO QUOD CONTRARIA SENTIEBAT, ABIECTUS EST.

AB IOHANNE IS VERO SCRIPTA VEL EPISTULAS AD EUM PERTULERAT A FRATRIBUS QUI IN PONTO FUERUNT.

This gives a new translation as follows:

The Gospel of John was openly given to the Churches by John in his life time, as Papias known as the Hieropolitan, the dear disciple of John, recorded on the wrappings, that is on the outermost part of his five books.

Papias wrote down the true gospel which the true John dictated all through.

When the heretic Marcion had been attacked by Papias because his views were wrong, he was excommunicated.

Marcion had brought to Papias writings by the true John and even letters by the brethren who died in Pontus.

The inference seems to be that John had openly published

his Gospel for general use and there had been nothing secret about it. When, thirty or forty years later, Marcion came claiming to bring other writings by the true John, these were obviously forgeries because John would not have left behind him secret writings of which his follower Papias did not know.

(Compare the similar arguments used later by Irenaeus and Tertullian to refute the Gnostics' claims to have secret knowledge of the teaching of Jesus. For example from Tertullian (De Presc. Haer. 22): 'Was any knowledge withheld from John the most beloved disciple of the Lord who rested on the Lord's bosom . . . ? Of what could He have meant those to be ignorant to whom He even exhibited His own glory with Moses and Elias and the Father's Voice also from Heaven?')

What seems to me specially attractive about this new interpretation of the Anti-Marcionite Prologue is that the whole passage appears to be coherent. But according to the translation commonly accepted the prologue seems to break into two unrelated halves: i.e. there seems no real link between John and Papias (in the first half) and Marcion and John (in the second). According to my present theory, Papias is the key to the problem. Round about A.D. 160 the writer of the Prologue considered that Papias had both guaranteed the authenticity of the Fourth Gospel and also been able to expose as forgeries the writings by John which Marcion brought to him. (What these forged writings attributed to John were, it does not seem possible to say, unless they were the Acts of John.)

Perhaps the time has come to revalue Papias as an authority.

Round about A.D. 180 it was to Papias' title that Irenaeus turned when he described the Gnostic teachers as 'tampering with the oracles of the Lord, showing themselves bad expositors of things well said'.

And perhaps the commentator who wrote of Papias in one early manuscript of Eusebius (Book 3 Chapter 36) the words *ἀνὴρ τὰ πάντα ὅτι μάλιστα λογιώτατος* was doing something more than coin a scholarly pun when he called him 'in all things as far as he could be the most *oracular* of men'. To this the commentator added that Papias was 'well versed in the Scriptures' (*καὶ τῆς γραφῆς εἰδήμων*). I take this to mean 'in the *Old* Testament'. And when Papias himself said in his Preface that he was relying less on the Scriptures than on the oral tradition of

eyewitnesses, I suggest he was again referring to the Old Testament writings because very little Christian literature was in existence when he wrote.

Fifty years ago Sandys claimed that in his view the natural date of the extracts of Papias quoted by Eusebius seemed to be *circa* A.D. 100. This personal guess he set confidently on record,[1] though he had no fresh evidence to suggest in support of it.

It is for his successors now to assess the value of the new translation offered at the beginning of this essay, a translation which in passing throws doubts on the wisdom of recent attempts by A. M. Farrer and others to dismiss Papias before they outline their own theories, as if he was an uncooperative witness who must be hustled firmly away, before he confuses the jury with his awkward statements.

Those who maintain that Papias wrote in the second century (rather than the first) might consider whether he could then have used for his books such a title as 'Exposition of *Dominical* Oracles'; for in Asia and Egypt the word '*Dominical*' (*κυριακός*) popularly took on the meaning of 'imperial' from the time of Domitian, as Deissmann has shown from inscriptions. (The oldest example of its use which he found to quote was a proclamation dated A.D. 68 from the Great Oasis in Egypt, when it was applied to the imperial finances and the imperial treasury.) By the middle of the second century the association of this word with the Emperor was close and established, for in A.D. 155 Papias' one-time companion, Bishop Polycarp, preferred to be executed for the Faith rather than call Caesar *κύριος*. Therefore it does not seem very likely that a Christian writer who lived in the Province of Asia, would have used *κυριακός* in a title of his, unless he wrote *before* it became a common technical term in the Empire. It is possible, of course, that Papias was engaged on a secret counterblast to the claims of the Emperor to be divine—on an 'Exposition of Oracles of the *True* Lord', as it were. But there is no evidence that the 'Exposition' was intended as a secret Christian document. We may rather conclude that Papias wrote his Preface early in Domitian's reign between A.D. 80 and 90.

[1] *The Criticism of the Fourth Gospel*, p. 251.

JOB

(Considered as a Contribution to Hebrew Theology)

by The Rev. Dr HAROLD KNIGHT

It is surely in the Book of Job that the religion of the Old Testament finds its most intense and concentrated expression. For the great theme of this book is something which lies at the root of the religious life of humanity, namely, the inescapable character of man's relation to God. Its real subject is the impossibility of eluding this numinous connexion with the ultimate religious and metaphysical ground of life. Job is like some creature caught in the toils. He comes before us as the victim of the dimension of eternity in which human life stands. He knows in his innermost soul that his suffering is 'sent' by the living God. He feels hunted and pursued by this mysterious divine Potentate whose character and designs are inscrutable to the petty mind of man and ever baffle 'the foiled searching of mortality'. In the apparent impossibility of finding relief from this torture of body and spirit, or a harmonious consummation of life, he longs to cut himself adrift from the metaphysical foundations of his being and to find a momentary peace upon a lower plane. One of the key-points of Job's thought, and of the Bible as a whole, is that of the supreme significance of man in God's providential purposes, the high worth with which he becomes endowed as a result of the cherishing care of his Creator. In the stress of his suffering, Job would fain elude the burdensomeness and the costingness of this uplifting relation with the divine which redeems man from final insignificance. The centre of consciousness from which his thoughts radiate and to which they ever return is the conviction that his sufferings are determined by the eternal counsel of God, by God's perpetual vigilance and control of human destiny. He is caught up in a relationship with God from which there is no escape, which is painful and costly, involving a fiery purgation of the soul. This relationship is initiated and sustained by God Him-

self who sets His mark upon man, calling him to the fulfilment of a high and noble end. Job's clear consciousness of the divine pursuit of man and his struggle to escape, is expressed in the following terms:

> What is man, that thou shouldest magnify him
> And that thou shouldest set thine heart upon him
> And that thou shouldest visit him every morning
> And try him every moment?
> How long wilt thou not look away from me
> Nor let me alone till I swallow down my spittle?
> If I have sinned what do I unto thee, O thou watcher of men?
> Why hast thou set me as a mark for thee
> So that I am a burden to myself? (7.17)

In other words, why cannot man live his life in peace, apart from God? Why cannot he determine and orientate his own destiny in full autonomy and self-sufficiency? Why must his behaviour unceasingly provoke reactions in the divine Being? Here Job is visited by the perennial temptation of man to rebel against his Creator, to wish to separate himself from the metaphysical ground of his existence by aspiring to an independence of status which can never be rightly his. This is the primal sin of Adam, but with Job the temptation is occasioned not by pride but by an unendurable intensity of suffering—a suffering which he knows to spring from that very relationship with God which is constitutive of his being as man.

The modern mind, with its tendency to discriminatory analysis, finds difficulty in appreciating the problem for theodicy which Job's suffering raises. At any rate, although the problem still exists for us in strict philosophic thought, it impinges less directly and forcibly upon the consciousness of modern Western man, not only because of changed habits of mind, but also because of a weakened sense of the all-pervading reality of God. How is it possible for us with our scientific outlook and our perception of innumerable secondary causes to sympathise with Job's conviction that his suffering arises out of the religious dimension in which his life is irrevocably anchored? Both Job and his friends share the tacit presupposition—so alien to modern thought—that the fact of this suffering may not be adequately explained and interpreted in terms of its immediate physical causes, and be regarded as a contingent circumstance, a surd, but that it *is* in essence a

spiritual reality, integral to the spiritual universe and as such implies either some evil in man or some injustice in God or the unfathomable mystery of His purposes. Not only can such suffering not be isolated from Job's religious and spiritual life, but he feels in bitterness of spirit, that precisely through his suffering the infinite Being of God pierces most deeply into his experience. For the most remarkable thing about the whole poem is that it is not simply a philosophical discussion between friends, but that it is alive with a soul's tremendous sense of the overpowering majesty and greatness of God. Throughout, Job is conscious of God as present, as determining the successive phases of his experience. It is the record of man's dialectical communion with God in its tensest, sharpest form, in which God apparently smites man to the dust in wrath and plunges him into an overwhelming gulf of sorrow which seems to disallow the hypothesis of faith. Job reiterates as a persistent lament that his sufferings represent the direct action of God who in His transcendent majesty eludes man's search and stands beyond the reach of human reasoning and expostulation. In the first part of the poem, Job is aware of the divine presence negatively, as it were. He is convinced that God is living, active, thrusting into the human spirit like a sword. God is the secret Author of all his pain, and yet he cries out in anguish of spirit that he cannot find God in such a way as to bring Him down on to the plane where man dwells and to be able to put before Him his pathetically human point of view. This phase of his consciousness may be summed up by saying that Job here feels himself to be crushed by the majesty of the transcendent God. He thinks of himself as a victim in the grasp of a God who is essentially unknowable and inscrutable. Perhaps it has not been sufficiently observed with what vigour and uncompromising forthrightness Job depicts the divine transdencence. The infinite distance between Creator and creature is so emphasised as to suggest a *prima facie* impossibility of affinity and communion between man and God. God does whatsoever He pleases and in the inscrutability of His designs overturns human standards and disappoints human expectations. It is the friends who affirm God's essential righteousness and beneficence and His conformity with man's idea of the good. The crucial point for Job is that God is removed from

His creatures by an infinite height and is impenetrable to man's insight and understanding. Thus Job is intuitively certain in his own heart—as against the insincere insinuations of his friends—that he is substantially righteous, yet he also knows that it would avail nothing to urge his innocence against the Absolute of God's Will:

> Though I be righteous, mine own mouth shall condemn me:
> Though I be perfect it shall prove me perverse. (9.20)

He hurls a defiant challenge at the justice of God's rule and allows no intervening causes to qualify divine omnipotence:

> The earth is given into the hand of the wicked
> He covereth the faces of the judges thereof:
> If it be not he, who then is it? (9.24)

In exasperation of mind, he sharpens paradoxes and dwells on the startling contrast between the limitless power of God and the helplessness of man, so that even man's efforts to attain righteousness are foredoomed to failure:

> If I wash myself with snow water
> And make my hands never so clean:
> Yet wilt thou plunge me in the ditch
> And mine own clothes shall abhor me. (9.30)

The point of the situation arises from the unqualified monism of Job's implicit philosophy. The omnipotence of God is so overpowering as to paralyze man's freedom of action. The calamity which has befallen Job, being due to immediate divine causation, is interpreted as a declaration of God's disfavour, as an objective symbol of guilt in the teeth of the witness of his own conscience, as something which signifies the termination of that relation of peace and blessedness in which Job had stood. As such it renders nugatory all man's attempts to remove the barrier to divine fellowship and to renovate the soul. It is a manifestation of divine wrath which humbles man to the dust, imparting to him a guilty fear, in spite of the general innocency of his life. Underlying this outlook is the sense of the numinous majesty of God, in the face of whose holiness none may unreservedly declare himself righteous.

> If I say I will forget my complaint,
> I will put off my sad countenance and be of good cheer
> I am afraid of all my sorrows
> I know that thou wilt not hold me innocent.

I shall be condemned;
Why then do I labour in vain? (9.27)

Job's humanity—his impassioned protestation of his innocence and his fervent expectation of consequent blessedness—is submerged in this devastating vision of living wrath. The calm world of order and security which he had built up around him on the basis of seemingly unassailable moral and religious certitudes is violently overturned as by some cataclysm of nature bringing death and destruction in its train. In order to measure the violence of the catastrophe and to appreciate the integrality of the Hebrew vision of life wherein spiritual and material factors mingle inextricably, it is necessary to understand the antecedents of the suffering Job who reveals himself in the biblical poem, the health and wealth of his previous life as an oriental patriarch and acknowledged leader of his village community. Job furnishes an excellent example of the Hebrew conception of the blessed man—the saint in whose life the blessing inheres as an objective force operating to produce its necessary effects both in outward prosperity of life and inward harmony and strength of soul. The naïve story teller who provides the poem with a prose introduction delights to give us the details of Job's blessed state—his seven sons and three daughters and numerous cattle. When we turn to the poem, however, we find there a pathetic picture of Job's vanished happiness and usefulness, poignant in its realism and sincerity, a description wrung from the bitterness of the heart as it recalls happier things. In this description (Ch. 29) nothing is more touching and significant than those traits which show the whole-hearted generosity and magnanimity of Job, the innate fineness and nobleness of his temper, the springs of compassion which well up within him at the mere thought of need and suffering. He does not and cannot keep the blessing selfishly for himself; by its very nature, it flows through him in ever-widening circles enriching and strengthening the lives of those around him. It is in no spirit of complacent pride that he instances his deeds of altruism. He is animated by the recollection of the joy which he felt in the exercise of his strength of soul, in the active manifestation of the blessing which gave meaning and plenitude to his life. Divinely equipped to fulfil his appointed role as chief and to be a fountain of succour and beneficence to the needy,

he earns the gratitude and ready veneration of all, he rejoices in his strength and looks forward to its perpetual increase and final consummation:

> Then I said I shall die in my nest
> And I shall multiply my days as the sand:
> My root is spread out to the waters,
> And the dew lieth all night upon my branch . . . (29.18)

This alone—the Hebrew ideal of the good life lived out in strength, harmony and peace and crowned with fruitfulness in good works, wealth and progeny—is the background against which we are in a position to appreciate the significance of Job's sorrow. His tragedy sprang from life's violent and merciless reversal of his philosophy and system of valuation, a calamity which culminated in the disruption and disorganisation of his soul. The basic points of faith forming a bedrock of certitude on which his life had been built, are torn asunder in a tempest unleashed by the wrath of God. Here we stumble upon the deep elusive meaning of the poem. Job's very success as a righteous man according to his lights and the very completeness with which he exemplifies the Hebrew philosophy of life, severely limit his vision of reality. He must learn that the holy God whose love tries him as with fire (Job 23.10), towers transcendent above man's theologies, and vouchsafes a yet deeper revelation from the heart of His being in those experiences of tragedy which seem to annul man's most cherished systems of faith. The purgation of soul and the loosening of self-centredness which suffering effects suffice to bring man nearer to God than years of conscious well-doing from the standpoint of an untested faith. Triumphant rectitude in the exercise of power, however beneficent and responsive to the needs of others, must needs entail a secret pervasive egotism.

Not until man stands naked and alone, in the terrible silence of a troubling universe, stripped of his accustomed dignity and virtue, and beholding the systems of thought and faith to which he had clung falling in ruins at his feet—not perhaps until lacerated by such tragedy can he be fully delivered from self, feel the sting of another's pain, the shock of reality and truth, and see the fullest vision of God's overruling wisdom and omnipotent love. There is a remarkable parallel between the fate of Job and that of Shakespeare's King Lear. In both cases

an overwhelming tempestuous tragedy, beating down the fortress of their self-conscious virtue and exalted state, reducing them to the nudity of manhood and to a position of tragic solitariness and insecurity in the face of a universe where evil seems to predominate, produces in them that catharsis of the soul in which the self becomes effaced in the searing but bracing vision of truth. It is no accident that Job's private sorrow unfolds to his startled gaze the picture of universal humanity and the terrible wrongs and cruelties under which it groans. How like Lear's compassionate cry: 'Poor, naked wretches, whereso'er you are', is Job's sorrowful description of the poor man, as defenceless against the elements as against the violence of the oppressor:

> They lie all night naked without clothing
> And have no covering in the cold . . . (24.7ff)

Our interpretation of the meaning of the poem, as springing from the mysteries of God's providential dealings with the soul of a saint, is confirmed by the concluding sections where a tremendous theophany in answer to Job's challenge induces in him a state of awestruck penitence and humility. The special point we would emphasise here is that the problem of theodicy which tortures his mind receives no satisfying answer on the intellectual and rational plane. The author implicitly recognises that it can never be answered at that level, but only in the depths of spiritual life, only by the attainment of the wisdom, the 'calm of mind' which emerges as a synthesis after the bitterest experience of life's cruelty and mystery and pain. It has already been pointed out that the poem is no debate in the realm of philosophical theology as its *prima facie* aspect might seem to suggest, but that it initiates us into the secret of a soul's communion with God. The problem set by the hypothesis of the book shows us the first phase of Job's religious consciousness as one of dispeace, of apparent strife between man and God. Job attributes his suffering, which is an offence to his reason and conscience, to immediate divine causation and interprets it as equivalent to an objective declaration of his guilt although he never wavers in his inner personal assurance of uprightness and charity. This leads him to the conclusion that God, measured by human standards, is unjust and

that he himself is the victim of an irrational explosion of divine wrath. Nothing could be more central to the consciousness of Job in this respect than the representation of himself as the very target of God's deliberate hostility and anger:

> I was at ease and he brake me asunder;
> Yea he hath taken me by the neck and dashed me to pieces:
> He hath also set me up for his mark,
> His archers compass me round about . . . (16.12ff)

As we have shown in Job's communings under the stress of his suffering there is an unqualified emphasis upon the transcendence and omnipotence of God who is represented as inscrutably remote, withdrawn beyond the ken of human understanding, and whose providence seems both to baffle and contradict human insight. Here we are in the presence of diverse theological elements. On the one hand there is the persistent primitive conception of the numinous wrathful God. On the other hand there is the undoubted influence of late post-exilic theology as seen in the thought of the uncleanness which clings to man as such, and in the preoccupation with the philosophic problems which the thought of God's transcendence necessarily involves.

The resolution of this discord in the dialogue between man and God comes about as the result of a change which takes place in the character and consciousness of Job. This change is the effect of a twofold cause, firstly the purgative process of suffering itself, and secondly a fresh encounter with and a surer grasp of the reality of God. Both causes operate to release Job from the self-centredness which permeates his well-doing and which is especially noticeable in his final speech (Ch. 31) enumerating the various sins of commission, omission or wrong disposition from which he is exempt. This self-centredness is also seen in the very fixity and rigidity of his notions, in his passionate clinging to the inner certitude of his righteousness, in his preoccupation with moralism and ideas of retribution. In all this, his personal attitude reflects a failure in the religion of Israel as fashioned and interpreted by the writers of the Wisdom school. What was needed in this period of decline and dessicated religious thought was a new revelation from the living God who makes a dynamic approach to men, a fresh experience of the full-flowing tides of the Spirit which invade

and sometimes break up the entrenchments of dogmatic preconceptions. The transformation of Job's character and outlook, the pacification of his anguish and the final answer to his tortured quest come through such a dramatic encounter with spiritual reality. The result cannot be formulated in words or conveyed to others in tidy logical concepts such as would secure a triumph in the thrust and parry of dialectics. It is akin to the beatific vision and the incommunicableness of all mystical experience. Previously he had known God through the superficial layers of personality (the hearing of the ear); now he knows God in vision (now mine eye seeth thee), at a depth where the heart and will are engaged and wrought by all-conquering divine Love into an attitude of submission and trust. He has attained the satisfaction of his spirit on a plane where understanding and wisdom flow from a heart that 'feels the finger of God and finds Him'. In fact his experience furnishes the ancient biblical prototype to that suggested by the words of the modern Catholic poet, for he too in the scathing fires of suffering has been almost unmade with dread. In this connexion it is inevitable that we think of the philosophy of Pascal with its emphatic distinction between rational and intuitive knowledge, between logical-mathematical reasoning and the innumerable subtle perceptions, the delicate nuances and rich complexity of the artistic and spiritual consciousness. There had been a 'moment of vision' anticipating this final state of harmony and peace in the famous cry through which he makes his appeal from empirical fact and narrow orthodoxy to the God of revelation whose presence and power his heart demands. The Vindicator who is to make his righteousness as clear as the noonday is One whose essential attributes lie in the all-quickening, renovating power of His outgoing Spirit and transforming energy. In a flash of intuition from the mysterious depths of the personality it is given to him to see that the God revealed to man's spirit—as opposed to the idea of God formulated in man's arid presumptuous theologies—is the living one in whose triumphant eternal life the evil and the finalities of earth are overcome.

> But I—I know that my Vindicator liveth
> And in after time shall take his stand upon the dust:
> And after my skin has been thus struck off
> Even without my flesh shall I see God. (19.25)

This anticipation of spiritual communion with God is completed and fulfilled through that theophany which is recorded in chapters 38ff. Here we have the testimony of an overwhelming and transforming spiritual experience by means of which the inner discords of his life are resolved and he attains a renewed and immensely strengthened grasp of God's reality and power. But how does this come about, and how do the contents and purpose of the theophany illuminate the ultimate meaning and message of the poem? The self-revelation of God at this point is no direct answer to Job's challenge. That challenge had been expressed in rational and theological terms, and had consisted in the solemn, passionate asseveration of his integrity and the consequent implication of the injustice of God's dealings with him. Now in the nature of the case no answer can be given on the level of ratiocination. The only effective and satisfying answer possible must be conveyed in terms of 'spirit' and 'life'. Hence the theophany which quickens the spirit of Job into newness of life takes the form of a sweeping and soul-subduing disclosure of God's infinite power and greatness reflected in the glories of creation, and of the infinite love which He bestows upon and with which He sustains His universe in all its teeming richness and variety. This argument underlines the biblical sense of distance between man and God. It again stresses the transcendence of God and man's nothingness and insignificance apart from Him. It administers a rebuke to the tenacious self-concern of Job whose thoughts obstinately revolve upon a single axis, while it is also a healthy corrective to certain characteristic tendencies—the anthropocentricism and moralism—of Hebrew theology as a whole. Above all it enormously expands and enriches the vision of God's providential care and of that ever-living victorious creative power by which He maintains the universe in being. Hebrew theology, under the guidance of prophet and psalmist, while not losing sight of the magnificent panorama of nature, had concerned itself mainly with God's loving purposes for man, working themselves out upon the broad field of history. The excessive preoccupation with this subject and the prophetic formulation of the doctrine of a righteous God whose righteousness is vindicated in the ordering of human life on earth led to a logical impasse. In this situation it was necessary that the mind of

Israel should be deflected from its concentration upon ethics and human destiny and should be stimulated and renovated by a new spiritual awareness of God, clothed in the transcendent majesty of His power and love and wisdom, incomprehensible in His infinitude, and irreducible to the schematic formulae of man's inevitably self-centred theology. The counterpoise to this anthropocentric tendency in the Hebrew outlook could only come from the quickening of the soul's spiritual communion with God (producing as a necessary consequence self-forgetfulness) and from a new worshipful realisation of the glory of God and of the infinite greatness and wonder of His being in its eternal self-existence apart from man. This is the precise and essential function of the theophany in Job. Under the mask of an *argumentum ad hominem* it is a paean of praise celebrating the glory of God's eternal and necessary and self-existent being and of His unceasing activity in creation. It is its central purpose to lead the mind away from man and his pressing problems, and to divert it for a space to the contemplation of the Being of God as He is in Himself, and as He is manifested in the production and maintenance of the inexhaustible marvels of the universe. Only after the mind of man has been thus expanded and stimulated by being plunged in such an ecstasy of religious contemplation, may it return restored and calmed to see in the light of its new vision the harrassing problems which had once vexed and contracted it. The spiritual state which follows upon this contemplative prayer and worship is characterised by the notes of penitent humility, self-abhorrence, awestruck fear and abiding trust. Job has won through to a vision of God in the glory of which his interior disquietude and mental anguish are dissolved as mist in the sunlight. In the teeth of present evil circumstance he is now able to repose securely in the everlasting arms of God of whose immutable goodness he now has immediate and assured knowledge. This whole-hearted assurance of God's unchanging love is derived not through any fresh light thrown upon His dealings with man, but through the contemplation of the tender care and forethought which the divine Creator bestows upon the lowliest of His creatures—the young raven or the wild ass—and the infinite wisdom and power with which He upholds His universe in all its vastness and grandeur, its marvellous intricacy and complexity of design.

Here we have of course a foreshadowing of the argument used by Jesus Himself to teach men to cast themselves in carefree self-committal upon the ever-watchful, love-inspired providence of God.

The reaction of this vision upon the consciousness of Job himself produces not only the joyous expansion of his being through faith, but also a mood of sincere penitence for his embittered self-concern, his fretful and presumptuous claims. Job at the last recognises himself to have been wrong. His fault consisted not so much in the arguments he had used as in the spiritual attitude which underlay them. His resentment, his preoccupation with the claims of man, his attempt to make man the measure of all things and to bring God to the bar of man's reason and judgment—all make him unable to see God as He truly is, as the Lover of men's souls, ever willing and seeking their good. Hence he is unable to rise to the thought of suffering as the gift of divine love, as a sacramental medium through the purifying effect of which man attains a deeper realisation and interiorisation of God. Nor is he visited by the kindred thought of the possibility of vicarious suffering as a service and sacrifice through which man expresses his love for God and for his fellow-creature. Job's theology remains within the sphere of juridical and forensic conceptions. In fine, it is obstinately man-centred and moralistic to the extent of overshadowing the idea that the highest spirituality is revealed in love. But when in the final synthesis Job 'repents and abhors himself', he stands with all the Christian saints in penitential self-loathing because like them he has seen the vision of God as sovereign Lord and Creator through whose self-giving Love and all-quickening Spirit man gains consummate felicity and fulfilment of life.

It will be seen that in our discussion we have omitted to take into account the data furnished by the narrative prose framework in which the poem is embedded and which, it is often insisted, provides the clue to the meaning of the whole. The tendency of recent criticism has been to emphasise that the prose prologue and epilogue form an integral part of the unifying plan and conception which inspired the author of the poem. It is claimed that the message and philosophy of the writer lie, not in anything intrinsic to the poem itself, but rather

in that heavenly background, that universe of God and spirits which lies within the veil and is hidden *ex hypothesi* from the protagonist of the earthly scene. The spiritual significance of Job's suffering, it is affirmed, and the ground of his ultimate vindication, spring from the *idée maitresse* that he is a martyr in the cause of disinterested religion. The inference is that earthly sufferings must be endured in darkness and loneliness as a finally unexplained mystery, as the severest trial of a faith which again and again seems to be disallowed by the stubborn facts of experience. The resulting perplexity and anguish of spirit are of disciplinary value, and provide 'the necessary condition for the manifestation of the deepest piety'. To us it seems doubtful whether this stoical philosophy with its emphasis upon fortitude and perseverance is compatible with the sublime and lofty conceptions which kindled the imagination of the poet himself. The outstanding characteristic and purpose of the *Volksbuch*, as it has been termed, is that it supplies a rationale, *sub specie aeternitatis* of the suffering which must of necessity remain a mystery to the sufferer himself. By the temporary and supernatural withdrawal of the veil which hides eternity from mortal eyes—a species of poetic fiction employed in the interests of edification—the author affords the intellect a satisfying logical solution of the problem which is his theme. This method however, belittles the dimensions of the problem by reducing it to the scope of man's mind while it contradicts the fundamental spirit and teaching of the poem. The latter shows—and this is its abiding and memorable contribution to biblical theology—that the operation of the divine providence and wisdom must remain a mystery to man since it surpasses the range of his mind and is insoluble in terms of a rational theodicy. Job—the type of universal humanity in his suffering and striving—reaches interior peace and harmony of spirit by the only possible means, viz. a mystical knowledge of and assured communion with the eternal, redeeming, Spirit of God. This knowledge and communion are brought about by an inner spiritual change such as is indicated in the word repentance, and an overpowering vision of God which pierces to the depths of personal life and exhibits the insignificance or falsehood of distorted, man-centred wisdom. In comparison with the high spirituality and poetic sublimity of this treatment, the approach

of the *Volksbuch* is typical of popular polydæmonistic religion and is on a level with the *deus ex machina* 'dénouement' of some deep human drama whose problem is inherently insoluble. The *Volksbuch* by its rationalising and dogmatic approach remains within the circle of those forensic notions from which Job's spiritual adventure and the transformation of his consciousness under the impact of the divine Spirit had successfully withdrawn him.

BOOK REVIEWS

Studies in the Gospels: Essays in Memory of R. H. Lightfoot. Edited by D. E. Nineham. Blackwell, Oxford, 1955. 30s.

The essays contained in this volume are twelve in number, prefaced by a memoir by the editor which by its exposition of Professor Lightfoot's own background and method of approach, and of the problems with which he was chiefly concerned, enables us to set his work in its true perspective. One comment demands quotation: 'If at times his own conclusions seemed somewhat radical . . . , it was precisely because he regarded the study of the Bible as too serious and sacred a sphere for anything but the most searching honesty.'

The first essay is a careful linguistic study by the Rev. L. H. Brockington of the Septuagintal Background to the New Testament use of δόξα. The normal classical meaning of the word does not occur in NT, which contains, however, a whole range of theological usage not found in classical Greek.

This essay is followed by an article from the pen of Professor C. H. Dodd, who applies the methods of Form Criticism to the Resurrection narratives. Having established two main types, he proceeds to test by this standard certain other *pericopae* sometimes regarded as misplaced Resurrection narratives. On the Transfiguration, for example, he concludes: 'If the theory of a displaced post-resurrection appearance is to be evoked for the understanding of this difficult *pericope*, it must be without any support from form-criticism, and indeed in the teeth of the presumption which formal analysis establishes.'

Mr C. F. Evans, in a study of the Central Section of Luke, makes the ingenious suggestion, backed by detailed comparison, that Luke at this point 'selected and ordered his material with a view to presenting it as a Christian Deuteronomy'. The suggestion is accepted in the following article by Dr A. M. Farrer, who argues (On Dispensing with Q) that Streeter's premises are no longer ours; the possibility that Luke used Matthew must be quite disproved before the Q hypothesis can even be considered. In Dr Farrer's view, 'the literary history of the Gospels will turn out a simpler matter than we had supposed.' Whatever our opinion of his thesis, it is well that we should be forced from time to time to re-examine the foundations

on which we build, instead of accepting uncritically the conclusions of the past.

The next two articles are both comparative studies. Mr J. C. Fenton (Paul and Mark) is concerned first to use the Epistles to find the meaning of Mark, and secondly to show the teaching common to Paul and Mark. For this purpose he chooses a number of themes from the Epistles, and seeks to read Mark with these in mind. Finally he seeks to formulate some of the aims of the evangelist. Mr C. P. M. Jones (Hebrews and the Lucan Writings) catalogues the points of correspondence under the three heads of Similarity of Language, Similarity of Fact or Interest, and Similarity of Doctrine, but refrains from jumping to the conclusion that Luke was the author of the Epistle. All he claims is a family likeness, which sets Luke and Hebrews together as a solid bloc in distinction from Mark and Matthew, from Paul and from John.

The paper by Professor G. D. Kilpatrick is devoted to the exegesis of Mark 13.9-11, a passage less straightforward than the English Version would suggest. The problems here are the meaning of *εἰς πάντα τά ἔθνη* and the punctuation of verse 10. On the basis of Marcan usage Professor Kilpatrick reaches the striking conclusion that universalism is absent from Mark. It may be observed, however, that in Luke, according to Professor G. W. H. Lampe, 'the Gentile mission belongs to the era of the Spirit'. Professor Lampe's contribution is a careful study of the Holy Spirit in the Writings of St. Luke, to which justice cannot be done in the space at our disposal. This paper may be commended as a clear, thorough and comprehensive treatment of the theology of Luke.

In 'Sacrament and Common Meal', Professor D. M. MacKinnon offers 'a few suggestions based on a study of part of the literature' on matters relating to the Eucharist which has appeared in recent years. The following paper contains a discussion by Professor T. W. Manson of the question 'whether the interpretation of the Gospels offered by Realised Eschatology is an adequate answer to the questions asked by Wrede'. Wrede's theory is acutely criticised, and it is shown that although there is a Messianic Secret in the Gospels it is a very different secret from Wrede's. 'The messianic secret and the essential meaning of realised eschatology are one and the same . . .: the Ministry of Jesus *is* the kingdom and the power and the glory for ever and ever.'

Another commonly accepted position is challenged in the article on the Order of Events in Mark, in which Professor Nineham breaks a lance with Professor Dodd. A detailed examination of this paper is out of the question here, but it may perhaps be asked if there was no one from whom Mark could have got a rough outline of the

earthly Ministry of Jesus. Presumably what he learned from Peter was not confined to the latter's public sermons.

In the last essay Professor H. F. D. Sparks, on the basis of the references in the Gospels, claims that 'there is no ground whatever for asserting that Jesus taught a Doctrine of "the Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of Man".' For Jesus, and the New Testament writers, men are not 'sons of God, by nature, although they may become so by grace'.

Space does not admit of fuller discussion, but it is hoped that enough has been said to convey something of the quality of this book. Not all the essays of course will meet with complete approval.

A line has been displaced from p. 53 to p. 35. Misprints have been noted: p. 16 (line 11 from foot) intrusive exclamation; 38 n. §, 2 *Vide* Zahn; 152 'One' for '*on*'; 187 fgit; 192 that *bis* (line 14); 224 n. †; 243 Husbandman. A hyphen is misplaced on p. 136, and there are a number of errors in punctuation. On p. 26 two notes have been interchanged, perhaps deliberately. Unfortunately, there is no index.

R. McL. Wilson

Towards an Understanding of the Gospels. By Edward Smalley. Epworth Press. 6s. 6d.

The writer who attempts in 83 pages to help laymen towards an understanding of the Gospels must omit much that others would have chosen to say, and state his own beliefs without reasons. Mr Smalley has indeed himself limited to generally accepted findings in New Testament Scholarship, and avoided wilder speculations; his treatment of the Synoptic Problem in chapter 2 is particularly clear. Mr Smalley claims no originality for any of his statements and quotes lavishly; it is a pity that so many of the books he has used are themselves popular expositions rather than standard works.

There are so many excellent short introductions to the Gospels today that a new book on the subject would need to provide a very attractive presentation and clear arrangement of its material in order to justify its existence. Mr Smalley uses both paragraphs and headings in the capricious and unreasoned way in which they are used by second-rate journalists; this may appeal to 'those who are not trained in these specialised matters'; it certainly does not appeal to the reviewer. On the other hand, Mr Smalley, whenever he refers to a Scripture passage, quotes the words in full—a practice that should be adopted by every popular interpreter of the Scriptures. Characteristically he uses the most conservative of modern Protestant translations, Dr Weymouth's.

Many of Mr Smalley's statements are so carelessly worded as to give false suggestions. When we are told on p. 17 that 'there are

two notable differences between Mithraism and Christianity', we naturally expect to be told the real differences. What we are told is that 'Mithraism was essentially a military religion' and 'because of this no place was allotted to women'—surely very inadequate reasons for the uninitiated preferring Christianity to Mithraism! Again on p. 25, we read, 'Jesus was not merely an angel', as if Jesus were an angel, as well as something else. Again when it is said of the Fourth Gospel (p. 65), 'Instead we have recorded miracles which are difficult to understand—"nature" miracles', the simple-minded reader might suppose that no 'nature' miracles are recorded in the Synoptic Gospels. It is surely also a wild statement to say that the 'only justification and defence' of those who demanded the abolition of slavery was 'the constraint of the Spirit' (p. 80).

There are omissions that we regret. The statement on p. 24 that Isaiah 53 is 'now regarded as having referred to the whole or part of the nation' needs expansion if not correction. A more positive treatment is needed of what Matthew meant by the Scripture being fulfilled; Mr Smalley's is almost entirely destructive. On p. 92, the Old Testament view of 'Wisdom' might have been mentioned as an element in the development of the *Logos* concept.

Mr Smalley derives several little homilies from Luke and John (although scarcely any from Matthew and Mark) which may have been more in place in Bible Class teaching than in a printed book. His answer to the question, 'Why does not God stop war?' may be true, but it is rather involved for young readers, who might more easily understand the statement that God has given men freedom to choose evil and its natural consequences (p. 73). The treatment of the sacramental on p. 75 is misleading; the Dominical sacraments are sacraments in a very different sense from that in which 'the whole of life is a sacrament'—and the sooner that young people know it, the better.

WILLIAM LILLIE

Jesus and the first three Gospels. By WALTER E. BUNDY. Harvard University Press. Geoffrey Cumberlege, London. Pp. xxiii + 598. 60s.

THIS is a curiously difficult book to review. It consists of a critical analysis, section by section, of the Synoptic Gospels based chiefly upon the work of the most radical scholars of the last century, Loisy, Schmidt and Bultmann. While it is the most careful and comprehensive guide to their opinions which exists in English, the genuine weight of learning which the book carries is largely offset by the methods which it adopts and the conclusions which it sets out. Thus the Virgin Birth is impossible history but valuable fiction. The relation between John the Baptist and Jesus is drawn closer than

the facts warrant by the Evangelists under the influence of their dogmatic presuppositions. The career of Jesus is unmessianic in character. The Passion Narrative, described as the Death Drama, embodies only a bare residuum of indubitable fact. 'Only the general gist, the bare outline is historical. Jesus was arrested, tried, condemned to death and crucified.' With the Resurrection we pass out of history altogether. 'Even if the story of the Empty Tomb were historical, it would prove exactly nothing' and the Appearances are no more than subjective hallucinations.

The author adopts the method of *divide et impera* with regard to his material. If passages would read more smoothly with the omission of some intervening verses, then these verses are an intrusion into the original tradition. He also appears to accept Bultmann's theory of layers or strata in the traditions to which different historical values can almost automatically be assigned.

In the course of the work a number of historical canons are applied and described as laws. There is the law of biographical analogy which enables the author to reject material recorded of Jesus on the basis of parallels with the lives of other sages or founders of world religions. There is the law of lyrical distortion which casts doubt upon emotional traits and further laws of epic, dramatic and rhetorical distortion which lead to the rejection of most of the material more normally taken as evidence for eyewitness. As a result the historical kernel of the Gospels is reduced to a mere shadow of its proper self. But what is the status of these so-called laws and can it be credibly maintained that within a short half century the Christian Community applied itself so 'creatively' to its early traditions? And what created this apparently creative community? What happened to the eyewitnesses of whom presumably a number existed and survived? And above all what makes the author so sure that the Christian Church was in fact a community to which these laws applied?

What is really at stake here is the question of the proper way to handle the Gospels and, even more widely, to write history. Whatever the defects of Dr Farrer's interpretation of the Gospels, it does at least insist that something is lost by the 'atom-splitting' approach to the Gospels. Is the historicity at which Dr Bundy aims more than an ideal target hardly attainable in human production? It would be an interesting exercise to apply his canons of interpretation to a modern biography in which the facts were reasonable beyond doubt. The law of biographical analogy would presumably lead to the deletion of the earlier chapters. Vivid and human traits in the subject would likewise have to go. And if Dr Bundy is much on his guard against a certain 'Catholicising' of the tradition, might not this lead to the rejection of the 'liberalism' of Morley's life of Glad-

stone? Such neutral-toned, 'objective' history would either prove impossible to write or not worth reading if it were written.

It is not that the book is a bad book of its kind. Quite the reverse. Its learning is beyond dispute and it might save the expert a good deal of time by its careful cataloguing of opinion. But its axioms and canons are so questionable and its methods so severely analytical as to fail signally in its primary purpose, to get the best out of the Synoptic Tradition even as history. And the author is 'Professor of the Bible' at an American University! H. E. W. TURNER

Scripture and Tradition. Edited by F. W. DILLISTONE. Lutterworth Press. 9s. 6d.

THE contemporary Church has been having the experience of two awakenings—one in a much deeper kind of biblical exegesis, and the other in a new respect for tradition. The latter is not so strong or widespread as the former, and they are not yet comfortable bedfellows in some quarters. It is a very complex issue, and the debate over it is as old as Christianity itself.

This book is in the main the substance of four papers read at a Conference of the Evangelical Fellowship of Theological Literature held at Cambridge in 1953, with a full introductory essay by the editor in which the problem is stated. Though it is a theme on which much has been written on a larger scale than this, this is a convenient and reliable brief statement of most of the questions involved, closely reasoned and learned.

The second chapter sets forth what was regulative as sources of belief for the early Church. The three bases are apostolic testimony, the Old Testament in the Septuagint version, and liturgical practice; and at this stage 'Tradition cannot be alleged as an authority for anything which is ruled out by Scripture.' From the second century onwards, there is a growth of patristic tradition as well as apostolic, as a kind of continuation of the Scriptures; and in time the danger of *quot homines, tot sententiae* appears.

The Anglican Reformation which lacked the thoroughness and depth of other contemporary reform movements had to face up to the problem of accretions to the faith and to try and reassert the supremacy of Scripture as now; and this is done unequivocally in the Thirty-Nine Articles, in a way which does not make a claim for inerrancy, but declares that Scripture is sufficient because it contains and makes known all that is necessary to salvation. This is stated in antithesis to Papal authority which adds to the tradition, and yet with due regard to the development of history and to matters which reason might establish as valid.

In the following chapter the problems raised by the emergence

of biblical criticism are faced, and the big questions regarding scriptural authority which the nineteenth century asked. The Tractarian movement stood for an exaltation of the patristic period. This is the joint in the historical treatment of the theme, where the nineteenth-century agitation passes over to 'the situation today', briefly sketched in the last chapter, of which much fuller treatment is necessary—but that is not possible within the scope of the book.

All theological students should read this book, and the fundamentalist evangelical would benefit from it, if he could be persuaded to study it. GEORGE S. GUNN

A New Metrical Version of the Psalter. By A. M. P. DAWSON. Obtainable from the author at Galleons Lap, Goodwood Close, Withingdon, Sussex.

OF metrical versions of the Psalter there is no end, but that is in itself no reason for not attempting another. Mr Dawson's version is felicitous, informed and also conservative in that he draws largely upon the best prose and metrical versions. It is well done. Yet—it may be because it is so well done—it lacks strikingly the masculine power of our rougher Scottish version. Many of the grave faults of our version are eliminated, but the craggy strength has disappeared. The valleys are no longer there, but neither are the mountains. That is always the inevitable price of revision, so it would appear; and the price is too high. WILLIAM D. MAXWELL

The Christian Use of the Psalms. By HENRY DE CANDOLE, Bishop of Knaresborough. A. R. Mowbray and Co., London, 1955. Pp. 83. 6s.

THE purpose of this little book is to help church people to understand the Psalter better and to find more profit in reciting and meditating on the Psalms. The contents of the Psalter are described, and its use in the Christian Church briefly surveyed, and methods of interpretation and its spiritual value are discussed. An appendix, taking up about a quarter of the book, suggests 'Psalm Headings' for use when the psalms are announced. The work is perhaps too short to do justice to so important a theme, and the very brevity is sometimes a little misleading. Thus the only reference to the Scottish Metrical Psalter reads, 'The Scottish Version, perhaps the most famous, dates from 1564' (p. 33). A few books on the Psalter are indicated, but other studies such as those of E. A. Leslie, Oesterley, J. Paterson, J. M. P. Smith and A. C. Welch, might with advantage have been suggested. The volume however is a simple and useful introduction to a great subject, and should inspire readers to proceed to further and deeper study. JOHN A. LAMB

The Jewish People and Jesus Christ. By Jakob Jocz. S.P.C.K., 1949. Pp. 446. 21s.

This book has a large subject and approaches it in considerable detail. The New Testament student will find in it a discussion of the conflict between Jesus and the Jewish authorities, with special reference to the work of modern Jewish scholars. The Church historian will be grateful for the careful study of Hebrew Christianity, primitive and contemporary; one of the most valuable sections seeks to correct the 'impression that all (early) Hebrew Christianity was heretical'—an impression rather fostered by Harnack who included under 'Jewish Christianity' only those tendencies which diverged from catholic tradition; Jocz maintains the existence of a section of Hebrew Christianity which was closely related to the Catholic Church and quite separate from Nazarenes and Ebionites. (We may note that the impression Jocz seeks to correct is given also by the title of Schoeps' recent detailed investigation, *Theologie und Geschichte des Judenchristentums*, which actually has reference only to heretical and schismatical Jewish Christian groups.) The student of missions will find Dr Jocz's review of the missionary approach to the Jews one of the best written parts of the book. Many ministers must have some contact either with Jewish people in their parishes or with Hebrew Christians in the Church, and this book will help them to understand both the attitude of Jews to the Church and the difficulties of Hebrew Christians living in a Church with an overwhelming Gentile majority. Lastly, throughout the book Dr Jocz maintains a theological awareness, and his work is a welcome witness to the fact that a Christian understanding of the Jewish people can be reached neither by historical study separated from theological thought nor by a dogmatic theology ignoring the complicated facts of the situation, historical and contemporary.

The notes are very full and when read with the text furnish a mass of interesting information. But its very comprehensiveness makes the book at times rather hard to read. The number of scholars quoted and discussed is in places quite bewildering, and one cannot help feeling that Dr Jocz has been unable to leave any writer unmentioned or any reference unrecorded. It may thus become easier to use the book section by section than to follow the argument straight through. This suggestion may help many readers, for two reasons. Firstly, some parts are much more difficult than others, and non-specialists might read with profit the sections on 'Theological Issues' (pp. 262-96) or 'Contemporary Hebrew Christianity' (pp. 201-61) before approaching the less familiar subject of the *Birkat ha-Minim*. Again, there is a certain amount of

duplication. The *Minim*, (a word used in the first place, in Dr Jocz's view, of Jewish Christians) receive a treatment of several pages in the section on 'Jesus Christ and the Synagogue', and a hundred pages farther on they appear once more under 'Primitive Hebrew Christianity', as if we had not yet heard of them, and receive sixteen pages more. The relations of our Lord with the Jews of his time and their religion are treated at length in the section on 'Jesus Christ and the Synagogue' and again, as seen through the eyes of Jewish scholars, in the chapter on 'Contemporary Judaism and Jesus Christ'.

This book is significant perhaps most of all because of its frank recognition that Judaism and Christianity stand and must stand in opposition to one another. No one should imagine that by 'opposition' Dr Jocz means 'enmity'. His book shows as real a friendship for the Jewish people as one would find among those most ready to hold that Sinai and Calvary are equally valid and equally true. In the last resort, however, he would say, while both Judaism and Christianity and all their peoples stand equally condemned before the divine judgment, yet nevertheless there is an irremovable division between those who existentially accept and those who reject Jesus Christ, whether Jews or Gentiles. Thus he stands for the Christian mission to the Jews at a time when some are seeking the abandonment of proselytisation and the acceptance of Judaism as the partner of the Church.

An interesting phenomenon of the present day is the study of Jesus and of early Christianity by Jewish scholars. To Christians working among Jews at the present day it is remarkable and ironic to see how the beginnings of this research were hailed in Christian circles as heralding the final breakdown of Judaism; it seems to us now that the process is rather one of taking possession of Jesus for Judaism than of accepting or even considering any part of historic Christian faith. Nevertheless Dr Jocz's judgment is perhaps hard and will surprise many: 'Jewish reclamation of the "historical" Jesus is of no real consequence to the Church or the Synagogue.'

Contrasted with the academic (though seldom unbiased) study of Jesus now increasingly coming before the Jewish public, one must deplore the naïve carelessness of both theology and history shown by much Christian propaganda. Nine-tenths of the Christian literature which comes into the hands of Jews must be tracts containing naïve 'proofs' of the Trinity and of the Messiahship of Jesus, not only unconvincing in themselves but grounded on a popular natural theology, relying on tendentious exegesis of biblical texts (the time-honoured 'Elohim' argument for a plurality of divine persons comes to mind), and often leading in any case to a heretical

Christology. Dr Jocz in his treatment of the theological issues between the two faiths, and especially in his concentration on their different ideas of man, shows us a better way of approach, based broadly on the whole field of doctrine. One would like to see still other theological issues thus explored with an evangelistic purpose —e.g. the theology of worship, the place of sacraments, and the social teaching of the Church.

It is in the doctrine of the Church that Dr Jocz leaves us with the deepest questionings. We should have liked, for example, an ecclesiological discussion of the idea of a Hebrew-Christian Church, mentioned by Dr Jocz and now being much discussed in the State of Israel; discussed with a certain lack of realism, because Hebrew Christians are as yet so small a minority, yet discussed with sufficient seriousness to have its effect upon the aims and methods of Christian work in Israel. We should have liked a deeper solution to the offence of the 'denominations' in Jewish eyes than Dr Jocz offers us when he seems to approve a carelessness of denominational loyalties (see p. 245 and note 293 there). Surely in Jewish work today there is a need for integration of Christian fellowship and doctrine in one disciplined body—a need which in the State of Israel at any rate is being left unsatisfied through this very 'undenominationalism' on the part of both Gentile missionaries and Jewish Christians—an undenominationalism supposed to foster unity but in fact unable to control disintegration.

And lastly we wonder if Dr Jocz has done justice to the Church idea in both the Old and the New Israels when he reduces the problem in the end to one of personal surrender. Ultimately he sees Judaism not as a husk of the old Israel hardened and preserved, but rather as one particular historical and communal form of a general human attitude of individual unbelief. And the Church as the New Israel has surely a calling and an existence that is prior to and more than the personal attitude of its members. Yet Dr Jocz does well to remind us that the Church can live only by faith and discipleship, and to point out how fully this is the experience of Hebrew Christians, for whom faith must be more than those two great passions of the Jewish people today, nation and homeland.

Most readers will be grateful to Dr Jocz for eschewing any pedantically exact system of transliterating Hebrew. A rough and ready system, without tiny letters suspended in the air above the line, is quite enough for most purposes. The pundits will always know what is meant, and those without Hebrew will not care anyway.

James Barr

The Jung Codex. Three Studies by H. C. Puech, G. Quispel and W. C. van Unnik. Translated and edited by F. L. Cross. Mowbrays. 15s. net.

Sensational recent discoveries by the Dead Sea and the Nile of MSS. that promise new light on the origins and early environment of Christianity have created much excitement among scholars. We are indebted to Dr Cross for enabling us to share this excitement by translating and editing these studies of the Nag Hammadi documents by three eminent continental specialists. In the first Professor Puech gives an inventory and characterisation of the forty-eight writings discovered including the four contained in the 'Jung Codex'. He points out how the study of Gnosticism is now put on a firmer footing since we are no longer dependent solely on the hostile and uninformative accounts of the Church Fathers. Professor Quispel takes up the tale, relating how, mainly by his efforts, a Codex which went astray was found and bought for the Jung Institute, Zürich, and so made available for scholars. He gives a fuller account of its four writings, three of which he attributes to Valentinus, and the fourth possibly to his disciple Heracleon. If he is right, we have direct access to the teaching of Valentinus when he stood nearer to the Church than he did later, and was actually, according to Tertullian, an unsuccessful candidate for the episcopal throne of Rome —Gnosticism at its most Christian best. Dr Quispel concludes his study with some inferences as to the origin of Gnosticism in Jewish heresies and the mutual influences of Gnosticism on Christianity and vice versa. Professor van Unnik, in an article of extraordinary interest, discusses the relations of the 'Gospel of Truth' (identified with the Valentinian Gospel mentioned by Irenaeus) with our New Testament. He shows that it uses ideas and phrases from every book including Revelation and Hebrews, so that an authoritative Canon of New Testament Scripture was recognised as early as A.D. 150. But the product is a 'system of timeless truth' quite unlike the New Testament. God is the All whom to know is life eternal, from whom man is separated not by sin but by ignorance or forgetfulness. From forgetfulness Jesus Christ, the revealer of Gnosis, is man's liberator and redeemer.

Professors Quispel and Puech are engaged on an edition of the Gospel of Truth. When it appears we shall doubtless be in a position to understand even better than we do the vigorous polemic carried on by the Fathers against Gnosticism even in this its most attractive form.

John H. S. Burleigh

S. Anselmi Opera Omnia. Edited by F. C. Schmitt. Thomas Nelson and Sons, Edinburgh, Vols. I-III, 1946; IV-V, 1951; V, 1952. £10 10s.

Few modern editions of great *Opera* have been better edited or more beautifully printed than this edition of the works of St. Anselm of Canterbury. Begun before the war by Dom Franciscus Salesius Schmitt and completed afterwards, it has been reproduced in this country in sumptuous form by Thomas Nelson and Sons to whose interest and enterprise in publishing editions of medieval classics historians of religious and philosophical thought are very deeply indebted. This edition is surely the prize of them all, and one of the most outstanding examples of post-war publication. To Father Schmitt we are even more indebted who has so successfully completed a work upon which he spent almost a lifetime's devotion, and in which he triumphed over the delays and many hardships he suffered during the war.

Few great men have suffered more from his critics and students than Anselm in that they have failed to take his measure in terms of all his works, his devotional writings no less than his theological writings. That was true of Gaulino's radical misunderstanding of Anselm's so-called ontological argument, as it is not less true of Aulén's one-sided and vitiated account of his doctrine of atonement. But now that we have all the acknowledged works of Anselm published in a single edition, which encourages us to study the *Monologion* and the *Proslogion* in terms of Anselm's works on the Incarnation and the Holy Spirit, and to study the *Cur Deus Homo?* in terms of Anselm's prayers and meditations, there can be no excuse for that any longer.

Students of Anselm have the advantage today of lines of investigation and interpretation which have done great service in illuminating his teaching. On the one hand the work of Dom Andreas Wilmart has shown us the setting of Anselm in the great devotional and theological meditation in the tenth and eleventh centuries, while the publication of the *Confessio Theologica* of Jean de Fécamp by Leclercq and Bonnes has revealed in startling fashion the theological prayer and prayerful theology out of which Anselm emerged as the first great scientific theologian of modern [*sic*] times. On the other hand the outstanding pioneer work of Karl Barth on Anselm, *Fides Quaerens Intellectum* has completely altered the perspective of our understanding of Anselm ever since it was set on a false tract by his contemporary critics, and within this proper perspective we have now a work of real power and brilliance by Professor John McIntyre, *St. Anselm and His Critics*, published by Oliver and Boyd. Both these lines of investigation from quite different angles combine

in urging us to go behind the high scholastic theology of the thirteenth century to the period of great ferment and creative thought in the eleventh to sit again at the feet of Anselm and to join with his pupils as together with him they humbly inquire of the Truth with the constant prayer that the Truth will offer itself to them.

This is indeed the great characteristic of Anselm's theology that it is the most carefully disciplined and scientific theology without ceasing in the fullest sense to be prayer. For Anselm the Truth is essentially personal, and is not to be known by discovery or argumentation but to be known in address, in the dialogue of reverent inquiry before, the self-communication of the Truth, and in articulated response to it. Hence the dual form in which Anselm presents his theology, in prayer to God and in dialogue with his pupils who led by him present their questions to the Truth that through them the Truth may declare itself. This is essentially *dialogical theology*. Thus, for example, in the opening chapter of the *Proslogion* Anselm prays: *Doce me quaerere te, et ostende te quaerenti; quia nec quaerere te possum nisi tu doceas, nec invenire nisi te ostendas. Quaeram te desiderando, desiderem quaerendo. Inveniam amando, amem inveniendo* (*Opera*, I, p. 100). Even the ontological argument opens with a prayer, while it closes with prayer as well: *Gratias tibi, bone domine, gratias tibi, quia quod prius credidi te donante, iam sic intelligo te illuminante, ut si te esse nolim credere, non possim non intelligere* (*Opera*, II, p. 104). That makes it immediately clear that the so-called 'proof '(Gaulino's term) is not really a proof offered on independent grounds for belief in God, but the self-understanding of faith dependent on the *te donante* and *te illuminante*.

This again is the side of Anselm so tragically missed by Aulén in his *Christus Victor* in which he interprets Anselm's *Cur Deus Homo?* severely in terms of the Medieval *lex et ratio*, that is in the forensic and rational categories of Feudal society. To say however that Anselm treats the relation of man and God in an essentially legalistic way is sheer caricature. All one needs to do to see the grave error of Aulén is to read beside the *Cur Deus Homo?* the beautiful *Meditatio redemptionis humanae* (*Opera*, III, pp. 84-91) and the *Oratio ad sanctam crucem* (*Opera*, III, pp. 11-14). No Lutheran could stress more biblically justification by grace alone than Anselm has done in these two devotional writings not to mention the Prayer before receiving the Eucharist (p. 10). Aulén's fault is that he has failed, where Anselm has not, to understand the full place occupied by the Humanity of our Lord in the divine act of reconciliation.

No theologian has been more concerned to draw out the full rationality of faith than Anselm, but Anselm's refusal in theological discussion to leave prayer behind, helped him to realise in a profound way that the nature of God is such that He always transcends the

concepts and analogies in terms of which we seek to articulate our faith in Him. That is what Anselm called *humilis sapientia*, which he opposed to the *insipiens superbia* of the reason which has never really learned to wonder. How much the *superbia* of the high Scholastic Theology that flowered in the thirteenth century could have been avoided if it had taken the humble road of Anselm rather than that of Abelard! At least the publication of this edition of the *Opera Anselmi* in his beautiful sonorous Latin, which is such a delight to read, may help would-be neo-Thomists and neo-Scholastics to learn again the meaning of theology as a humble inquiry of the Truth.

T. F. Torrance

Die Verkündigung des Reiches Gottes in der Kirche Jesu Christi. Zeugnisse aus allen Jahrhunderten und allen Konfessionen. Erster Band*: Von der Zeit der Apostel bis zur Auflösung des Römischen Reiches.* Pp. 441. 28.10 Swiss francs. Zweiter Band: *Von der Christianisierung der Franken bis zum ersten Kreuzzug.* Pp. 396. 27 Swiss francs. By Ernst Staehelin. Verlag Friedrich Reinhardt, Basel.

These are the first two volumes of a monumental source-work for the history of Christian doctrine being put out by the renowned Professor of Church History and the History of Dogma in the University of Basel, Dr Ernst Staehelin. A third volume has just appeared but is not yet to hand, while a fourth is still to come. In them Professor Staehelin has sought to gather the most significant statements and discussions concerning the Kingdom of God throughout the whole history of the Christian Church, from all branches of the Church, and from many lands and different languages.

In a foreword to the first volume Professor Staehelin points out that the two decisive acts of God which bring the *Heilsgeschichte* of the Kingdom to its consummation are the Ascension and the Return of Jesus Christ. Everything else in the Christian faith falls under the significance of these two events. Therefore to study the mind of the Church throughout the ages upon these decisive events of the Kingdom will help us to think through the many related questions with which we are faced today, and indeed to do it in a truly ecumenical fashion. One of those primary questions which Professor Staehelin does not mention, but which surely he has in mind throughout, is the problem of Church-history itself. Why is it that all the standard works on Church-history are shamefully divorced from eschatology, as though the history of the Church had nothing to do with the history of the Kingdom, or as if the history of the Church could be written faithfully and even scientifically in entire abstraction from the mighty acts of God upon which all the history of the Church depends? Is it at all possible to write *Church*-history apart from the

Heilsgeschichte of the Kingdom? If a Church historian neglects this, the most important aspect of *Church*-history, is he not really writing a secular history of the Church and not a *Church*-history after all? Professor Staehelin is not concerned in these volumes to raise or answer that question, but it is significant that here we have one of the most exact and methodical Church historians of Europe concerned, in what promises to be perhaps the greatest collection of texts from Church History yet undertaken, to lay before the world today in chronological sequence the most important passages from the teachers and documents of the Church bearing upon the Kingdom and Advent of Christ. Here then Professor Staehelin puts into the hands of Church-historians the source-material which they must consider if they really are to write *Church*-history, that is, the history of the Church in the light of the sovereign acts of Christ the King and Lord of history. This is then a source-work of the greatest interest for historian and for theologian alike.

But it is, or should be, of no less interest for the New Testament scholar, for by means of these volumes he can study the exegesis that has been given to crucial passages in the NT, throughout the history of the Church; by a comparison of that exegesis from age to age he can discover the time-conditioned elements that have entered into the interpretation; and then in the light of it all be helped to interpret the same passages from the NT in a truer and more objective light. There can be no question that New Testament scholars have to pay far greater attention to the history of interpretation if they are to meet the demands for scientific rigour and exactitude and avoid the unconscious assumptions of the superficial interpreter which lead him to read into the NT his own uncritical ideas. That is particularly evident in those who are often the first to accuse others of 'eisegesis' because in point of fact it is the exegesis they criticise conflicts with their own unconscious and subjective notions!

Such is the service that these volumes can render to us all. And the service will be all the greater to those who avail themselves of it because of the exact and careful way in which Professor Staehelin has gone about his task of selection and translation. His own judgments upon the passages are kept to a minimum; short notes are given about each author with an indication of the best texts and discussions to guide further research. Here too we have an unparalleled work in which vast material drawn from volumes often not easily obtainable, and not easily accessible in a readable language, is put together in handy form. No doubt the publication of the original texts in Syriac, Greek, and Latin along with their translations would have made the volumes too bulky and expensive, but the German translation is as readable as it is accurate. The

present two volumes take the study up to Anselm of Canterbury and the first crusade. The third volume is due to carry us through the exciting period from Bernard of Clairvaux to Savonarola. The work of collecting all this material as well as the translating and editing must have been prodigious. Already it is clear that the completed work will be of the greatest value and will make itself quite indispensable. T. F. TORRANCE

Dogmengeschichte. By WALTHER KÖHLER. 2 vols. Max Niehans Verlag, Zürich, 1951. 23.10 and 28 Swiss francs.

THE issue of the third unaltered edition of Köhler's 1938 *Dogmengeschichte* has been made the occasion of adding another work to the original. At the time of his death in 1948, the MS. of this second volume still lacked final revision at the hands of its author, but, with a foreword by Hans Barth, it now appears as Vol. II of a more complete work. The first volume covers the ground 'from the beginnings to Luther', and the second deals with the period of the Reformation. In the introduction with which the first volume begins, Köhler is at pains to define carefully the sense in which he understands 'history of dogma'. One traditional method was to start from the Creed and to expand historically the distinguishable *loci*, *de Deo*, *de Christo*, and so on. Harnack begins a new epoch by understanding dogma as 'from start to finish a work of the Greek spirit on the basis of the Gospel'; and accordingly his work deals with Catholicism later than Augustine and the whole of Protestantism as merely the 'threefold issue of dogma'. Seeberg and Loofs, on the other hand, thought dogma to be essentially the Christian thinking which the Church legitimised. The plan Köhler adopts is more spaciously conceived. The discipline of *Dogmengeschichte* deals with Christianity. The work is given the sub-title 'the history of Christian self-consciousness', and this in turn is defined as the 'Christian consciousness come to awareness of itself'. The author himself, when what is now the first volume appeared, declared that the work did not differ radically in form from that imposed by the *loci* method, but he held that the standpoint differed. 'One must trace the "Logos" of the development of Christian thinking; for only then is *Dogmengeschichte* really understood.'

On these presuppositions, then, Köhler dealt with dogma up to the Reformation. But the same presuppositions carried him further than this. He was constrained by the advice of friends and by the 'inner dialectic' of his fundamental principles. The combination of the systematic and the historical in his view of *Dogmengeschichte* compelled him to continue his exposition of 'Christian philosophy seen from its proper presuppositions and fundamental principles' up to

the present day. It was this which the second volume essayed to do. Even it remains only a 'torso'. On his definition, later Pietism, the Auklärung, and Idealism should have found a place, so far as they represented ways in which the Christian spirit unfolds. But the work was not carried out, and we are left with his account of the Reformation period only.

But we may well be grateful for the volumes which we have. They constitute a massive contribution to dogmatics. Of particular value, as might be expected from the presuppositions made, is the way in which Christian thought is related to its background. The present writer found the treatment of the 'principle of authority' in the second volume specially illuminating, and this, not only in its reference to the Reformers, but in its account of how the principle came to be diversely understood by those who followed the Reformers, in Protestant Orthodoxy, and among the 'Spiritualists' and the Pietists.

This scholarly and incisive work is a salutary reminder of the way in which Christian doctrine, when it comes to think out and state its understanding of the Gospel, is exposed to contemporary influences, and of the consequently provisional nature of all theology.

J. K. S. Reid

Introduction to Theology. By John Christian Wenger. Herald Press, Scottdale, Pennsylvania, 1954.

This book is a statement of the theological position of the Mennonites, a Christian sect that originated *circa* 1523 in Zürich. A comparison of their sixteenth-century theological convictions with those of the twentieth century reveals no significant advance in theological thinking during the span of 400 years. This does not mean, however, that the Mennonites have been free from 'mental fight'. The tacit claim made in this book is that the author is writing on behalf of *all* Mennonites. This, in fact, is not the case. A modern encyclopaedia remarks that 'today there are more than a dozen separate Mennonite "churches" in N. America'; and of these some have moved away from the original Mennonite theological convictions that roused the ire of the authorities in various parts of sixteenth-century Europe. Doubtless the more lax groups of Mennonites would be dismissed as 'modernists' by those who still cling to the teaching of the original leader, a Dutchman named Menno Simons (1496-1559), but probably all would be described as 'fundamentalists' by many other religious groups.

The author has divided his subject into six parts. In a longish prolegomenon the meaning and value of theology is discussed, as is also the value of the Bible as the source book of Christian theology

and the relation of the latter with mysticism, philosophy and other religions. The second section, on God the Creator, deals with the Divine attributes, Christian anthropology and the doctrine of sin. Part 3 traces the stages in the self-disclosure of God from Gen.1 to the Word become flesh. The Scriptures too are a vehicle of Divine revelation since they are divinely inspired. This naturally settles Mr Wenger's doctrine of the Word and determines the principles that govern the interpretation of Scripture. The fourth section, God as Redeemer, sets forth the Mennonite doctrine of Christ and the Church. Part 5, God as Sanctifier, is concerned with the work of the Spirit, particularly in regeneration, sanctification and union with Christ. The final section, God as all in all, sets forth the Mennonite doctrine of eschatology.

The reader will find that so far as the basic elements in Christian theology are concerned there is little difference between the Mennonite views and those held by other strictly fundamentalist groups; there is, therefore, little that is new in this book. But in fairness to the author it should be said that he is not concerned to make a contribution to the advancement of theological thought. His aim is to set forth the theological position of the Mennonites. But inevitably this imposes serious limitations on the book. There is throughout a completely uncritical adherence to Scripture in the sense that there is little attempt at exegesis or biblical exposition. Naturally there are numerous references to the works of Menno Simons, large portions of which are printed verbatim. As was only to be expected the main Mennonite dogmas are given great prominence and here the reader will find much to interest him. Arminianism is set over against Calvinism with approval. The work of the sixteenth-century Anabaptists is commended uncritically; baptism is everywhere emphasised, although neither it nor the Lord's Supper are sacraments in the sense that they are means of grace. They are pre-eminently symbols or ordinances, and, along with the ordinance of feet-washing, constitute the main 'ceremonies' of the Church.

The Anabaptist-Mennonite tradition of separatism is also strongly emphasised and is said to operate in two spheres. It determines one's attitude to the world. It is this separatist tradition that compels the Mennonites to refuse to take oaths before magistrates. It also prevents them from joining secret societies which are 'oath-bound'. While they feel free to honour the government and pay taxes, even those that are used to finance war, the Mennonites cannot obey the government in its use of force and refuse, therefore, to do military service. They feel compelled to walk the way of non-resistant suffering. The Mennonites' refusal to serve as a magistrate also arises from the same principle of separation.

More seriously still Anabaptist-Mennonite separatism determines the relations with other communions within the Church. The separatist attitude among the Mennonites has led to the establishment of 'close communion' which, it is claimed, is 'in part made necessary by the behaviour of some professing Christians, and in part is occasioned by the sub-Christian standards of some denominations'. It should be added, however, that this statement of the Mennonite position *vis-à-vis* the world and other communions is free from bigotry and intolerance. It is obvious that this separatism is significant for the contemporary situation when for many oecumenicalism and pacifism are living issues.

But that apart, the thoughtful reader will be saddened when he reflects that after over 400 years there has been apparently no significant advance in the theological thinking of certain sections of the Mennonites. Is this, at once, the explanation of the decline in their numerical strength, and of the tendency to sectarianism among the Mennonites that remain? J. G. S. S. Thomson

Some Aspects of the Conflict between Science and Religion. The A. S. Eddington Memorial Lecture, 1953. By H. H. Price. Cambridge, 1953. Pp. 54. 3s. 6d.

Professor Price finds that there is an ineradicable conflict between the naturalistic and the religious world-outlooks because the latter require us to entertain certain propositions about matters of fact, and according to the former no human being is in a position to assert them as true. The first half of his lecture surveys the conflict as it arises about the 'basic religious propositions', which cannot be established by 'natural reason', i.e. from non-religious premises. If their credibility is to be established at all, it must be by an appeal to religious experience, meaning by that 'a *cognitive* capacity, by means of which we become *aware of* something which we could not otherwise have been aware of'. We must, in fact, affirm religious genius, in varying degrees, and what scientific investigation tells us about human nature lends no support to this affirmation. But religion also commits us to propositions about 'other worlds'. It is not difficult to establish the logical possibility of other spaces besides physical space, or other types of causality such as might clarify the efficacy of prayer. But there is no excuse for making propositions which are about the created universe unless we do so on the basis of empirical evidence. And the second part of the lecture is a review, such as the author is uniquely qualified to give, of investigations into phenomena of 'extra-sensory perception' (though the term 'perception' is shown to be misleading). The effect of this inquiry is to upset the Materialistic conception of human personality, which makes it seem incredible

that human beings have cognitive capacities of a peculiar sort, and that they are in some sense 'souls' who continue to exist as such in 'other worlds' after the disintegration of the body. These fundamental religious affirmations are not thereby justified, but their certain and obvious falsity, nowadays assumed by the majority of Western educated people, may no longer be dogmatically maintained. The lecture is an interesting and lucid utterance. Those who believe that the defence of Christian faith is bound up with the defence of 'religion' will have their armoury brought up to date by a philosopher of stature. The '*traditional* conflict between Science and Religion' has been carried one step further by Price's work, and it is good to hear about it, even if one happens to think that Christians cannot feel entirely at home on this particular fighting line.

W. A. Whitehouse

Christian Faith Today. By Stephen Neill. Pelican Books. 2s. 6d.

The basis of this book is a series of 'open lectures' sponsored by the Faculty of Divinity in Cambridge University. It is described as 'a reasoned approach towards solving those difficulties which men feel cloud their understanding of Christianity today'—and for that purpose it is admirable. Bishop Stephen Neill acknowledges that what he writes is a kind of *confessio fidei*—which is inevitable, and indeed a source of enrichment to the argument. The writer's experience as a missionary in India for twenty years shines through every chapter.

What is the specifically Christian view of history and how can it be set forth as reasonable in our time? That is the core of the book. The method pursued is largely historical, helped out by a very wide range of reading in the other sacred Scriptures of the world, in the ancient classics and in contemporary literature of varied sorts. No one can read this book, and especially its two finest chapters, those on Jesus Christ, without realising that it comes from the mind and heart of a man who has accepted the sole, supreme sufficiency of Jesus Christ.

After touching on the true sense in which Christianity can be said to be reasonable, the argument starts from three basic questions—What kind of a universe is this? What kind of things happen in it? What kind of purposes can be formed and carried out in it? Man's search along these lines at all stages of his development is examined, until the decisive stage of Israel and its prophets is reached. After a useful examination of the five leading ideas of the Old Testament, there is a study of the unsurpassed figure of Jesus, of the character of His relationship with His disciples of every age and clime, of His reconciling work for man 'whose chief problem has always been

himself', and of the full gospel of forgiveness in all its necessity, costliness and effectiveness.

In the chapter on the Church, the marks of the new Christian community are outlined, the essential importance of fellowship is stressed, the dangers of mysticism brought out, the faults and blemishes of the Church fearlessly faced (not least 'the apparently irredeemable trivialities of the Churches'), and its extraordinary recuperative power acknowledged. There follows a chapter on the World Church in which Christianity is seen in its essential conflict, 'the warfare of ideas', with the other religious systems of the world; and it is rightly claimed that *the* new factor in the twentieth century is that for the first time we have a religion which is universal.

It is not surprising to read that the last chapter, 'Beyond Time and Space', carrying the issues out to eternity, proclaiming a Christ who is able to sustain such eternal issues, and confronting men with an inescapable challenge to make a decision, was heard, when delivered, in a silence that could be felt. The whole book is full of precise statement, with many safeguards against misinterpretation, leaving readers in no doubt as to what this point and the next means and does not mean. Its publication as a Pelican Book must be designed to reach a large circle of general readers. Here is a liberal Christian education for half-a-crown. GEORGE S. GUNN

The Christian Message to the Hindu. By A. G. HOGG. S.C.M. Press. THIS book was published in 1947, when war-time restrictions made small editions inevitable. As a result many failed to see it, and it gained much less notice than it deserved.

The late Principal John Mackenzie of Wilson College, Bombay, wished that it should be studied by every missionary going to India. With that judgment I heartily agree, but I should go further. Its value is obscured by its title. It is much more than a guide for missionaries: it is a treasure for all who are called to preach the Gospel in any land.

Dr Hogg says in the Foreword: 'The author is conscious that his own apprehension of the Gospel has been enriched and clarified by having to think it out afresh for himself under the stimulus of intercourse with the Hindu mind' and it is this fresh apprehension of the Gospel which he seeks to convey to his readers.

Every preacher can learn from Dr Hogg something that will help him to preach with 'A Challenging Relevancy'. He will find here the most uncompromising insistence on the absolute Lordship of Christ. The missionary situation brought home to Dr Hogg the inadequacy of any presentation of the Gospel which brings the Church in as a mere afterthought. The Hindu lack of concern for

this world led him to a firm grasp of the cosmic dimension of redemption. The Christian is 'emancipated from the world only so that . . . he may serve God *in* the world' (Otto).

For many readers the chief value of the book will lie in its approach to the problem of suffering. This is acutely felt all the world over. The Hindu solution has been the doctrine of Karma which asserts that every man suffers in this life the due reward of his sins in a previous existence. The fact of unjust suffering is therefore denied. In antithesis to this Dr Hogg argues boldly that a world in which each man received his merits—no more and no less—would be a bad world, for it would make it impossible for any man really to benefit his neighbour. The suffering of the innocent is a necessary implication of a world in which love can find a place. Thus the Christian affirms that 'it is right that there should be undeserved suffering'. Sin arises from self-centredness. Repentance means radical abandonment of this, 'and it has not absolutely gone until our consciences sorrowfully approve of others suffering along with us for that for which not they, but we, were responsible'. In the Cross each brother's sin is wiped out in his brother's sorrow. Further 'In the Cross of Christ the Incarnate, the universe reveals itself as a place whose deepest law is this, that sin shall be not merely expiated but swallowed up in a blaze of moral glory.'

There are places where the argument is impaired by a tendency to think of sin primarily in ethical rather than in strictly religious terms, but the main contention is one which is startlingly illuminating in its bearing both on theodicy and on the Atonement.

Finally Dr Hogg stresses the task that is as necessary in the 'Christian' West as in the lands of the Younger Church—to awaken men to the devastating news of God's judgment on sin that they may find forgiveness at the foot of the Cross of Christ.

This is a book which well deserves to be reissued, and to have the widest circulation among preachers of the Gospel.

JOHN HERON

Christian Words and Christian Meanings. By JOHN BURNABY. Hodder and Stoughton. Pp. 160. 9s. 6d.

THIS is an admirable piece of practical divinity. It consists in a series of public lectures given in Cambridge on behalf of the Faculty of Divinity and is an excellent model of the way in which such a course should be constructed.

The author takes a series of concepts linked in the Christian vocabulary and expounds their meaning in non-technical language. His general approach is personalist and all his material is carefully built into this particular fabric. Faith is an engagement to God in

Christ which ripens into knowledge. Revelation is given as a Presence rather than as a network of propositions, though these are inevitably involved in any attempt to express the Givenness of God. The Incarnation is considered from the point of view of human self-consciousness, a problem evaded by many theologians. Sin and Judgment, Forgiveness and Atonement are studied from the same point of view.

It is not the intention of the book to offer detailed interpretations of the problems either of classical or contemporary theology, but from time to time the great issues are simply discussed always with something of significance added by the author. Dr Alan Richardson's treatment of the famous distinction between special and general revelation, Dr F. R. Tennant's theory of sin, Moberley's famous interpretation of the Atonement in terms of vicarious penitence and, most recently Professor Thouless' distinction between essential and non-essential dogmas (in connexion with a lucid discussion of the credal difficulties of modern man) all find a place in the argument. There are a few capable pages on ancient Christologies and a particularly brilliant characterisation of the controversy between St. Augustine and Pelagius. If the author carries his learning lightly, there is plenty and to spare for his purpose.

But it is not an *exposé* of theologies past and present that the book is primarily intended. It is rather an exposition of the Christian Faith in fresh terms and an 'invitation to pilgrimage' for the non-specialist reader. For this it is excellently adapted and it deserves a wide circulation among general readers. It might even be made 'prescribed reading' for theologians as a warning that learning is no substitute for clarity and as a reminder of pastoral obligations to the ordinary man which still inhere in the teaching office of the professional theologian. H. E. W. Turner

Ecumenism and Catholicity. By William Nicholls. S.C.M. Press, 1952. 12s. 6d.

If merit alone guaranteed prompt review, this book should have been reviewed long ago. On the other hand, some books are so good that it is never too late to review them. This applies to the work here named; and, while many readers of the *Journal* will already have profited from it, it is still worth while to recommend it to others who have missed it. It is an excellent piece of ecumenical writing.

The author notes the existence of a 'massive underlying unity' of which Christians are conscious as they enter into the personal relations with fellow Christians which constitute real ecumenical encounter. It is most apparent in the acts of common worship in which members of different Christian traditions join on ecumenical

occasions; and its strength and reality is most evidently demonstrated by the fact that, despite profound differences, the Churches concerned are able to 'stay together' (contrast the nations in UNO), and even to say something significant together (contrast the recent Geneva conference). This unity is not theological in character: in fact it exists despite theological diversity. It is rather eschatological. 'Those who meet in the ecumenical movement find that they belong to the same country, and on the journey home to it meet others of its citizens, also on the way there. They are not united by any bond arising from the present circumstances of their sojourn abroad, or from the journey itself, but by a common destination. The hope of reaching this destination is for all the deepest hope they have. Thus they discover that they actually belong together, that their past separation is anomalous. Henceforth they will regard it as normal to journey together.' 'We have no direct relations with one another', as Dietrich Bonhoeffer has said. 'The meaning of the Church is that it is in Christ that we are related to one another.'

Yet the matter cannot simply be left there; nor is it sufficient to plead a 'spiritual' unity as reason for doing nothing more about it, since 'in the Bible spirit is not opposed to *matter*, but to *flesh*.' 'It is true that the Body of Christ is eschatological. But men enter this new creation, the Body of Christ, in history. . . . Because we have been made partakers of an eschatological unity we have to live in unity in history in one concrete historical society.' 'It is the process of becoming what we are.'

How then are we to relate these two diverse facts, the completeness of the eschatological given unity and the apparent disunity which the Church historically manifests? One possible reply is that 'God has in fact preserved the unity of His Church in history in the historical life of one visible society'. Both the Roman Church, and those of other communions who advocate the 'branch theory' of the Church, make this kind of reply, though they express it in different ways. But in fact the reply in either form is a rationalisation of the fact of schism. The Romans extrude the fact of disunity from their own communion and locate it, together with the blame attaching to it, in the other Churches. Those holding the 'branch theory' combine territorial considerations with a similar view of ecclesiastical unity and exonerate the Churches of the Orthodox East, Rome, England, and perhaps Scotland, from disunity, but must treat the other Churches just as Rome treats them. Neither view, however, takes seriously enough 'the irrational ravages of sin in the Church'.

There follows a penetrating account of the Anglo-Catholic view of the Anglican Church. The theologians of the Anglican Church, seen from this standpoint, repudiated 'the tenets of Protestantism

they knew' and hence their Church has 'no essentially Protestant character'. On the other hand, the same view holds that the Anglican Church retained certain elements in the Catholic tradition which the reformed Churches had abandoned, and, considering them to be the 'essential and determinative elements' of Catholicity, thought that they guaranteed the catholicity of the Anglican Church. It thus happens that, by isolating the theory of the ministry, apostolic succession comes to be of the *esse* of the Church, while unity is regarded as merely of the *bene esse*. What is happening here is that a historical element is elevated to a determinative role in the meaning of catholicity: 'The apostolic succession became increasingly the king-pin of the whole ecclesiological structure.' Other Churches without apostolic succession cannot then be held to be true Churches. A disturbance of the right balance (the theme of the later *The Historic Episcopate*) has taken place.

The ecumenical movement implies that the view outlined above has to be rethought, and the key to this rethinking lies in the realisation that, as the unity of the Church is both eschatological and historical, 'the eschatological is prior'. 'An ecumenical view of Catholicity must frankly recognise the fragmentation of the Church, and recognise also that the fragments are fragments of the *Church*, because they share in the eschatological unity of the Church which cannot be broken.' The obverse of this is also true: 'the only way to be Catholic in a divided Church is to be ecumenical.'

It has not been easy to summarise an argument which is powerful and closely woven. Indeed perhaps no summary could do anything but scant justice to the fine insights the book offers into matters less central to the main theme. There is a constant insistence on the need for repentance on the part of *all* Churches. Disunity is of sin. It might have been even more clearly emphasised that the given unity enjoyed is of grace, and from this the conclusion drawn that eschatological unity can never serve as a pretext for doing nothing, just as we may not continue in sin even in order that grace may abound. All historical unity is provisional, and this consideration, together with its implied 'eschatological suspension of judgment', provides a solid basis both for the author's profound charity towards other denominations and for genuine ecumenical conversation with them. All Churches are alike at two points: that they lack something on the human side, and that Christ in His mercy makes up what is lacking. Yet this equality between Churches is never interpreted as though it made the differences of no account. 'All our theologies have the taint of heresy'; but we must confess the faith, knowing that 'our confession . . . is continually menaced by the heretical tendency to claim that we alone know how to confess it,' and realising



that 'if we abandon confessionalism, we tend only to replace it by a theological relativism which is even worse.' Churches that enter into ecumenical relations have most seriously to ask themselves what is thereby implied concerning intercommunion. The arrangement of mutual open communion is said to have 'no ecumenical implications at all'; yet the Churches that practise it must surely ask themselves on what grounds they none the less persist in separation. Those, on the other hand, that refuse intercommunion have to clarify the reasons for their refusal, since to have ecumenical relations at all implies (or, in view of the actual situation, *seems* to imply) 'some reality of the Church in other Churches'. In the second last chapter, Catholicism and Protestantism are compared as respectively emphasising the horizontal and the vertical views of the nature of the Church. Catholicism tends to regard the presence of Christ in His Church ontologically, implying a real transformation of nature and of man in the Church. Protestantism regards this as an illegitimate anticipation of the state of glory. One may perhaps suggest that this illuminating and not unfamiliar comparison hardly covers all the facts. Perfectionist tendencies, whether moral or physical, are paradoxically enough to be found in bodies not usually thought of as emphatically Catholic.

The whole book is a profound study of the nature of ecumenism and an honest attempt to outline some of its implications. In some degree it is the record of what ecumenism has done for someone who started out with quite a different understanding of the Church and of unity in the Church. There are many Anglicans who will disagree strongly with what is said. But the fact remains that, with great insight and the utmost charity, a basis is here offered which makes ecumenical conversation not only possible but hopeful.

J. K. S. Reid

Ubi Spiritus Dei, Illic Ecclesia et Omnis Gratia. By Fr. Isidro Goma Civit. Published by Seminario Conciliar de Barcelona, 1954.

The author is a priest and Professor of Holy Scripture in the Theological Seminary of Barcelona, and his book, which is in Spanish, has for its sub-title 'The Holy Spirit and its "Charisms" in the theology of the New Testament'. This is not a full-scale treatise, rather it is a monograph of 107 pages in which after introductory matter the author briefly discusses the references to Charisms in Eph. 4.7-16, Rom. 12.3 ff, 1 Cor. 12-14, next proceeds to the enumeration and definition of the Charisms in the New Testament, and then arrives at his final purpose which is to show that the teaching authority of the Hierarchy of the Roman Church possesses these Charisms in fulness and, therefore, here 'freedom and obedience

are reconciled in a supernatural harmony in the Catholic Church the Kingdom of the Holy Spirit.'

It is difficult to discern what value this work will have for the Protestant scholar, for in spite of the clarity and succinctness of the treatment and the occasionally useful book-references in the footnotes, the author has given us neither a full nor an adequate account of the New Testament material. What he allows to filter through his sieve is pressed into the rigid ultramontanist mould of the Hierarchy and its teaching authority—a mould that is far from being a self-evident consequence from the New Testament. The book, in its method, is not to be compared with the articles on the same subjects in that excellent Catholic work the *Dictionnaire de la Bible*: Supplément.

Perhaps the more interesting part of this book for readers of this *Journal* will be the Introduction. This is a vigorous attack, delivered in support of the Roman Hierarchy, against what the author believes to be a dangerous and insidious Catholic 'lay theology' which gives itself the air of being 'an auxiliary hierarchy'. The author denounces an existentialist mentality amongst these Catholics who think not of 'truth in itself' but of 'truth for me' and who tend to be concerned exclusively with Biblical and Patristic Theology, thereby tacitly setting aside the 'precious elaboration and subsequent systematisation during so many centuries of the Church'. The demand among some Catholics for liturgical and canonical reforms, the frequent use of the word 'liberty', the view of the Hierarchy as 'authority' and not 'autocracy', the right of others than priests to proclaim the faith on the ground of there being a prophetic element in the Church—all these are sharply rejected by the author. (In addition the Protestant view of there being an 'enormous problem' in the relation between Spirit and Authority, is contemptuously set aside, and the discussions of this theme in Sohm, Harnack, Holl, and Goguel are dismissed in a sentence or two.) The answer proposed by the author is to invoke the 'aesthetic principle of a harmony of opposites', that is, to show that the Apostolic Church of Rome is both hierarchical and charismatic and is, therefore, the Hierarchical Church in which are the Charisms of the Spirit. His point of departure is Irenaeus in the saying quoted as the title of this monograph, and its context. But surely Irenaeus is not speaking of a visibly organised society: his words in the passage concerned (*Adv. Haeres.* III.24.1) are symbolic and mystical in their context. In any event Irenaeus in *Adv. Haeres.* II.32.4, and elsewhere, speaks of the Charisms as gifts of the whole Church, rather than as peculiarly canalised in a hierarchy. This predetermining of the evidence which the author wishes to find is also typical of his approach to the New Testament in the

subsequent chapters of his book. For example, in writing of the Church as the Kingdom of the Spirit, it is curious that he gives more space to the doubtful provision of New Testament evidence for the Spirit's work in the seven Sacraments, than to the clear and ample New Testament evidence for the Spirit's work in adoption, justification and sanctification—this is indeed to stand the New Testament on its head. To confine all that the New Testament states about the power of the Spirit in its Charisms to the teaching and disciplinary authority of the Roman Hierarchy on the ground that they are the successors of the Apostles and are endowed with the special Charisms of the Apostolic age, is plainly to ignore or wrench the evidence to the contrary.

Lastly, this is a disquieting little book for it presents a not indirect attack on that kind of recent Catholic scholarship, especially French and German, which has attracted the sympathy and interest of so many Protestant scholars. BASIL HALL

Frederick Denison Maurice. By H. G. WOOD. Cambridge University Press, 1950. 10s. 6d.

ALTHOUGH Dr Wood's Dale Lectures were delivered as long ago as 1942-3, they have only now been published. While this delay in making them available will perhaps detract somewhat from their interest, they form nevertheless a welcome addition to the literature dealing with F. D. Maurice, in whom there has lately been such a notable revival of interest. Not the least valuable feature of these lectures is that they are, in certain respects, complementary to Dr Vidler's study, *The Theology of F. D. Maurice*, which I reviewed in the September 1950 number of this *Journal*. Dr Vidler gives us a comprehensive and exhaustive survey of Maurice's teaching, from which his guiding principles are deduced and expounded. Dr Wood, on the other hand, illustrates in detail, yet with great clarity, the way in which those principles found expression in practice. He does this, not by considering Maurice's work in its entirety, but by selecting and examining, more or less in chronological order, certain specially significant writings.

This method naturally has its limitations, particularly in respect of the extent of the field covered. In view of Maurice's importance for the ecumenical movement (a fact which Dr Wood brings out), some discussion of his view of Anglicanism would not have been out of place, even in the Dale Lectures. There is, moreover, no reference to the *Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy*, apart from a passing mention, and Maurice's conception of Scripture might have received fuller consideration. As compensation, however, Dr Wood has given us several sympathetic and penetrating studies of the way

in which Maurice's mind worked, and of his method of applying his principles to specific problems. These are the more valuable because they show in what relation he stood to other contemporary thinkers. As Dr Wood says, 'The necessity of a vigorous exercise of mind to understand and digest his thought remains unaltered', but this book will make it easier to comprehend Maurice, simply because it teaches us how to think alongside him and to see things from his own point of view.

One of the most interesting chapters is that which deals with Maurice's critique of Newman's *Essay on Development*, and two others discuss the controversies with the King's College authorities over the theories of the Atonement and of Eternal Punishment expressed in his *Theological Essays*, and with Dr Mansel on the nature of Revelation. The two concluding chapters are also worth special mention. One gives an admirable account of Maurice's teaching and work in the cause of education, and Dr Wood describes his *Learning and Working* as 'a classic on adult education' which 'might well find a place beside Newman's *Idea of a University* and Sir Richard Livingstone's *Future in Education*. . . .' This is an aspect of Maurice's work to which, perhaps, something less than justice has been done in the past, and it is good to find the balance redressed. The final chapter of this book, on the other hand, deals with the Maurice whom everyone knows: Maurice the Christian Socialist. Yet here, too, Dr Wood has some new light to throw upon his subject, especially in connexion with Maurice's critical attitude towards democracy. These, and the other chapters, well deserve careful study; they comprise an important contribution to the understanding of one who was a prophet in his own day, yet who speaks no less certainly to the present time.

SHERWIN BAILEY

F. D. Maurice and the Conflicts of Modern Theology. By A. M. RAMSEY. Cambridge University Press. 10s. 6d.

THIS important little book gives us the substance, and to some extent the text of the Maurice memorial lectures of 1948. It contains only a brief sketch of the life and character of Maurice, with a primary emphasis upon his theological development. Anything more would have been superfluous, since there is already a growing body of literature devoted to the subject. The major portion of the book consists of an exposition and evaluation of the teaching of Maurice in relation to such basic questions as the kingdom of Christ, eternal life, atonement, revelation and the Bible. As the author observes, in respect of two of these, the atonement and the Bible, he is breaking new ground. But in so doing he is able to

show all the more clearly the importance of Maurice as a formative factor in more recent theological thinking.

With regard to the lectures themselves, we may say at once that they have all the charm and distinction which we should naturally expect of their author. Professor Ramsey, as he then was, goes right to the heart of the subject. He has an unerring eye for the crucial issues. He writes with a profound knowledge of Maurice himself, but also of the movements which he so greatly influenced. But he also writes with a simplicity and clarity which are in striking contrast with the involved and laborious utterance so often characteristic of scholarly theological exposition.

The importance of Maurice is something which we have only come to appreciate fully as we look back upon the movements which succeeded him. In his own time he was too much identified with this or that aspect of his thought for his deeper and more central influence to be discerned. Individual thinkers like Hort were conscious of their debt to him, but it was hardly perceived that the principles of Maurice underlay all the more significant Anglican developments of the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Ramsey claims even more. Rightly or wrongly, he does not believe that Maurice himself can be simply identified with the naïver theology and sociology of the pre-war epoch. He finds deeper undertones which still have a message for the very different world of the present.

The secret of Maurice's influence undoubtedly lies in his conversion to Trinitarianism, and his attempt to understand the Christian message, and with it the created order, in Christocentric terms. It is this which gives to his theology its unity and power, in spite of the unattractive expression and the apparent fragmentariness in detail. His Christian socialism and his views of the Bible proceed from the same source. But while the theology of Maurice was Christocentric, there can be no doubt that the understanding of the saving action of God in Jesus Christ was not worked out in purely biblical terms, but in biblical terms reinterpreted, or partially reinterpreted, in the light of Platonic philosophy and the theology of the Alexandrians. If there was a 'liberal' element in Maurice, it was not simply that he advocated a social Gospel or denied eternal punishment or took up the cause of biblical criticism. It was something deeper than that. He had a whole understanding of the Christian faith, an understanding which was Christocentric, but not in quite the same sense as the original witness of the New Testament.

To the extent that it was Christocentric, the theology of Maurice prevailed. It was almost inevitable that it should do so given the

intellectual conditions in nineteenth-century England. In so far as it is genuinely Christocentric, it still survives even when certain of its superficial manifestations have perished. But the ultimate question which has still to be answered is whether Maurice is really Christocentric in the right way. Professor Ramsey assumes that he is. But may it not be that those who cruelly persecuted Maurice in his lifetime were right in instinct, if not in perception or conduct? May it not be that Anglicanism will not return to its true line of development until it moves quite away from the mediating Christocentricity of Maurice to that which gives it its real force, an understanding of the Word and Work of God which is christological in the true or Biblical sense? G. W. Bromiley

The Primacy of Preaching Today. By Arthur A. Cowan. T. and T. Clark. 7s. 6d.

In the last two generations at least one hundred books on Preaching must have been published, under several foundations; and some thirty of these have come from the Warrack Lectureship in the Church of Scotland. The generous founder of this Lectureship seemed to believe that, if preachers who had won some reputation for effectiveness and success spoke fully and frankly to theological students, the level of preaching would be considerably heightened. It is not so simple as that; but all the lectures have been beneficial.

Dr Cowan has a strong title to speak on this subject. Though he modestly described himself as 'a general practitioner' and his book as 'these inadequate prelections', there are few men who can speak out of a longer and richer experience. For nearly forty years he has been minister in a large Edinburgh church, and he is the author of three volumes of sermons, marked by richness and substance, able construction, varied illustration and telling language. These same qualities are evident in the present book in which the experience of a lifetime is poured out.

The title which Dr Cowan has chosen is significant, indicating not only that the preacher's day is not over but also that preaching is irreplaceably important for the special conditions of our time, for the preacher's vocation in every age is 'not merely to offer sensible advice but to bring great news'. The main assumption of these lectures is that exposition of the Bible and of doctrine is basic, and this calls for 'hard desk-work'. The people who attend our churches have to be inspired with a noble fear, and many of them are 'like the ponies on Shetland moors, preferring to roam at will rather than to be saddled'. Preaching has always to aim both at the decided and the undecided, and has to deal both with personal and social salvation.

Two chapters contain stimulating illustrations of expository ser-

mons from the Old Testament and the New Testament, showing how every part of the Bible can be preached on. In another chapter an outline address on each of the seasons of the Christian year is given, and this is the most meaty theological part of the book. In the closing chapter sensible things and true are said on the manner of delivery which will best capture the whole person, mind, heart and will: 'our preaching should throb with pastoral affection and sympathy'.

Anyone who at this time of day writes yet another book on preaching is travelling on familiar ground. It is something of an achievement to do this, as Dr Cowan does, in a fresh way. Other books in this series may be more crisp and lively, but none is more serviceable, with the exception of the books by Henry Sloane Coffin, James Black and J. S. Stewart. Many will be glad that a good word is said for the Children's Address. GEORGE S. GUNN

The Order of Divine Service and sundry other Services, as used in the Canongate Kirk (Edinburgh). Published with foreword by Ronald Selby Wright.

Peace and Safety, a short Description of the Morning Service in the Canongate Kirk. Reprinted by permission from the Church Service Society Annual 1955. By Ronald Selby Wright.

The Holy Communion, order of the celebration at Clare College, Cambridge.

THE three works named afford evidence (if any more were needed) of the liturgical interest being shown in the Churches today. This revival makes a different impact upon different Churches and its expression is accordingly different. As R. Paquier says, in a book reviewed in this *Journal* in the last issue, *Traité de Liturgique*: 'Des Eglises richement dotées liturgiquement ont laissé leur héritage se scleroser et se mécaniser. D'autres Eglises étaient ou sont lamentablement démunies et indigentes à cet égard.' The books listed above represent attempts in Churches of both kinds to do justice to liturgy.

The talented minister of the Kirk of Holyroodhouse (and wartime Radio Padre) says that the order for which he is responsible, so 'far from "splitting" the congregation' has rather united it: 'for they love its order and beauty as they are able to understand and follow its logical sequence.' There is nothing in the Order, he adds, which is not authorised explicitly by the Book of Common Order of 1940, and the worship proposed is based on ancient practice and the teaching of the sixteenth-century Reformers. This may be allowed, but whether Calvin was right in claiming that his Service Book of 1562 is strictly 'according to the use of the primitive Church' is more dubious.

One obvious deviation from standard practice in Scotland is the postponement of the 'great prayer' (consisting of thanksgiving, intercession, remembrance of the departed, and the Lord's Prayer) to a position following the Sermon. From this position it was displaced, if we are to believe Dr W. D. Maxwell and others, under the influence of the Anglican Morning Prayer—itself a wrong example to follow here, since its intention is rather daily usage than Sunday Divine Service and public worship. It is thus the 'alternative order' of the Book of Common Order that is made standard in the Canongate. For the rest, the saying of the Creed, the Apostles' ordinarily and the Nicene at Holy Communion, is restored; kneeling for prayers and standing for the Gospel are recommended; lamps at the Holy Table are lit; and the choir is composed only of boys and men, and is robed. On the whole it is an order with dignified and restrained beauty, as those will testify who have been privileged to take part in it.

Peace and Safety is both description of and apology for the Order. 'Some digressions' are disarmingly admitted, and some of the notes dealing with them show some impatience. Nor is it possible to be quite sure that the chief intention of all liturgy and the main motive for liturgical renewal, namely the greater glory of God, receives clear enough expression. If the words 'Let us worship God' are said with the announcement of the first hymn, how can this processional hymn be said to be 'but an introduction for, and not the beginning of, the service'? Further, it is not adequate to say of 'adoration' that in it 'we ask God to help us to love Him more'. I do not really think that the author, as he alleges, fails 'to see on what possible grounds our Form and Order can be criticised'. He is much too wide-awake for this to be true. But the statement provokes important questions which in turn raise deeper issues. If we believe that there is a 'horizontal element' in the Church at all, and allow that historical continuity is of real, if secondary, importance, then in some degree what is done as practice in a Church is so far justified—not indeed because it is right in itself, but because it has a claim to be a declaration *e consensu ecclesiae*, and so to be more nearly right than the speculations and arguments of even the best of individual theologians and liturgists. This seems to constitute the root of the difficulty so unfailingly and universally encountered in persuading people to change their ways of worship. When all has been said on theological, liturgical and historical levels, conviction seems often as far off as ever. Why is there this quite unusual difficulty, such a far cry, as Paquier says, 'between paper and life'? If it could be put down to simple conservatism and sloth, it would be easier to combat. But this is too simple a diagnosis. The fact is that I have always to offer

unfailing respect to the declared voice of the Church—even the denominational Church—to which I owe allegiance, the rock from which I am hewn. It is because the situation is as complex as this that liturgical renewal can only be understood, and proposals made for it, at the very deepest level, where God is seen to be both initiator and recipient of worship, and His Word is seriously taken as the norm for its ordering.

The third booklet is the eucharistic liturgy used in a Cambridge College chapel. But it combines with the order a running commentary, occupying the left hand pages, and including description, explanation and exhortation. Here an unusual diversity of elements is gathered from many sources and with unusual success. The commentary is always illuminating, invariably fitting, and never obtrusive. 'For the cleansing of our hearts and the perfecting of our love we are brought up for measure not against someone else—of whom we can say "I am as good as he"; not against our own best self —of whom we can say "That, not my sin is the true I"; but against the absolute, holy love of God—before whom we can but repent, "Lord, have mercy!" ' And at the Prayer of Consecration, the beautiful 'Thy death, O Lord, we commemorate, Thy resurrection we confess, Thy coming we await!' is introduced from the liturgy of the Church of South India. Part of the adequacy of the commentary consists in its simplicity. The division of the rite into the Liturgy of the Word and the Breaking of the Bread is familiar; the pattern of the action follows the dominical example of taking, blessing, breaking, and giving; the exposition of the purpose of our coming is expressed as a work done for us, a presence given to us, and a way of life to be carried out through us.

An honest attempt has been made to regard the Holy Communion as an act 'of the whole People of God, in which each one of us has his liturgy to perform'. Thus a layman reads the first lesson and a deacon the Gospel; the biddings prefacing the intercession before the invitation are read by a layman; while for 'fraction' the loaf is given to the deacons. The basilican posture is adopted for the part constituted by the breaking of the bread. In the earlier Liturgy of the Word, attention is focused by both action and posture upon the lecterns, and the writer must record how impressive he found the way in which the deacons and other assistants took up position facing directly the Holy Scripture and its readers, for all the world like a tableau to illustrate 'Hearing the Word of God'. 'The exposition and preaching of the Word is an integral part' of the whole service.

Certain features without parallel in the Book of Common Prayer make their appearance. There is a presentation of the elements, the

bread and the wine being brought in by representatives of the laity, transmitted to the deacons, who in turn place them on the Holy Table—a deeply impressive action. (But when did wine become a symbol of 'our leisure'?) Biddings are introduced before the prayer of intercession. Then follows the 'third action', for which the rubric runs: 'As the priest hands the Loaf to the deacons to be broken, he may say: The bread which we break, is it not a communion of the body of Christ? Because there is one loaf, we, who are many, are one body. Then shall the deacons break the Bread.' Precedent for this is found in the liturgies of the Eastern Orthodox Church, the words of St. Chrysostom, and the Didache. One is tempted to wonder whether it is justifiable to separate four 'actions', thus by imitation 'continuing that of Jesus at the Last Supper, when He took, and blessed, and broke, and gave'; and whether especially this third action is rightly distinguished. In fact the fraction of imitation has already been carried out by the chief officiant (though the Order does not make this quite clear, for the rubrics inset in the Consecration Prayer in the Book of Common Prayer are not given, and there is only a retrospective reference to this fraction at all). There is a good deal to be said for bringing the fraction out of the context of the consecration prayer, as is done in the Book of Common Order and in other rites; and then indeed it might be granted independent status as an 'action'. But when what must rank as *the* fraction takes place during the course of the prayer, any fraction that follows seems rightly to belong to the delivery and communion, rather than to stand independently as a third action.

This connects with two other questions which the present writer finds difficult to answer satisfactorily. The first is whether 'the Breaking of Bread' really is the best general title for all that follows the 'Liturgy of the Word'. It has of course scriptural warrant and so far has good credentials. But what if the connotation of the scriptural term is different from that given to it here? What if we have to reckon with the fact that history has since interposed a distinction between sacrament and *agape*, and so diminished the appropriateness of the term for denoting anything in the new situation? And if the term is still to be retained, does it not then more appropriately apply to the *agape*? (An *agape* in fact follows the Communion here: 'The sharing of bread, concluded now sacramentally, must be continued socially', in a common breakfast.)

The other question concerns the appropriateness of the term 'Sharing' as title for the fourth action of the second part. Of course sharing is an essential element of the meaning of what is done in the Eucharist. The term used here serves to remind us that one part of communion is 'horizontal' and consists in the establishment of

relations with fellow partakers. But 'sharing' does not by itself indicate that this aspect of communion is absolutely secondary to (though necessarily a result of) the communion of all with and in Him who is present in the Eucharist. In other words, the term when used thus singly is more appropriate to the *agape*, and its use to denote the whole of this second part of the rite tends to over-emphasise the human aspect of the communion. And this is certainly not the intention of the gifted Dean of Clare College.

It is, however, only such formal elements that are open to criticism. The matter of this fine liturgical document remains unimpaired.

J. K. S. Reid

Asking Them Questions. A Selection. Edited by Ronald Selby Wright. Oxford University Press, 1953. 8s. 6d.

In this excellent little volume the Rev. R. Selby Wright has collected into one book forty-three of the most useful articles from a series of three earlier volumes published under the same title. These articles are written as answers to questions originally raised by members of Mr Wright's Boys' Club in Edinburgh, and together they form a very valuable handbook for the use of youth leaders and teachers as well as ministers in their work with young questioning minds. There can be no doubt that the questions posed accurately reflect many of the problems which the Christian faith raises for many in our day. Here they are dealt with very faithfully and lucidly by an imposing array of distinguished men and women from the different churches of the country. Since the first series of *Asking Them Questions* was published in 1936 some of the authors have passed on, such as D. S. Cairns, H. R. Mackintosh, D. M. Baillie, A. E. Taylor and C. C. J. Webb, but it is good to be able still to enjoy their witness and help in these pages.

Not all the articles even in this selection are of the same standard of insight or usefulness. A. E. Taylor's contribution on the Almightiness of God, valuable as it is, will not readily be appreciated by the boys of the Canongate! Here too the weaknesses of the great and the greatness of the great are clearly to be seen. The articles on the crucifixion and redemption are not very adequate. But what could be so rich and delightful as the answer of D. S. Cairns to 'What is salvation?'. But let it be said that all these articles have proved their worth in thousands of instances and their re-publication in this form should be very widely welcomed and used. Every minister should have a copy in his library for he will find it a constant source of insight and help in meeting the 'posers' that are so frequently put to him in his work.

T. F. Torrance

SWEDISH THEOLOGY SINCE 1900[1]

by The Rev. Professor Dr. GUSTAF WINGREN

It is individuals and their particular characteristics that form the pattern of any country's theology; but it is neither the qualifications nor the scholarship of these individuals alone by which the distinctive theological outlook of the country is determined. A great deal too depends on the way in which the Universities are organised, the extent of ground covered by the professorships, the nature of theological examinations, and things of that kind. It is factors such as these which determine the course of study to be followed by theological scholars before they reach a chair in the University, and for those of them who are appointed as lecturers it is the organisation of the study which prescribes, for example, what they are required to teach. A few words, then, may be appropriate at this point on the composition of the Swedish theological faculties.

There are two faculties, both maintained by the State, one in Uppsala and the other in Lund. As a general rule there has been only *one* Professor for each subject; but it should be noted here that Systematic Theology comprises two subjects, viz. Dogmatics and Christian Ethics,[2] while Practical Theology is counted as a separate subject. It should be particularly noted that Comparative Religion has been treated as a separate subject for a very long time. In the theological faculties of both Universities there has been a teacher of Comparative Religion since as early as 1913. It was in that year, actually, that Edvard Lehmann came from Berlin to Lund. For several years prior to that Nathan Söderblom had been the leading spokesman for Comparative Religion at Uppsala. There is no other country, as far as I know, where Comparative Religion has held this strong position as a subject of study—a fact that has been of significance for theology generally. Gustaf Aulén,

[1] *Svensk teologi efter* 1900; translated by the Rev. Ross Mackenzie, B.D.

[2] Within recent years there have been the further appointments of a Professor of the History of Missions at Uppsala, and a Professor of the Philosophy of Religion at Lund.

the systematic theologian, began as lecturer under Söderblom; he did not begin as a lecturer in Systematic Theology. And Anders Nygren, also a systematic theologian, began as lecturer under Lehmann—not as a lecturer in Systematic Theology.

The whole of the education for the Ministry in the Church of Sweden, theoretical as well as practical, is located in the theological faculties of Uppsala and Lund. The Church, however, has no voice in the appointment of Professors or other lecturers, their appointment being a purely University matter. Professors have few teaching obligations (lecturing four times a week), and there is a large number of Docents and other lecturers to undertake the necessary teaching. As a rule Professors offer no comprehensive series of lectures on every part of their subject, and so they can devote themselves to *monographs*; and if they so choose they may lecture on special problems connected with their particular subjects. In consequence, their literary output often becomes restricted to monographs, the disadvantage of this being that, speaking generally, we lack in Sweden good comprehensive text-books on the various theological subjects.

I have already mentioned that both theological faculties in Sweden have their own Chairs of Dogmatics and Christian Ethics. Closely connected with this, in Sweden the History of Dogma and the History of Ideas belong to Systematic Theology, not to Church History. This in turn has two results which have begun to appear in Sweden to an increasing degree in the last ten years. The first is that Systematic Theology is being given a historical emphasis, and there has devolved upon it the complete investigation of the history of Christian thought. In particular it has had as its study Luther and earlier Lutheranism, a study which it has pursued with a great deal of energy in research of an extremely penetrating and exact nature. In the meantime it has lost sight of many of the modern problems of Systematic Theology. The other result is that Church History is tending to lose its theological content. Speaking generally, the Church historian in Sweden does not deal with the history of the Christian Church as a whole, at any rate not as a scholar. His studies are of local history, and as a rule are limited to Sweden. Within recent years Practical Theology too has acquired the same provincial Swedish character. In

Uppsala there is published the *Year-book of Church History* which contains original papers and records of research. In Lund there is no comparable publication, but a large number of papers have been issued under the direction of Hilding Pleijel and Sven Kjöllerström. A Church historian or practical theologian in Sweden collaborates more often at present with historians in the Faculty of Philosophy than he does with theologians. Contact with the wider theological problems is not usual. An exception—but what an exception!—is Yngve Brilioth, who was Professor of Practical Theology at Lund, and whose writings display a comprehensiveness that is not usual.

And yet this concentration on Swedish problems and interest in domestic and local history has also a wider significance in that it gives those involved in every kind of academic study an insight into the individuality of the Church of Sweden and Swedish Lutheranism, in relation, for instance, to ecclesiastical law and worship. This work has been of great importance, and even a man like Edvard Rodhe (Brilioth's predecessor as Professor at Lund[1]) has had the task of dealing with it. But as I have been requested to deal mostly with Biblical and Systematic Theology, I limit myself in the main to biblical exegetes and systematic theologians in Sweden, touching on Comparative Religion only in so far as it is of significance for their work.

In 1901 Söderblom returned to a Chair in Uppsala from a pastoral charge in France. The year before, also in Uppsala, Einar Billing had sat for his doctorate. Thus the century began. There was no such obvious revival as this to which one can point around 1900 in the case of Lund, where Pehr Eklund, the brilliant dogmatician, used to walk around the streets talking to people. His writings are not of much importance, although possibly they are waiting to be rediscovered. In Lund the great revival began about 1920 when Aulén and Nygren began the co-operation that had so many fruitful results. In the 'Lundensian Theology', which had its origin at that point, much of what had been initiated at Uppsala around 1900 was rediscovered, and it was Aulén who achieved this rediscovery. Both Söderblom and Billing had directed their attention to the *dis-*

[1] Rodhe, to a greater extent than Brilioth, has set the direction which present-day research is taking among Church historians and practical theologians in Sweden.

tinctiveness in Comparative Religion of the biblical faith in God: the concept of the God who acts, and whose place of activity is the external world with its events and conflicts. In attempting to define the meaning of this biblical belief they knew they were going against contemporary Lutheran orthodoxy as well as the superficial and rationalistic liberalism of their day. Söderblom was not, perhaps, as much aware as Billing of this double opposition—there is no doubt that on the whole Billing was the more original and independent of the two. Furthermore, both Söderblom and Billing had a great interest in Martin Luther. They investigated his world of ideas, and both published lengthy works on different problems connected with the Reformer. As early as this—over fifty years ago—the trend which Swedish Lutheran studies were going to take was already fixed. It may be appropriate at this point to give a general picture of this trend.

It is characteristic of Swedish Lutheran studies that a line is drawn from the *Bible* to the *Reformation*. In the first place, Luther is regarded as a restorer of what was original in early Christianity and the primitive Church, and since the Bible belongs to the whole of Christendom and not only to Lutheranism, Luther himself, as a result of the very impulse given to the study of the Bible within Lutheranism, comes to be read as a theologian for the whole of Christendom, a restorer of what is truly catholic, as against the deviations of the Middle Ages. Luther is represented in such a way that his ecumenical significance becomes immediately obvious—the line is emphatically not drawn from Luther to Lutheranism. In this respect, perhaps, Swedish theology can rightly be accused of a certain one-sidedness, for it goes without saying that Luther exercises a lasting influence in orthodox Lutheranism. But when Swedish theology has dealt with the relationship between Luther and Lutheranism, it has almost always concerned itself with the *difference* between these two, and in particular it has emphasised the similarity between medieval scholasticism and Lutheran orthodoxy. Luther is isolated, and regarded as pretty well unique in his biblical purity—and it is for this reason that he is able to speak directly to us in the present day. Söderblom, whose thinking is marked by a greater multiformity and at times eclecticism, gives no support to isolating Luther like

this. But it is with Einar Billing that this thoroughly Swedish concentration on Luther, or rather, on the Bible and Luther, can be said to begin.

A theology such as this must naturally stand in permanent contrast to the earlier orthodox or pietistically-orthodox churchmanship—a contrast which is at least as obvious as its opposition to liberal theology. In this respect Swedish theology stands under the same conditions as, for instance, dialectical theology in Europe. But in Sweden, as far as relations to the life of the Church are concerned, special features have appeared. We have in the Church of Sweden an active 'high church' movement among the clergy, with a great interest in worship, sacraments, and so on. It is common knowledge that this 'high church' movement can be found universally at the present time, but outside Sweden the movement is often marked by an interest in the primitive Church and patristic theology; indeed, a certain repudiation of specifically *medieval* features can be discerned in these high church groups. But in Sweden this movement has a wholly positive attitude towards the medieval tradition, and is, if anything, apprehensive about any trend in the direction of a favourable evaluation of the primitive Church. This is quite certainly connected with the theological attitude in the Swedish Universities. 'High churchmanship' chooses a standpoint that is diametrically opposed to academic theology, and orientates itself towards the Middle Ages (which the high churchmen hold to be compatible with Lutheran orthodoxy!). I believe that it is the over-emphasis in Systematic Theology on the resemblance between medieval scholasticism and Lutheran orthodoxy that is having a prevailing influence in this respect. Unfortunately, by making this emphasis, 'high churchmanship' disengages itself from fruitful contact with the thought of the primitive Church and of the Reformation. It is characteristic in Sweden that it is the *Lutheran* scholars (and in particular Nygren and Aulén) who have devoted most of their time to studying the thought-world of the primitive Church. The early Church and the Reformation are seen in Swedish theology to be essentially one. Both are regarded as true and normative interpretations of biblical Christianity, a fact which gives the whole of Swedish theology a markedly *ecumenical* basis.

By thus digressing on Swedish Lutheran research from 1900 up to the present I have, however, anticipated events. At the beginning of the century there was, at the most, a *movement* towards this position—above all in Einar Billing. In Söderblom's great work of Comparative Religion, *Den levande Guden*,[1] which may be said to sum up a good deal of his thought, there is an obvious and undeniable apologetic tendency, and a striving after 'proofs for the existence of God'. Religions which speak of the acting and unexpectedly intervening God are evidence, says Söderblom, that a living God such as this 'exists'. At the same time, however, Söderblom, with his encyclopedic knowledge, gave an enormous boost to Systematic Theology which set itself, as its main task, to provide an historically accurate picture of the biblical viewpoint, in both religious and ethical terms, and which, at the beginning of the century, had its foremost champion in the young Docent, Einar Billing. Billing's great work, *De etiska tankarne i urkristendomen* (*The Ethical Thought of Early Christianity*, first published in 1907, and later in a new and revised edition, 1936), is a pioneering work which, even today and in spite of its age, would be worth translating. His discussion extends from the earliest period in Israel to the apostolic preaching of the New Testament, comparisons from time to time being made with Greek philosophy. Billing strongly emphasises the inner unity and coherence of the Bible: he sees Jesus as the One who, after the period of internal decadence in Judaism, restored something that belonged to the earliest stages of Israel's development. At the same time, however, Billing clearly defines what the tension within Judaism was that gave it its distinctive character—centred as it was in the idea of the Law, and incapable of seeing God at work in the here and now. His analysis of IV Ezra is of particularly great interest, and his discussion of the matter is repeated and extended in his smaller work *Försoningen* (*The Atonement*, 1908; 2nd edn., 1921), where he deals with Paul.

Söderblom and Billing left their chairs while they were comparatively young, Söderblom becoming Archbishop of Uppsala in 1914, and Billing Bishop of Västerås in 1920. Neither of them by then had reached fifty. Speaking generally,

[1] This work, based on Söderblom's Gifford Lectures at Edinburgh University in 1931, was published posthumously in 1933 in English as *The Living God*.

Swedish theology in the twentieth century has suffered great losses because the Church has claimed the right to secure for its episcopates several leading scholars (e.g. Söderblom, Billing, Rodhe, Tor Andrae, Brilioth, Aulén, and Nygren). But the contributions made by Söderblom and Billing have had a lasting influence on Swedish theology, and even today that influence is still felt. In a peculiar way their contributions filled the place which, in a small, remote country like Sweden, might normally (say, up to and during the first World War) have been taken by a liberal theology. In Sweden liberal theology has hardly had a single representative who is typical, so there was no need around 1920 of the radical remedy for liberal theology which Karl Barth was creating in his projected work. In Sweden the great contribution of Barthianism has been held to be of hardly any significance, and in the same way the very latest cry of 'demythologising' has by-passed us as well. Sweden's only prominent liberal—a professor furthermore—was Emanuel Linderholm, a Church historian at Uppsala, and therefore not an exegete nor a systematic theologian by training. In his special subject of Church History Linderholm was a brilliant scholar, but when he put himself forward as a reformer of theology generally—a reformer who was too poorly armed as an exegete or systematic theologian—he stood (as I said) alone. His work was taken over and is at present continued by the 'Religious Reform Alliance of Sweden', a society which has no great contact with the work that goes on in the theological faculties, and which is as hostile in its cant as the sacerdotal 'high church' party. At the same time as Linderholm was at Uppsala, Hjalmar Holmquist was at Lund as a Church historian, both of them retiring in the 1930s. Söderblom's ecumenical vision had a very strong and lasting influence on Holmquist. In his many important text-books of Church history he is fond of describing the history of the Christian Church as a development from 'compulsion' through 'toleration' to 'co-operation'.

But the theologian of the present day through whom the influence of Söderblom is most keenly felt is Gustaf Aulén, who increasingly appears as the one man who succeeds in uniting the theological revival at Uppsala at the beginning of the century with the theological revival at Lund after 1920. Aulén

was a Docent at Uppsala from 1907-13, Professor at Lund from 1913-33 (succeeding Pehr Eklund), and Bishop of Strängnäs from 1933-52. In the autumn of his life he has now settled in Lund where he is still busily engaged in writing. In his work, *Den kristna gudsbilden* ('*The Christian Conception of God*'), 1927, he stresses the connexion between his own basic position and the thought of Söderblom and Billing.[1] An essential part of this position is his 'dramatic' view of history with its 'dualistic' aspect, i.e. the idea of *conflict* and *victory* as the key to the meaning of Christ's work. The term 'antagonistic' would perhaps be better than 'dualistic'; but what is decisive in Aulén is that God is understood as the One who contends and is victorious in the death and resurrection of Christ, as well as in His continuing work in the Church. Aulén takes seriously the 'powers of destruction', as he calls them (the Devil, Sin, Death, and Wrath), and he wants as far as possible to discard *juridical* terms and concepts. In this respect he is clearly influenced by the studies he has made in the thought of Irenaeus, but he is particularly anxious that these perspectives of conflict and victory should be applied to the Atonement, a concept which in the past has generally been interpreted in juridical terms. According to Aulén the two interpreters who throughout the centuries have most clearly seen the inner meaning of the Atonement, and who have most successfully avoided juridical categories, are Irenaeus and Luther. Here, then, in Swedish theology we can see an instance of the similarity of view that is common to the early Church and the Reformation. Aulén sees Irenaeus and Luther as true interpreters of an early Christian, New Testament line of thought. Quite characteristic of Aulén too is the criticism he makes of the concept of *satisfaction* in Lutheran orthodoxy in relation to the meaning of the Atonement, a juridically-inclined interpretation in which he discerns a certain relapse into a medieval and scholastic thought-form.

Aulén was appointed Professor when he was thirty-three years old. Nygren was exactly the same age when he was appointed in 1924 to the second Chair of Systematic Theology along with Aulén at Lund. In spite of the fact that Aulén, like so many others, became a Bishop, he did actually have a long

[1] This work was published in 1930 in German with the title, *Das Christliche Gottesbild.*

period as Professor at his disposal (almost twenty years), and he made full use of these years by writing extensively. His other publications include introductory text-books which have been long in use. Aulén's great work, *Den allmänneliga kristna tron*, which went to four editions in Sweden (4th edn., 1943), is a text-book of Dogmatics.[1] Aulén—along with Holmquist—has undoubtedly had the greatest influence through his text-books on the younger generation of the clergy in Sweden and also in the neighbouring Scandinavian countries. Within very recent years his work has been quite intensively read in the U.S.A. as well. Aulén regards faith as being the object of dogmatic interpretation, and it is typical of his understanding of dogmatics that he should deal with the subject in this way. Neither dogmatics nor theology, he holds, offers us any justification for faith; nor does any thinking *within* faith or thinking *by* faith—there is, therefore, no 'Christian thinking' as such by which faith may be vindicated. Aulén's starting-point is that faith is present in history: faith is expressed in historical phenomena such as any scholar can observe—in the New Testament, in the Reformation, in the prayers and hymns of the Church, and so on. Dogmatics or theology is a science *about* faith, and the task of dogmatics is to express, as closely and as clearly as possible, what the nature of that faith is and what it says—and then to let faith stand on its own with whatever powers of persuasion it may possess, but without having arguments made in its favour by theology. In thus defining his task Aulén is partly dependent on Nygren. There was no real incisiveness or force in Systematic Theology at Lund until Nygren appeared with his doctor's thesis in 1921; but on the other hand Nygren had learned a great deal from Aulén during his years of training. In Swedish theology there is an independent line of thought that is specifically Aulén's own.

The point at which this line of Aulén's begins is the interest which Söderblom and Billing had taken in the unique position which the Bible occupies in Comparative Religion, and also in their common interest in Luther. But what is specifically Aulén's own contribution is his attempt, using this starting-point, to sketch roughly the history of dogma from the New

[1] An English translation, *The Faith of the Christian Church*, was published in the U.S.A., 1948.

Testament up to the sixteenth century, and so to see Christianity in relation to other conceptions which appear in the history of ideas, Platonism and juridical thought-forms, etc. We discover, says Aulén, that although there have been times when the Christian faith has been overshadowed by these other conceptions, yet there have been other times when it has emerged again from the shadows and its brightness has been renewed. It is in this direction that the interest of Aulén's theology moves, and as a consequence he comes to devote a great deal of his attention to the question of dividing the history of dogma into *periods*, the problem being to determine what difference each period of time has made in obscuring or clarifying the Christian faith. In particular it is the reciprocal relationship between early Christianity, the primitive Church, the Middle Ages, and the Reformation, with which Aulén is continually dealing. Even here in his earlier years we can trace the characteristic 'historising' of Systematic Theology which later becomes so universal in the whole of the so-called 'Lundensian theology'. Theological thinking is directed back towards some period in the past in which true Christianity is held to be securely rooted. Aulén himself sees the New Testament, the early Church, and the Reformation, as constituting a unity, whereas the Middle Ages and the post-Reformation period are, in his estimate, periods of eclipse. This outlook has spread through the whole of the Church of Sweden, even among the opponents of Lundensian theology, some of whom exalt a different period as the fountainhead of truth, e.g. the Middle Ages, the period of Lutheran orthodoxy, or of popular revivalism, but it is not always evident to them that in so doing they have taken over the historising aspect of Lundensian theology; and that while they are tied up with the day-to-day work of their parish ministry—where the *Word of Scripture* and *the present situation* ought by rights to be central—they are wasting time puzzling over problems which have their rightful place in the brain of a Dogmatics Professor! There is a kind of reaction backwards into the past, a movement away from the present, which is typical of Swedish Church-life.

This thinking in terms of periods and the critical appraisal of whole centuries at a time is prominent also in what is apparently Aulén's best known work in the English-speaking world,

Christus Victor,[1] in which the object of his criticism is the concept of the Atonement. Aulén takes the concept of the Atonement as determined by the perspectives of conflict and victory, a concept in which God is understood as the living, active God who vanquishes the 'powers of destruction', and in which Christ acts as God, *qua deus*—Aulén takes this idea of the Atonement and very sharply distinguishes it from the Latin idea of the Atonement in which the juridical perspective is predominant, and in which Christ represents humanity, and so acts *qua homo* before a wholly receptive and passive God. This perspective of victory is to be found in the New Testament (Paul), in the early Church (Irenaeus), and in the Reformation (Luther); whereas the Latin, juridical type is to be found in the Middle Ages and in Lutheran orthodoxy. But whatever subject Aulén is dealing with, it is the same scheme of division into periods that he follows. Broadly speaking, Aulén's general scheme of dividing Church history into periods and his critical appraisal of these periods has permeated the history of ideas in Sweden. That this is so is due, to a very great extent, to the contribution which Anders Nygren has made.

Nygren became Docent in 1921, and in 1924 was appointed Professor. The whole of his education and his academic career are connected with the University of Lund. Partly by his studies and partly by travel, he had acquired, before he came to public notice, a close knowledge of Continental (and in particular German) theology and philosophy. But as far as Aulén is concerned, the interest in *philosophy*, which is so characteristic of Nygren, was for him untouched ground at the beginning. During the years 1924-48 Nygren was Professor of Systematic Theology (with the subject of Christian Ethics) at Lund University. In 1948 he was elected Bishop of Lund. Thus Aulén and Nygren were colleagues together at Lund for the first nine years of Nygren's professorship (1924-33), after which period Aulén left for Strängnäs, returning to Lund in 1952 on retiring as Bishop. We might, I believe, regard these nine years during which Aulén and Nygren were professors together as being in particular the period when 'Lundensian theology' originated. During the period Nygren became

[1] The original Swedish work of 1930 was called *The Christian Concept of the Atonement* (*Den kristna försoningstanken*).

increasingly the dominant partner, and his predominant position as leader became even more obvious after 1933 when Ragnar Bring was appointed Aulén's successor—Bring is a disciple of Nygren and Aulén. He has trained a larger number of students than either of them, and a large number of papers has been published in Lund, often under his general direction, but these have, as a rule, dealt in close detail with historical matter belonging to different periods—the subject-matter having been examined through Bring's magnifying-glass rather than through field-glasses![1] No one after Aulén and Nygren, with few exceptions, has made any violent changes in taking up as a subject for fresh discussion the wide perspectives and the comprehensive appraisal of the whole of Christianity and the whole of the history of Christian thought which both these scholars dealt with. This wide approach in all its comprehensiveness is the contribution which Aulén and Nygren have made through their originative writings in the Lundensian school of Systematic Theology. In this particular Nygren has been exceptionally instructive and inspiring, and there is no one, not even Söderblom or Billing, who has exerted so wide an influence in Swedish theology as he has.

It would take us too far to give an exhaustive review at this point of Nygren's philosophical writings. He has a direct link with Kant and Schleiermacher, and he is particularly concerned with the problem of the separation of religious and ethical experience from the theoretical. Nygren holds that whereas a theoretical proposition is directed towards the question, What is true?, a religious or ethical proposition is not concerned to provide an answer to so simple a question. A religious or ethical way of thinking cannot, therefore, have its veracity proved by science. Empirical science (like philosophy) can establish only that there are many questions which are not theoretical, e.g. communion with God or salvation (the religious question), and human community or goodness (the ethical question). Further, empirical science (like theology) can establish only that certain factors appear in history as answers to these religious and ethical questions, such as Chris-

[1] Among Bring's most important contributions to theology in Sweden is his editorship of the *Swedish Theological Quarterly*, the leading Swedish journal of Systematic Theology, founded by Aulén in 1925. Since 1937 Bring has edited the journal.

tianity, Judaism, and Platonism, which state something about God and about goodness, offer salvation and enjoin the performance of certain good works, but are actually irreconcilable. Platonism and Christianity, indeed, are as like as fire and water. So are Judaism and Christianity. A *choice*, therefore, has to be made between these contradictory religions, and in making the choice we can look for no support from science, not even from the science that is called theology. Dogmatics and Christian Ethics have other tasks (not apologetic tasks), and these tasks are quite clearly defined.

The task of Dogmatics is to establish the Christian 'answer' to the religious question by investigating the past history of Christianity; and similarly the task of Christian Ethics is to establish the Christian 'answer' to the ethical question, but in both cases the method is the same, viz. the *study of patterns*. Systematic Theology is essentially the study of patterns, which also means that Systematic Theology is essentially an historical science. In the position taken here certain elementary features from Aulén are recognisable, though they are far more sharply defined. Both Nygren and Aulén understand theology as a science *about* faith. It is rooted as a science in a purely theoretical context, and it puts purely theoretical questions about what is *true* (in the ordinary, simple meaning of the word), asks questions, that is, concerning the truth *about Christianity*—and Christianity is a precise religion with a precise ethos. And when it comes to examining the result of the study that has been made, and consequently of discovering exactly what Christianity is like, we find also that there is a marked resemblance between Aulén and Nygren. Nygren holds that the study of patterns proves that the basic motif of Christianity is *agape*, both in the religious sense as well as in the ethical sense. From a religious standpoint *agape* implies that God is a giving, creative God who seeks man in his imprisonment in sin and creates him anew; while from an ethical standpoint *agape* means that the legalistic patterns of society and the egocentric development of personality are to be broken apart. In the history of the West there have been two particular rivals of *agape*: the legalistic *nomos*-pattern, the pattern of the *Law*, and the thoroughgoing legalistic view both of communion with God as well as of society; and the Platonic (and Hellenistic generally) *eros*-pattern, the

pattern of *Libido*, the powerful motivation of self-purification, of climbing and rising, which has been evident in past periods of European history. The greater part of European Church History indicates that a pattern alien to Christianity has dominated the understanding of God and the life of man which has been held in the various communions. Nygren has as pronounced an interest in the division of Church history into periods as Aulén, and the appraisal which both have made of the periods concerned is roughly the same, each of them rediscovering *agape* in the New Testament, in the early Church, and in the Reformation.[1]

A great deal of Aulén's work was intuitive: he felt his way forward, without any precise methods. Nygren, on the other hand, has combined philosophy and historical narrative in a way which makes possible the construction of simple methodical rules for the work of Systematic Theology, and (we might say) he stands out as something of a theological engineer—compasses and ruler and all! Whatever the subject in hand he always succeeds in reducing the problem by the easiest possible way to two or three basic questions, and proceeds to solve them without further ado, or at least points the way to their solution. A method like this is easy to imitate, and there are many of the younger scholars who have adopted Nygren's methods and applied them to a subject in the history of ideas not touched upon by Nygren. In this way the literature of Systematic Theology in Sweden has grown considerably, especially as a result of theses offered for the doctor's degree. At the same time, however, it is true to say that in Systematic Theology (as is generally recognised) every new positive contribution consists in the attempt to think from basic principles. I am afraid that the great flood of writing which has been produced in imitation of Nygren will prove to possess a somewhat limited value. What is original in this vast amount of writing is chiefly Nygren's work.

As I emphasised above, Aulén is a link between Uppsala and Lund, and through him the influence of Söderblom and Billing is still felt in Lundensian theology. Yngve Brilioth is another such link, although in his case he has been mainly influenced

[1] Nygren's large work on the Christian concept of love has been translated into a number of languages. The two English translations are called *Agape and Eros*.

by Söderblom and less by Billing. The part of Söderblom's work which Brilioth continues is his way of thinking *ecumenically*, and this ecumenical approach and discussion has had an effect not only on Brilioth's practical attitude as a churchman, but also on parts of his writings. As a church historian and a practical theologian Brilioth has, of course, given a lot of study to Swedish history, and especially to the Middle Ages in Sweden but along with this he has pursued a close study of Anglicanism (an early visit to England as a young student has given him a continuing friendship with the Church of England ever since, and this friendship towards the West still influences him). From the ecumenical point of view, however, the most important of Brilioth's works are his books on Holy Communion and Preaching.[1] In these two books Brilioth gives a broad, comprehensive picture of the history of the church universal from early Christianity up to the twentieth century, and he selects his subject-matter in such a way as to put the *present* into an international perspective. Brilioth sees the existing denominations which are to be found all over the world as having their origin in certain periods of Church history, their principal features having been moulded at one particular period. As an Archbishop Brilioth also thinks in terms of Church history, which means that he thinks ecumenically. He sees the different denominations throughout the world as individualities, about which little can be done. Brilioth has little inclination for dogmatic thinking, and he often emphasises with a light touch of self-depreciation that he does not understand Systematic Theology—but his self-depreciation is always tinged with a slightly ironical reference to the systematic theologians! In a way Brilioth has also contributed to the peculiar 'historising' of Swedish theology. But Brilioth sees hardly any single period in the past as being *right* in contrast to any other period. *All* of them, he holds, have their contribution to make to the church-life of the present-day. This attitude of Brilioth's towards the past in itself implies a great readiness to understand the individual characteristics of the present-day denominations. Brilioth naturally takes a leading place as well in the present Faith and Order movement.

[1] The work on the Holy Communion was translated into English in 1930 as *Eucharistic Faith and Practice.*

Brilioth's understanding of the point at issue in terms of Church history and at the same time of the ecumenical approach is particularly noticeable in his work, *Eucharistic Faith and Practice* (published 1926, new edn. 1951). The existing divisions of Roman Catholicism, Lutheranism, the Reformed Tradition, and Anglicanism, are here made living issues and become comprehensible to anyone who reads his book, as Brilioth, with his easy, well-balanced, and masterly style, proceeds to describe the different types of Holy Communion in former centuries from a purely historical standpoint. It is a recognised fact that Brilioth's work on the Holy Communion was of real practical importance in regard to the recent experiment in Church unity in South India and Ceylon, and therefore is still of importance in the new developments that are typical of the ecumenical understanding. But if *Eucharistic Faith* is the superb example of Brilioth's characteristic type of writing with the wide general surveys, it is also true to say that the same literary quality is displayed in his *Predikans historia* (1945) (*The History of Homiletics*), in which he has examined Roman Catholicism, the Reformed Tradition, American preaching, etc., from the ecumenical standpoint.

More particularly in the case of Sweden the encounter with Anglicanism was a new factor. One could perhaps say that it was Brilioth who, in the 1920s, established the friendly relations between the Church of England and the Church of Sweden. When Brilioth was professor, Anglican high churchmanship began to exercise a particularly strong attraction among the student circles.

It is strange that among the present leaders of the Church of Sweden there should be two theologians as unlike one another as Archbishop Yngve Brilioth in Uppsala and Bishop Anders Nygren in Lund, both of them in their own University towns.[1] If I were to name the most important theologian in Uppsala at the present time I should name Brilioth, although he is not one of the members of the Faculty, and similarly, if I had to name the most important theologian in Lund at present I should name Nygren, although again he is not a member of the Faculty there. The agreement and yet the tension which

[1] Brilioth was Professor at Lund from 1928-37, Bishop of Växjö from 1937-50, and has been Archbishop of Uppsala since 1950.

exists between these two theologians reflects in part the peculiar nature of the life of the Church of Sweden in 1956, especially in its relationships with the outside world. Both are wholeheartedly engaged in ecumenical work, Nygren being orientated mainly towards Europe, Brilioth towards England.[1] As theologians both are equipped with a thorough training in various subjects, and both possess wide general views of history.

Up to this point I have spoken occasionally of Biblical Theology, but in the whole of my description of Swedish theology since 1900 I have not mentioned any exegete of that subject. In the present century biblical exegesis in Sweden was for long fettered by the mutual antagonism between the conservative biblical view and historical biblical criticism. During that period the exegetes in the Universities directed their attack on conservative groups within the Church, and it proved difficult for exegetical research in Sweden to develop in this atmosphere with a free scope of inquiry. The exegete at the University was often in the position of being a pupil of some foreign school or line of exegesis. The protracted work of a translation of the Bible into Swedish also took away much of the active influence of the Swedish exegetical scholars. (The translation was ready in 1917, and is the first completely new translation in our country since the sixteenth century.) A native Swedish exegete first emerged in the twentieth century in the person of Anton Fridrichsen who was Professor of New Testament Exegesis at Uppsala from 1928-53. Fridrichsen was Norwegian by birth, and earlier in his life was Docent in Oslo. He was educated at a number of European universities, and from the very first was something of a cosmopolitan in Swedish theology. The importance of Fridrichsen lies not in his writings but in his unique capacity for drawing disciples together and inspiring them to pursue their studies. He founded the *Uppsala Society of Exegesis* in 1936, and was responsible for a series of publications, in particular an exegetical Annual.[2] The two Swedish compilations, *En bok om kyrkan* (1st edn., 1942) (*A Book of the Church*) and *En bok om bibeln* (1947) (*A Book of the Bible*), in which theologians of different branches of study (but for the most part

[1] Nygren was President of the Lutheran World Federation from 1947-52, and still holds a leading position in that organisation.

[2] In Swedish, the title of the Society is *Uppsala exegetiska sällskap*, and the Annual *Svensk exegetisk årsbok*.

exegetes and systematic theologians) co-operated, both contain very important contributions from Fridrichsen. A very large number of gifted scholars gathered around Fridrichsen. Their theses were as a rule published in English, German, or French, whereas the theses in Systematic Theology and Church History at Lund were usually published in Swedish. As Fridrichsen's total understanding of the New Testament and of the task of exegetics is not available in any major work but has to be sought in smaller essays, it is difficult to say anything precise about it. But some points, however, are quite clear.

Among the most important of these is the *messianic* understanding of a great number of the works and words of Jesus by which Fridrichsen interprets almost every narrative (whether it deals with a healing miracle or a meal, the choosing of twelve apostles, or a controversy with the Jews), and almost every line of the Gospels, in such a way as to see a messianic claim set deeply within them. The earliest picture of Jesus we have does not display, he holds, any understanding of His person which is different in essentials from the one which we find in John and Paul, and especially in the Epistles. This means radically, says Fridrichsen, that we must put back to an earlier period a great number of features in the Gospel which we have formerly been accustomed to regard as late. To the very earliest period, for example, belongs the idea of the *Church*—around the Messiah is being gathered the messianic people of God. Another very early feature is the conception of the *ministry* which, in early Christianity, is not the late inflexible form of authority which came into existence after the end of the 'charismatic' period, but is primitive in origin, a reaction in response to the fact that Christ Himself has been 'sent out'. In the same way too, and because of this, says Fridrichsen, great importance comes to be put on the *sacraments*, on Baptism and the Lord's Supper. With this rearrangement the New Testament begins to be seen as a collection of writings which to a great extent are homogeneous, the Gospels, the Acts, and the Epistles, having the same fundamental view of God and of His work in Christ.

Since this total understanding of the New Testament is to be found among those who are members of the circle that has gathered around Fridrichsen, it is understandable that the

former aim of biblical research could no longer be acceptable to them. There seemed to be no point in their attempting to discover a primitive stage at which 'the historical Jesus' appeared, or in attempting to establish an 'authentic word of Jesus' by text-criticism. The earlier type of research had got its inspiration and nourishment from its vision of the imminent future—a historically reliable picture of Jesus that was free from so-called secondary 'dogmas'. As early as the beginning of the 1920s the fallacy of this picture of the future was quite clear to exegetes in every country, but in Sweden, it would appear, exegetical study chose a different way out of the impasse from exegetics in the Continent. In particular, it was the idea of the *Church* which took a central position in New Testament exegetical studies at Uppsala where there is a quite obvious contact with the day-to-day life of the Church of Sweden, and a certain influence received from it. While in actual fact the life of the Swedish Church is moulded according to an ideal which we might derive from outside Sweden—in part from Anglican high churchmanship—the interest of the New Testament exegetes was centred upon the early Christian conception of the Church. The resulting association of these two factors demonstrated a remarkable agreement.

If we are surveying this method of procedure from the approach of *theology in general*, it is clear that a particular problem will have to come very much to the front. The earlier Church historians spoke of a 'process of catholicising' which took place, as they believed, at the end of the second century or the beginning of the third, at which point early Christianity was corrupted and 'Rome' appeared. It was presumed that the corruption consisted of an increase in the authority given to certain things which had peripheral importance in the earliest Christian period—the ministry, the sacraments, etc.—but as a result of the new exegetical studies we can now see what we did not see before, namely, that these things go back to the earliest New Testament period, back indeed to Jesus Himself. At *what* point, then, did the 'corruption' occur, and in what does it consist? Or perhaps no corruption at all took place during the first centuries of the history of the Church? But anyway, is not the Reformation in that case a great 'corruption'? The enormous task of criticising the Reformation

and especially Luther's theology from the position of the New Testament (understood in a new way) stands out as a theological task of the first order. And since in Sweden we have not only got this modern New Testament exegesis with Uppsala as its centre, but have also got an older Systematic Theology as practised both at Uppsala and at Lund, with Luther-research as its principal contribution up to the present moment, the relationship between the New Testament and Luther in our own country is bound to become a particularly urgent question, although there are no signs yet that this problem has begun to trouble Swedish theology. It is possible that the start of a general theological settlement such as this must take place in such a way that New Testament exegesis at Uppsala will make a determined move forwards from early Christianity to the early Church, and in this way set itself to the study of *patristics*, in co-operation, of course, with the historians of dogma. (As was noticed above, the study of patristics in Sweden has been in the past the concern principally of systematic theologians who have also been Lutheran scholars.)

Old Testament exegesis at Uppsala also has had suggestions and ideas to offer to all branches of theological study in the last decade. As had been the case at times before, it was also on this occasion a reversal in the general pattern of Comparative Religion which was primary. Geo. Widengren, who has been Professor of Comparative Religion at Uppsala since 1940, has strongly criticised Söderblom's whole understanding of the subject, and with a marked appreciation of the contribution made by Tor Andrae he has offered a completely new plan for the study of Comparative Religion.[1] While it is true that he has linked up with non-Swedish patterns, yet by combining generally accepted contributions and emphasising certain differences he has made his scheme for the study of religion something that is original to Sweden. Important aspects of this scheme are a general anti-evolutionism and a strong interest in ritual patterns. 'Myth' and 'rite' are regarded as associated elements, while the most important pattern is the 'royal' one. Widengren's school of thought finds 'the sacral king' at every point, even where the pattern has become so faded that the

[1] Widengren gives a general picture of his basic position in his work, *Religionens värld* (2nd edn., 1953).

untrained non-professional eye cannot discover it. This method has proved itself to be particularly fruitful in the department of Old Testament exegesis. Ivan Engnell, who has been Professor of Old Testament Exegesis in Uppsala since 1947, has devoted a great deal of attention to the *messianic* element in the Old Testament while making the most comprehensive use of Comparative Religion.[1] The Psalms especially take on a new meaning when looked at from this perspective, he believes. When we read Engnell and the exegetes who have been influenced by him, we sometimes imagine that we are seeing an endless number of new threads which bind the Old Testament to the New, but no one has yet taken up enthusiastically the question of the relationship between the Old and New Testaments in this connexion. Harald Riesenfeld, who has been Professor of New Testament Exegetics at Uppsala since 1953 (as successor to Fridrichsen), has been influenced by Engnell and Widengren and applies similar methods to New Testament texts, but he has not yet tackled the vast problems of biblical theology which are waiting to be discovered in Uppsala where all this exegetical research is being carried on.[2] It is worth noting that scholars both of patristics and biblical theology as a whole are being stimulated by Uppsala where in some measure New Testament exegetical study occupies a key-position.

In Lund, Hugo Odeberg has held the Chair of New Testament Exegesis since 1933. He, too, in a more unusual way has set about the task which the interpretation of the New Testament poses. Odeberg is trained in Semitic philology and possesses an intimate knowledge of Jewish literature. For many years he has been asserting the importance of the Hebrew Scriptures for an understanding of the New Testament, and he has given particular attention to the Gospel of St. John.[3] Odeberg, who is a theologian of the conservative type and close to Free Church circles, exerts considerable influence on the young students who have been trained for the ministry in recent years at Lund. On the other hand his theological posi-

[1] Among Engnell's publications available in English is the thesis he offered for his doctorate, 'Studies in Divine Kingship in the Ancient Near East', 1943.

[2] A typical example of Riesenfeld's method is the thesis which he offered for his doctorate, 'Jesus Transfiguré', 1947.

[3] Hugo Odeberg, *The Fourth Gospel*, 1929.

tions have not to any great degree modified the general theological position in Sweden so far as this is reflected in learned productions.

If I were to define the two problems in Swedish theology today, with all they involve, which require a fresh revision, I think I might very well indicate them in this way:

1. The most important problem is a purely theological one, and it concerns the relationship between the contents of the Bible and the exposition of the Bible in later periods of Church history, and in particular the exposition in the early Church and in the Reformation. The defining of the relationship between biblical theology and Lutheran studies is urgently necessary. A step in this direction could be taken by a renewed study of patristics.

2. The second most vital problem is not of a purely theological kind, but concerns the relationship between faith and the whole of the rest of our experience, which means consequently a relationship *outwards*. A renewed treatment of this problem in Sweden would probably lead to a resumption of the old topic of discussion—theology and philosophy. In Nygren's earlier writings between the years of 1921 and 1924 this problem was put in a radically new way in our country, and the solution to the problem which was offered by Nygren has not been replaced by any other over a period of more than thirty years which have since passed. A revision of these two problems with all they involve would be of significance for the whole of theology.

There are, of course, many problems in every special branch of study besides all this, and for those who work in these different branches of study the problems that are limited to their own department often seem more important. They are also easier to tackle. It is quite possible that the two main problems for the whole of theology which I have mentioned here may remain unrevised for a long time. But the time will come when debate on them can no longer be postponed!

THE MEANING OF ORDINATION

by The Rev. Professor JOHN M. BARKLEY

This article was written originally as a draft for private study, consequently all my indebtedness to other scholars, such as Dr J. L. Ainslie, Dr T. W. Manson, Dr T. F. Torrance, etc., is not noted as it ought to be. That it owes much to such men is freely admitted, so I hope that this acknowledgment will be accepted as adequate. Further, it was prepared for a group of theologians, with the result that a considerable background-knowledge is taken for granted. Its purpose was simply to form a brief historical survey as a basis for further study.

The leaders of the Reformed Church, during the Reformation period, repeatedly stated that they modelled their Church polity solely on the injunctions of the New Testament, but even a cursory examination exposes the fallacy of this claim. The same is true with regard to Ordination. There were many influences, apart from the NT, and these may be summarised as follows:

i. The evidence of Jerome, Alexandria, etc., with regard to episcopate and presbyterate.

ii. The fact that the 'communior sententia' of the Schoolmen was that the highest Order of the Christian Ministry is the presbyterate, and that the bishop is only a presbyter, who has been given the episcopal office.

iii. The ordination of a priest was a sacrament, whereas the consecration of a bishop was not.

iv. At the ordination of priests the bishop prays, 'May they be worthy fellow-workers of our Order, and may every kind of righteousness shine forth in them, etc.' The words 'our Order' are significant.

v. Pope Boniface IX and Pope Innocent VIII had both authorised certain presbyters to ordain. Indeed, the Bull of Innocent VIII was still in force during the Reformation period, and was not repealed until the reign of Leo XIII (1878-1903).

vi. Some of the leaders of the Reformed Church, for example, Row, Winram, Craig, in Scotland, had a considerable knowledge of Canon Law.

vii. Owing to the doctrine of 'lineal' succession the laying on of hands with prayer was emphasised rather than prayer with the laying on of hands.

viii. A knowledge of Eastern practice.

ix. The prelates, in many places, were actively hostile to the reforming movement.

These were all determining influences (some perhaps unconsciously), but the principal factor was the evidence of the NT. Acts 20.17-35 and Titus 1.5-9 pointed towards the identity of 'bishops' and 'presbyters' in the apostolic age; Acts 14.23 and Titus 1.5 pointed towards government by presbyters; 1 Tim. 4.14 pointed towards ordination by presbytery; and Acts 6.1-6 and 13.1-3 to ordination by prayer with the laying on of hands.

In this connexion it is noteworthy that the Council of Trent (Sess. xxiii, 1563), and the 'Bishops' Book' (1537) and 'King's Book' (1543) of the Anglican Reformation, all declare the 'prebyterate' to be the highest Order of the ministry. Indeed, this is still 'the common view and the common practice' in the Roman Church (*Teaching of the Cath. Ch.*, edit. Smith, ii, pp. 1043-5). In Anglicanism, on the other hand, there has been a change since 1662. In that year bishops were first said, in the title and at the presentation, to be ordained and consecrated. Many Anglican theologians, prior to this, had maintained that bishops and presbyters were of the same Order, for example, Mede (*Works*, p. 34) and Field (*Works* I, pp. 320ff). Ussher declared, '*Episcopus et Presbyter gradu tantum differunt, non ordine*' (Erlington, *Life of Ussher*, p. 258). On the other hand, Andrewes and Jeremy Taylor held that bishop and presbyter were different Orders. Here Dr H. F. Woodhouse, *The Doctrine of the Church in Anglican Theology, 1547-1603* should be consulted. To this extent at any rate, the leaders of the Reformed Church are justified in their conclusions. The fact that the NT was the chief determining factor means that today, as always, the Reformed Church must examine afresh the teaching of the NT for light and guidance, as she must always submit herself to the leading and criticism of the Word of God.

Church and Ministry in the NT

The NT reveals that in the Church of Christ everything is determined for believers by their relation to Christ (Matt. 1.21; Luke 2.11; John 3.17; 12.47; etc.). 1 Peter states, 'Ye are a chosen generation, a royal priesthood, an holy nation, a peculiar people' (2.9). Outside, and apart from, Christ there is no Church. This Universal Priesthood is both corporate and personal. The priesthood is a priesthood 'in Christ'.

The NT uses priestly language to express the royal priesthood of Christ, and, also, applies priestly language to the Church, showing that the Church is given to participate in His Ministry in word and action; in word, by proclaiming the Gospel to the nations, by edification of the Body, by prayer and worship, and by praise and thanksgiving; in action, by loving self-sacrifice, by ministering humbly to the needs of others, and by presenting our bodies in worship and service to God.

As all Christians are priests, so all Christians are ministers (servants) in virtue of their membership in one body. There is a universal ministry within the Church. Within the Body of Christ the members are differentiated according to the 'gift' bestowed upon them by the Spirit, and the possession of any gift is regarded as implying a debt to others, the discharge of which would be a ministry. Further, it is through the Spirit that the saving work of Christ is actualised in the Church as redemption (Eph. 1.7, 14; 4.30). This is a threefold operation: (*a*) The Spirit operates by creating out of the world the Body of Christ (Rom. 5.5; 8.9, 23); (*b*) the Body reaches out through the Spirit to a teleological and an eschatological fulfilment (Eph. 3.17; 4.13); and (*c*) this movement takes place through the operation of the Spirit in the Word and Sacraments (Acts 6.7; 12.24; 19.20). Amid the large diversity of gifts of ministry, certain ministries are prominent. In 1 Cor. 12 the ministries are described as apostles, prophets, teachers, miracles, healing, governors, helpers, tongues; in Eph. 4, as apostles, prophets, evangelists, pastors, teachers.

The dominant principle of the ministry in the NT is that of the manifold grace of God, and the relation of all these varied ministries to the Body is expressed from two points of view. In 1 Cor. 12 and Rom. 12, the Church is the recipient of the

fulness of the divine gift of the Spirit, and within the organism various members are given particular functions. The ministry may be said to come into being through the Church. In Eph. 4, on the other hand, the ministries are given by the Lord to the Church for the upbuilding of the Body. The stress here is on the gift of the ministry to the Church. The Church may be said to come to her fulness of growth through the ministry. These two views are complementary, not contradictory. The gifts, though special to certain members of the Church, are possessed by the Church as a whole. Thus in the NT the ministry of the Word and Sacraments is a divine gift to the Church, and is an integral part of her organic life. It is a ministry within the Church, exercising, in the name and by the authority of the Lord Jesus Christ, the King and Head of the Church, powers and functions which are inherent in the Church as His Body.

The appointment of the Seven (Acts 6.1-6) and of presbyters (Acts 14.23) shows that a number of offices becomes necessary so soon as the community begins to function as a self-contained organism. All ministries are organs developed in the Body of Christ for the performance of a specific function, namely, to declare Christ to the world and the building up of the Body by making better, healthier, and more efficient members. They are for the purpose of God in the Church. They are eschatological. Concerning the relationship of the office-bearers to the universal priesthood, the NT shows that it is of primary importance to note that there existed the closest relation between discipleship and apostleship. Before they were apostles, they were disciples (Luke 6.13). Discipleship is fundamental. It is the basic element of the new fellowship, but that does not annul the necessity of special office-bearers. Jesus called and trained the Twelve. After Pentecost, under the pressing circumstances of growth the primitive organisation gradually crystallised into more definite forms (Acts 6.1-6; 14.23), in which the Ministry of the Word took the central place (Acts 6.2; 1 Tim. 5.17). These officers are God-given (Acts 20.28; 1 Cor. 12.28; Eph. 4.11), and they are always thought of as 'servant of Christ', 'slave of Christ', 'steward of God', etc. (Col. 1.7; Rom. 1.1; Gal. 1.10; 2 Pet. 1.1; 1 Cor. 3.9; 4.1; 1 Tim. 1.12; Acts 20.24; 26.16). The primary character of the ministry is that of *ministerium*, not *sacerdotium*. They are called stewards or messengers

of God, servants of Christ, and suchlike. Priesthood, on the other hand, is always associated with the whole Body (1 Pet. 2.9; Rev. 1.5-6).

In the NT no descriptive adjectives are used of the Church, only the genitive, 'of God', 'of the living God', etc. Later, the terms 'one', 'holy', 'catholic', and 'apostolic' are used. The Church is 'one' in that she is the Body of Christ. She is 'holy' because she is called 'in Christ'. She is 'apostolic' because she is sent or commissioned 'in Christ'. Further, Ignatius is truly correct when he says, 'Wheresoever Christ Jesus is, there is the catholic church' (*Smyr.* 8.2). The fundamental principle is 'in Christ'. The Church is not an end in itself. She is a means to the realisation of God's ends; through her Christ continues His ministry in the world. She is a living organism created and kept in being by Divine power for a Divine purpose.

This may be summed up as follows:

i. The Church is the Body of Christ, and in her Jesus Christ, her Risen Head, continues His ministry.

ii. The Ministry of Christ is the only 'essential ministry' in the Church, and all other ministries are derived from and dependent upon Him.

iii. The call of Christ and the gift of His Spirit alone validate any ministry.

iv. All ministries are functions exercised by the Body of Christ through organs which are organs of the Body.

v. Ecclesiastical authority in the ordering of ministries identifies itself with the Divine will by recognising and accepting the gift of Christ to His Church.

Ordination in the NT

Three passages in the NT record an act answering to Ordination. 1 Tim. 5.22 and 2 Tim. 1.6, being doubtful, are not considered. The first is Acts 6.1-6, the appointment of the Seven, 'whom they set before the apostles: and when they had prayed, they laid their hands on them'. The second is Acts 13.1-3, the commissioning of Paul and Barnabas, 'when they had fasted and prayed, and laid their hands on them, they sent them away'. In both these passages the emphasis is on 'prayer with the laying on of hands', not on 'laying on of hands with prayer'. This distinction is borne out in the later history of ordination, for

example, Hippolytus, Serapion, and the Church Orders. The third is 1 Tim. 4.14, 'Neglect not the gift that is in thee, which was given thee by prophecy, with the laying on of the hands of the presbytery.' This, together with 1 Tim. 1.18, refers to a prophetic monition that Timothy should be set apart for his immediate task. A ceremony like that in Acts 13.1-3 is presupposed: prophets revealed that Timothy had been chosen by God, and the presbytery ordained him by prayer and the laying on of hands.

Timothy is exhorted not to 'neglect' but to 'stir up' the 'gift of God' that is 'in him'. The gift is God-given, and we must believe that it was something more than the external authority for entering upon his office, for being 'in him', as a personal possession and experience, it was something to be stirred up and increased by use. He could not stir up his Divine Call or his official authority as these were fixed facts. The only thing to which the words can be applied is the grace of God for the fulfilling of the official duties, given to him in ordination. The gift of the spirit takes the particular form of reading, exhortation, and teaching, that is, it expresses itself in the exercise of a function within the Body of Christ. While avoiding the error which links God's spiritual gifts mechanically with the mere performance of outward ceremonies, we must equally avoid the unbelieving error which makes the performance of God's appointed ordinances a mere outward form, and divorces them from His efficacious blessing upon those who rightly use them. The action is sacramental, not sacerdotal.

The term 'laying on of hands' in all three passages is ἐπιτίθημι τὰς χεῖρας. The verb contains the idea 'to impose with authority' and 'to lay commands on'. Consequently, in each case, there is the giving of authority and a commission.

Further, we must note that in Acts 6.6 the laying on of hands is by 'apostles' (are 'Twelve' v. 2 and 'apostles' v. 6 absolutely identical?), in Acts 13.3 the act is that of 'prophets and teachers', and in 1 Tim. 4.14 that of 'presbyters'.

Acts 14.23 reads, 'And they elected presbyters for them in each church, and prayed with fasting, and committed them to the Lord on whom they had believed'. Here presbyters are ordained by prayer and fasting. That the laying on of hands is not mentioned may be owing to St. Luke not specifying all

the details. The laying on of hands seems an inevitable conclusion from Acts 6.6 and 13.3. Further, 1 Tim. 4.14 refers to the laying on of the hands of the presbytery, there is the OT background (Num. 27.18-22; Deut. 34.9), and the fact that in post-captivity times a man became an 'elder' by the laying on of the hands of elders, in Jesus' time three. All this, and its frequent use in Judaism for a wide variety of purposes, rather places the onus of proof on those who would deny its employment at the ordination of presbyters. Later, both χειροτονεῖν and χειροθέτειν were technical terms for ordination. Originally this may not have been so, as the former may only have applied to election, and the latter to ordination. The former is used in Acts 14.23 for the appointment of presbyters during the first missionary journey, and in 2 Cor. 8.19 for the appointment of a church delegate, chosen for a mission of charity.

Titus 1.5 contains the injunction 'ordain presbyters in every city'. The verb is καθίστημι, and as it is also found in Acts 6.3 it may be taken to include election, and prayer with the laying on of hands.

The preparations for ordination also have their roots in the NT. In the case of the Seven, the ordination is preceded by an inquiry into qualifications, an election, and presentation. The qualifications outlined as necessary for presbyter-bishops and deacons in the Pastoral Epistles (1 Tim. 3.1-7; Titus 5-9; 1 Tim. 3.8-13) are not simply for the guidance of Timothy and Titus, but for the whole Church.

The NT provides little in the way of detail, but it does give the principles to be followed prior to ordination and in the action itself.

The Church in the NT is always in a Christological and eschatological setting. So is the Ministry of the Church, and so is Ordination. The end is the fulfilment of the purpose and work of Christ, and the Kingdom. What actually takes place in an Ordination takes place under the Spirit in the name and by the authority of Jesus Christ, the Head of the Body. It is an eschatological mystery. What is seen and heard are human words and actions. But in, with, and under, these human words and actions, God Himself is speaking and acting.

Ordination always points to the future, to a day of redemption. Men are ordained for the building up of the Church and

the bringing in of the Kingdom. Acts 6.1-6 shows that while the Seven were appointed because of a problem, they were ordained not only that the problem be solved, but that the Ministry of the Word be not hindered. In Acts 13.1-3 Paul and Barnabas are ordained 'for the work whereunto I have called them', namely, the Ministry of the Word (Acts 13.4-5). 1 Tim. 4.13-14 makes it clear that Timothy was ordained for the exercise of a God-given 'gift' expressing itself in the Ministry of the Word. The eschatological significance is clear in all three cases.

The NT indicates clearly that Jesus Christ intended His Ministry to be continuous in His Church, and that there should be a ministry within His Church to shepherd His Flock and to be an organ of the universal priesthood. This ministry is derived from Christ Himself through the operation of the Holy Spirit, and is perpetuated by the Holy Spirit through prayer with the laying on of hands.

This may be summed up as follows:

i. Ordination is preceded by a Divine Call.
ii. Ordination is an act of Christ in His Body.
iii. In Ordination the Church identifies herself with the Divine will.
iv. Ordination is by prayer with the laying on of hands.
v. Ordination implies a commission.
vi. Ordination admits to office within the Body, it does not constitute a caste.
vii. The ordained serve the whole Body of Christ.
viii. God supplies 'grace' for the fulfilling of the ministry.

Ordination in the Fathers and the West

It is necessary that we should examine briefly the doctrine and practice of the Church. The evidence of the NT, as we have seen, is not extensive. In the Apostolic Fathers and subsequent patristic literature, apart from the 'Church Orders', there is very little direct evidence. From the second century we have a threefold ministry of bishops, presbyters, and deacons. After the time of Cyprian sacerdotalism increases until it results in ordination to the priesthood by a bishop being held to convey an indelible character to the ordinand, sacerdotal authority, and the grace necessary for the discharge of his sacerdotal duties. During these centuries, we have also the evolution of

papal power until it attains its climax under Hildebrand. Remembering that these developments greatly influenced the interpretation of Ordination, we can still learn much from a brief survey of the rite.

After the NT, the first full information concerning Ordination is provided in the 'Prayer Book' of Serapion, the 'Apostolic Tradition' of Hippolytus, and the Church Orders.

In Serapion the word χειροθεσία, 'laying on of hands', is widely used, apart from the Ordination prayers, in the sense of benediction. The prayer for the making of a bishop is an epiclesis (edit. Wordsworth, p. 74). The same is true of the prayers for making presbyters (p. 73), and deacons (p. 72).

Hippolytus gives us fuller information than Serapion on procedure, but the fundamental element is the same. The prayer for the consecration of a bishop is an epiclesis (edit. Dix, p. 4). So are those for the ordination of presbyters (p. 13) and deacons (p. 17). 'The Apostolic Tradition' is the basis of most Church Orders. In the 'Apostolic Constitutions' and the 'Testament of our Lord' the prayers are expanded. But in each case the prayer remains in essence an epiclesis.

In the 'Apostolic Constitutions' (8.3-18) at the ordination of a bishop, the candidate is presented to the congregation, at which several bishops, surrounded by the presbyters and deacons, preside. The presiding bishop interrogates them as to the identity and qualifications of the candidate. The questions are thrice repeated, and the people are expected to reply in a loud voice, Ἄξιός ἐστιν, 'He is worthy'. Then three of the bishops approach the altar. The candidate kneels, and while two deacons hold the open Book of the Gospels on his head, the presiding bishop recites a consecrating prayer, at the end of which comes the response, 'Amen'. The newly made bishop is then conducted to his seat, receives the kiss of peace, and then acts as celebrant at the Eucharist. The same form (omitting the imposition of the Book of the Gospels) is followed in the case of priests and deacons, and the consecrating prayers are accompanied by the laying on of hands. Except that some of the details on ceremonial are more precise, *de Ecclesiastica Hierarchia* of pseudo-Dionysius is substantially the same.

The main sources for the Roman Ordination rites are the Leonine and Gregorian Sacramentaries, and the *Ordines Romani*;

and for the Gallican rites the *Statuta Ecclesiae Antiqua*, the Gelasian Sacramentary, and the *Missale Francorum*. In all these rites the form of ordination consists especially of a prayer, with laying on of hands, recited over the candidate in a public assembly. Later, owing to Gallican influence the presentation of the instruments, etc., became part of the Roman rite, but the original essence of ordination, prayer with the laying on of hands, was retained.

At the eve of the Reformation it is interesting to note that, when liturgical embellishments have been removed, and cognisance has been taken of dogmatic utterances and canonical legislation arising from the growth of a hierarchy of Orders, of a hierarchy of Jurisdiction, and of Papal power, it can be seen that ordination was originally, in essence, prayer with the laying on of hands.

As an illustration the prayer for the Ordination of a priest in the Roman rite may be quoted: 'Grant, we beseech Thee, Almighty Father, to these Thy servants the dignity of the Presbyterate, renew within them the spirit of holiness, that they may keep the rank in Thy service which they have received from Thee, and by their conduct may afford a pattern of holy living.' Here, there is more emphasis on office and rank than in Hippolytus and Serapion, but two facts are evident, (*a*) the prayer is an invocation or Epiclesis, and (*b*) the ministry is held to be God-given. That office (bishop, priest, deacon) is God-given, and an epiclesis remains, means that, while each has his own function in the common life of the Body of Christ, and while there are ordered relations among them, they (false doctrines having been excised) are all alike in that all depend completely on the ministry of Christ in His Church.

For further information Fr. J. Bligh, S.J., *Ordination to the Priesthood*, should be consulted.

Two questions, which the Schoolmen debated with spirit, may be summarised here, because they influenced the decisions of the Reformed Church.

1. Whether a priest, with papal authority, might ordain. Full details are given in Gillmann's *Die Lehre der Scholastik vom Spender der Firmung und des Weihesakramentes* (1920). The canonist, Huguccio, held that, on papal authorisation, every ordained person could impart his own 'ordo' in ordination to another

(pp. 4ff). This was the view of Pope Innocent IV, d. 1254 (p. 88). Aureolus, d. 1322, Antonius de Butio, d. 1408, John de Imola, d. 1436, and Nicolas de Tudeschis, d. 1454, maintained that with papal authority a priest could perform the ordination of a priest (pp. 88-95). William of Auxerre, d. 1231, affirmed that if all bishops were dead priests could consecrate a bishop (p. 36). Richard von Fitzralph, d. 1360, held that, in virtue of divine right, the right belonged to priests of extending the priesthood as in the apostolic age, and upheld the affirmation of William of Auxerre (pp. 130ff).

The grounds, which the theologians and canonists of the Middle Ages give for ordination by non-bishops, were threefold, (*a*) the identity of the office of priest and bishop in primitive Christianity; (*b*) the non-sacramental character of the bishop's consecration which in principle gives no new element to the sacramental ordination of a priest, since it does not give higher power than that for the celebration of the Eucharist; and (*c*) the fulness of the power which adheres to the Pope, as representative of Christ, who can therefore at will equip priests and other clerics with the authority for ordination.

The affirmation of the authority of priests to ordain was not confined to theological speculation, but had become also ecclesiastical practice, cf. Bulls *Sacrae Religionis* (1400) of Boniface IX, and *Exposcit* of Innocent VIII in 1489. Thus scholasticism prepared the way for the views of the Reformed Church that presbyters could ordain.

2. In respect of the nature of Ordination the Middle Ages saw a remarkable deviation from ancient Church tradition that the essence of Ordination lies in an Epiclesis with the laying on of hands. Early scholasticism, down to Peter Lombard, d. 1148, regarded this as the essential ordination act (van Rossum, *De essentia sacramenti ordinis* (1914), pp. 74-149). Occasionally it is found later, for example, in William of Auvergne, d. 1249, Bonaventura, d. 1249, Dionysius the Carthusian, d. 1471.

On the other hand, almost all regarded the ceremonies introduced into the Roman ordination ritual from the Frankish rites as essential, or, at least, as essential in a complementary sense. This resulted in the conception of the nature of Ordination being twisted and distorted by most schoolmen. Many, including Albertus Magnus, d. 1280, Richard of Mediavilla, d. 1300,

and Gabriel Biel, d. 1495, see the sole essential rite at the ordination of priests in the presentation of the instruments (van Rossum, pp. 12ff). Even Aquinas took this view. The prayer of the bishop, laying on of hands, and the anointing are only preparatory acts for the actual reception of ordination; although special significance adheres to the laying on of hands, since 'through it the fulness of grace is given', it only serves 'to make' the ordinands 'fitted for the exercise of the ordo' (*Summa* III, q. 37, a. 5; a. 6). Other schoolmen, such as Duns Scotus, d. 1306, Petrus de Palude of Paris, d. 1342, and Jean Gerson of Paris, d. 1429, complete the Thomist conception, contending that, apart from the presentation of the instruments, the second laying on of hands derived from the Frankish rite, which conveys the power to give absolution, is also essential for the act of ordination.

The *Decretum pro Armenia* of the Council of Florence, in 1439, declares the presentation of the instruments to be the 'matter' of the Sacrament of ordination (Denzinger, sec. 701). So the new scholastic theory of the nature of ordination was solemnly confirmed through a Council and through a pope as the dogmatically correct view in the Roman Church. This also considerably influenced the Reformed Church.

Moreover, attention must be drawn to one point, as it is absolutely essential for the understanding of the Roman doctrine of the Sacraments. The chief minister of the Sacraments is Christ. He is 'minister principalis'. Through the administration of the Sacraments His Spirit becomes effective in His Body, the Church. The priests, who are authorised by Christ to act in place of His Person and in His Name are only ministers, instruments in their function, 'ministri secundarii et instrumentales' (Scheeben-Atzberger, *Handbuch der katholischen Dogmatik* (1927) IV, p. 500).

Here a reference must be made to Morinus, who, in 1665, published his *de Sacris Ordinationibus*. He declares it to be the general opinion of the Latin Fathers that '*episcopi et presbyteri una ordinatio est*' (III, p. 30). Eugenius IV in the Bull *Exultate Deo* promulgated at the Council of Florence in 1443, 'the Holy Council approving', ruled that the 'matter' in ordination to the priesthood consisted in the porrection of the instruments, and made no requirement of the laying on of hands. Morinus in

his learned work demonstrated that for the first thousand years in the history of the Western Church there had been no such custom as the presentation of the chalice and paten, and that it had never been the custom in the Eastern Church at all (III, 11.5). Also, he showed that for the first twelve centuries the words used in the ordination of a priest were in the form of a prayer, but subsequently the opinion gained ground that these words should be not precatory, but imperative; therefore formulae couched in the imperative were introduced into the Ordination Services of the West, and, as Morinus points out, Nunez went so far as to make the change an article of faith, to maintain the contrary of which was heresy.

Morinus' great service was to recall the Church to the true essence of the rite, and many theologians, including a number in the Roman Church, since his time, have held that prayer for the Holy Spirit with laying on of hands is alone required.

Morinus believed that a number of Popes had been only deacons at the time of their election, and never were ordained presbyters. This has given rise to the opinion that the episcopate is a separate order and that a bishop receives at consecration the 'fulness of all the ministerial gifts', and, when he ordains, he delegates some of them to other orders. This view is held by Mabillon, Martene, and others, in the Roman Church. Also, it influenced Anglicanism. On the other hand, it must not be overlooked that for many years prior to Morinus' work, this was not the teaching of the Church. The Council of Trent decreed that 'Christ instituted a new, visible, and external priesthood, and gave to his apostles and their successors in the priesthood the power of consecrating, offering and administering His Body and blood, as also of forgiving and of retaining sins. Sacred Scriptures make open mention not only of priests, but also of deacons . . . ' (Sess. xxiii). There are seven Orders. The Bishop and the Priest are of same 'order' although 'differing in dignity and power' (*Trid. Cat.* II.vii.22, 25). In spite of this, and as a result of Morinus' work (III.i.2.26), some Roman scholars argue in favour of eight orders (*Cath. Dict.*, p. 673). In view of this, let me quote Mgr. Cronin:

> This (that is, the teaching of the Council of Trent) is certainly the general view of theologians; and . . . it is confirmed by the universal practice of the Church. There are some, however, especially among the canonists, who

regard the Episcopate as an Order entirely distinct from the Presbyterate; so distinct indeed, that it does not even presuppose, of its own nature, ordination to the priesthood. In other words, the Episcopate, in this view, is the 'whole' priesthood, and of itself confers the whole priestly power, or would confer it if it happened (quite unlawfully, to say the least) that someone were consecrated bishop without previous ordination to the priesthood: the Episcopate is the whole, and the Presbyterate is a part contained in it. The ground on which this opinion is based is the supposed historical fact of episcopal consecrations in the early ages which were not preceded by ordination to the priesthood, i.e. there exists no record of such ordination. They instance the Apostles themselves; but the Apostles did not receive their episcopal power by means of the Sacrament of Order. They received it super-sacramentally from Our Lord himself. The only other argument used is that from silence, which is inconclusive and treacherous. We have therefore deemed it unnecessary and undesirable to depart from the common view and the common practice, which enumerates seven Orders, culminating in the Priesthood or Sacerdotium.' (*Teaching of the Cath. Ch.*, edit. Smith, ii, pp. 1044-5)

Further, against Morinus' belief that a number of Popes at election had only been deacons, and were never ordained presbyters, must be set the fact that several popes, for example, Siricius (*Ep. ad Himerium*, i.14), Innocent I (*Ep.* xxxvii), and Zosimus (*Ep. ad Hesychium*, ix.1, 2) held that the Council of Sardica in 343 had decreed that the passing through all the grades of the hierarchy in succession was obligatory (Gratian, *Decretum* lxi.10). This makes his argument from silence hazardous even though *Ordo Romanus VIII* (P.L. lxxviii.1002) is capable of being interpreted either way.

Ordination in the East

Calvin quotes from Ignatius, Chrysostom, Basil, Gregory Nazianzen, Eusebius, Origen, Theodoret, pseudo-Dionysius, and other Eastern Fathers, yet it must not be assumed that he had a detailed knowledge of Eastern rites. Neither must it be assumed that he was absolutely ignorant of them. Consequently, a brief consideration of them is necessary.

It would appear that in the West 'Ordo' was borrowed from the municipal constitution of the Romans, so that 'ordo' would mean 'magistracy' (Aquinas, *Suppl.* xxxii.2, 4). At any rate, it came to have the sense of 'magisterial rank' (*Cath. Dict.*, p. 672). When one compares this with the East, he finds that there the emphasis is on 'Order' rather than 'Orders'.

The apostles are held to have founded churches and directed their organisation, but this does not mean that they created a whole system of ecclesiastical government. The Church has to undergo historical development. In this hierarchy arose, spontaneously, in accordance with the spirit of the apostolic tradition though there was a period when it did not exist. A threefold hierarchy of bishop, presbyter, and deacon, is found in the second century. The living tradition of the Church, true to the apostolic teaching, did not remain stationary but, in its gradual development, in due season, gave rise to hierarchy. Also, the apostolic practice of laying on of hands as a means of transmitting 'grace' was adopted in ordination. The Church is *a priori* to hierarchy, and not *vice versa*. The principle is that hierarchical powers belong to the whole Church, and that episcopacy has arisen within the Church through the Church's own power, and was not given to it, as it were, from without, straight from the Apostles. Pentecostal gifts include episcopal grace, but bishops were not created on the day of Pentecost. Owing to those gifts, in the course of time, bishops were created locally in accordance with the needs of the Church. The commission in Matt. 28.19-20 is in truth intended for the whole Church, and it cannot be said that bishops alone have apostolic grace. Episcopal grace is given to the community and not to a separate individual, or group, and can only be realised by the individual, or group, in connexion with the community. This means that not episcopal laying on of hands alone, but the active approval and participation of the whole community, establishes hierarchy and its succession. Hierarchy must be understood as the organisation of universal priesthood. Ordaining in union with the Church the bishops successively realise the function of universal priesthood. Ordination is not a mechanical or magical act, *Deus ex machina*, and does not imply the sacramental power of one bishop over the Church; rather it is the organ in and through which the dignity of priesthood inherent in the Church as a whole is handed down in succession to separate individuals. Apostolic succession means precisely the universal priesthood of the people of God. A bishop, in the East, as an individual, has no special power to make priests and deacons; his function is to sanction in the name of the Catholic Church the ordination performed by the Holy Spirit, who acts through the unanimous decision

of a local church gathered for the celebration of the Eucharist. Ordination administered by a bishop, without the participation of the congregation, is null and void.

Further, in the East, there is no such distinction, as in the West, between 'clerical' and 'lay'. The Church is an 'ordained' community. This is seen in the doctrine of Confirmation. For the Orthodox, Confirmation has nothing to do with the renewal of baptismal vows. It is an ordination, by which the Christian receives a special 'grace' as the result of which he can participate in the administration of all other sacraments. From this brief survey, it can be seen that the Eastern conception is that of Order within an harmonious community.

The form of ordination remains much the same as that found in the 'Apostolic Constitutions', outlined above. The corporate spirit of the Eastern Church finds, apart from the Eucharist, its most complete expression in the Ordination of deacons, priests, bishops. The first part of the service consists in the presentation of the candidate to the people, to which they must reply unanimously, 'He is worthy'. The same procedure is followed for the 'clergy'. Then the candidate is brought to the Bishop, who lays his hands upon his head, and prays: 'The divine grace, which healeth that which is infirm and completeth that which is wanting, is designating, John or Paul, etc., the most devout deacon, to be a priest. Wherefore let us pray that the grace of the all Holy Spirit may come upon him.' Still holding his hand on the candidate's head, the bishop prays that he may worthily discharge his sacred ministry, 'offer gifts and spiritual sacrifices', and 'renew the people through the laver of regeneration'. The bishop then raises the newly-ordained priest to his feet and loudly proclaims, 'He is worthy', which is repeated three times by 'clergy' and 'laity'. For further details Fr. S. Bulgakov, *The Orthodox Church*, should be consulted.

The Reformed Church

It must be remembered that the Reformers had been trained in the general tradition of the Western Church that Episcopate and Presbyterate are only degrees of one Order; that ordination to the presbyterate is a sacrament, whereas consecration to the episcopate is not; that the bishop, in Order, is no more than a presbyter entrusted by the Church with certain duties

for the sake of orderliness; and that the limitations imposed on other presbyters are canonical. Their guiding principle, therefore, was that Scriptural discipline should be restored. This meant the restoration of the Presbyterate to its primitive position, and the purging of Ordination from all false associations. While a prelatical episcopate was rejected, Episcopacy, being Biblical, was retained. Two points may be stated here: (*a*) Canon Law regulates, it cannot denude of capacity for what God has given, and (*b*) the Reformed Church is episcopal.

To understand the Reformed doctrine of the Ministry and Ordination one must bear in mind the Reformed doctrine of the Church. In studying the Scriptures, the Reformers had re-discovered the doctrine of the priesthood of believers. This was a doctrine held by all the Reformers, including Calvin (*Inst.* IV.iv.9; II.vii.1; xv.6). The Second Helvetic Confession (1566) may be quoted as representative: 'The Apostles of Christ call all believers in Christ priests . . . ' (Niemeyer, p. 508). The principle is understood in its Biblical and historical sense as implying the royal priesthood of the Church as an organism, because she is 'in Christ'.

Calvin frequently refers to the Church as the Body of Christ, and Christians as essentially members of the Body (Kolfhaus, *Christusgemeinschaft bei Johannes Calvin* (1939), ch. vi). 'To those to whom God is a Father, the Church must also be a Mother' (*Inst.* IV.i.1). 'There is no other means of entering into life unless she conceive us in the womb and give us birth, unless she nourish us at her breasts' (*Inst.* IV.i.4). 'It is only through the instrumentality of the Church that we are born of God and brought up' (*CRC* i.239). Jesus Christ, and He alone, is the Head of the Church. The Second Helvetic Confession declares: 'So the Church cannot have any other Head than Jesus Christ. For as the Church is a spiritual body, so it is necessary for it to have a head who is in agreement with it, and consequently spiritual. It cannot ever more be led or animated by any other spirit than that of Jesus Christ. St. Paul said also, speaking of Jesus Christ, He is the Head of the body, the Church' (Niemeyer, p. 501).

Certain passages in Calvin imply a tension as to whether the Church on earth is 'multitudinous' or 'gathered', but his teaching, taken as a whole, and his practice reveals his practical

identification of Church and community, the whole people being children of God, with a right to the Gospel message and a duty of obedience. The Church is a Divine Institution as distinct from a human association. In Reformed Confessions, as Professor G. D. Henderson points out, 'there would be agreement that the Church is for the sake of the Kingdom and aims at its extension. As was stated at Lausanne in 1927: "The Church is God's chosen instrument by which Christ through the Holy Spirit reconciles men to God through faith, bringing their wills into subjection to His sovereignty, sanctifying them through the means of grace, and uniting them in love and service to be His witnesses and fellow-workers in the extension of His rule on earth until His Kingdom come in glory" ' (*Nature of the Church*, p. 7). Christ created the Catholic visible Church 'for the gathering and perfecting of the saints in this life to the end of the world' (*West. Conf.*, xxv.3). The Reformed Churchmen proclaimed the doctrine of the priesthood of believers, but they also taught that drawn from and in the midst of this priesthood was to be an order of men to serve the Church in spiritual things. The relationship of the priesthood of believers to this ministry is expressed as follows in the Second Helvetic Confession: 'The apostles of Christ indeed call all believers in Christ priests, but not by reason of a ministerial office, but because through Christ all who are the faithful, having been made kings and priests, are able to offer spiritual sacrifices to God. Accordingly, there are great differences between a priesthood and a ministry. For the former is common to all Christians, as we have just said, but the same is not so with the latter. And we have not removed the ministry out of the midst of the Church when we have cast the papistical priesthood out of the Church of Christ' (Niemeyer, p. 308).

Zwingli expresses it as follows: 'It is true we are all fully ordained to the priesthood . . . but we are not all apostles and bishops' (Usteri and Vogelin, vol. ii, p. 279). The Ministry is a divine institution, 'Christ Himself alone is the true and rightful Head and Teacher of His Church. It is He Himself who gives to His Church pastors and teachers' (*First Helvetic Conf.*, Niemeyer, p. 119). Unto the Church 'Christ hath given the ministry, oracles, and ordinances of God' (*West. Conf.*, xxv.3).

Calvin, although not uninfluenced by medieval ecclesiastical

institutionalism, emphasises that the purpose of the Church is redemptive. The marks of the Church are 'the word of God sincerely preached and heard . . . the sacraments administered according to the institution of Christ' (*Inst.* IV.i.9), and 'these cannot anywhere exist without producing fruit and prospering by the blessing of God' (*Inst.* IV.i.10). The setting of the Church and Ministry is the redemptive purpose of God. The same is true of Ordination.

The authority of ministers to act in the Church is the fact that they are ordained by God (*Inst.* IV.i.6). A man must be duly called and he must answer his calling. In practice the divine vocation was carefully tested. Firstly, there was an examination of the candidate by men already in office concerning his knowledge of Scripture, and his ability to use it for edification; and concerning his moral character to ascertain if he would be a worthy example as well as a good teacher and pastor. Secondly, he was required to preach before the people, who were asked to give their judgment concerning him. Thirdly, there was the act of ordination. All three elements were considered essential. The usual features in Reformed Church ordinations came to be fasting, preaching, questions to ordinand and people, prayer with the laying on of hands, the right hand of fellowship and exhortations to minister and people. The Genevan 'Ordonnances' (1541) state: 'Now in order that nothing be done confusedly in the Church, no one ought to intrude himself into this office (i.e. the Ministry) without a call.' Calvin expounds what is meant by this: 'If anyone would be deemed a true minister of the Church, he must first be duly called: and, secondly, he must answer to his calling. . . . But as we have already touched on the necessity of executing the office, let us now treat only of the call. The subject is comprehended under four heads, namely, who are to be appointed ministers, in what way, by whom, and with what rite or initiatory ceremony. I am speaking of the external and formal call which relates to the public order of the Church, while I say nothing of that secret call of which any minister is conscious before God' (*Inst.* IV.iii.10, 11). The inner Call of God to the Ministry is always to be understood. Explicit definition of what was meant by the constitutional call is to be found in various authorities, for example, in the Scottish *First Book of Discipline*, 'Ordinary vocation con-

sisteth in election, examination, and admission' (Knox, *Works*, ii, p. 169).

The candidate must profess the doctrine of salvation, must lead a pure life, and must be capable of giving instruction. The greatest essential in the method of election is 'to pray to God, asking the Spirit for advice and discernment' (*Inst.* IV.iv.12). The election of ministers was arranged for in the Reformed Church under regulations varying somewhat from time to time and in different places. However, it was never wholly lost sight of that, whatever the variations might be, the people ought to have some control in the choice of their ministers. Here a distinction must be drawn between ordination which is the appointment of Jesus Christ, and the election of a minister, which is the appointment of men to a particular charge (*Form of Pres. Ch. Gov.*). At the same time the Reformed Church does not normally ordain unless there is a call to a specific charge. Fasting was a feature of the ordination of ministers, and a fast was sometimes held, also, prior to the election. In Scotland, the custom of an ordination fast has not completely died out (McMillan, *WSRC*, p. 355). Preaching was, without exception, a part of the ordination service in the Reformed Church from the beginning. Every extant Reformed rite testifies to ordination being by prayer. In this connexion, reference may be made to the 'Form and Order of the Election of the Superintendent, which may serve in the election of all other Ministers' (1560). The prayer of ordination is an epiclesis, and following it and the giving of the right hand of fellowship the Moderator shall give 'the benediction as followeth, "God the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath commanded His Gospel to be preached to the comfort of His elect, and hath called thee to the office of a watchman over His people, multiply His graces with thee, illuminate thee with His Holy Spirit, comfort and strengthen thee in all virtue, govern and guide thy ministry to the praise of His holy name, to the propagation of Christ's kingdom, to the comfort of His Church, and, finally, to the plain discharge and assurance of thy own conscience, in the day of the Lord Jesus: to whom, with the Father, and with the Holy Ghost, be all honour, praise, and glory, now and ever: Amen".'

Concerning the laying on of hands, Calvin recognises that

Scripture contains no express divine injunction with regard to it, but he thinks the example of the apostolic Church should be regarded by us as a 'precept' (*Inst.* IV.iv.16). On the other hand, while the ceremony is 'useful' the essence lies in prayer. It must be remembered that all the Churches of the Reformation succeeded to a Church in which the 'matter' of ordination had been declared to be the 'delivery of the instruments'. It was a period of reform, and 'laying on of hands' was discussed under the term 'ceremony' (*Inst.* IV.iii.16; Quick, *Synodicon* i, pp. 62, 93; Knox, *Works* ii, p. 193). Calvin discusses ordination on a Biblical basis, as the Church identifying herself with God's will, and goes so far as to say that he had no objection to the laying on of hands therein being called a 'sacrament' so long as the term is not used in exactly the same sense in which it is applied to the Eucharist (*Inst.* IV.xiv.20). The German-Swiss Reformed Church used laying on of hands from the first (Daniel: *Codex Liturgicus* iii, 235), although it is of interest to note that Zwingli in one passage seems to hold that the right hand of fellowship will serve as well (Usteri and Vogelin, ii, p. 175). The First and Second Helvetic Confessions both include it as a part of the ordination rite (Niemeyer, pp. 110, 119, 307).

Calvin's position is substantially that stated by Dr Rawlinson, 'There is even no abstract necessity for ordination to take place through tactual laying on of hands at all. Laying on of hands must be regarded simply as the means used by the Church to show that she is making the appointment and bestowing the authority; some such "outward and visible sign" to mediate the commission is doubtless required, but not necessarily this particular sign' (*Foundations*, p 399).

The first legislation on the subject by the Church of Scotland occurs in 1566, when she approved and adopted the Second Helvetic Confession. It states: 'Let those who are elected be ordained by the presbyters with public prayers and laying on of hands.' This practice was confirmed by the Assembly in the *Second Book of Discipline* in 1581, and in the *Form of Presbyterial Church Government* in 1645.

The Reformed Church holds and maintains that the office and commission of the ministry are derived from the Divine Head of the Church. Ordination is an act of Jesus Christ by His office-bearers, which means by prayer with the laying on

of hands by His ministers lawfully associated in Presbytery. Orders, therefore, because it is Christ who ordains, are to the ministry of the Church, Catholic and Apostolic. The Reformed Church acts by her presbyters as the Church Universal (cf. *Form of Free Ch. Gov.*; *Discipline de l'Eglise reformée de France*; etc.).

On Biblical grounds Calvin identifies bishops, pastors, and presbyters (*Inst.* IV.iii.8; *CRC* LII.7.411), although he appears to have had no objection to bishops if these were presbyters specially entrusted with the work of superintendence (Pannier, *Calvin et l'épiscopat* (1926)). On the other hand, the sacerdotal doctrine of episcopacy is rejected. The draft Ecclesiastical Ordinances (1541) states: 'There are four orders of office instituted by our Lord for the government of his Church. First, pastors; then doctors; next elders; and fourth deacons' (*Library of Christian Classics*, xxii, p. 59). This became the accepted position of the Reformed Church, but originally the conception of ministry was not so stereotyped; for example, there were Superintendents and Readers in the Scottish Kirk, and the Hungarian Reformed Church elects bishops for her Church districts, but this dignity on the ecclesiastical side does not confer on him an authority exceeding that of any other minister. He is the pastor of a congregation, and is answerable not to a bench, but to the Courts of the Church. Political and ecclesiastical controversy led to the later rigidity.

Turning to the question of apostolic succession, the Reformers attacked the whole idea of 'lineal succession', but they never denied a succession 'in Christ'. All that was attacked was a particular conception of succession. They maintained that 'they continued stedfastly in the apostles' doctrine and fellowship, and in breaking of bread, and in prayers'. The continuity of the Church and Ministry rests in the Lordship of Christ (Matt. xxviii.20; Alliance, *Proceedings*, xvi, p. 154).

The Reformed Church rejected the medieval doctrine of 'indelible character' being given in the ordination of priests. But they held that, as a rule, a minister is to be a minister for life. This is probably based on the words of Jesus, 'No man having put his hand to the plough and looking back is fit for the kingdom of God'. The French Discipline (1559) states: 'Such as are once chosen unto the Ministry of the Word must know that their call is for life' (Quick, i, p. 4). The 1571 revi-

sion provides a reservation: 'Those elected to the Ministry must understand that it is for life, unless they are lawfully discharged by the Provincial Synod for special and weighty considerations' (Quick, i, p. xix). So, while there was no belief in the imprinting of an 'indelible character' at ordination, there was the investing of the ordained with what may be described as an 'inalienable office' that was too spiritual to be put off except by a decree of the Church.

With regard to the conferring of 'grace' by ordination the Reformed Church rejected all ideas of the mechanical conferring of grace, but accepted the fact that grace would be given according to the Divine promise and call to service in every worthy experience of life. Commenting on 2 Tim. 1.6, which he takes to refer to the ordination of Timothy, Calvin writes:

> Whenever ministers were ordained, they were recommended to God by the prayers of the whole Church, and in this manner grace from God was obtained for them by prayer, and was not given by virtue of the sign, although the sign was not uselessly or unprofitably employed, but was a sure pledge of that grace which they received from God's own hand. That ceremony was not a profane act, invented for the sole purpose of procuring credit in the eyes of men, but a lawful consecration before God, which is not performed but by the power of the Holy Spirit. . . . But we are met by another question; for if it was only at his ordination that Timothy obtained the grace necessary for discharging his office, of what nature was the election of a man not yet fit or qualified, but hitherto void and destitute of the gift of God? I answer, it was not then so given to him that he had it not before; for it is certain that he excelled both in doctrine and in other gifts before Paul ordained him to the ministry. But there is no inconsistency in saying, that when God wished to make use of his services, and accordingly called him, he then fitted and enriched him still more with new gifts, or doubled those which he had previously bestowed. It does not therefore follow that Timothy had not formerly any gift, but it shone forth the more when the duty of teaching was laid upon him.

On Eph. 4.11, Calvin writes: 'When men are called by God gifts are necessarily connected with office. God does not confer on men the mere name of apostle or pastor, but endows them with gifts, without which they cannot properly discharge their office. He whom God has appointed to be an apostle does not bear an empty and useless title; for the divine command and ability to perform it go together.' From these two extracts it is plain that, even if the Reformed Church could not believe that the rite of ordination magically or mechanically produced grace,

they did believe that along with it, and because of the ordination by God into the office of the ministry, there could be bestowed the enabling grace of God suited to the office.

However, the fullest expression of Calvin's views is possibly to be found in his prayers, for example, that with which he ends his lecture on Mal. 2.9: 'Grant, Almighty God, that since Thou hast deigned to take us as a priesthood to Thyself, and hast chosen us when we were not only of the lowest condition, but even profane and alien to all holiness, and hast consecrated us to Thyself by Thy Holy Spirit, that we may offer ourselves as holy victims to Thee. O grant, that we may bear in mind our office and calling, and sincerely devote ourselves to Thy service, and so present to Thee our efforts and labours, that Thy name may be truly glorified in us, and that it may really appear that we have been ingrafted into the Body of Thy only-begotten Son; and as He is the chief and only and perpetual Priest, may we become partakers of that priesthood with which Thou hast been pleased to honour Him, so that He may take us as associates to Himself; and may thus Thy name be perpetually glorified by the whole body as well as by the Head' (*Lect.* clxxiv). Here we have in remarkable fulness and succinctness the Reformed doctrine of the Holy Ministry within the whole priesthood, and the doctrine of Ordination as consecration within the Body.

When we turn to the seventeenth century the most important document is the Westminster *Form of Presbyterial Church Government* (1645), which since its compilation has been regulative for English-speaking Presbyterianism. It states concerning Ordination:

> No man ought to take upon him the office of a minister of the word without a lawful calling. Ordination is always to be continued in the church. Ordination is the solemn setting apart of a person to some publick church office. Every minister of the word is to be ordained by imposition of hands, and prayer, with fasting, by those preaching presbyters to whom it doth belong. It is agreeable to the word of God, and very expedient, that such as are to be ordained ministers, be designed to some particular church, or other ministerial charge. He that is to be ordained minister, must be duly qualified, both for life and ministerial abilities, according to the rules of the apostle. He is to be examined and approved by those by whom he is to be ordained. No man is to be ordained a minister for a particular congregation, if they of that congregation can shew just cause of exception against

him. Ordination is the act of a presbytery. The power of ordering the whole work of ordination is in the whole presbytery. . . . It is very requisite that no single congregation . . . do assume to itself all and sole power in ordination. . . . The preaching presbyters orderly associated, either in cities or neighbouring villages, are those to whom the imposition of hands doth appertain, for those congregations within their bounds respectively.

This, it can be seen, is a summary of the doctrine and procedure outlined above, but two points call for comment. *Firstly*, 'the power of ordering the whole work of ordination' is declared to be in 'the whole presbytery', yet ministers only lay on hands. The principle is that ordination is conferred by the ministers of the Court, proceeding on the resolution of the Court as a whole. There is a distinction between the judicial and ministerial, just as in the Kirk Session the Court may decide to grant baptism after discipline, but it is the Minister who celebrates. *Secondly*, Ministers 'orderly associated' (that is, in presbytery) may ordain only 'for those congregations within their bounds', which mark the limits of their jurisdiction as a Court. To ordain for a more general purpose, for example, a professor or missionary, requires the authorisation of the General Assembly.

The Westminster 'Form' also enacts that 'at least three ministers' co-operate in an ordination (cf. Hodge, *Ch. and its Polity*, p. 305). Ordination by a single congregation is rejected, the form of ordination of a presbyter in the Church of England is held 'for substance to be valid', and the form in the Church of Scotland, 'or in any other reformed church', is accepted as valid. In view of the summary given above, further comment is unnecessary here, except to add that the doctrine and procedure of the Westminster *Form of Presbyterial Church Government* underlies the Ordination rites of present-day Presbyterianism.

To conclude, let me quote from the finding of a study group of the World Presbyterian Alliance, in 1948, on 'Essentials and Non-Essentials in Church Order'.

Fundamental to all Church Order is Christocracy, by which is meant the reign of Christ. Christocracy implies that the risen Christ continues to work in history among all nations and at all times. Christocracy is served by those who are faithful and devoted Christians. . . . The continuity of Church Order rests in the faithfulness of the Lord. The Church, with all her members, is called to serve the Lord in the world. The Church does not exist for her own purpose; Christocracy leads to a Church which is instrumental in carrying out the purpose of Christ. . . . The Church is the

body of Christ, the fellowship of the redeemed, created and continuously maintained by the eternal Word of God made man in Christ and always vitalised by the Holy Spirit. The Church is essentially one, holy, catholic, and apostolic. . . . The Church is not a static society but a living growing organism guided by the Spirit of the glorified Christ into a knowledge of the truth and of the way of life. . . . Jesus Christ, the Head and Ruler of the Church, has ordained the office of the ministry of the Word and Sacraments. . . . It . . . is a gift of God to the Church to the end of His redemption of men. . . . While the office of the ministry of the Word and Sacraments is considered a Divine ordinance, the officers are chosen by the congregation and are ordained by the laying on of hands and prayer by authority of the Presbytery or its equivalent. At the same time we recognise that all believers are prophets, priests, and kings, and that manifestations of the Spirit are not confined to the office of the ministry of the Word and Sacraments. . . . In so far as the ministry of Presbyters and Bishops is concerned, the New Testament teaches the parity of these offices. . . . Therefore, in the light of this fact, the faith and polity of the Reformed and Presbyterian Church has no place for a sacerdotal episcopacy. Nevertheless, it is increasingly evident that the requirements of the order, unity, and peace of the Church may demand, in certain national situations, the setting apart of chosen Presbyters to act as 'Pastores pastorum', but without independent authority. Furthermore, it is our judgment that in cases where it would contribute to the greater effectiveness of the Church as the servant of Christ and open the way towards wider unity in the body of Christ, the several member Churches of the Alliance, as occasion requires, may take steps to provide for a constitutional episcopacy.

Conclusion

I believe, as Professor T. F. Torrance says, that 'the time has come for a proper reunion of the churches on a Biblical and doctrinal basis and in a plenitude of faith and order in which no church will be the poorer but in which all churches will be enriched' (*Royal Priesthood*, p. 108). Only through biblical study, accompanied by a thorough examination of history, can a proper understanding of the meaning and significance of Ordination be attained. So, in conclusion, let me express the hope that, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, this brief survey may lead not only Reformed Churchmen, but the members of all Churches, to a fuller understanding of Ordination to the glory of God, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

ORDO[1]

by The Rev. Canon S. L. GREENSLADE

I. Introduction

The Church Militant, living and working in history as an organic and visible society, must have a structure and organs which express its nature and enable it to be what it is and to fulfil its function or mission. Whatever might be argued *a priori* about this structure and these organs, and whatever might be learned from the experiences of history through the centuries, it is plain from the New Testament that the apostolic church possessed institutions which were part of its structure and which existed in order to further its mission. Among these was a ministry of men distinguishable *qua* ministers from the other members of the body, a special organ of, and therefore within, the one body.

This distinction was later described by the use of such terms as *taxis*, *tagma*, *ordo*, though these words are not always used in the same way. Of themselves they do not necessarily carry with them the notion that this ordering of the Church into what were soon called clergy and laity is of divine appointment, immediately or mediately, any more than the sociological and administrative subdivision of Roman society into *ordo senatorius*, *ordo equestris* and *plebs* was, or the difference between the magistrates and councillors of a city (its *ordo*) and the populace. Indeed Tertullian, who first uses *ordo* of the clergy (*ordo ecclesiasticus*, *ordo sacerdotalis*) expressly states that it was the authority of the Church which determined the difference between *ordo* and *plebs*.[2] But that statement was made when he was a Montanist, anxious to make the most of the priesthood of all Christians. He had earlier reproved heretics for imposing priestly functions (*sacer-*

[1] This paper was written at the request of those taking part in the *Conversations* between the Church of England and the Church of Scotland, and is published by their request. It was submitted as a basis for discussion, and its form and contents were determined by its original purpose. It is not, of course, a formal, or a complete, statement of the Roman Catholic or Anglican doctrine of Orders.

[2] Tert., *Exhort. Castit.* 7. Though this is a work of his Montanist period, it does not follow that this opinion is Montanist; cf. *De Baptismo* 17.

dotalia munera) upon laymen.[1] Patristic theology considered the ordering of the Church into ministry and laity to be of divine appointment, and did not find this to be incompatible with the priesthood of the laity or the corporate priesthood of the whole Church. The Age of the Fathers was not compelled to formulate a full and careful doctrine of ministerial order.[2] It was led to state a doctrine of apostolic succession; it had to consider the validity of ministry and sacraments outside the Church; and it had some trouble, particularly in the fourth century, over the relation of presbyter to bishop and also of presbyter to deacon. While many later problems did not arise, the Donatist controversy and Augustine brought the question of *ordo* to the fore and, by treating ordination as a sacrament conferring an indelible character, he prepared the way for, and to some extent determined the form of, a systematic doctrine of orders, and he handed on to the Western Church a goodly crop of problems.

These problems might perhaps be listed at once; but they will probably emerge more clearly and concretely from a consideration of the Roman Catholic teaching on the subject.

II. The Roman Catholic Doctrine of Ordo

It might seem proper to construct the doctrine of the ministry exegetically and inductively, so to speak, from all relevant biblical evidence. Formally, however, Rome derives its doctrine of *ordo* in a more deductive way (though it is not wholly deductive) straight from the institution of the Eucharist, taking up other biblical material to support or fill out these deductions.

(i) Since the Eucharistic Sacrifice is the highest action of the Church Godwards and since the Eucharist is the means by which the divine life and grace are communicated to the faithful, it is essential that there should be ministers competent to perform that sacrifice and communicate that grace. No man can make himself thus competent to share in the Priesthood of Christ; so Christ Himself created such a ministry in commanding the Apostles, at the Last Supper, to 'do this in commemoration of me'. And since 'doing this' means 'performing this sacrifice', and since *sacrificium* and *sacerdotium* are correlative, the essential

[1] Tert., *Praescr. Haer.* 41.

[2] This paper pursues only the Western tradition. For the Eastern see the paper by Brother George Every.

Christian minister is the *sacerdos*. *Ordo* is essentially *sacerdotium*. As *sacerdotium* ordo is distinguished from *jurisdictio* and from *magisterium*, the latter being by some theologians understood as a subdivision of jurisdiction. Ordo itself is primarily, if not purely, sacramental. Ordination bestows a *potestas*, an ability to perform sacraments which the minister does not possess unless he is ordained to perform that sacrament (and *potestas* in this context is not simply authority); it also bestows a general sacramental grace to perform the duties of the office to which the minister is ordained, grace which is to be distinguished from the *potestas*; and it bestows a *character indelebilis*, so that *ordo* cannot be lost or reiterated. For ordination, like baptism, is a consecration once and for all.

(ii) Now if *ordo* considered as *sacerdotium* were restricted to the power of celebrating the Eucharist, with the addition of the power of sacramental absolution, conferred by Christ upon the apostles subsequently, it would follow that there is only one order in the Church, the order of priesthood; and this would be held equally by the ministers who are named for other reasons bishops and presbyters; and it would not be held by deacons. So far as concerns the equality of bishops and presbyters as *sacerdotes* and so their oneness in order, it is well known that this has always been a tenable position in the Church of Rome. In the Middle Ages it had the authority of Peter Lombard and Thomas Aquinas behind it, and was long the dominant view; it was not ruled out by the Council of Trent, and, though probably less dominant today, it still finds plenty of support among theologians.[1] In this case the distinction between bishop and presbyter is spoken of, within the sphere of order, as one of degrees (*gradus*) of order. The other view is, of course, that the difference between bishop and presbyter is such as to constitute episcopacy a separate order, with *potestas* to confirm and ordain, and with a fresh *character*, conferred by a separate sacramental ordination.

It must be remembered that this particular controversy is not about apostolic succession or about the existence of a separate *office* of bishop, though there has been some controversy as to

[1] On St. Thomas see G. E. Dolan: *The Distinction between the Episcopate and the Presbyterate according to the Thomistic Opinion* (Washington, D.C., 1950), which I know only from a review.

whether Christ separately instituted the office of bishop. The Council of Trent defined that bishops possess a *potestas confirmandi et ordinandi* which they do not share with presbyters, and while Trent itself stopped short of saying that this difference is *jure divino*, the modern Canon Law takes that step. Contrast Trent, *Sessio* XXIII, *Canon* 6, *Si quis dixerit in ecclesia catholica non esse hierarchiam divina ordinatione institutam, quae constat ex episcopis, presbyteris et ministris*, A.S., with Canon 108, *Ex divina institutione sacra hierarchia ratione ordinis constat Episcopis, presbyteris et ministris.* The former declares that there is in principle a divinely instituted hierarchy, which (as a matter of fact) consists of bishops, priests and deacons (but not necessarily by divine appointment); the latter affirms that it is by divine institution that the hierarchy consists of bishops, priests and deacons. Nevertheless, room seems to be left for much controversy, even for the view that the presbyter can, by virtue of his order, confirm and ordain, but is restrained from doing so juridically and ordinarily.

The deacon is brought within *ordo* first because his office is of apostolic appointment, and secondly because this office brings him into direct contact with the Eucharist as a minister, so that he participates to a certain degree, in priesthood.

(iii) *Ordo* is conferred properly by Christ Himself through ministers whom He has empowered to confer it, when prayer is made to Him for that purpose. As a sacrament, ordination has its own form and matter. The long controversy about the matter, turning upon the *porrectio instrumentorum*, and certain doubts about the form, are now held to have been finally settled by the Apostolic Constitution of 1947, as follows: 'The matter, and only matter, of the Holy Orders of the diaconate, presbyterate and episcopate is the imposition of hands, and similarly the sole form is the words which determine the application of this matter and which signify in a univocal fashion the sacramental effects.'

(iv) To turn away from points of detail, we may end this section by noticing some of the conclusions drawn by some modern theologians of the Church of Rome from its doctrine of order. It is not only that there is a hierarchy by divine appointment, but also that the being and life and mission of the Church depend on the hierarchy. Thus, recently, Journet writes: 'The hierarchic powers themselves preside from the

outset over the formation and conservation of the Church of faith and charity. They are prior to her: not with a priority of temporal succession, but with a priority which an always active ministerial cause can have over the effect it unceasingly produces. The hierarchic power, which we have called the apostolic body, is an organic institution founded by Christ and enjoying an uninterrupted life. . . . The Church derives her most precious and most inward gifts from the hierarchy; and from the imprint which the hierarchy stamps upon her comes her created soul.'[1]

These gifts, then, are procured by the priest. Thus Monsignor Cronin, writing on Order in Smith's *Teaching of the Catholic Church*, says: 'The priests of the Church ascend upon the Son of Man that is, by the ladder of the Cross of Christ, to heaven, bearing with them "the gifts and sacrifices" for the sins of the people, and descend from heaven by the same means, bringing as the gift of God for the people the sacramental and other graces of which they stand in need.'[2] Here the action of the priest in the Eucharist Godward precedes the gracious action of God manwards, as well as conditioning it. This is put in an extreme form in the traditional language here quoted from Tanquerey, *Synopsis Theologiae Dogmaticae*, ed. 23, III, sect. 1021: '*Eminens sacerdotum dignitas . . . hi angelis praestant, qui mittuntur ad divina mandata exsequenda, dum sacerdotes ipsi angelorum regi imperant, eum e caelo in terram descendere jubent, et quibus volunt dispensant.*'

III. The Church of England

What did and does the Church of England make of this western doctrine of order? It should be said first that it wishes to be loyally scriptural, and will not deliberately propose any doctrine of order, priesthood, episcopacy or succession as *de fide* or necessary to salvation unless it is read in Holy Scripture or may be proved thereby and, secondly, that it has not in fact said a great deal explicitly by way of defining a doctrine of order or ministry in its fully official documents, though its theologians have had plenty to say in controversy sometimes with Rome and sometimes with Presbyterians and Independents.

(i) It may be that the Church of England does not expressly

[1] Charles Journet, *The Church of the Word Incarnate* (Eng. Trans., 1955), Vol. I, p. 27. [2] G. D. Smith ed., *The Teaching of the Catholic Church* (1952), p. 1024.

say, with the same clarity as Rome, that there is a divinely appointed difference of order between clergy and laity; and there have undoubtedly been many Anglicans who have believed and taught that the clergy are simply officers of the Church. But Article 26 speaks of ministers of the Word and Sacraments ministering in Christ's name, by His commission and authority; and the Ember collect says that God, the giver of all good gifts, has of His divine providence appointed divers Orders in His church; and this belief is at least implicit, if not explicit, throughout the Ordinal. It may surely be assumed, without further evidence or discussion, that the Church of England officially holds that the ministry is given to the Church by its Lord, and is not simply the creation of the Church. It is probable that it is characteristic of Anglicanism to base this belief widely on the New Testament, including especially such passages as 1 Cor. 12.28 and Eph. 4.11, rather than to derive it precisely from the historical actions of Christ at the Last Supper and at other times. This means that the concept of order may be wider than that of priesthood.

(ii) Ordination is not defined to be a Sacrament. Article 25 explicitly denies that Orders is a Sacrament of the Gospel; it is one of the states of life allowed in the Scriptures which has not any visible sign or ceremony ordained of God. The emphasis here is on the last few words. Anglican theologians, even the more Protestant ones of the sixteenth century, allow that in ordination there is an outward and visible sign and an inward and spiritual grace, conferred by Christ, so that it is like a sacrament or a kind of sacrament. But, strictly, it is not one, for 'the things and words were not instituted and enjoined by Christ Himself, with a promise of saving grace annexed to the performance of it'.[1] And it was held to be important, when judging other churches and their ministries, that the matter and form had not been fixed by the Lord. Archbishop Wake's words are a useful summary of much, but of course not all, Anglican opinion: 'The imposition of hands in Holy Orders, being accompanied with a blessing of the Holy Spirit, may perhaps on that account be called a kind of particular Sacrament.

[1] Cf. Prideaux in More and Cross: *Anglicanism* (1935), No. 161. For references to earlier statements, see Woodhouse: *The Doctrine of the Church in Anglican Theology*, 1547-1603, p. 76. An interesting passage is in Calfhill's *Answer to Martiall*, Parker Society edition, pp. 227-31.

Yet since that grace which is thereby conferred, whatever it may be, is not common to all Christians nor by consequence any part of that federal blessing which our blessed Saviour has purchased for us, but only a separation of him who receives it to a special employ, we think it ought not to be esteemed a common Sacrament of the whole Church, as Baptism and the Lord's Supper are.'[1]

(iii) What does this ordination confer, besides grace in general to perform one's new duties? First, while upholding a distinction between Order and Jurisdiction, Anglican theology puts within the sphere of order some things which Rome puts within *magisterium* or jurisdiction. Thus the Anglican priest is emphatically ordained to the ministry of the *Word* and Sacraments. Secondly, while the *character indelebilis* was apparently not much discussed in early Anglican theology, and while extreme Reformers like Hooper objected to the idea, Anglican practice and the general sense of Anglicanism have accepted it at least to the extent that no one validly ordained would be 'reordained', even after lapse. Ordination is a consecration, not just an appointment to an office. Thirdly, ordination e.g. to the priesthood enables a man to do the work of a priest. This enabling is not confined to the general grace which assists the ordained man to be faithful in his duties. But it is not closely defined in authoritative Anglican documents. In the ordination itself, the words used are 'Receive the Holy Ghost for the office and work of a Priest' and secondarily, unless this is confined to jurisdiction, 'Take thou authority to preach the Word of God, and to minister the Holy Sacraments'. Hooker sometimes speaks of authority, more often and more formally of 'the power of order', corresponding to the Roman use of *potestas*, as distinct from a general *gratia*. Field also uses 'the power of order' as his standard terminology. It may be difficult to determine, and legitimate to discuss, the relation between power and authority here, and to ask whether the unordained, but baptised, Christian, though he has not been given authority, *can*, in the absolute sense, celebrate the Holy Communion. In the case of the ordained priest, the result of ordination is, as already quoted from Article 26, that he ministers Word and Sacrament by Christ's

[1] Quoted from his *Exposition of the Doctrine of the Church of England* (1686) in More and Cross: op. cit. No. 162.

commission and authority; and officially the Church of England rests, in practice, on this belief, without elaborating the point. Unofficially, the effects, rather than the precise nature of the power of order, are elaborated; or perhaps we should say that, sensibly enough, the thing is seen in terms of its effects. And we do not have to wait for the Carolines or the Anglo-Catholics for strong statements. In a famous and eloquent passage, Hooker comes near to the language already quoted from Roman writers: 'The power of the ministry of God translateth out of darkness into glory, it raiseth men from the earth and bringeth God himself down from heaven, by blessing visible elements it maketh them invisible grace, it giveth daily the Holy Ghost, it hath to dispose of that flesh which was given for the life of the world and that blood which was poured out to redeem souls, when it poureth malediction upon the heads of the wicked they perish, when it revoketh the same they revive.'[1]

(iv) Next we must consider whether, or in what sense, *ordo* equals *sacerdotium*. This will lead into the question of the number of orders, but first we must ask in what sense the Church of England speaks of the priesthood. Articles 19, 23 and 26, which speak of Church and Ministry generally, avoid the word; but article 36, referring to the Ordinal, uses it, as does 32, on the marriage of priests, where bishops, priests and deacons are enumerated. The Ordinal employs the word freely, and the bishop formally ordains to the office and work of a priest. The nature of this priesthood has to be inferred from the Ordinal. Clearly the priest is ordained to be a minister of Word and Sacrament, and he becomes explicitly the minister of Absolution. In the Book of Common Prayer the Communion service calls its minister both minister and priest, and in practice only those ordained priests are allowed to celebrate it. But the theology of priesthood remains unformulated. In contrast to the contemporary Roman ordinal, and obviously of set purpose, the sixteenth century ordinals of the Church of England did not explicitly ordain a man to offer sacrifice. Everything depends on what is implicit. In controversy, scores of Anglican theologians of historical importance repudiated the Roman doctrine of eucharistic sacrifice as, in itself, a propitiatory sacrifice, and with that repudiated the conception of priesthood propor-

[1] *Ecclesiastical Polity*, V, 77; More and Cross, op. cit. No. 148.

tionate to it. But they normally admitted or taught that the Eucharist is in a real sense sacrificial (they may have differed in working this out) so that its minister is a priest in a sense proportionate to the sacrificial aspect of the Eucharist. There have always been many who disliked the word priest, as applied to the minister, and others, like Hooker, who insist that strictly it is the English for *presbyter*, not *sacerdos*. And the Church of England insists upon the uniqueness of the Cross, as the only sacrifice which procures our redemption, and the uniqueness of Christ's own Priesthood; as also upon the corporate priesthood of the whole Church, derived from Christ's. But it is certainly legitimate to hold, and equally certainly it is widely held, that the ordained presbyter is in some sense the priest of the eucharistic sacrifice.

(v) Is this then, together with the power of absolution, the essence of *ordo* for Anglicans? If so, we shall have the same difficulty as Rome about bishops and deacons in respect of their order.

As was said earlier, it does not seem to be characteristic of Anglican theology to think of the ordination of a presbyter as exclusively the making of a priest, in the technical sense, and so to limit his *ordo* to *sacerdotium*. In other words, his order is not deduced from his eucharistic function. He is ordained to the full office and work of a priest (i.e. presbyter), including its pastoral duties. He is the minister of the Word and Sacraments. Thus even when the word used is priest, as *sacerdos* is used in the archiepiscopal reply to *Apostolicae Curae*, it is claimed that our ordinal (i.e. of a priest) '*nulli alii ministro ecclesiae nisi sacerdoti congruit qui et potestatem clavium habeat et verbum et mysteria Dei populo solus pleno jure dispensat*'. The sentence continues '*sive in presbyteratu maneat, sive in episcopatum ad maiora munera promotus fuerit*'. This leads us straight into the problem of the number of orders, and with it, of what constitutes an order. On the one hand, if *sacerdotium* is thought of as the essence of *ordo*, the presbyter possesses it equally with the bishop. On the other hand, the functions of a bishop, the totality which constitutes his *office*, is considerably different from that of a presbyter and includes functions like ordination which the bishop is specifically consecrated to perform. Should we think that this makes the episcopate a different *order*?

The question might seem to have been settled for Anglicans

by the Preface to the Ordinal, which from 1550 onwards has declared that 'It is evident unto all men diligently reading Holy Scripture and ancient Authors, that from the Apostles' time there have been these Orders of Ministers in Christ's Church: Bishops, Priests, and Deacons'. But what does Order mean here? The very next words are 'which offices', and a line or so later we read again that these Orders are to be continued. Before 1662 the Ordinal was 'the Form and Manner of making and consecrating Bishops, Priests and Deacons', with subtitles about making deacons, ordering priests and consecrating bishops. Article 36 refers to it as the 'book of consecration of archbishops and bishops, and ordering of priests and deacons'. It was in 1662 that Bishops were first said to be *ordained* and consecrated (in the title and at the presentation). Accordingly many Anglican theologians before 1662 maintained that bishops and presbyters were the same order. Thus, Hooker, who generally, and perhaps always, speaks of degrees of order, Mede, and very emphatically Field.[1] There were others, however, like Andrewes, who held to a difference of order because there were differences of function; and Andrewes taught that the two orders of bishop and presbyter were constituted by the Lord in the Apostles and the Seventy. So also Jeremy Taylor. Others remained in doubt, and sometimes thought that it was only a question of terms, being satisfied by the distinction of office.[2]

(vi) Is it in fact only a matter of definition? It may appear so to all who hold that the office of bishop, as distinct from that of presbyter, including the sole right and power to ordain, was inherited by the first bishops from the apostles, over the heads, so to speak, of the presbyters whom the apostles also appointed. In that case, even if full *sacerdotium* is allowed to the presbyter and equivalence in *order* is allowed on that ground, the presbyter as such never receives the power to ordain, and his dependence upon the bishop for his order makes it possible to speak of the bishop, who also possesses *sacerdotium*, as the essential minister in the Church. But where it is believed that the apostles, in order to promote the mission of the Church, first appointed

[1] For Hooker and Mede, see More and Cross, op. cit. Nos. 148, 149. For Field, his *Of the Church* (ed. 3, 1635), V, 27.

[2] For Andrewes, see A. J. Mason, *The Church of England and Episcopacy* (Cambridge, 1914), p. 67, and for Taylor, ibid. pp. 126-7. Mason gives the opinions of many other Anglican theologians.

presbyter-bishops who governed the local churches and did ordain, it can be asserted that their *order* includes the power to ordain and is always possessed in virtue of their order by presbyters through their ordination to do the work of a presbyter, even if by jurisdiction or the subsequent action of the Church, the exercise of this power of order is limited to those presbyters who are further consecrated to the office of bishop. In this case, in so far as Order means the divine or apostolic ordering of the Church as known from Scripture, the presbyter or minister of the Word and Sacraments is the essential minister in the Church. Consequently many Anglican bishops and theologians held that the Churches of the continental reformation had valid orders. Thus, while the 1662 Ordinal obviously swings the Church of England towards an official teaching that there are three Orders, the sense in which order is used remains open, and the relevant problems of ecumenical theology are not settled by the use of the word.

IV. Some Conclusions and some Problems

(1) The ethos of the Church of England is well displayed in its attitude to the Ministry. It has decided what to do—namely to maintain the three ancient offices or 'orders' of Bishop, Presbyter and Deacon—and has refrained from laying down officially a systematic statement of the doctrine of the ministry. Its Ordinal is full enough to show its intention in ordaining and to clarify the functions of the various offices. It tacitly repudiated the notion of the sacrificing priest, in the strict sense of the word, but positively its official documents are often capable of more than one theological interpretation. And what it lays down for itself, in the Ordinal, it does not claim to demand of the Church absolutely (Articles 19 and 23), and so of other churches.

(2) Not that it considers the doctrine of the Ministry to be unimportant or indifferent, or thinks of ministers as purely human functionaries. But it recognises that there is much which is not completely clear in the Bible and much that is not defined *de fide* by any ecumenical council or taught unambiguously by universal tradition. It therefore allows a good deal of liberty of interpretation within the requirements of practice.

(3) Since it retained the three ancient 'orders', it was not at

once compelled to produce officially a systematic statement of its doctrine of order for the purpose of justifying a new practice. Its theologians have naturally been influenced by the particular controversies of their own day, whether with Rome or with Presbyterians or other non-episcopal communions, and so have emphasised different points at different times. On the whole they have tended, in method, to take a broad view of the biblical evidence and of the total needs of the Church for ministry both towards God and towards man, rather than to attempt to deduce or organise a systematic doctrine from or around some one doctrine or principle or institution, such as the Eucharist, though they have often insisted upon a particular principle or institution as being essential.

(4) There would be general (though not complete) agreement on the following points:

(*a*) The Church must be so ordered as to exhibit and fulfil its nature and mission; and although many details of organisation are relative to circumstances and within the power of the Church to determine, it must be faithful to biblical principles and to such biblical institutions as, in the light of those principles, appear to be intended and given as part of the permanent structure of the Church.

(*b*) All human ministry and priesthood is a continuing participation in the ministry of Christ.

(*c*) The ministry and priesthood of Christ is continued and shared by the whole Church, and not limited to an ordained ministry within it.

(*d*) But an ordained ministry, participating in a special way in the ministry and priesthood of Christ and intended to exercise particular functions, was and is given by the Lord to His Church; and this is a ministry on behalf of Christ in and to the Church, by which the Word and Sacraments are constantly ministered to the members, and the members are assisted to perform their own ministries or services to God and to each other and to the world.

(*e*) Therefore the ordained minister receives his primary and essential authority from Christ and through the Church, though in some matters he no doubt receives an authority directly from the Church. (It is what he receives from Christ that, properly speaking, determines his *ordo*.)

(*f*) The New Testament exhibits a differentiation of ministries and *charismata* within the ordained ministry, grounded theologically in the organic nature of the Church as the Body of Christ, and historically in certain recorded actions of Christ and the apostles.

(*g*) These ministries are mutually necessary and must serve each other in love, as they serve Christ and the whole Church; but this mutuality is not incompatible with a subordination in rank involving the authority of one grade or order over another.

(*h*) In the New Testament, the general oversight of the whole Church is seen to be in the hands of the apostles, who committed *episcope* in local churches to colleges of presbyter-bishops, making them ministers of the word and sacraments.

(*i*) *De facto*, the so-called monarchical bishops exercise, in episcopal churches, certain functions, especially of general oversight, which were formerly exercised by the apostles; and these they exercise corporately within and on behalf of the whole Church. Further, historically and *de facto*, some of these functions may not be exercised, in episcopal churches, by presbyters. The consecration of bishops, and not of presbyters, to exercise such functions, especially that of ordaining, has resulted in a general use of the expression 'three orders', when deacons are included. But there is no binding and official explanation of the difference between office and order.

(5) There is much uncertainty or disagreement within the Church of England on the following points:

(*a*) Whether the office of bishop is of divine or apostolic appointment in such a sense that it is permanently necessary to the being, or to the perfection, of the Church; and in what sense bishops are successors of the Apostles.

(*b*) Whether the distinctness of the office of Bishop means that he has also a separate order, in the sense that he is ordained to and given a *potestas* and a *character* without which it is strictly impossible, and not merely irregular, for the functions specific to his office (especially ordination) to be performed; or

(*c*) whether it is open to the Church, or even to parts of the Church, to sanction ordination by presbyters, either in virtue of the authority of the Church corporately or in virtue of the *ordo* of presbyters as the essential ministers of the Word and Sacraments, with corporate *episcope*.

(6) The following points may need special discussion:

(*a*) Is there any doctrine, principle, or institution, round which the doctrine of Order can and should be systematised? Or is it safer to be more inductive, historical, and, in a sense, empirical, in this matter?

(*b*) Where is the boundary between Order and Jurisdiction?[1]

(*c*) In what sense does ordination confer *character indelebilis*?

(*d*) Does the consecration of a bishop confer a new *character*? Or does it simply give him authority and grace to perform functions inherent in the *sacerdotium* or *ordo* of the presbyter, but not at present exercised by presbyters? Historically, the *sacerdotium*, or ministry of the Word and Sacraments, was at one time regarded as particularly the characteristic of the bishop rather than of the presbyter.

(*e*) What about ordination to the episcopate *per saltum*? Does this confer *sacerdotium*? If it does, does this imply that bishop is a particular kind of presbyter, or a separate order, complete in itself? If it does not, does it imply that episcopacy is not, strictly, an order, and that a bishop, if he is to celebrate the Holy Communion, must first be, or be ordained, priest?

(*f*) In what sense are deacons an order? What is implied where they are treated as having *ordo*? That their difference of office, combined with apostolic institution, constitutes difference of order? Or that they participate, in a limited way, in *sacerdotium*? Can the necessity of deacons, as distinct from the fact of their occurrence in the Apostolic Church, be demonstrated from any biblical principle?

[1] e.g. the proposals for the initial unifying of the ministry in Ceylon appear to rest upon different conceptions of the relation between Order and Jurisdiction from those which underlie the plan adopted in South India.

CHEIROTONIA AND ORDINATION

by Brother GEORGE EVERY, S.S.M.

The verb *ordinare* and its cognates have been used for the setting apart of church officers ever since Latin began to be an ecclesiastical language. It is significant that the names of the offices were transliterated; *cheirotonia*, the laying-on-of-hands, was not. This no doubt may be very simply explained. Actions with the hands were used in healing, in the reconciliation of penitents, in the ceremonies in and after baptism. A distinction of terms was needed; the choice of a term points forward to the whole history of Latin Christendom.

Already in S. Cyprian's[1] time the *clerus* at Carthage is a class in this sense, that two messengers going to Rome require clerical status, and are made reader and subdeacon for this purpose. The older word *clerus*, transliterated from the Greek, implies allotment to a liturgy or other piece of public service, as Greek citizens and clubmen were allotted duties by rotation or assignment from those whose lot it was so to distribute services.[2] But *ordo*, *ordines*, *ordinatio* imply that there exists in the Churches something like the order of decurions in the municipalities of the Roman empire, and the senatorial and equestrian orders in the general body of the empire as a whole, an aristocracy of office, and therefore of dignity.

The *clerus* did become an order, an official class in East and West when the officers of the Church were given immunity from curial burdens and other privileges of the pagan priesthoods. In many cities in the fourth and fifth centuries the Church rose in power as the *curia* declined. Where the municipal authorities were impotent, the bishop and his assistants could often act, not only in the relief of distress, but in necessary representations to higher authorities, or to invaders. This is common to East and West and in all churches brings a certain enhancement of

[1] *Epistle* 29.

[2] See especially the prayer at the consecration of a bishop in Hippolytus, *Apostolic Tradition*, ed. Dix, pp. 5-6, where the Greek of the *Apostolic Constitutions*, but not the Latin of the Verona fragment, has 'to give lots', as part of the bishop's office.

the status of the ministry. The difference between the Greek East and the Latin West is this, that the Latin order of clergy from the very first tends to become a *militia*, an organised ecclesiastical service, comprehending all church functionaries from doorkeepers to bishops, with a regular *cursus honorum*, a normal ladder of promotion. But the tendency in the Greek East is to limit immunities, and therefore to draw distinctions between those who have received *cheirotonia*, who have, in the full sense, liturgies, including deacons, and those who are helpers, including deaconesses. No doubt this has much to do with the difference in political conditions. In the West, where government was falling to pieces, many desired an ecclesiastical status which was on the whole respected by invaders and brigands, nor was any government strong enough to refuse privileges to the ecclesiastical authorities. In the East the public bureaux kept a careful eye on exemptions from taxation.

The divergent movements are not immediate or uniform, but it can hardly be an accident that in the East no office has survived without liturgical functions of its own. Not only bishops, priests, and deacons, but readers and subdeacons have work to do in the liturgy in the greater churches and monasteries. Not only do many deacons remain deacons for life, but some are marked for the episcopate before they enter the diaconate. Bishops, presbyters and deacons fulfil these functions through most of their lives, though bishops and presbyters must first serve as deacons, and bishops also as presbyters. In the West all the lesser orders, including the diaconate, have come to be regarded as steps to the order of priesthood. Clerks in minor orders were common in the Middle Ages, but most of them, it would seem, had aspired to the *sacerdotium*. Permanent deacons and subdeacons were survivals, chiefly found in conservative churches such as Rome.

A further divergence arose through the integration of the clerical order with the monastic profession. This was so far complete in the West that most monks came to be priests. Lay brothers formed a special class, and had difficulty in maintaining their position in monastic communities. At about the same time the married priest and deacon, though not the married clerk, disappeared from the Western Church. All priests, deacons, and subdeacons were celibate, and to a great extent

expected to model their discipline on that of the monks. In the East this monastic profession extended to the bishops and to their own immediate assistants among the presbyters and deacons, from whom, as well as from monasteries in the stricter sense of the term, the bishops have generally been drawn. Parish priests and deacons were never monasticised. As a corrollary Eastern monasteries were never clericalised. They have enough priests, deacons, readers, and subdeacons for liturgical offices, but the choir are not ordained. In the heyday of Greek monasticism the proportion of priests was much smaller than it now is.

This difference is partly, but not wholly explained by the reluctance of the East Roman government to encourage an indefinite multiplication of monks. Byzantine monasteries were very numerous, but they had few immunities with regard to the bishops, or to the government, and, generally speaking, they were not munificently endowed by Western standards, nor were they ever organised into great religious orders.[1] The immunity of monks from the control of bishops, and the liberty of the clergy from any and every lay authority are ideas alike alien to Byzantium, nor did such ideas originate in Rome. The first is an Irish notion, infiltrating into continental Europe in the wake of Celtic missionaries. The second, in its developed form, is the result of fusion between the Roman idea of the universal mission of the successor of St. Peter, and the Celtic idea of a sacred tribe, protected from barbarous violence by the monastic tonsure (perhaps in a form first derived from the Druids[2]), and by the holy oils poured on the anointed heads and hands of bishops and priests. This anointing[3] is certainly Gallican, not Roman in origin. The earlier Roman forms are like the Byzantine. But in the medieval Pontificals Roman and Gallican forms of ordination were fused and enlarged, as ordination in the minor orders was formalised. This had consisted simply in the blessing and 'porrection' of instruments, a key to doorkeepers, a book to readers, a linen bag to acolytes, and an empty chalice to subdeacons. But when these became steps in a graded pro-

[1] See the chapter on 'Monasticism in Byzantine polity' in J. M. Hussey, *Church and Learning in the Byzantine Empire*, Oxford, 1937.

[2] See J. B. Bury, *Life of S. Patrick*, 1905, pp. 142-4, 240-3.

[3] For its anthropological significance see E. O. James, *Christian Myth and Ritual*, 1933, especially chapter III.

gress into the ecclesiastical state, something similar in kind was demanded at the higher stages. After a time the laying-on-of-hands became a subordinate element in the ordination of priests and the consecration of bishops. What was important, the matter and form of the sacrament, according to the teaching of S. Thomas Aquinas,[1] had to do with the power to sacrifice conveyed in the porrection of chalice and paten.

On the precise character of the investiture of bishops with ring and staff many books were written and much blood was shed round about the year 1100. The outcome, so far as the theory of ordination is concerned, may be studied in Louis Saltet's book on *Reordinations*, conveniently reviewed for English readers in Bishop John Wordsworth's *Ordination Problems* (1909). The result seems to have been a much clearer separation between the power of order and the power of jurisdiction. All the ceremonies of ordination henceforth relate to the priesthood. All the other orders are stages in the making of a priest, with the exception of the episcopate, which is needed to make a priest, but not strictly necessary for any other purpose. Here the Celtic contribution to medieval ecclesiastical theory is clearest. But even the necessity of bishops for ordinations was sometimes questioned. Saltet writes[2]:

> The Middle Ages had a tendency to distinguish, in regard to the conditions for the validity of sacraments, between the acts of bishops and those of priests. . . . The priesthood, which conferred a character, seemed much more independent of the power of jurisdiction than the episcopate, to which was ascribed, generally speaking, not a character, but only a power, which some would describe merely as a simple delegation. In time of schism, the validity of episcopal acts must therefore appear more subject to doubt than that of priestly acts.

Writing of the later stages of the Papal schism of 1378-1417, he goes on to say that

> To escape from this embarrassment an old opinion was exhumed, according to which a simple priest could confirm the faithful and ordain other priests. By this theory, it would not matter if there were no bishops; the transmission of the power of order was indefinitely assured, for the power of ordaining was attached to the sacerdotal character, which, in the opinion of all, is independent of jurisdiction.

But this, he complains, was 'to neglect an essential element in the theory':

[1] *S.T. Supplement*, Q. 37, art. 5. [2] *Les Reordinations*, Paris, 1907, p. 367.

Some former authors certainly say that a simple priest has the power to confirm, and to ordain priests: but they stipulate one condition, delegation given by the Sovereign Pontiff. In time of schism, this delegation cannot be presumed: the remedy revealed its own ineffectiveness.

In time of revolution, the condition will be ignored. The state of the question, as described in Saltet's authoritative work, does much to explain the action of the Reformers where bishops are concerned. But the uncertainty will also explain the search for precedents, older than the current canonical practices, by scholars of the Renaissance. So the East and the early Church began again to influence Western theory and practice.

In the East the laying-on of hands had always been the sacramental means for the consecration of bishops, priests, and deacons. The three were differentiated not so much by the manner of their consecration, though differences did exist, as by its position in the liturgy, bishops at the beginning, before the Epistle, priests at the Great Entrance, before the offering of the Eucharist, deacons after the consecration, but before the communion. The ceremonies are distinguished in the *Ecclesiastical Hierarchy* of Dionysius 'the Areopagite':

The bishop who is brought to episcopal consecration kneels on both his knees before the altar and has the Holy Scriptures (sc. the Gospels) held over his head and the bishop's hand; and so in this manner is consecrated by the consecrating bishop with hallowing invocations. The priest too, after he has bent both knees before the altar, feels the bishop's hand on his head, and in this way is hallowed by the consecrating bishop with priest-making invocations. And the deacon, bending one knee before the altar, feels on his head the hand of the consecrating bishop, and is consecrated by him with invocations appropriate to the consecration of deacons. On each and all the sign of the cross is sealed . . . and in every case there is a holy proclamation and a perfecting salutation.[1]

The salutation is in the cries of '*axios*' (worthy) whereby bishops, priests, and deacons are all hailed as their consecration is completed. While the bishop or bishops are praying with their hands on the head of the candidate, the congregation are responding to a litany of fervent supplication, and at the end they, as well as the clergy, will cry 'worthy'.

Some Byzantine canonists were aware of implications in this. They knew that *cheirotonia* might refer to the lifting-up of hands

[1] *M.P.G.* 3, c. 509.

in election, as well as to the laying-on of hands in blessing.[1] 'Dionysius' seems to be anxious to limit the cry of '*axios*' to the clergy in the sanctuary. His importance lies in this, that his *Ecclesiastical Hierarchy* was much better known in the West than any Eastern liturgical text. Those who followed Valla and Erasmus in rejecting the genuineness of the Dionysian writings did not at first ascribe them to so late a date (*c.* A.D. 500) as scholars in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, who had better knowledge of the general history of Greek theology. Many scholars of the Renaissance regarded the *Ecclesiastical Hierarchy* as a safe guide to the standards of Greek Christianity in the patristic age, nor were they very wide of the mark. I suspect that this book is responsible for the three orders of the Anglican Ordinal. In the 'Bishops' Book' of 1537 and the 'King's Book' of 1543 the medieval computation is retained; the priesthood is the highest of seven orders. But in 1550 the minor orders and subdeacons are disappearing. Of the seven, only two remain. Three are preferred and can be obtained by shifting from the canonical classification to Dionysius, who leads the objections when schoolmen consider the distinction of orders.[2]

The threefold ministry is the oriental contribution to the ideas of the English Reformation. The first Anglican theologian to insist unambiguously on the indispensable necessity of episcopal ordination for a valid ministry,[3] Bishop Richard Montague in the reign of King Charles I, was also the first editor of the letters of the Patriarch Photius, who was then supposed to be the great adversary of Rome in the East. Others who did much to make the apostolic origins of the three orders part of the furniture of the Anglican mind were also students of early Christianity in the East, John Pearson, the vindicator of S. Ignatius, William Beveridge, the editor of the Byzantine canonists,[4] Joseph Bingham, of *Origines Ecclesiasticae*, and Thomas Brett, the author of the first considerable English work on Eastern liturgies.[5]

[1] e.g. Zonaras on the First Apostolic Canon in *M.P.G.*, 137, c. 37.

[2] e.g. in the *Supplement* to the *Summa Theologica* of S. Thomas, Q. 37, art. 2, 'Whether there are seven orders'.

[3] In his *Origines Ecclesiasticae*, Vol. II, 1640, pp. 463-4. His edition of the letters of Photius was published in 1651.

[4] His edition was included in Migne's *Patrologia*, *P.G.* 137-8.

[5] *Dissertation on Liturgies* (1720). Brett was also the author of *A Review of the Lutheran Principles* (1714) and *The Divine Right of Episcopacy* (1718).

But the threefold ministry should carry with it the recognition of the bishop as the principal liturgical minister in his diocese, and of the liturgical functions of deacons. In regard to the first it may be said with justice that nearly all serious church reformers in the Church of England since the Reformation have desired more bishops, and a better understanding of their office, not simply as administrators, but as pastors and teachers to the whole of their dioceses. The problem of the diaconate has been almost entirely ignored. Here, I believe, the Church of England has something still to learn from the churches of the East, and also from the Presbyterian tradition.

Lutherans and Presbyterians took for granted the established fact that in the sixteenth century there was only one ministry, the presbyterate. The lesser orders, including the diaconate, were stages in the preparation for this, while the bishops were, to all intents and purposes, political and administrative officers. The Swiss reformers tried to reintroduce something of the complexity of primitive church order through ruling elders and a real diaconate. It may well be agreed that they failed in their understanding of their Scriptural sources, as the Episcopalian enthusiasts for the authority of S. Ignatius failed in their understanding of the position of bishops in the early Church. Both might have gained something from a better knowledge of worship and order in the Christian East.

Eastern liturgies have been misunderstood because they were first studied at a time when the vernacular and liturgical languages were falling apart in Russia and Greece, and the new type of high *iconostasis* had set a barrier between the sanctuary and the choir.[1] This has obscured the significance of the deacon's part as leader, not only of the choir but of the *laos*, in their active participation in divine worship. The Reformation rejected 'private masses', but had the greatest difficulty in escaping from the conception of worship, and therefore of doctrine and order, implied in Low Mass, where the priest alone is active and the people at most murmur a response.

The underlying issue is the relation of the ministry to the Church. In the East the bishop is elected and ordained by other bishops. He represents the universal Church to the local.

[1] This began in Russia, where churches were low and had no room for icons on the walls. It came south only in the Turkish period.

His office is to preserve and transmit tradition, and to that end he is consecrated under the Book of the Gospels. Priests are ordained to offer the sacramental oblations, deacons to give communion to the *laos*, to serve as a link between the priests and the choir. Bishops, priests, and deacons have their allotted liturgies, but none of them are 'set over us as rulers' either in the Papal or in the Presbyterian sense. That Anglican insubordination which Scots call Erastian has in it a tincture of Byzantium. On the other hand Presbyterians, who have no clear distinction between presbyters and bishops, do possess what Anglicans lack, a connecting link between the laity and the ministry in a diaconate not only of deacons, but also of elders.

BARTH'S *DOGMATICS* IN ENGLISH

by The Rev. Principal W. A. WHITEHOUSE

The first half-volume of Barth's *Church Dogmatics*, in English, has been available since 1936. The corresponding half-volume, which completes the Prolegomena, is now in print. Decency demands that any fanfare which seems appropriate to an enthusiastic reviewer should be sounded on muted trumpets, and Barth himself has made it clear in this volume that no teacher of the Church should become for us an angelic power to whose weak and beggarly influence we are glad to enslave ourselves. Nevertheless the Church has been given a teacher in this generation whose stature has not been obviously exceeded by any of the great servants whom God raised up for the same task in earlier days, and it is time that his voice was properly heard in Britain. Experts on theological fashion assure us, with all the confidence of Athenian *spermologoi*, that the time, mercifully, has passed; other voices, more interesting and less exacting, are carrying the discussion forward to a post-Barthian stage. Only the years will show whether what these experts say is true. And each of the next five or six years will bring two part-volumes of substantial dogmatics, as distinct from prolegomena. Those are the volumes which contain the work which most obviously effects the transition from Bible to sermon. The first volume serves principally to diagnose and to heal our 'permanent or passing, but always radical, incompetence with regard to the whole business'. It does so, of course, in the most non-arrogant and robustly human way.

The contents of the volume are known in outline through the published translation of Otto Weber's admirable report. Barth is concerned, in the Prolegomena, to explore the problematic character of theology and to prescribe an adequate method for testing and articulating in a reasonable and scientific way the unique knowledge by faith which Christians confess. The main decisions which define the method and the fundamental statements which safeguard it are familiar enough to readers of this

Journal. The core of the matter, so far as revelation is concerned, has been given a distinguished exposition recently in James Brown's book *Subject and Object in Modern Theology*. On the other hand, there is ample evidence of the ease with which Barth's position can be misrepresented as arbitrary, obtuse and irrational.

The aim of theology is to understand the revelation attested in the Bible. The content of this enterprise is 'to understand the reality of Jesus Christ as such, and then, by reading from the tablet of this reality, to understand the possibility involved in it'. Understanding does not come when our minds are deflected by previously conceived general concepts of revelation 'from an insight into which our knowledge of *this* reality would first become a grounded knowledge'. It comes when the doctrines of the Trinity, of the Incarnation of the Word and of the Outpouring of the Holy Spirit are worked out in the form of explanatory prolegomena to shed light on the particular path of Christian theological knowledge. Barth's account of the doctrine of the Trinity, in Vol. 1.1, has come to be recognised as a classic of theological exposition. The corresponding accounts of the Incarnation and of the Spirit, which occupy the first half of 1.2, will be held in the same high esteem. It is a habit, in some theological traditions (notably in the Anglican), to treat these doctrines as individual statements among others. Barth finds in this habit 'a lurking source of error . . . which it is our present task to overcome'. There is division of opinion, in England at any rate, about the kind of systematic inquiry which follows upon historical and exegetical disciplines, but those who regard that inquiry as being in the main a matter of wrestling in new circumstances with the doctrines of the Trinity, the Incarnation and the Church, may find their perspective altered as they meet Barth at the obvious point of contact which he offers in this chapter called 'The Revelation of God' and which overlaps the two half-volumes. The articulation of these specially Christian doctrines serves a preliminary, though definitive, purpose. Barth's account of them is penetrating and most illuminating. The Christology is Chalcedonian, worked out in the framework of a theology of divine action. The sole point from which New Testament witness stems, and the sole point from which a doctrine of revelation congruous with this

witness can originate, is the name of Jesus Christ which we confess by calling the true God man and the true man God. Here the truth breaks forth in event and no higher concepts can take us behind the concrete reality. The mystery attested in John 1.14 becomes transparent to our understanding when appropriate questions are posed and answered, and Barth's theological aptitude lies in his selection of these questions. At the end of the inquiry, we, who know Jesus Christ, are left knowing how God in His freedom is able to disclose Himself to men. Similarly, when we know the Holy Spirit in our knowledge of the Son from whom He proceeds (the *Filioque* is important), we know the freedom in which it has been granted to man to be the recipient of this revelation. Knowledge of the Spirit requires for its clarification a discussion of the Church and of the real existence as sons of God which is granted to men for Christ's sake. Man's receiving of revelation is the divine act of Lordship in no less a sense than is the Incarnation of the Word; it is 'the mystery and the miracle of the existence of God among us, the triumph of free grace'.

The section on the Incarnation includes a fascinating chapter on the problem of Time, which helps us to understand the real temporal pre-existence of Jesus Christ in prophecy, His temporal existence in the recollection of the Church, and His abiding existence in the fulfilled time of Easter. (Later volumes contain modifications of what is said here.) Again, in the account of the Outpouring of the Spirit there is a long discussion of 'Religion' which has not had the consideration which it deserves. The translation of its title by '*Abolition* of Religion' may turn out to have been misleading. '*Superseding*' might be a less emotive word. If proof were needed that Barth takes anything but a cavalier attitude to the ongoing life of the Church and its institutional religion, it can be given by a quotation from the end of the discussion:

> Both in general and in particular, Christianity as an historical form is readiness for the Lord, by whose name those who profess this religion, and with them the religion itself, are created and elected and justified. That is why the problems of the nature and form of this religion are serious problems: the question of canon and dogma, the question of creed, cultus and Church order, the question of correct theology and piety and ethics. They are not serious problems in the sense that to win through to certain answers would enable Christianity to justify itself as the true religion. But they are

serious problems in the sense that by the answers made to them it is decided whether Christianity is here and now ready for the Lord who justified it long ago. (p. 361)

The second half of the book consists of a chapter on Holy Scripture, related to the problems of authority and freedom in the Church, and a chapter on the Church's Mission and the relation to it of the dogmatic theologian's work. It should be plain that this volume contains a wealth of expository material, covering every aspect of the Church's problematical existence and activity, which claims the attention of any responsible Churchman.

Over and above this expository material, however, there is an educative power which inheres in the book as a whole. The main contention is that 'the Bible has given an answer to our question about God's revelation, in that it has placed God's sovereignty before our eyes'. This answer has to be articulated in the form of dogmatic theology (one among other forms), and the question of method and equipment for this task is a crucial one. How should we ask, 'with the utter seriousness of one who does not yet know, *what* Christian language ought to say *today*'? No one who has begun to learn from Barth can rest content with the amalgam of 'Biblical Theology', 'Philosophical Theology', 'Existentialist Theology', not to mention linguistic and typological prestidigitation, which gives animation to the British scene. It is true, of course, that Barth is an exacting teacher. The Editors' Preface to the new volume comments wisely and usefully on the difficulties to be expected. The shape of the discussion is clear enough. The reader may have to cultivate a measure of patient sympathy with the questions used by Barth in order to uncover the truth. At first sight they may not seem to be our questions at all. The fact is that most of us are not well equipped to enter with Barth upon his knowledgeable discussion with the whole tradition of Christian theology. But to follow him as best we can is an education which turns us into different persons. And it is a measure of his greatness that the Educator who makes the difference is not Barth's lively and well-stocked mind but the living Word of God at work in His Church through all ages, to whom Barth directs us with great faithfulness. The questions, clarifications and delimitations by which he does so are sometimes unfamiliar

for another reason, namely that Barth has taken the measure in his own way of the gulf which separates post-Enlightenment from pre-Enlightenment thinkers, and sees it as a gulf which has to be overcome in theological discourse. His analysis of Neo-Protestant preoccupation with 'religion' in section 17 is most illuminating in this respect. It helps us to understand the painstaking way in which he strives to bring home to our minds the truth so clearly perceived by the Reformers 'that the decision about man has been taken once for all and in every respect in Jesus Christ'.

No summary or exposition can bring home with full educative power what Barth has to give us. The courage, and the enormous industry, which lie behind the forthcoming English translation, seem to me to be abundantly justified. The Editors, Dr G. W. Bromiley and Professor T. F. Torrance, have earned our gratitude and support. The team of translators will receive congratulations as they take the stage one by one. In this case we salute Professor G. T. Thomson, who gave us the first half-volume, and Dr Harold Knight who took over at p. 661 when Professor Thomson's health declined. And behind editors and translators there stands the author, whose seventieth birthday falls this year. Readers who feel moved to send a birthday greeting may be willing to have it expressed here: to Karl Barth, with gratitude, love, and best wishes for the next decade (and the next three or four thousand pages)! Those who like to spend money on other people's birthdays can fittingly buy *Church Dogmatics* 1.2. (T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh; 50s.)

BOOK REVIEWS

Geschichte des Naturrechtes. Erster Band. *Altertum und Fruehmittelalter.* By Felix Flueckiger. Evangelischer Verlag, Zollikon-Zuerich. Fr. 26.40.

Theologians concerned with the Christian Social Ethic and Jurists concerned with the Philosophy of Law are alike concerned with the concept of justice which itself has been, historically, bound up with the concept of a Law of Nature. In the interests of a fuller understanding of this latter highly important concept Dr Flueckiger has undertaken to trace its history in European culture from the beginning to the present day, in three volumes of which this is the first. In it the story is brought down to Thomas Aquinas. The first half of the volume describes the development in classical antiquity. It begins with primitive 'sacral' ideas of law (Themis and Dike) to be met with in Homer and Hesiod, and goes on to show how these were rationalised by the Sophists—who invented the distinction between Nomos and Physis—and how this distinction was transcended in a higher synthesis in the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. There follows an account of the development in late antiquity—how on the one hand the Stoics elaborated the doctrine of the law of Nature which Cicero expounded in Latin and which was influential with the jurists who codified Roman Law in imperial times, and how on the other hand the Neoplatonists propagated a conception of hierarchical order, which influenced Augustine and still more 'Dionysius the Areopagite'. Dr Flueckiger then goes on to describe concisely but accurately and with admirable lucidity the infiltration of classical ideas into Christian Theology from the second century onwards, in spite of the very different standpoint of the Bible with regard to God, Nature and human nature. Side by side with the authoritative biblical *Heilsgeschichte* in which the chief moments were Creation, Fall and Redemption, the doctrine of the Logos—ordering all things and enlightening all men—first taught by Philo and then adopted by the Greek Apologists and the Alexandrian Theologians, made possible some understanding of a law of Nature or natural reason. Nevertheless the belief that the Logos was fully and finally revealed in the Divine Christ who was also man's Redeemer and whom the world had crucified made it impossible to hold that the law of Nature was immanent in the world and would triumph in history, as Greek idealism tended to assume.

The history of the tension between biblical and Hellenic elements in Christian social and political thinking, reaching its climax in Augustine, is clearly and fairly outlined in one hundred closely-packed and masterly pages.

The final section reviews the history of Natural Law in the early Middle Ages, especially in the West where the prevalence of the Augustinian doctrine of sin and grace tended to reduce the reliance put upon human reason. The Law of Nature when mentioned at all tended to be identified with the Law of God—the moral law of the Old Testament plus the New Testament Law of Love—a supernatural revelation, therefore, and not a discovery of the natural reason of man. Nothing less than a revolution in Christian thinking was accomplished when Thomas Aquinas contrived to bring into a subtly integrated system ideas derived from Aristotle, the Neoplatonists, the Bible and the Christian tradition. Nothing could be clearer or more illuminating than Dr Flueckiger's analysis of the thought of Thomas.

With this volume as a sample readers will await with impatience the publication of the remaining volumes of this instructive work. Dr Flueckiger writes as an objective historian, and so far it is impossible to say whether he conceives of his task as that of exposing a mare's nest or of uncovering the fountain of all fruitful legal and ethical thought. At all events he provides us with the exact scholarly material on which a judgment will have to be based.

JOHN H. S. BURLEIGH

Gefesselte Kirche. By O. A. DILSCHNEIDER. Evangelisches Verlagswerk, Stuttgart.

SINCE the War the German churches have not experienced that awakening and enlargement which had to some extent been expected. Partly, of course, there have been problems of organisation, due to the complicated situation in post-War Germany. But Dr Dilschneider is convinced that the trouble goes deeper, that the evangelical church is unable to speak clearly to the present generation because it is hampered by its sixteenth century theology and structure. Even the impulse given by Barth has to some extent exhausted itself in a new confessionalism. What is needed as the author sees it is to free the church from the fetters of tradition and allow the message of the Gospel to come afresh to the present generation. The present book is an outworking of this thesis, mainly in relation to the original form of the Gospel in Paul, and to some extent in John.

Two main points are made. First, the author does not believe that Luther really understood St. Paul, or that the Lutheranised

Paulinism with which we are familiar, and to which Lutherans are committed by their formularies, is a genuine representation of his teaching. In support of this view he calls in many recent studies of Paul and his theology. But he also has a suggestion of his own to offer, that in spite of superficial similarities the experience of Paul and that of Luther were quite different. Luther was the tortured and trembling sinner who failed to find relief in asceticism and turned finally to the crucified Jesus for forgiveness. Naturally, therefore, his main emphasis fell upon atonement and justification, and he gave a central importance to those Pauline passages which supported this view. Paul, on the other hand, was the self-righteous Pharisee, who was arrested and struck down by the Risen Christ, and learned to find newness of life in Him. This included forgiveness, and the end of self-righteousness by works, but the main emphasis was upon the new creation in the Risen and cosmic Christ, and the self-identification with Him.

Second, Dilschneider points out that in his theological outworking of the Gospel Paul does not take a single theme, as for example justification, and make that the basis of a system. On the contrary, realising the fulness of the Gospel, he applies the Christian message to each situation as it arises. In the Romans, for example, a good deal of emphasis does fall upon free justification as opposed to the righteousness of works, for that as the particular need which had to be met. But in Corinthians, although it is the same Gospel, the need is different, and so too in other epistles. If there is a central theme, it is that of the new creation in Jesus Christ. Now Luther was quite right to press the truth about justification in his own age. Dilschneider does not dispute this. But it is wrong to make the necessary Lutheran emphasis binding upon all subsequent presentation and preaching: that is the fetter which is binding the Lutheran Church today, preventing it from speaking with freedom and power to its own generation. Dilschneider's own suggestion is that the message which is primarily needed today is that of the lordship of Christ, but that of course is a more debatable matter, which hardly affects his main thesis.

What are we to say to these points? Certainly, it does appear on examination that the experiences of Paul and Luther were not so similar as has usually been presupposed. Yet Dilschneider surely overstates his case. It is not apparent on the surface that Paul had found a superb self-righteousness prior to the meeting on the Damascus road. On the contrary, the narratives suggest that there was a definite unsettlement of conscience which gave to his persecuting activity its ferocity. Again, although it was the Risen Christ who appeared to Paul, it was the Christ who had died and was risen

again from the dead. And the image which seems to be suggested is that of the Messiah who had been persecuted being crucified afresh in the sufferings of His people: Why persecutest thou me? The connexion between Christ and forgiveness is also emphasised from the outset, although the forgiveness is of course part of the new life of identification with Christ. The point is, not that Dilschneider is wrong, but that he tends to make the gulf between Paul and Luther too wide. Luther may not have seen the wholeness of Paul's experience or thinking, for the case of Paul was indeed an exceptional one. But what he did see was there all the same.

With regard to the second point, it is undoubtedly true that Luther's message had a particular relevance to his own day which it does not have at the present time. The truth of justification unlocked for the Reformers many New Testament doors which had previously been closed. It may well be that some other truth will do this for other ages and countries, according to their differing situations. On the other hand, we must not forget that the Pauline letters were roughly contemporaneous. If it is wrong to force all theology and preaching into a form dictated by justification, it is wrong to force it into a form dictated by some other key-idea, e.g. the lordship of Christ. The situation in one country, even one individual church or individual life, may demand one emphasis, and the situation in another a different emphasis. That is surely the lesson of Paul's teaching. Dilschneider may well be right for the situation which he himself knows. He is not necessarily right for the age as a whole. Indeed, the book suffers from a tendency to generalisation in respect of epochs for which there is no precedent in the New Testament, and which is hardly borne out by the details of history. The Reformed emphasis, for example, differed from that of the Lutheran. And it must also be remembered that for Paul the central core of the Gospel remained, irrespective of the differing needs which he met.

Yet in his ultimate perception Dilschneider is surely right when he works out that central message in terms of a new creation in Jesus Christ; and a self-identification in the Holy Spirit with the birth, life, death, resurrection and ascension of Jesus. This is the positive message, grounded in the historical life and death and resurrection and ascension of Christ, from which all the varying emphases derive their truth and power. We may not agree with all the details of the analysis, although it will always jolt and challenge and stimulate us. But if we come to see what it means for Jesus Christ to be incorporated in us by the Holy Spirit, whatever emphasis our own local situation may demand, we shall never be far from the central Pauline and New Testament message. G. W. Bromiley

Das Problem des Heiligen Geistes bei Wilhelm Herrmann. By J. M. Robinson. Karl Gleiser, Marburg, 1952.

This academic thesis has a theological importance out of all proportion to its unpretentious size and appearance. It is a strict historical examination of the problem of the Holy Spirit in Herrmann's teaching, but it reaches forward to the most pressing theological issues of the modern world. As Dr Robinson sees it, Herrmann is a bridge from the theology of the nineteenth century to that of the twentieth. Because the bridge has been passed, Herrmann himself has dated and his teaching has been largely forgotten. But the problems and theses of the present are implicit in Herrmann and a reassessment of his teaching may enable us to distinguish between true and false developments in the modern period.

The main part of the thesis is devoted to a chronological survey of the historical material, with critical notes on the positions which Herrmann advocated and the general development of his thinking. The main contention of the author is that for all his opposition to contemporary Pietists, Orthodox and Idealists, Herrmann did not succeed in solving the problem of a true doctrine of the Spirit. We can pick out tendencies in the opposite direction, but more and more he was pressed in the direction of an ethicising of the Christian faith with the true centre in the moral self rather than in Jesus Christ. The root of the trouble was that Herrmann never found a place for the objective Christ and His work. His Pneumatology was from the very outset and consistently divorced from Christology. In this respect, like all Neo-protestant individualists in their different ways, he carried out only too faithfully the programme of Lessing's *Erziehung*, in which the modern age is the age of the Spirit. But Pneumatology apart from Christology destroys the objectivity of the Christian faith and leaves us ultimately with a mythology and subjectivism.

In two valuable concluding sections Dr Robinson considers the actual and possible effects of Herrmann's teaching in the contemporary world of theology. It is, of course, Bultmann who follows up the actual teaching of Herrmann in a new existentialist form and with a willingness to discard what are now plainly stated to be mythological features. Against this Dr Robinson makes the consistent criticism that the Holy Spirit must be related to the objective and historical work of revelation and redemption as it was accomplished in Jesus Christ. The question of mythology only arises at all when we let go the fact that revelation and redemption have happened. The true demythologisation is not to dissolve the objective facts in an existential subjectivism, but to return to the historicity of the faith, to relate the Holy Spirit to Jesus Christ as in Holy Scripture, and to relate His witness to the apostolic preaching,

the New Testament and the living proclamation and activity of the Church.

There are certain elements in Herrmann's teaching which point in this direction although Herrmann himself failed to exploit them. The author does not say as much, but these are the elements which Barth has followed up in his *Dogmatik*. Indeed, the first part of Vol. IV is a less explicit but a more extended example and application of the main points made by Dr Robinson in his concluding sections. But if the roots of Barth no less than of Bultmann are in Herrmann, it is evident that in both cases, although in different directions, there has been a good deal of independent development. The main value of the present study is perhaps twofold. It shows us the origins of present day trends. And it provides an object lesson that an improper emphasising of the doctrine and work of the Spirit involves the final dissolution of a distinctively Christian faith.

G. W. Bromiley

Faith and Justification. By G. C. Berkouwer. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1954. Pp. 207. $3.00.

In this volume, the third in English translation of his series, Studies in Dogmatics, Dr G. C. Berkouwer, Professor of Systematic Theology, Free University of Amsterdam, discusses the relationship between faith and justification which illustrates according to him, 'if anything can, that theology, being ever relative, must be ever relevant and is relevant only when duly relative'. The fact that the question of the *ordo salutis* or way of salvation has come to the front of contemporary theological discussion is explained by three main factors: (1) dialectical theology; (2) renewed controversy between Roman and Reformed theologians; (3) the renaissance of the study of Luther. The study of the way of salvation is necessarily bound up with the correlation between faith and justification. It is essential to realise that the entire way of salvation is only meant to illuminate the 'sola fide' and the 'sola gratia'. Only thus can it be confessed that Christ is The Way. The purpose of the Church's reflection on the way of salvation is not merely to systematise, but to cut off every way in which Christ is not confessed exclusively as The Way. The relation between faith and justification has engaged the Church since the earliest days—Pelagianism, the Reformation, the Remonstrants. An examination of the Reformed Confessions (the Heidelberg Catechism, the Belgic Confession, the Canons of Dort) and the Lutheran standards (the Augsburg Confession, the Apology for the Confessio Augustana, the Formula of Concord) shows that they are at one in the realisation that faith is not an independent meritorious act accepted by God as good enough for Him but that it is a total

commitment to the one Way, Christ. It is thus not faith itself that justifies—faith is only the instrument by which we embrace Christ who is our justification. Was the Reformation doctrine of *sola fide* the fruit of a fragmentary perspective (misunderstood and mutilated Paulinism) as Roman Catholics claim it to be, or was it a real revival of the whole Gospel? Professor Berkouwer makes it convincingly clear that the doctrine of *sola fide—sola gratia* is not exclusive to Paul. Paul was faced with concrete situations in which he had to demonstrate peculiar apostolic intolerance of anything that sought to replace the gospel of grace, *sola fide—sola gratia.* In as many variations as there are writers, this is the central theme of the whole New Testament. The doctrine of forensic justification embodies the gracious act of God in Christ Jesus whom man can take to himself in faith alone. The author then deals with three objections to *sola fide—sola gratia*: (1) '*Judgment according to works.*' The Bible insists that we shall be judged according to the works done in the flesh. Has the radical *sola fide* doctrine neglected this aspect of the Scriptural teaching? Professor Berkouwer does not think so. Paul when he urges the necessity of works does not refer to the works of the law but to the works of faith and the toil of love, the fruits of the Holy Spirit, which might be looked upon as giving form to faith. Judgment according to works 'is not an analytical ethical judgment, but an infallible perception of works in their relation to faith'. (2) '*The idea of reward in Scripture.*' According to the author the correspondence between work and reward must be maintained, but stress must be laid on the fact that every merit that could accrue to good works must be denied—paradoxical but true! The truth is that rewards have no function which can be isolated from God's mercy. In the promise of reward is set a goal toward confidence in God's mercy. The relation between the works of faith and reward is never outside the divine mercy. (3) '*Justification in the book of James.*' There is no cleavage between Paul and James. Just as Paul insists on the fruits of the Spirit so James contends against the divorce of faith and works. Works must show that faith is of the right kind and so complete it. Next the author deals with the question of whether justification occurs completely in time, thus making sense of the phrase 'justification through faith' or whether it precedes faith as such and occurs in the eternity of God's counsel. This problem formed the subject of a great debate in the Netherlands of the eighteenth century between Comrie (justification from eternity) and Brakel (justification in time). Professor Berkouwer points out that the whole Gospel can be expressed only where both facets—the sovereignty of grace (emphasised by those who contend for eternal justification) and the demand of faith (emphasised by the opponents

of eternal justification) are included and thus both of the dangers they point to—antinomianism and neonomianism—are excluded. The valid religious motivation behind the doctrine of eternal justification is according to the author satisfactorily expressed in the Confessions which assign no creative function to faith in its correlation to justification. The whole matter is framed in God's eternal grace. This correlation is, however, given in the Confessions as a correlation in time. The sovereignty of grace is honoured only in faith, a faith that gives honour to God. This is why salvation in the historical correlation of faith and justification is made dependent upon human decision. Salvation, says Professor Berkouwer, is not of, but surely in history. The author concludes with a discussion on the value of faith in correlation with justification. If faith is made imperative, is not justification ultimately dependent upon a human condition? The mystery of the correlation of faith and justification is crystallised according to the author in Calvin's unique and paradoxical statement: 'We are prepared, therefore, to seek and obtain the grace of God, discarding at the same time all confidence in ourselves, and relying solely on the assurance of His mercy' (*Inst* III, XII, 8). The correlation, therefore, must not be understood as a relation in which both sides are mutually dependent and reciprocally effective. Correlation properly understood involves a relationship which is unique, *sui generis*, and which therefore must remain ultimately mysterious. This much, however, is clear: faith can never make God's justifying act of grace relative. This is what the Reformers and the Confessions meant by speaking of faith as an instrument, as well as by the emptiness, the vacuity, the passivity of faith. Yet sovereign grace must be accepted in faith—hence the necessity of faith. The fact is that the way of salvation is the way of faith just because it is only in faith that the exclusiveness of divine grace is recognised and honoured. Faith being directed only to divine mercy excludes all worthiness. It is in this exclusion of worthiness that the worth of true faith is brought out. This is a very fine book which re-states, if not the Reformation doctrine of *sola fide—sole gratia*, at least the orthodox Calvinistic interpretation of it. Although one may disagree with some of Professor Berkouwer's opinions—e.g. Barth's idea of Christ as the electing God and the elected Man seems to solve more difficulties than the orthodox Calvinistic doctrine of election—his study should prove helpful to all students of dogmatics. He is always interesting, concise and above all fair. This is noticeable when he deals with the views of Barth, Brunner and others. The translator, Lewis B. Smedes, must be congratulated on an excellent piece of work.

Rudolph J. Ehrlich

Living and Knowing. By E. W. F. Tomlin. Faber. pp. 285. 25s.

The publisher's blurb says that Mr Tomlin is engaged in elucidating the nature and meaning of existence. For one reader, at any rate, he does not throw light on anything; quite the contrary. He appears to start with the inference that because consciousness is a kind of life therefore all life is a kind of consciousness. Having thus obliterated all ordinary useful distinctions he has to introduce distinctions of his own, which only serve to increase the confusion. It is a pity, as Mr Tomlin evidently wishes to be on the side of the angels.

A. D. Ritchie

Christianity and the State in the Light of History. By T. M. Parker. A. and C. Black. 21s. net.

The title of this book is slightly misleading. In fact it contains an historical survey of Church-State relations from New Testament times down to the Reformation—excluding the English Reformation! There is also an introductory chapter mainly dealing with the Old Testament, and a brief Epilogue in which Mr Parker refuses 'to draw a moral' from his tale, unless it be that 'Christianity is a religion not easily fitted into the categories of human natural life', and that to seek today for a synthesis of Church and State on any of the older patterns is to pursue a chimera. 'Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity', he says in one of his few brief references to English Church History, 'is the swan song of a great ideal.' The theme of the book might therefore be better described as the Rise and Fall of the conception of an identity of Christian Church and Christian State, and its aim is to give 'as objective a treatment of the theme as possible'. This aim is perfectly fulfilled, no small achievement where so much that is vital and controversial has to be handled. But the treatment is not only objective; it is masterly. Though the field be limited to the first 1500 years of Christian history, it remains a vast field. Nevertheless specialists will find Mr Parker everywhere familiar with the sources and the recent literature, moving with astonishing ease through the maze of scholarly detail and compressing his material as only a master can into 172 closely packed pages. The non-specialist may use this book with confidence as a reliable guide, stretching his mind to the uttermost at all times, but making his way clear and bright with illuminating illustrations and memorable judgments. Whether he is dealing with the Early Persecutions, or the Medieval Synthesis and its break-down, or the Lutheran and Calvinist Reformations, Mr Parker is equally illuminating. Occasionally there are hard sayings. What can be meant by saying that the monks of the East 'occupied in popular regard a position not unlike that of the Old Testament prophets'? (p. 74). What are we to make

of an 'interpretation of the apparent difference separating Lutheranism and Calvinism in their attitude to the State (which) suggests that both are really different forms of a theory of Church-State identity, both deriving on different lines from the medieval conviction of the unity of the Christian *respublica*'? (p. 166). And still more question-raising and thought-provoking, 'Christ's institution of an apostolate as the formative and regulative organ of His new society' ensured that 'side by side with the hierarchy of the State there would always be in a Christian community the hierarchy of the Church, a clergy, which, as its very name implied, was in origin and function distinct from the corps of wielders of temporal power'. This recalls a similar yet very different statement of the Westminster Confession: 'The Lord Jesus, as king and head of his church, hath therein appointed a government in the hand of church-officers, distinct from the civil magistrate.' It may be that the Westminster Divines were still seeking a synthesis of Church and State, but they pointed the way to a *modus vivendi* actually realised in recent years and worthy of attention 'furth of Scotland'.

JOHN H. S. BURLEIGH

The New Creation. By T. C. HAMMOND. Marshall, Morgan and Scott.

THIS book is a simple but extremely valuable introduction to the theology of experiential Christianity, and all who wish to have an intelligent grasp of what happens at conversion, and of the Spirit's activity in the Christian's daily life should make a point of reading it. The title 'The New Creation' is probably based upon 2 Cor. 5.17 (RV margin); and by the word 'creation' is meant the change effected within the man 'in Christ'. In the book Archdeacon Hammond re-examines some of the basic words in the evangelical theological vocabulary in the light of Scripture, and then considers the definitions of these terms current among Free Church, Anglican and Roman theologians. Inevitably a fresh scrutiny of such great themes as regeneration, justification, righteousness, adoption, sanctification and glorification raises other questions such as faith, baptism, etc. Now these are matters of fundamental consequence to those who are alive to the importance of theological terminology, and the discerning reader of this book will quickly realise that Archdeacon Hammond has many pertinent things to say which have peculiar relevance to the religious situation today. We draw attention to only four of these.

The place of faith in regeneration is much in our minds in the aftermath of the All-Scotland Crusade, and here Archdeacon Hammond supplies a necessary corrective to a 'humanistic' approach to personal salvation with its unhealthy emphasis on human initiative. We are reminded that faith and obedience are the evidence, not the

cause of, regeneration. Since faith is the gift of God, not a resource of human nature, believing in Christ is not native to us: otherwise we would be justified by some act or virtue within ourselves. Regeneration is 'a prevenient act of the divine Spirit'; therefore faith is an activity of the heart regenerated by the Spirit; it is an outcome of the renewal that the Spirit works in us. Until we have been energised by the Holy Spirit we cannot obey the command, 'Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ and thou shalt be saved'.

Archdeacon Hammond also discusses the relation between baptism and regeneration. He examines the NT teaching on baptism giving special attention to the baptismal commission in Matt. 28.19. The positive and emphatic nature of NT language regarding the sacraments (cf. e.g. Rom. 6.4f, Col. 2.11, Gal. 3.27, 1 Pet. 3.21, 1 Cor. 10.16) is underlined, as is also its unconditional nature. But Archdeacon Hammond goes on to remind us that the NT writers recognised the possibility of erecting a barrier against the grace communicated through the sacraments. Certain conditions must be fulfilled if the benefits conferred are to be realised (e.g. Gal. 4.19, Rom. 8.9, 1 Cor. 11.29). The promises fulfilled in the sacraments are both unconditional and conditional. The sacraments are at once promises and obligations. It was a baptized person who was still 'in the gall of bitterness and in the bond of iniquity' (Acts 8.13, 23). A covenant has been made, baptism is its sign, one is thereby sacramentally incorporated into Christ, but the ministrant cannot conclude that the one upon whom the sign has been made is necessarily a recipient of regenerating grace. John 3.5 seems to support the contrary view, there being a necessary and permanent relation between 'water and Spirit' in the regenerate man. In John 3.5 regeneration 'has its external sign as its internal reality' but these need not necessarily (Hammond remarks that they 'rarely if ever') coincide in time. E.g. Paul had already received 'the internal reality' before 'the external sign'. But when, in the divine decree, the internal reality and the external sign coincide the internal call will finally coincide with the external call given in baptism.

Archdeacon Hammond also refers to the doctrine of limited atonement. The danger here lies in a denial of imputed righteousness, which denial detracts from Christ's 'finished work'. The implication is that God does not justify us solely on the grounds of the atonement. Our acceptance of Christ's merits is indispensable for salvation. Christ's death has placed freedom from the law within the reach of every man, but those who reject that freedom thus invalidate for themselves the efficacy of the atonement. Thus the atonement is limited to those who accept it by faith; but this implies that the atonement is not effective until accepted by faith; i.e. faith must

be added to the merits of Christ before we can be saved; which makes our merits the ground of salvation. Archdeacon Hammond remarks that while the response of faith from man is necessary, man does not thereby 'clinch the work of God'.

He also has some important things to say about sanctification. He draws attention to the dilemma at the heart of this NT doctrine; i.e. to the gap between sanctification as a 'realised' experience (cf. Eph. 3.20f, Col. 1.10, 1 John 2.5, 3.6, 9), and as a process leading to this experience (cf. Rom. 8.22f). Cf. e.g. Jas. 3.2 with Jude 24 in the Greek; 1 Pet. 4.18 with 2 Pet. 1.11; 1 John 1.8 with 3.6, 9. This paradox is also evident in the experience of Paul (cf. 1 Cor. 13.5 with Acts 15.36ff), Peter (Gal. 2.11ff) and Barnabas (Gal. 2.13). The gulf between what we should be and what we are is due, it is suggested, to our 'imperfect receptivity' of the Spirit. It is this that explains the tragic relative fulfilment of the high NT ideal for Christian living. The claim, therefore, to the eradication of the sinful nature, or to entire sanctification even without any such eradication, is rejected. For Archdeacon Hammond sanctification as a work of the Spirit 'is an internal operation whereby the new desires are strengthened and brought to expression and whereby the old desires of the flesh and of the mind are corrected and caused to die ere they emerge into action. There is no suggestion that these old desires cannot rise again.' The new nature wrought in the Christian, however, is unable of itself to master the flesh, but Christ now dwells in the heart by faith and the measure of dependence upon Him, and of the reception of and surrender to the Spirit, determines the measure of victory over sin. The good created in us by God must now be energised by God through the Spirit to whose power and influence we need daily to surrender ourselves.

There is very much more in this volume by Archdeacon Hammond but perhaps enough has been said to show that its appearance at this juncture is most timely. It should prove valuable to those who have recently started out on the Christian way, and to countless other Christians who are desirous of standing complete in all the will of God.

J. G. S. S. Thomson

Man, God, and Prayer. By Hubert Northcott, C.R. S.P.C.K., 1954. Pp. 211. 9s. 6d. net.

This book has been prepared for the information and guidance of lay people in the understanding and practice of the spiritual life, and also to help workers in the mission field, especially those of African nationalities whose needs the author understands well. The introduction deals in a simple way with the nature of man, of God, of

the Church and its tradition. The prayer-life of the community is considered, but the major part of the book is concerned with private prayer, mental prayer and contemplative prayer. The value of these exercises and methods for their practice are clearly indicated, and there is special emphasis on two things—first, that these kinds of prayer should be regarded not as suited only to some with a special aptitude for them, but as possible for all, for the leisured and the busy worker alike; and second, that the exercise of these forms of prayer is a positive service to the world, a witness to the power of Christ's religion. Many wise things, pertinent to the present situation and its problems, are said, and those who read the book as it is meant to be read, quietly and devoutly and with self-examination, cannot but deepen their own spiritual life and strengthen their testimony to the world.

JOHN A. LAMB

The Problem of Life and Death. By A. E. MORRIS. S.P.C.K. 3s. 6d.

THE Bishop of Monmouth has here reprinted two courses of lecture-sermons entitled 'The Problem of Pain and Evil' and 'The Last Things'. As he says, the themes, though well worn, are of perennial interest, and he brings to them a freshness, a lucidity and a Biblically controlled commonsense, which make his book a good introduction to intelligent thinking on these subjects.

In the first series, on suffering and evil, he uses the opening lecture to size up the problem itself, the next two to present the various strands of teaching about it in the OT and NT, and the last to say something on 'The abiding Christian attitude towards the problem'.

The only criticism I would presume to put forward is one to which perhaps any book which purports to speak *about* the problem is liable. The real, heart-rending difficulty, as every pastor knows, is to be able to say any of the things which are so obviously true about suffering in general *to* some particular man or woman who is actually suffering. It is easy in the study, or even in the pulpit, to imagine that the gravamen of the problem is the *existence* of evil in the world and its *scale*, whereas what shatters and desolates is far more often its apparently impersonal *distribution*. The sum of suffering is somehow accepted; but why should all this happen to me? why is one taken and another left? why? why? . . . That there is evil at all seldom cuts the nerve of faith so deeply compared with its seemingly arbitrary incidence. In other words, the problem is felt most poignantly not as an argument against a *good* God, a challenge to a *moral* order, but as intolerable offence against a *loving* God, a flouting of an intensely *personal* providence. Consequently, any real answer must be an equally personal one. That does not

mean that it will simply be private to each case. Kierkegaard's parable of the pinch of spice, for instance, speaks to everyone; but it does so, not by advancing general considerations (however indispensable these may be for placing the problem in rational proportion), but by addressing 'the individual' in pure subjectivity. Bishop Morris says some useful things in discrediting a neat providence claimed as objectively discernible. One wishes he had gone on to relate the tragedy of suffering to that inward faith in providence and miracle without which any true religion must die.

In the second course, the Last Things are treated under the traditional headings of Death, Judgment, Heaven and Hell. This has the inevitable effect of distorting the NT emphasis by removing the centrality of the *Parousia* and forcing attention on individual eschatology to the neglect of the corporate and historical hope to which in the Bible it is subordinate. However, within this artificial framework there is a great deal that is well said. The treatment suffers from the fact that there is so much in the popular deposit of ecclesiastical tradition on the Last Things requiring to be unsaid that there is little space left for positive teaching. The writer is so taken up, for instance, with insisting that 'hell' in the English Versions does not mean everlasting torment and that paradise is not the same as heaven, that the great themes of the love and wrath of God receive little attention. Sometimes too points in the biblical mythology appear to be rather lightly jettisoned to 'modern' belief. The biblical view that mortality is in some deep sense unnatural to man and a consequence of his sin is not faithfully represented by saying that 'death came by man' refers simply to 'spiritual' death. Again, the NT insistence, however strange it sounds to us, that the resurrection of the body (that element of solidarity between man and man and man and nature) is perfected only at 'the last day' is integral to the essentially corporate understanding of Christian salvation.

But in general the weaknesses, such as they are, of this second series derive from the fact that the Church has no agreed biblical theology of the Last Things to popularise. As a work of popularisation itself the book is much to be commended.

JOHN A. T. ROBINSON

The Foundations of Life. By T. A. BOWHAY. Privately printed. 10s. 6d.

THESE are the thoughts of a gentle, unsophisticated mind on such themes as 'What is Life?', 'Trust, Belief, Faith', 'What is the Soul?', 'Man is More than an Animal'. They present nothing new or exciting in philosophy or theology, but they bring us into touch with an interesting personality, the youngest in a Devonshire family of thirteen brothers, born towards the middle of last century. He had a

natural understanding of children ('Woe betide the person', he writes, 'who remains with a child when it has had enough of him'), and a most beneficial influence on all thwarted ones. His mind, like Shelley's, absorbed everything (he studied a new language, we are told, every summer holiday) and he tends to set everything down. The word 'not', for instance, leads him to refer to ignorance and then to instinct; but 'instinct' must be defined, so we embark on a discussion of the wisdom of defining terms in philosophy; and hence, by way of Immanuel Kant, arrive at the mystery of the existence of a plurality of languages. Yet the thread is never lost. Four pages later, a little breathless by now, we read, 'To come back to a definition of instinct . . . '.

The author tends to be completely literal in his interpretation of any text. For long he was worried because he never seemed to have heard the phenomenon described by St. Paul when he said, 'The earth groaneth'; but one day—'Suddenly I heard it and I did not faint, but my legs would not support me. Now when I know that I am going to hear the groaning I do not go out'—and he found great comfort in this Christian equivalent for the music of the spheres.

There does not emerge from the pages any clear sense of humour nor any profound appreciation of beauty in prose and poetry, but since these—contrary to common opinion—are often severe handicaps in dealing with difficult boys, half angel and half devil, there may have been virtue in his very defects.

As preface to the volume, affectionate tributes to the memory of the author are paid by Canon John Ballard and by Mr Eric Kennington, whose fine portrait of Bowhay is the frontispiece.

EDGAR P. DICKIE

How to Know Your Bible. By A. VICTOR MURRAY. Allen and Unwin, London. Pp. 185. 12s. 6d.

THE reader will be disappointed who, taking this title at its face value, opens Professor Murray's book in the hope that it will present the contents of the Bible in schematic or tabloid form, and so provide a short cut to a knowledge of the Scriptures. The author's purpose is rather to show his readers how to *understand* the Bible. To achieve this he has adopted a rather novel scheme. After a short general introduction to the Bible, there follows a discussion of 'nine representative books' of the Bible, five from the OT (Amos, Hosea, Isaiah 1-29, Micah and Deuteronomy), and four from the NT (Philippians, Acts, Galatians and Mark). The main concern in this section is to demonstrate the chronological sequence both of the books in each group and the series of events with which each deals. In the next main portion of the book the more strictly historical, as distinguished

from the literary, approach just referred to is followed; and here Professor Murray recounts the history of the Jews and the Church as that is unfolded in the Old and New Testaments. The chapters are divided into paragraphs which are numbered, a device which has obvious advantages.

In any book that deals with the whole Bible it is almost inevitable that the value of all its parts will not be uniform, and this work is no exception. The weakest part is undoubtedly that which deals with the OT, and it is to be feared that the 'ordinary lay people' for whom the author writes will, as they read, find themselves concluding that before they can begin to 'know' the OT (*a*) most traces of the miraculous must be eliminated, and (*b*) one must not accept what the OT writers say if what they say does not coincide with what one thinks they ought to say. Some such rationalising process is the key to an understanding of Scripture.

On the 'jacket' of the book we are told that 'the author takes for granted the findings of modern scholarship, and does not trouble the reader with arguments in support of a case'. Doubtless Professor Murray had good reasons for adopting such a course but it should have been borne in mind that 'ordinary lay people' are not conversant with 'the findings of modern scholarship' and will, therefore, find it most disturbing to have so many OT claims and statements rejected without a word of explanation. This cavalier treatment of the OT will do incalculable harm, especially if Professor Murray numbers among his readers S.S. teachers and leaders of Bible Classes and youth fellowships. This is undoubtedly the surest way of destroying their conviction that the Bible is a reliable record of the revelation of God. Readers will be grateful for the way in which Professor Murray recreates the historical situation in which the eighth-century prophets lived and for his handling of the contents of their books. His treatment of the Psalms and the way in which he brings out the importance of Ezekiel are also good. But we feel that attention should be drawn to the manner in which he deals with prophecy in general.

The author tells us (p. 33) that 'the prophets of Isaiah had a very interesting origin'. He observes that among Semitic peoples there have persisted from earliest times men 'of unusual mental and spiritual gifts' of whom 'the dervishes of the deserts are examples. . . . There were people like this in ancient Israel. Two of the earliest of whom we have records are Elijah . . . and Elisha. . . .' Professor Murray goes on to indicate that the eighth-century prophets also had their origin among the same genus. That which distinguished the prophets of Isaiah from the dervishlike type among whom they originated was that they added to their 'unusual temperament . . .

a quite remarkable understanding of national and social life and spoke out what they believed to be the will of God in these matters'. Cf. too pp. 37 and 47. On p. 97 the reader is urged to read Judges 4 and 5 '. . . to realise the welter of pagan ideas and barbarous standards out of which the prophets were later to lift Hebrew religion on to a level that was very nearly Christian'. It is, therefore, not surprising to be told that the famous phrase 'thus saith the Lord' was simply the prophet's way of saying, 'I feel absolutely convinced' (p. 24). It is clear that Professor Murray believes that no revelation was really granted to Israel, and that there was nothing very distinctive about her religion. It was rather the result of an evolutionary movement. Indeed on pp. 88-9 he says: '. . . alongside this popular religion there developed among the Hebrews, and not among any others, a more "ethical" [*sic*] religion, and this was due to the work of . . . men called "prophets" [*sic*]. . . . The appearance of these men at various stages . . . is quite unaccountable. But it was their insight that refined and finally transformed the religion with which the nation began.' (Cf. also p. 111.) It will be seen that Professor Murray's position raises issues that are really vital. Certainly there were many similarities between the prophets of Isaiah and those of neighbouring peoples, and doubtless the historical situation in which they found themselves was an important factor, but there were other factors that made the OT prophets unique, just as there were features in Israel's religion that made it unique. Now that is precisely the conviction of the OT, and any theory of the origin of Israel's prophets and the nature of her religion must attempt to do justice to that conviction and not just ignore it as if it were of little or no consequence.

It is obvious that Professor Murray is on more familiar ground when dealing with the NT. 'Ordinary lay people' will find this part of the book illuminating and helpful. But even in this area they must be prepared to meet with statements that will surprise them, especially in the author's treatment of the Fourth Gospel. We quote one example: 'Chapter 17 is a long prayer put into the mouth of Jesus Himself' (p. 179).

J. G. S. S. Thompson

An Introduction to the New Testament. By Richard Heard. A. and C. Black. 12s. 6d.

This is most certainly a good and useful book. As things go nowadays, it is extremely good value at the price. For the sake of the theological student one might be inclined to wish that the author had allowed himself a little more space, so that the treatment of some things could have been fuller. But perhaps it is good that this

book, though within its limits so excellent, is so obviously not enough; for the student will not be tempted to rely on Mr Heard alone, but will be forced to do some work for himself instead of accepting ready-made answers.

A book of this sort does not lend itself at all easily to a short review. There are innumerable points of interest that might be mentioned, including, as is only to be expected, some statements that are open to question. We must limit ourselves to two or three matters. The chapter on the life of Jesus (pp. 97-130) was one of the things that struck the present reviewer as particularly useful. The combination of a very conservative view of the date and authorship of the Epistle of James (*c.* A.D. 45 and by the Lord's brother) with the rejection of the Pauline authorship of Ephesians is interesting. With reference to James, Mr Heard's last sentence on p. 168 seems to suggest that the Epistle sets forth one interpretation of the Gospel that may be set alongside of, and contrasted with, that of Paul or 1 Peter. But it would be precarious to argue from the omissions of James that some Christians did not believe this or that, or did not regard this or that as important. May it not rather be that here we have to do with a consciously marginal comment, which all the time assumes the Gospel which is not actually stated? The present reviewer, at any rate, gets the impression that the author of the Epistle is a pastor who is troubled by the ease with which Christians say pious things but deny them by their actions, and so in this Epistle he purposely avoids saying the things that his readers would expect him to say and concentrates on the business of providing a searching test of Christian sincerity. He does this, not because he does not share his fellow-Christians' faith, but precisely because he does share it and takes it absolutely seriously.

Sometimes Mr Heard's opinions are surprising, as when he suggests that Mark's Gospel may have been written in Syria (p. 63) or that 1 Peter was written in Mesopotamia (p. 171). His explanation of the feeding of the multitude (pp. 109f) will leave a good many unconvinced.

A number of misprints were noticed: p. 44, 'in any than'; p. 60, line 22, 'what' should be 'that'; p. 111, line 29, 'regard' should be 'regards'; p. 142, 'Bithyria'; p. 153, line 2, the reference to Acts vi. 12-16 should be to vi. 2-6; p. 182, 5 lines from the bottom, 'who' should be 'whom'; p. 194, line 5, 'brought' should be 'wrought' p. 198, 'quieten' should be 'quicken'; p. 209, 'of Titus' should be 'to Titus'; p. 247, the reference to Luke xxii. 34-36 should be to xxi. 34-36.

But in spite of these minor blemishes and of the lack of fulness

of treatment due to limitations of space and also of a number of questionable assertions, this is undoubtedly a very worthwhile book and a bargain at 12s. 6d.

C. E. B. Cranfield

The Fourth Gospel in Recent Criticism and Interpretation. By W. F. Howard, revised by C. K. Barrett. The Epworth Press, 1955. 16s.

Dr Howard's book was welcomed when it first appeared in 1931 as an invaluable aid to the understanding of modern criticism of the Fourth Gospel. A second impression the same year and two further editions later attest its usefulness and its popularity. The printing-press, however, does not stand still, and even the best of books in time goes out of date. It was therefore a timely thought to issue a revised edition, nor could the revision have been entrusted to more competent hands than those of Mr Barrett, himself the author of a recent commentary on the Gospel.

The reviser's interpretation of his duties is made plain in the preface: the book remains Howard's, and the reviser's contribution is restricted to a minimum, nor is the reader left in doubt as to which is original and which revision. The new material consists of two short chapters which bring the history of criticism and interpretation down to 1953, and in addition some three pages of notes on the original chapters, to which attention is drawn by an asterisk in the margin, referring to more recent literature or offering an alternative point of view. The Bibliography has been revised and shortened, and finally, by permission of the Delegates of the Clarendon Press, Dr Howard's important article on the common authorship of the Gospel and the First Epistle has been included in an appendix. Within his self-appointed limits, Mr Barrett has done an admirable piece of work, which will ensure for the volume a further period of service.

Tribute should be paid to the publisher for issuing such a book in such an attractive format at such a reasonable price.

R. McL. Wilson

A Companion to the Study of St. Augustine. Edited by Roy W. Battenhouse. New York: Oxford University Press. $5.50.

This handsome composite volume, contributed to by sixteen eminent scholars teaching in various American Colleges and Seminaries, is properly named *A Companion to the Study of St. Augustine.* It is far more than an Introduction, for, though it claims to be 'directed more toward the learner than the specialist', the learner will have

to be a really serious student wishing more than text-book information, looking rather for expert guidance through the labyrinth of Augustine's writings, and towards an understanding of their meaning for today. The central theme of this book is 'the continuing vitality of Augustinian wisdom'.

The first essay underlines this theme, and two more in Part One deal with the life of Augustine and his work as Pastor. Part Two offers 'A critical Guide to the Major Works' in their natural groups —The Earliest Writings, On Christian Instruction, the Controversial Writings against the Manichees, the Donatists and the Pelagians, the Enigma of the Trinity, and the City of God. Finally in Part Three are five essays on important Special Aspects of Augustine's Thought, e.g. Faith and Reason, the Person and Work of Christ, the Christian Ethic and The Devotional Life. From this table of contents it will be seen that this is a comprehensive work. Its quality is uniformly high, critical but sympathetic and constructive. Among so much that is good it may be invidious to single out any one essay, but the present reviewer cannot refrain from making special mention of the brilliantly luminous treatment of the debate between Augustine and Pelagius contributed by Professor Lehmann.

With such a richly informed and interesting 'Companion' to guide him the earnest student will be able to find his way about among the works of Augustine, and the inevitable tedium of studying so prolix a writer will be sensibly relieved. And if life should be too short to carry the study further, the reader of this book will be thankful to have so refreshing a distillation of the essential Augustinian wisdom.

JOHN H. S. BURLEIGH

St. Bernard. On the Christian Year. Selections from his Sermons. Translated and edited by a Religious of C.S.V.M. London: A. R. Mowbray & Co. Ltd., 1954. Pp. 167. 10s. 6d. net.

THIS well-produced volume is the third in this series of Religious Classics containing translations of passages from the works of St. Bernard. Here we have parts of sermons preached to the monastic community of which he was the head, and the subjects are all suited to the various seasons and festivals of the Church Calendar. Much of this may sound strange to the modern ear, but, perhaps for that very reason, will make good devotional reading, and the preacher will find some useful suggestions for his own exposition of the significance of the Christian Year. The translation generally reads well, and the notes gathered together at the end of the book will be found useful and informative.

JOHN A. LAMB

The Kingdom of God in Bible and Church. By JOHN BRIGHT. (English Edition.) Lutterworth Press, 1955. Pp. 292. 30s. net.

IT has been evident for some time that there was need for a book that would set out, in moderate compass and in a form not too difficult for the average theological student and the intelligent layman, the contribution that recent advances in biblical scholarship have made to our understanding of the Bible, and in particular of the relationship between the Old and New Testaments. With great courage Professor Bright of Richmond, Virginia, has come forward to meet this need.

Professor Bright has read widely in the literature of his subject. It may serve as some indication of his point of view that the scholar most frequently cited is his teacher W. F. Albright (I think; an Index of authors cited would have been a welcome addition to the book), with Professor H. H. Rowley a good second and Professor G. E. Wright third. His attitude on critical questions is generally conservative, and he goes further than I would go myself in bringing back portions of Hebrew literature to a period anterior to 900 B.C. (p. 26, n. 1); but every man has a right to his own opinion, and a reaction was overdue against the tendency to bring everything down to the Persian period—an easy thing to do, since we still know almost nothing about that period! At certain points Professor Bright seems to be glancing over one shoulder at liberals and over the other at fundamentalists; but these are not frequent enough seriously to interrupt the flow of his exposition.

In the carrying out of his intention to provide the reader with a clue to the general design and structure of the Bible the author has had a considerable measure of success. But there are a number of points at which criticism may not be out of order. Here and there the narrative tends to degenerate into a summary of the history of the kingdoms of Israel and Judah; perhaps the occurrence of so many uncouth names of Babylonian and other monarchs may be perplexing to the ordinary reader, and may hinder his perception of the general movement of biblical thought. To me one of the strangest things in the book is the small amount of attention paid to the Psalms. It is not necessary to follow all the eccentricities of the Scandinavian school, which Bright rightly rejects, in order to recognise that the greatest contribution of recent Old Testament study has been precisely the recovery of the Psalms in their historical setting. Now that we are no longer required to bring them all down to the Maccabean Age, it is possible to understand, as we did not understand till recently, the immense significance of the temple and its cult in the life of the people, and the role played by successive kings, imperfect Christs, in that cult. It is surely odd that in a book

devoted to the idea of the kingdom Psalm 72 is referred to only in a footnote, and Psalms 20 and 21 are not referred to at all. Nor is our attention directed to that extraordinarily revealing phrase in Lamentations 4.20, 'the breath of our nostrils, the anointed of the Lord'. A certain value is accorded to the Law, and Ezra in Professor Bright's account is a far more respectable, indeed admirable, figure than he has often been made to appear. But no space at all is accorded to the Wisdom literature; there is one quotation from Proverbs and one from Sirach, none at all from any of the other Wisdom Books. The value of Apocalyptic, however, and its real contribution to the thought of both Testaments is recognised and acknowledged.

As a matter of general construction, it may perhaps be questioned whether it was a fortunate decision to devote slightly more than twice as much space to the Old Testament as to the New. It is of course the case that the Old Testament is much longer than the New, and much less familiar to the ordinary reader. But surely significance rather than bulk should be the criterion, and, though it is quite true that we cannot understand the Old Testament without the New, it is by the New that we primarily live. Perhaps it is a consequence of this distribution of the material that the New Testament section seems to me much less satisfactory than that which deals with the Old.

The chapter on Jesus the Messiah is good. Perhaps the views of Albert Schweitzer still command too much respect to be adequately dealt with in one footnote (p. 227, n.1); and again the question as to whether 'is at hand' means 'that the kingdom is near and will soon come, or that it has arrived' would seem to demand rather more than the expression of a personal preference in a note (p. 228, n.1). But in the main the author has been successful in showing how Jesus was in His own way the fulfilment of all earlier longings for the coming of the kingdom, and why His particular form of coming could not end otherwise than in crucifixion.

It is in the next chapter that the difficulties begin. What really is the relationship between the Church and the Kingdom? The identification of Kingdom with Church is the cardinal error of Roman Catholic theology, and Professor Bright quite rightly will have nothing to do with it. But *why* does the expression 'Kingdom of God' appear so rarely in Acts and Epistles? Had the apostolic writers failed to apprehend something that is essential in the teaching of their Master? Or were they right in thinking that, in the dispensation of the Holy Spirit, the categories of the Kingdom were not those that were most readily applicable? And what is the end to which the Church can properly look forward? Both Old and New Testaments clearly affirm a future triumph of God *in time*. We have reacted so strongly

against the evolutionary concept of a triumph of the Kingdom of God that is to come about largely by human effort, and we have been so offended by literalist and prosaic interpretations of the vivid symbolism of apocalyptic, that it is extremely hard for us to take seriously what the Bible seems so seriously to say, and we take refuge in ambiguous assertions about the end of history being beyond history and so forth. But these are just the problems with which our eschatologists must busy themselves; and cloudy rhetoric is no adequate substitute for hard thinking and clear exposition.

The fact is, of course, that all through Professor Bright is wrestling valiantly with the difficulties in which his title and his point of departure have landed him. The category of the kingdom is not broad enough to include within itself all the multiplicity of divine revelation. Professor Eichrodt has made the idea of the covenant central in his Old Testament Theology. This has good grounds for it. But I am convinced myself that the only formula under which the two Testaments can be brought together is 'the people of God', or 'God and His people'. Professor Bright himself at intervals recognises this. His first chapter is called 'The People of God and the Kingdom of Israel'; and, summing up almost on his last page the way that has been travelled, he writes: 'In that Cross we shall find our true destiny as the servant people of God' (p. 275). Once this is taken as the starting-point, we are driven back, beyond Professor Bright's point of departure in the Exodus, to Abraham, and the full significance of the Church as the Israel of God begins to appear.

I am old-fashioned enough to think that a majestic subject should be treated in dignified language, and I can only regret that at certain points Professor Bright has taken too facile a line of popularisation: 'Clearly Jeremiah and Jehoiakim were not going to get along!' (p. 111). The English reader will be surprised to learn that 'Ahab had *fielded* two thousand chariots against the Syrian in 853' (p. 57). 'I am fed up with burnt offerings of rams and the fat of fat animals' —the sombre magnificence of Isaiah is not really brought nearer to the modern reader by this kind of modernisation (p. 85). It is a pity that some revision of the text for the English edition could not have been carried through. The narrative is interrupted rather frequently by homiletic passages; and these are so closely related to the situation in America as to have little relevance for those in other areas.

In short, then, this is a book in which there is much that is excellent and valuable. It will certainly be of great value to students in many American seminaries. But it is only with certain reservations that I could recommend it for wider general use.

STEPHEN NEILL

The Word of God in the Life of Man. A Symposium. Mowbray. Pp. 198. 9s. 6d.

This rather unusual volume consists of a series of schemes of study and skeleton sermons to cover the Christian Year from Advent to Trinity. It is written by an excellent team of scholars but the individual contributions are all anonymous. The idea behind it is the praiseworthy one of helping hard-pressed ministers who have lost the initiative of personal study and who are therefore in danger of becoming either the purveyors of unconvincing platitudes or the readers of other people's homilies. The title is a good one and the title pages bear some instructive biblical and more general quotations. The scheme has apparently been tried out with some success in various dioceses in the south.

All the same, the book fails to be entirely convincing. The basic scheme of study cries out for criticism, especially in relation to the suggested reading. The themes overlap to some extent. The skeleton sermons are very uneven in quality and vary considerably in style and method. It is to be hoped that no overawed or indolent preachers will ever attempt to read them to their congregations. Perhaps the main impression left, however, is that there is something gravely wrong with a system of training and parochial life and organisation in which an evident stop-gap of this nature is even necessary. Surely the ministry ought not to require crutches of this kind, nor should our scholars have to give their time and talents to manufacturing them.

G. W. Bromiley

The Study of Missions in Theological Education. By Olav Guttorm Eyklebust. Egede Instituttet, Oslo. N.Kr. 27.80.

The Norwegian Research Council for Science and the Humanities has made possible the publication of this learned volume, and the Church everywhere is their debtor. In this, the first volume, the theme is carried up to the year 1910—and the theme is 'an historical inquiry into the place of world evangelisation in Western Protestant Ministerial Training, with particular reference to Alexander Duff's chair of Evangelistic Theology'.

The writer admits that he has set himself an arduous task, but the book which now appears is a masterpiece in the assembling and assessing of vast material stored up in minutes and reports and books; and for his primary and secondary sources he has gone to many libraries. There is a vast bibliography of forty-eight pages, containing only the works which the author has consulted and referred to in the text or in footnotes; and many that he wished to

consult were inaccessible. It is hard to see how this piece of work could ever be superseded; but the number of persons who will use it is likely to be restricted.

The main contention of the book is that 'theological institutions must provide the education required for missionary leadership'. This need has only slowly been recognised. Within recent years it could be said with some real degree of truth that no theological college in Britain provided a full course on the modern missionary movement.

Even well-educated Scottish readers will find what is said about the centrality of Alexander Duff to be news to them. Three chapters deal with the pre-Duff era, from Ramon Lull onwards; but chapter 4 is *the* chapter, and 1867 is *the* year. Scotland was the first country in Christendom to establish a chair of Missions, under Alexander Duff, the first missionary of the Church of Scotland. Duff had been very conscious of the need for this since his student days, and he put the issue very strongly to the General Assembly of the Free Church in 1867 when he was elected Professor to the new chair of Evangelistic Theology. Unfortunately Duff's lectures were never published, and on the whole his work as professor was not appreciated, especially by some of the most brilliant students. This book examines candidly the reasons why the great experiment was not a success, so that in 1893 the chair was replaced by yearly lectureships. The other great name in the field is Warneck, 'the real founder of the science of missions'. Throughout the world now there is a great increase in missionary professorships and lectureships and in missionary literature of all kinds; but there is still a strong feeling that missionary leadership is not being given by the average minister, and that he is hardly able to give it because he knows too little about the history and the theology of missions as an integral part of his training and of his responsibility to the people.

GEORGE S. GUNN

The Meaning of Unity. By ANTHONY HANSON. The Highway Press. 6s. *Why Bishops?* By H. E. W. TURNER, Church of England Information Boards. 3s. 6d. *Unity in Faith and Life*. The Christian Literature Society. 2s. 6d.

THE whole structure of ecumenical effort rests ultimately on an understanding of the subject which is so well treated by Dr Hanson in the first of these small books. He goes right back to the Bible and inquires how far the various existing theories of what constitutes the Church are supported by the Scriptures. In four lucid, telling chapters he summarises the teaching of the Old Testament, the

synoptic Gospels, Acts, the Pauline letters and the Johannine writings. In such short space this is exceedingly well done. It is only in the light of the biblical teaching on the Church's unity that we can hopefully approach the problems of reunion; and that teaching may be expressed in the following propositions—the unity of the Church is Christ, the membership of the Church consists of all baptised persons, the unity of the Church does not depend on the ministry but *vice versa*, the aggregate of all baptised persons all over the world is the Catholic Church, and the existence and unity of the Church is not unrelated to the doctrine of the Church. Dr Hanson has rather a special title to speak on these issues, as he belongs to the Church which has advanced far beyond all others in reunion, the Church of South India.

It is good to get an answer to the question 'Why Bishops?' from such an eminent theologian as Professor Turner of Durham University, the author of a recent masterly volume, *The Pattern of Christian Truth*. In sixty readable pages, equipped with questions for discussion, and specially suited for young people, Dr Turner describes the origin, functions and traditions of the office of bishop. There are several larger books on this subject, and some of them are referred to here; but this survey will help greatly to mould what is urgently needed, if ecumenical discussions are to progress, viz. an instructed Christian opinion on the subject of reunion. More and more the question which is the title of this estimable booklet will be asked and have to be asked, as the separate Churches proceed to consider plans for the mutual adaptation of their respective systems and the changes that will be required on both sides.

In the third little book we have a hundred pages of fine material. The first meeting of the Synod of the Church of South India issued an invitation to other Churches to discuss the possibility of wider union in South India, and in 1948 and 1947 certain conversations took place with the Evangelical Lutheran Federation and the Baptist Churches. This in turn led to certain lines of study by the Theological Commissions of the Church of South India and the Evangelical Lutheran Federation. The papers were published in 1954—and they include agreed statements on the Law and the Gospel, the Doctrine of Election, and the relation of Confessional Statements to the Being of the Church. This occupies about one sixth of the book, and the remainder is devoted to papers on the authority of the Bible and of the Church, and on the visible unity of the Church. To a remarkable extent, these pronouncements are firmly rooted in history and at the same time are more forward-looking than some such documents succeed in being.

GEORGE S. GUNN

The Writings of Bishop Patrick 1074-1084. By Aubrey Gwynn, S.J. Dublin Institute for Advanced Studies. Pp. 147. 25s.

This, the first volume in a projected series of *Scriptores Latini Hiberniae*, contains five previously unpublished poems of a moral and edifying nature, together with the tract 'De tribus habitaculis animae' which is popularly ascribed to Augustine. By means of an immensely detailed analysis of the manuscript tradition, coupled with a comparison between the proper names mentioned in glosses to the poems and a list of the monks of Worcester at the time of St. Wulfstan, Professor Gwynn has been able to identify as the author a Worcester monk who became the second Bishop of Dublin, and whose pontificate covered the years 1074-1084. This Patrick was consecrated as a suffragan of Canterbury by Lanfranc, whom he recognises as 'Britanniarum primas', and whose metropolitan authority he sought to extend in Ireland; he must have played some part in the contemporary Irish movement, towards establishing a regular hierarchy of diocesan bishops, which took decisive shape in the synods of Cashel (1101) and Rath Breasail (1111). He may perhaps even be regarded as one of the preservers of the Irish episcopate; for it was the absence of a similar movement to reform the old Celtic government by monastic abbots, that in Scotland, and to a lesser extent in Wales, favoured the eventual dissolution of a diocesan structure which had never gathered strength.

Trained in the school of St. Wulfstan at the height of its piety and learning, Patrick writes a gracious Latin in both prose and verse, which suggests to his editor that Worcester could rival the French cathedral schools in classical scholarship. There is little apart from Patrick's writings to support such an opinion, and I would prefer to regard his work as a late flowering of the native Irish genius; for the Hellenisms in his vocabulary, with one peculiar Hebraism, indicate that his learning had an insular origin. His theology appears also to be characteristically Irish. Indeed the 'De tribus habitaculis' was quoted by Archbishop Ussher in evidence of his contention that the Celtic Church professed no belief in Purgatory. Professor Gwynn appeals to an unpublished Hiberno-Latin text of the eighth century, now at Münich, to prove that the doctrine of Purgatory was known in ancient Ireland; but it remains a surprising fact that in Irish treatises, such as the 'De tribus habitaculis' and the 'Vision of Fursee', where one would expect it to be mentioned along with Heaven and Hell, no mention of Purgatory is made. The Augustinian tendencies of the 'De tribus habitaculis' are not specially characteristic of Ireland, but of Western monachism in general at the eleventh century. But the doctrinal implications of Patrick's interlinear notes to his 'Versus allegorici' are of sufficient interest

to deserve further investigation. As specimens it may be mentioned that the island of Archipolis, which signifies the Church, is founded 'super petram', and the words are stated unequivocally to refer to Christ; its temples are lit with thirty windows, signifying the volumes of the whole canon of Scripture, and it is very difficult to reconcile so small a number with acceptance of the apocryphal writings. However, the principle of 'sola scriptura', so strongly held by earlier Irish authors, is here overlaid and lost in a mass of medieval allegory and fable.

In addition to a learned Introduction, Professor Gwynn has supplied a translation which is normally clear and helpful to the reader, though there are very occasional lapses—'heavy water' is not, in this modern world, the most fortunate rendering of 'gravis unda'. For the 'De tribus habitaculis' he prints a hitherto unpublished version in Elizabethan English, which may be by the Jesuit poet and martyr, Robert Southwell; this has a sentimental interest, but is too prolix to be useful in following the Latin text. The *apparatus criticus* contains a conspectus of readings from a large group of manuscripts, and most—but not quite all—of the scriptural quotations are listed; but there is no attempt to trace the references to other literatures. In appendices, the editor throws some fresh light both on the folklore cycles relating to the 'Wonders of Ireland', and on the literary heritage of Eusebius Emisenus, to whom amongst others Patrick's prose treatise has been ascribed. Dr Ludwig Bieler contributes a short but exhaustive section on the Latinity and style. The volume has been carefully produced by the Oxford University Press, and I note minor errors only on pp. 119, 121 and 123.

G. S. M. Walker

Masters of the English Reformation. By M. L. Loane. Church Book Room Press Ltd. pp. 247. 12s. 6d.

The quarto-centenary of the Marian persecution is a particularly suitable time for a reconsideration of some of the great leaders of the Reformation in England. In the present volume Canon Loane does not restrict himself to those who perished under Mary. He selects five outstanding figures, adding to the Marian triumvirate two martyrs of an early period, Bilney and Tyndale, whose work had a particular influence on the general course of events.

The method adopted by Canon Loane is to bring together a series of short independent biographies which overlap but which carry the story forward from the first beginnings in Cambridge to the death of Cranmer. In every case he makes use of the original writings and Foxe as his basic materials, and he attempts an assessment of the thought and contribution of the subjects as well as a straightforward

narrative of their lives. The result is an informative and readable story told by one who has a very evident sympathy for the men themselves and for the cause which they represented.

The danger of biographical history is that a full perspective is difficult to attain when everything is viewed from the standpoint of a single personality. There is also the danger that the biographer's very necessary sympathy with his subject will blind him to the faults or mistakes of which even the best of men can legitimately be charged. Canon Loane is largely preserved against these dangers by his constant reference to sources, but he does not altogether avoid them. In particular, some of his more general statements have a rhetorical flourish which goes rather beyond what the actual situation warrants, and he has a pronounced tendency to slide over or to excuse the less happy episodes in the lives of his heroes.

Yet as he himself avows, his purpose is to go to the inner source of the external action of the age, and there can be little doubt that it is to be found in the Reformation which came already to men such as these by their reading of the Word of God. Again, the tendency in the Anglicanism of the last hundred years has been to react away from the liturgical and dogmatic standards of the sixteenth century fathers and therefore to lose sympathy with the men themselves and to depreciate or even disparage their work. If Canon Loane is ardent in his advocacy, it is not without a cause. No one can pretend that the Church of England is the healthier today for its deviation from the classical norm. To enter once again into the spirit and teaching of its reforming martyrs is one of the great needs of modern Anglicanism, which still has all the forms of a Reformed Church but not so much of the spirit and the power. In so far as this book may help to an understanding of, and therefore to a recapture of, that spirit and that power, it is to be warmly commended and will, we hope, be widely read.

G. W. Bromiley

The Vitality of Faith. By Murdo Ewen Macdonald. Hodder and Stoughton. 10s. 6d.

Professor Emil Brunner has recently published a volume of sermons, *The Great Invitation*, in the preface of which he says: 'Preaching is essentially a living occurrence which can only very imperfectly be crystallised in writing. For this reason I have up to the present carefully avoided the publication of sermons. But perhaps in this instance the special circumstances will justify a departure from the rule.' It is certain that too many volumes of sermons have been published, and that the libraries of too many ministers are excessively stocked with them.

The changes which have come over the whole field of preaching could hardly be measured better than by a careful comparison of say six of the best sermons of the preachers who have occupied the famous pulpit from which the sermons in this book come—Alexander Whyte, Hugh Black, John Kelman, James Black, and Murdo Ewen Macdonald. While they are—fortunately—all saying the same decisive thing, the emphases, the illustrations, and especially the language employed are vastly dissimilar.

This is a vivid and forceful book. Except for four Old Testament texts, the sermons are based on well-known New Testament texts. They are not expository in the sense of delving deeply into the rich soil of the Scriptures, but they never lose sight of the contemporary world in all its aspects. In this age when people's powers of listening have been blunted, they are about the length that most churchgoers nowadays can stand. Every sermon is well laid out, and there is a building up of carefully thought-out and easily-remembered heads, e.g. The Gospel—its Sanity, its Simplicity, its Security; The Answer of the Pessimist, the Optimist, the Realist; A Gospel—of Realism, Regeneration, Resoluteness; Christian Boldness—of Creed, of Conduct, of Commission; Suffering—the Answers of the Sceptic, the Spectator, the Sentimentalist; The Demand—for Coherence, Comfort, and Completion.

Modern thought comes in for a good deal of 'blasting'—Russell, Huxley, Wells, Spengler, Hemingway, Koestler, Hoyle, Sartre; and also certain popular preachers with pronounced psychological bias whose gospel is described by a quotation as 'go ye into all the world and relax!' There is evidence in every one of these sermons of wide reading in modern literature, and most of the illustrations are from this source. Accordingly, there is much good phrasing and some swift, sharp rapier thrusts.

Mr Macdonald is emphatic that 'history's most blasphemous and dangerous heresy' is that we can live life in compartments. He asserts everywhere that Christ is able to change all life completely, 'to save human nature in its totality'. The great and difficult question, of course, is how much does this exactly involve in actual life in all its community relationships. No preacher can deal with this in one sermon or a course of sermons, but it is an urgent issue to which the Church as a whole has to bend its efforts. The conventional or superficial Christian, or the type of Church member who would be shocked equally by the enthusiastic practice of the Christian religion in all life as by its outright denial, should be made to feel uneasy by this book.

George S. Gunn

Over His own Signature. By Leslie D. Weatherhead. Epworth Press. 10s. 6d.

The Gospels leave us in no doubt that Jesus aroused a ferment of discussion centring on Himself, that in one form or another people were everywhere asking 'Who is this?', and that He Himself was eager to learn from His disciples what kind of answer was being given. This central question goes on resounding down all the centuries; and we are in no doubt as to the true answer, for He Himself has given it in a many-sided form. Hence the significance of the title of this book which is a study in the self-portraiture of Jesus Christ.

There can never have been a time when many preachers did not deliver a series of sermons on the great 'I Am's' of Jesus; and there must be many excellent unpublished discourses on this theme. Dr Weatherhead includes not only the sevenfold 'I Am' of John's Gospel, though he separates 'The Truth' from 'The Way', and combines 'The Door and the Way', but also includes four others, 'I am meek and lowly of heart', 'The King', 'Master and Lord', 'Alpha and Omega'.

The style is easy and conversational. There is a certain looseness of construction, some of the illustrations are very familiar, and to give the greater part of the study on 'The Resurrection and the Life' to an examination of the evidence for the resurrection of Christ is not the best use of the opportunity that this text affords. Also, the book may be a little irritating to those who have read Dr Weatherhead's earlier books, because of the inclusion of material which has already appeared; but on the other hand it will be welcomed by those to whom it may be the introduction to his writings. These studies fulfil their purpose of fixing our reverent and grateful thought upon Jesus and all that He offers to and demands from men. Dr Weatherhead has helped us all, moreover, by his testimony at the close of this book that, after forty years in the ministry, he is more sure than ever that 'life will only work out one way, and that is God's way. Whatever road we may be on, Jesus Christ confronts us from A to Z.'

George S. Gunn

What Time the Tempest: An Army Chaplain's Story. By Waldo E. L. Smith. Toronto: The Ryerson Press.

It is a common complaint that, in our Divinity Halls, Practical Theology is often over theoretical and separated from parish life. Queen's Theological College, Kingston, Ontario, which serves the United Church of Canada, is most fortunate in having as its Professor of Church History and Practical Theology, one who is so

thoroughly experienced in the practical side of the Holy Ministry, namely a war-time Chaplain and holder of the Military Cross, the Rev. Waldo E. L. Smith, Ph.D. Almost in the form of a war-diary, Professor Smith tells the story of his Chaplaincy service from 1939 to 1945 in what is a most moving book, entitled *What Time the Tempest*, with the modest, explanatory sub-title, *An Army Chaplain's Story*. The narrative takes us with the Canadian Army across the Atlantic to the United Kingdom, on the raid of the French coast at Dieppe, and through the long campaign from Sicily up through Italy to the Gothic Line. It is the absorbing 'human interest' of the story that makes this an outstanding commentary on the Gospel in time of war.

Many found that serving as a Chaplain on active service was a new working out of the implications of the Incarnation because it was to interpret our duties as an identification of the Church, Christ's own Body, with men in their problems and sufferings. Doctor Smith relates his experiences from this deeply Christian standpoint, believing that 'One can do more for a man's faith in going to him when he is being shot at than one can do in a year of preaching. If the padre goes to him then and shows that he cares that much about him, then the soldier can believe that God cares too and is at his side' (p. 156).

This padre is, however, too wise and experienced to minimise the importance of preaching, and the efficiency of his own short homilies is fully realised by all who have read his *Talks to the Troops* (1944). Here is one of the things he has to say about preaching in the Army: 'You have ten minutes for plain speech and your own mental vigour and the vitality of your faith come out in it. Everybody else believes in persuasive speech. Christianity has used it as a telling instrument for nineteen centuries. A padre can do fine things in his brief sermon if he has a mind to' (p. 11).

This volume of war-time experience presents, behind its modest, forthright and self-effacing writer, a God-fearing Army Chaplain who was a preacher, pastor, leader and friend to men in testing hours. He has no use for the commanding officers who want their padre to be 'a combination of sports promoter, court jester, and Rotarian song leader' (p. 7): alas, that any leader of men should ever wish that, or any minister ever so respond! I hope that many of our younger ministers who 'missed' the war will read this book and learn that an Army Chaplain is first, foremost and always a Minister of the Gospel, whose parish happens to be composed of men (and sometimes women too!) in uniform. The Faith assumes a new reality and vitality when it is being taught, thought and lived in a setting like the battlefield of Cassino of which Professor Smith

records: 'We had a Good Friday service for which I agreed to give the address. It is curious how service conditions lead you to see new meanings in familiar passages of the Bible. The Last Supper I saw in a new light. Our Lord was like a soldier preparing to go into action. Whereas we always hoped we might survive, He knew it meant death' (p. 218).

I strongly recommend this volume both as a war book and as a Christian book.

R. Stuart Louden

The Faith and Practice of Al-Ghazālī. By W. Montgomery Watt. Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1953. 9s. 6d.

To understand the thought of men of another faith, it is not sufficient to read what specialists say about it; one needs to read what they wrote. But as comparatively few people in this country are able to read the works of Muslim theologians in the original, reliable translations are necessary. To supply this need Dr Watt has made a valuable contribution by publishing a translation of two short works by the famous Muslim theologian and mystic al-Ghazālī (1058-1111 A.D.), with an introduction. His translation is not only reliable; it is also readable. So these two important and instructive works are made available in an attractive English form.

Al-Ghazālī was one of the most famous scholars of Islam. He early rose to a position of eminence, becoming a professor in the Niẓāmiyya College in Baghdad at the age of thirty-three. But after four years he resigned his position and adopted the life of an ascetic. Having come to believe that the mystics were the possessors of truth, he decided that it was not enough to know what they taught; it was necessary to adopt their form of life. He therefore lived as an ascetic for over ten years. Eventually he resumed teaching, but he insisted that his motives were now different. Previously his chief aim had been to advance his own reputation; now he undertook his work for the glory of God.

The first of the two books translated is al-Ghazālī's account of his search for truth. It need not be taken as an accurate chronological account of the process. It is rather an attempt to describe in an orderly manner different schools of thought and his reaction to their teachings, with the purpose of explaining why he eventually found rest in mysticism. He tells how from his youth he had an insatiable thirst for knowledge, his aim being to find something which he could accept as infallible. He explains how he came to doubt the reliability of sense perception and intellectual apprehension. For a short time he drifted into scepticism, from which darkness he emerged, not

because of any arguments, but by a light which came to him from God. He discusses at some length four groups of seekers after truth: theologians, those who claimed to have an infallible leader, philosophers, and mystics; and declares that he found the truth he was seeking in the doctrine and life of the mystics. The whole discussion displays a very acute and deeply religious mind.

The second book here translated, *The beginning of guidance*, is of a different nature. It is divided into two main parts, giving guidance regarding (1) the religious exercises which a pious man should undertake daily, and (2) the avoidance of sins. This is an intensely serious work which makes great demands. Indeed, one feels that its injunctions can be fully obeyed only by one who has devoted himself to a religious life. Al-Ghazālī does make allowance for spending time on acquiring the necessities of life for oneself and one's family, but this appears to be treated as a very minor matter compared with the many religious exercises which should occupy one's day. It is of interest to notice that he says of Friday, 'Let this one day of the week be specially devoted to what pertains to the future life, and perhaps it will be an atonement for the rest of the week.' This is not normal Islamic teaching, for the only special demand made about Friday is that one should attend the midday prayers in the mosque.

Sins are treated in detail. Al-Ghazālī speaks of the sins which may arise from the different members of the body and warns his reader against them. He deals also with sins of the heart, such as hypocrisy, pride, arrogance, boastfulness. But while he has dealt with his subject in a searching manner, he points out at the end that he has spoken merely of a small part of the science of piety in its external aspect. The seeker must go on to learn its interior aspect also.

These two works by one of the finest minds in Islam will repay study. Dr Watt wisely remarks that Christians must be prepared to learn from Islam, and adds that they are unlikely to find a more sympathetic guide than al-Ghazālī.

James Robson

The Grey Friars in Cambridge 1225-1538. The Birkbeck Lectures 1948-9. By John R. H. Moorman, Emmanuel College. Cambridge. 35s. net.

If these lectures merely served to correct the impression made by Chaucer and to a less extent by Langland, that the friar in medieval England was almost synonymous with roguery, they would have fulfilled a valuable purpose; and certainly, seen through the eyes of

Dr Moorman they become a highly respectable part of the English community. But these lectures do more. They show how the Grey Friars started in Cambridge with truly Franciscan poverty, in the humble dwelling of Benjamin the Jew, and in course of time made for themselves with noble literalness, a 'local habitation and a name'. Not only did they build a friary more in keeping with their growing numbers and their pretensions to scholarship, but they became noted throughout the country as itinerant preachers, and in Cambridge for learning and as teachers. With Dr Moorman's carefully documented book before us we may even go so far as to say that Cambridge University owed to the Grey Friars the beginning of sound theological training. Foreign scholars came periodically to lecture in the Friars School, and but for the international reputation thus created Cambridge might not have been singled out so early along with Paris and Oxford as one of the three chief centres of learning in Europe.

Friction was perhaps inevitable, both with the secular clergy and with the University authorities. Commissioned as wandering preachers, and given sanction by their Order to hear confession and to bury the dead, they were bound to come into conflict with the parish priests whose jurisdiction they infringed. As for the long-standing quarrel with the University, that arose from two sources, one being the refusal of the Friars' Theological School to recognise the authority of the Chancellor, the other the Friars' tendency to regard Cambridge as a place for 'a good catch of men', thus depriving the University of promising youths, at a very tender age. The issue was rather unfairly decided against the Friars by the government order dissolving the monasteries throughout England.

This valuable piece of historical research is supplemented by a most impressive list of Cambridge Franciscans, for whose brief biographies Dr Moorman has obviously made a wide sweep of ancient registers and college archives. Some three hundred men noted for their theological learning or their piety or their practical gifts or even—as in the case of the celebrated Friar Bungay—for working miracles, are not to be set lightly aside in a survey of those three centuries so vital both to Church and University in England. Such an array indeed, following upon such exact and painstaking scholarship and antiquarian research as are displayed in this valuable book, disarms even incipient criticism. One must now suppose that Chaucer was violently prejudiced—does not Dr Moorman even prove he was?—and that a few black sheep in the ranks of the Grey Friars ought not to have swayed successive generations of readers against a body of men to whom England owes so much.

C. R. Walker

The Spiritual Espousals. By the Blessed Jan van Ruysbroek. Translated from the Dutch with an Introduction by Eric Colledge. Faber and Faber Ltd. 18s. net.

Ruysbroek has long been recognised as a giant among the great mystics. His descriptions of the mystical states, so hard to describe at all, amount to sheer genius. Evelyn Underhill found in him 'awe and rapture, theological profundity, keen psychological insight'. Certainly all these qualities are evident in *The Spiritual Espousals*, one of Ruysbroek's most mature works.

The main divisions of the book, 'The Active Life', 'The Life of Yearning for God' and 'The Life of Contemplation of God', follow the well worn lines of the mystical ladder, but Ruysbroek's treatment of each stage shows much originality. For instance, while admitting that the average Christian is not required to go beyond the 'Active Life', he makes that first stage both comprehensive and spiritually arduous. All the cardinal virtues must be evident in the Christian—his life must be marked by Cross bearing, for only so can he recognise the humility of Christ in descending to men—or prepare himself for Judgment.

The second part of the book, 'The Yearning of the Soul for God', forms the major portion and the most elaborate and difficult. Taking the Parable of the Ten Virgins as his framework, as indeed he does throughout the book, Ruysbroek describes the coming of Christ to the soul, and the soul's response, under the figure of the Bridegroom's arrival at midnight and the cry, 'Go ye out to meet him'. No better framework could be found for the purpose, for Ruysbroek is concerned with the conditions of seeing Christ, and the varied manner of His coming, and the variety of the soul's response to Him. The bewildering divisions and subdivisions to which this leads remind us of medieval scholasticism at its most tantalising, but the truth and profundity of his descriptions of what happens between Christ and the soul leave a lasting impression: prevenient grace like a candle lit within a lantern; the Holy Spirit at work within the soul like water boiling up whenever the fire beneath is kindled afresh; God in the soul like an inflowing and outflowing tide—these similitudes carry their own conviction.

The third part, 'The Life of Contemplation of God', is very short. Here Ruysbroek's kinship with St. John of the Cross is evident, though Ruysbroek puts far less stress upon the Dark Night and far more upon the illuminating power of Christ our Sun.

Mr Colledge reminds us in his informative Introduction that Ruysbroek was accused in his day both of Quietism and Pantheism. Judging from 'The Spiritual Espousals' at least, the accusations are unwarranted. 'Mere passivity' is for him mere emptiness. As for

his supposed pantheism, it is the 'pantheism' of St. Paul who could say that in God we live and move and have our being. Moreover Ruysbroek was a faithful son of Holy Church, and a firm believer in the 'Commonness' of Christ as exemplified supremely in the Sacrament of Holy Communion.

Whether Ruysbroek altogether escaped the grave pitfall of mysticism, that is of making Christ but the highest step of the ladder towards Union, remains doubtful. But here a devotional genius brings divine mysteries as far as possible within the categories of reason, only reminding us that 'all created understanding behaves as does the eye of the bat in the brilliance of the sunshine'.

C. R. WALKER

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JOHN BAILLIE, A LYRICAL TRIBUTE AND APPRAISAL

by The Rev. President JOHN A. MACKAY

The invitation to pay a tribute to my friend, Principal John Baillie, on the occasion of his attaining the biblical three score years and ten, and his consequent retirement from duty in New College, Edinburgh, stirs memories that go back half a century and more.

The Baillie family, a widow and three sons, John, Donald, and Peter, came to Inverness from Gairloch in the closing years of the nineteenth century. Their arrival was some years before the Diamond Jubilee of Queen Victoria which was celebrated in 1897. The head of the household, the Reverend John Baillie, had been minister in the parish of Gairloch on the west coast of Ross-shire. Upon his death, Mrs Baillie took up her abode in the Highland capital and enrolled her boys in the Inverness Royal Academy, a school which can boast an unbroken record of seven hundred years.

I shall be pardoned if I say a word about this old school where the Baillie boys and the writer were pupils together. 'Its beginnings,' one reads in the school Prospectus, 'go back to the foundation of the Dominican Priory in Inverness in 1233. One of its "rectors" is a witness to a deed by King Robert Bruce in 1316. It had grown into a Grammar School, supported partly by the Priory and partly by the Town Council long before the Reformation; and as the "Grammar School", it continued to flourish under the Town Council until 1792. . . . In the following year, 1793, a Royal Warrant and Charter of Incorporation was obtained and the School has ever since been known as Inverness Royal Academy.' The Academy had famous teachers at the beginning of the century. One was Thomas Cockburn who taught English and history. As a student in Edinburgh University, he had heard Thomas Carlyle give his famous rectorial address. We Academy boys say still to one another that 'Cobie' was the greatest teacher we ever had. The other was

the Rector, William J. Watson, who taught Classics to the upper forms. 'W.J.' later became Rector of the Edinburgh High School, and after that Professor of Celtic in Edinburgh University.

It was in 1903, the year I entered the Academy, that I first met the Baillies. John was my senior by three years, and Donald by two. The newcomer stood somewhat in awe of boys in the school's upper class who had already won scholastic fame among their peers and whose reputation seeped down into the lower strata of us younger fry. John was the president of our school's Debating Society, which met every Friday evening. He presided at the meetings where some twenty or thirty of us made our debut into public debate. A large proportion of the members of that juvenile society were headed for the Christian ministry. In addition to John and Donald Baillie, there was John Y. Campbell, now Professor of New Testament in Westminster College, Cambridge; and Donald Ross, minister until recently of the Mayfield Church in Edinburgh. Jack Campbell and Donald Baillie were bosom friends; so, too, were Donald Ross and I. When their school days were over, the Baillies, Campbell and Ross all went to Edinburgh University where the Baillie family took up residence. I went to Aberdeen. After graduation, I found my way to Princeton, U.S.A., and thereafter to the Latin American world. Decades passed before John Baillie and I saw one another again. The encounter took place in his home in Union Seminary, New York, to which he had come as Professor of Systematic Theology.

What I have to say about the theological and ecclesiastical significance of John Baillie cannot fail to be coloured by memories of boyhood, and by an acquaintanceship which has ripened into friendship with the advancing years, as our comradeship has become closer in the service of the world-wide Church of Christ. It is obvious why I should begin on this lyrical note.

The Man

I will begin with Baillie, the *man*. No one can understand or appreciate either the personality or the writing of the Principal of New College, Edinburgh, without considering the fact that he belongs to the Celtic race, and that his spiritual heritage has

its roots in the region north of the Grampians. John Baillie was born and reared in that region of the British Isles which from time immemorial has been preponderantly Celtic. It was Celts from the northern Highlands who, nearly two thousand years ago, broke the might of Agricola's Roman legions in the famous battle of Mons Graupius. It is somewhat of a paradox that the first Scottish president of the World Council of Churches should belong to an area which the Romans, because they failed to conquer it, did not regard as within the *oikoumenē*, the ancestral word from which 'ecumenical' is derived. Yet in recent centuries, this region, which was extra-ecumenical in the old Roman world, has given more men to the *oikoumenē* of our time than any comparable region on earth, and not a few leaders to the Church Universal.

Baillie's Celtic background offers the key to the imaginative and beautiful style in which his books are written. It also accounts for the soft liquid 'r' which marks his speech. This Celtic 'r' has characterised the traditional speech of Inverness and Dublin, and contrasts strongly with the burr or trilled 'r' which marks the spoken tongue in the south of Scotland, especially the Clyde valley, and which is wrongly regarded by many foreigners as the invariable hallmark of Scottish speech.

It was natural, too, that a true son of an old Highland manse should be interested in learning and piety. The fact that to a greater extent than any professional theologian of our time, John Baillie's work combines the finest scholarship with a deep devotional spirit, harks back to Highland religion at its best. The atmosphere of the old Ross-shire manse, with its family worship morning and evening, and where the scholarly traits of a devout father and free play, help to explain that classic of devotional literature, *A Diary of Private Prayer*, as well as the profound interest of its author in religious experience. It was the glory of religion in the Scottish Highlands in those days that theological orthodoxy and personal piety were an equal concern. It was no dead orthodoxy that reigned, for the ultimate criterion of the religious life and a person's worthiness to become a church member, and to participate in the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper, was his ability to show that he had been a subject of divine grace and that the roots of the new life were in him.

After a very brilliant career in philosophy at Edinburgh University, John Baillie studied in Germany. This was followed by an assistantship in philosophy in his Alma Mater, and some years as assistant minister in an Edinburgh church. Then came four years of service with the British armies in France from 1915 to 1919 under the auspices of the Y.M.C.A. In 1919 Baillie crossed the Atlantic and became Richards Professor of Philosophy in Auburn Theological Seminary in New York State. Eight years in Auburn were followed by three years as Professor of Systematic Theology in Emmanuel College, Toronto. From Toronto he returned to the U.S.A. to become Roosevelt Professor of Systematic Theology in Union Seminary, New York, where he spent four years. In 1934 he came back to Scotland to succeed the famous W. P. Paterson as Professor of Divinity in the University of Edinburgh. Since 1950 he has served in addition as Principal of New College and Dean of the Faculty of Divinity. Four years of wartime experience in closest contact with life's grimmest realities and fifteen years in the Western world were an unusual preparation for one who was to become, if one might use the term, the leading *mediational* theologian of our time.

The Theologian

It was a significant coincidence that Baillie should have gone to the United States the year after the first edition of Karl Barth's *Römerbrief* made its appearance. Fifteen years in the Western world, divided between the United States and Canada, gave the young Scottish theologian an unusual knowledge of the American mind and of religious trends in this country at a time when theology was not a popular science. The Baillie of those days was above all else a philosopher of religion who defined theology 'as the interrogation of the religious consciousness with a view to discovering what religion really is'—*The Interpretation of Religion* (page 14). It was not until his return to Scotland that he really began to take seriously the fresh breezes that were blowing from continental Europe, and which had their source in Bonn and Zürich. When one reads *Our Knowledge of God* which was published in 1939, there becomes evident a new appreciation on Baillie's part of the biblical revelation and an awareness of the profound problems posed by the

Theology of Crisis. Since that time, the subject of revelation has been a paramount concern of John Baillie. *The Idea of Revelation* is the title of his latest book which forms The Bampton Lectures delivered in Columbia University, New York.

Baillie's significance as a thinker lies largely in the fact that he has been a mediating theologian. He has been a bridge-builder, not only between the religious thought and outlook of two continents, but between the older Liberalism and the new Dialectical Theology, now commonly called Neo-orthodoxy. To fulfil the role of mediating theologian, he not only had the advantage of his New World experience, but a remarkable innate capacity to understand, appreciate and communicate the thought of other people. His writings are distinguished, as one of his most brilliant American students has put it, 'not by a systematic comprehensiveness, but rather by this historical and systematic interpretation of separate theological problems'. 'The range of Baillie's knowledge and the richness of his mind,' this same person goes on, 'brought to his singular capacity for expounding the core of another scholar's mind, a kind of original quality. One could always be sure that he had received through Professor Baillie's mind a reliable grasp of another thinker. In this, too, he demonstrated a penetrating criticism. This criticism seemed to me rooted not so much in an original and creative option of his own, as it did in a sharp logical turn of mind. But what it meant was that the person engaged in conversation with him, or coming under his strictures needed to be very clear and precise about his own views.'

On the other hand, a mediating theologian, despite his gifts of comprehension and communication, always occupies a perilous position. History indicates that the influence of mediating theologies tends to be short-lived. The questions to which he addresses himself belong to a transitional period and rapidly lose their significance. Baillie's thought, moreover, has not been characterised by a structural systematic quality such as that of a Barth or a Brunner or a Tillich, or even, to a certain extent, his own brother Donald.

But if it be true that Baillie's theological thought is not marked by systematic comprehensiveness or an architectonic character, few writers can match him in doing critical justice to the thought of others. His capacity to relate theological

ideas to the realities of the secular order is particularly impressive. Significant in this connexion are the following words of a Scottish theologian who now resides in the United States: 'An important place,' he writes, 'in an estimate of Baillie's theological contribution should be given to the notable part he played as Chairman of the Commission appointed by the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland to interpret the deeper issues presented by the War. The annual reports of this Commission, which were subsequently collected in a single volume under the title of *God's Will for Our Time* did much to guide the thinking of the Church and brace it for its task in those dark and critical years.' It was in the darkest period of the War, that Baillie wrote his *Invitation to Pilgrimage* (1942). Gradually the sense of tragedy had entered the theologian's soul. Ideas of progress which he had previously held, now appear in a greatly modified form, and the notes of evangelical Christianity are heard as in no previous book.

The Professor

In collecting material for this brief essay, I asked three former students of Professor Baillie to give me an estimate of what he had meant to them as a teacher. The first of these was his pupil more than twenty years ago in Union Seminary, New York. Today he is one of the most vigorous theological minds in the United States, and has just been called to the Chair of Theology in a leading American University. 'As I think of Principal Baillie,' he writes, 'I think especially of what I most learned from him myself. He was, as you know, my teacher, and I continue to recall with gratitude the remarkable clarity, orderliness, and substance in the lectures which he gave. I always feel that I really learned from him how to teach via the lecture method. It was an exhilaration to be in his classrooms and to participate in the range of his scholarship and in the lucid and precise way in which he could bring to life both familiar and unfamiliar details. It is this clear pedagogical method which stands out in my mind.'

The second former student now edits a leading theological journal. He happened to be in New College, Edinburgh, the year Professor Baillie arrived from New York. His words throw light upon the impression made by the 'return of the native'.

'I first met Baillie,' he says, 'when in Edinburgh in 1934. He had just come from Union Seminary, New York, to take the position vacated by W. P. Paterson. Many of the American graduate students flocked around him, feeling that he understood the American scheme of things and appreciating his willingness to help in the matter of arranging the graduate programme. I happened to be working at the time with H. R. Mackintosh, but Baillie was a sort of "second" adviser in my work. The two men, Mackintosh and Baillie, were, of course, quite different. The one was more theological and evangelical; the other more philosophical and analytical. The one was ending his long teaching career, the other was just moving into the limelight.' He then goes on to quote a famous piece of doggerel which originally was scratched on a desk in Baillie's classroom.

> Baillie, Baillie, give us your answer true.
> Why ain't Plato found in the canon, too?
> For by your interpretation
> He's better than Revelation.
> His style is neater
> Than Second Peter
> And he isn't a dirty Jew.

My correspondent goes on: 'The implications of this verse were unfair to Baillie (to say nothing of the crudity of the last line), but it was perhaps a true indication of one side of Baillie's thought.' The side referred to was, of course, the Professor's enthusiasm for Platonic thought, upon which he had been brought up under Pringle-Pattison, and which had schooled him in crystalline clarity and logical cogency.

A third young American was Baillie's student in Edinburgh in recent years. He is now a brilliant young instructor in an American theological seminary. He pays this tribute to his master: 'Quite candidly, Principal Baillie was one of the finest teachers under which it has been my privilege to sit. I have reference here not so much to the points of view expressed by the teacher as to the substantial content of his lectures, the spirit of delivery, and the openness for "give-and-take" classroom discussion. Although the lectures were read from manuscripts, the style was always easy to listen to, provocative and informative material being presented for the enlightenment of thought-

producing stimulation of the students. Not least among the delights of his classroom were the numerous bits of humour which punctuated his remarks. Furthermore, the student invariably knew just where the lecturer stood on any given issue. Principal Baillie delighted in classroom debate, and was never constrained within the limits of his manuscript. Indeed, we were often taken in pursuit of philosophical and theological themes which in many instances are rarely if ever touched upon in theological seminaries on this side of the Atlantic. Principal Baillie's long years of teaching on the American scene undoubtedly made him familiar with the mind and interests and weaknesses of the theological students in this country, and equipped him with insights and a manner of approach to stimulate, enlighten, and broaden the horizons of those privileged to study with him.'

These were the qualities in the Principal of New College which attracted so many theological students from the United States to Edinburgh.

Two of these same correspondents pay also a glowing tribute to the rich humanity of their former teacher and to his close contact with his students in the domestic circle. The one who knew him in his New York days writes thus. 'I must say a further word about Principal Baillie as a person. What I remember especially is a remarkable self-effacement in both commonplace and human relations. This always seemed to me to be the more notable because of his eminence as a scholar and as a churchman. I recall on various occasions when, as a guest in his home, or when, in later years, he on his part was a guest with us, how unobtrusive and considerate he was of little things which make human relations so delightful. I have often thought it is this gentle humaneness which underlies the remarkable power of the *Diary of Private Prayer* and the *Diary of Readings*.'

The other writes, 'Among the pleasures associated in the memory of my years abroad are the social gatherings which took place in the home of Dr Baillie. Here the students were enabled to gain another perspective of their teacher, a man who showed great delight in assuming the role of host for an evening of games, stories and refreshments. Indeed, Principal Baillie seemed to have a storehouse full to overflowing of delightful

entertaining stories into which his listeners were inextricably bound. Great thinkers of other years, many of them but names to us of a different generation, took on life and meaning as they were paraded before our vision through the lips of our host.'

In these expressions of gratitude appears the profile of one of the great theological teachers of our generation. As regards theology and the home, there is a remarkable resemblance between Baillie and Barth. However great the difference between the two men, both are associated in the minds of their students with exuberant mirth and humour in the home circle. In this respect, the German Swiss and the Scottish Highlander are gloriously akin; both are great human beings. Let me say it with reverence. In both, 'the word has become flesh'.

The Churchman

Let me conclude with a few reflections upon Baillie, the *churchman*.

John Baillie has been much more than a teacher of theology, very especially in recent years. Sören Kierkegaard once berated with biting sarcasm the typical professor that he knew. 'Take away paradox from a thinker,' said he, 'and you have the professor.' He imagined that near the Cross of Christ stood a man who beheld a terrible scene and then became a professor of what he saw. The same man witnessed the persecution and imprisonment and cruel beating of the Apostles and became a professor of what he had beheld. He studied the drama of the Cross but was never crucified with Christ. He studied apostolic history but did not live apostolically. The living contemporaneousness of the Crucified meant nothing to him. 'It ended,' said Kierkegaard, 'with the Apostles being crucified—and the Professor became professor of the crucifixion of the Apostles. Finally, the Professor departed with a quiet, peaceful death.'

John Baillie has not been this kind of professor. For four years during the First World War, he ministered to the British forces. He was with the men who made the terrible retreat to Dunkirk. He was Moderator of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland for the year 1943-4 when the Second World War was entering its most crucial period. In the post-war period Baillie has played the part of a missionary churchman in Australia, in Argentina, as well as in the United States

and Canada. At the Evanston Assembly of the World Council of Churches in 1954, he was elected president of that ecumenical body.

Only one thing I have regretted in the career of my fellow Invernessian—it is something we have discussed together—his belated appreciation of the genius of the Reformed faith and of the role which the Presbyterian heritage is called upon to play in the Ecumenical Movement. A number of years ago he pointed out to me how so many ministers and members of the Church of Scotland, and even of the former United Free Church of Scotland, were scarcely aware that they belonged to a world family of churches and to a specific theological heritage. They thought of themselves simply as belonging to a church which, like the Church of England, was national and unique. They eschewed everything that might appear to be sectarian. They were loyal to the Scottish ecclesiastical tradition and to churches, whether 'Auld Kirk' or 'Free', which did not happen to have in their official letter either the designation 'Presbyterian' or 'Reformed'. They were interested only in that kind of wider ecclesiastical relationship which crossed confessional boundaries and was ecumenical in the fullest sense. It is a significant, if pathetic, fact, that there was a time in the present century when the Westminster Confession of Faith, the subordinate standard of the Church of Scotland, could not be obtained because it was out of print. When Karl Barth gave his Gifford Lectures on the First Scottish Confession, he was taken aback to learn that he was not dealing with the Confession recognised as standard by the present Church of Scotland.

In recent years, however, with that supreme sensitivity and mediational quality which have always marked his thought and outlook, John Baillie has come to a growing appreciation of the Reformed tradition, and of what it can contribute to the faith and life of Christ's Church Universal. At the meeting of the World Presbyterian Alliance which convened at Princeton on the eve of the Second General Assembly of the World Council of Churches, he played a prominent and constructive part. He had come to realise that to be confessionally minded need not make a man sectarian in spirit and outlook. In this connexion, one might hope that in the years ahead, the distinguished figure who has just stepped down from the principal-

ship of New College would develop the concern for Reformed Christianity which marked his distinguished predecessor, Dr William A. Curtis. His sensitive spirit and superb mind could do much to clarify the unique elements in the Reformed heritage of faith, those elements which Presbyterians should strive to carry as their special contribution into the treasure house of Christ's Church Universal.

My own commitment to the Ecumenical Movement has followed a different course from that of the Principal of New College. In early boyhood I passed through an experience of ecclesiastical strife and bitterness. My father was one of a group of earnest and devoted people who separated from the Free Church of Scotland. I learned to study and contend for the faith in a fellowship which had the eschatological certainty that it would be the Church of the Millennium. It was in that fellowship that I passed through a crucial experience of conversion which cleft my boyhood in two a few weeks before I entered the Inverness Royal Academy. In that same fellowship the iron of conviction entered my soul regarding the authentic Christian core in the Presbyterian heritage.

The future of the Ecumenical Movement in our time lies in a calm facing of the creative significance of resurgent Confessionalism. What has Presbyterianism, what has Anglicanism, what have Lutherans, Methodists, Baptists, and the rest got to contribute to the fulness of Christ and to the upbuilding of His Church? Let us reject for ever the thought that the unity of Christ's Church Universal must ever be based upon a lowest common denominator formula. Far from that. Let Christian churchmen in full loyalty to Christ, to the biblical revelation and to the Church Universal seek, in an agony of prayer, in self-criticism and in adventurous faith, to bring what is authentically Christian into the treasure chamber of the Church which is Christ's Body. It gives me no ordinary joy that one to whom I look up today with the same reverence that I did as a schoolboy more than half a century ago is a comrade in the Central Committee of the World Council of Churches.

THE ARCHITECTURE OF KARL BARTH S CHURCH DOGMATICS[1]

by JOHN GODSEY

Introduction

It may sound a bit presumptuous to speak of the architecture of a dogmatics which is not yet complete, but the size and scope of Professor Barth's *Church Dogmatics* to date would seem to justify our attempt to examine its outer structure in order to discover the basic dynamic principles involved in this Protestant 'Summa'. In following this procedure, however, we should be aware that we are working backwards, for, unlike the many dogmatics in which the Christian Faith has been forced into a pre-established mould, Professor Barth has been willing to cast the mould in accordance with the demands of the Faith itself. This is not to deny in any way the obvious human element involving meticulous planning and unusually sensitive organisational skill, but is to state clearly that the *Church Dogmatics* is not a system conforming to the dictates of human reason, but is a bold yet humble attempt to write a systematic theology which conforms to the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. As such, the architectural plans must necessarily result from obedient and faithful listening to the Word of God spoken to the Church, and all future designs must remain fluid and prepared for unexpected changes.

Anyone who has investigated the growth of the *Church Dogmatics* during the past twenty-three years will soon discover that the author's well-laid plans have often been altered by the hard demands of the Word of God. To be sure, after publishing his first *Prolegomena to Dogmatics* in 1927 and then experiencing the necessity of completely re-writing the very same *Prolegomena* during the next eleven years, Professor Barth had firmly established the five doctrines which constitute the main divisions of his *Dogmatics*. But if one reads the projected outline for the

[1] Paper read before Barth's English Colloquium, Basel, 8th Nov. 1955.

future course of the *Dogmatics* which is given at the end of I-2, one will be struck by the structural changes which have subsequently occurred. A more recent attempt at prognostication has made Professor Barth lament the fact that he did not learn his first lesson well enough. This concerns the projected outline for the doctrine of Reconciliation, which stands at the beginning of IV-1—an outline which has already proved unreliable in some details.

Keeping this living character in mind, our task is now to consider the structure of the *Church Dogmatics* as it stands before us and to attempt to discover why it is so constructed.

Empirical Investigation

1. General Observations

Let us begin with some general observations which even a casual reader should discover. First, the title of *Church Dogmatics* is to be taken seriously. From the outset this theology is bound to the *sphere of the Church* and is only understandable and meaningful within its borders. It arose from a pastoral concern which prompted a man to dare to be the Church in his own concrete situation by attempting to carry out the function of dogmatics within the Church, that is, by measuring the proclamation of the Church according to the yardstick of the essence of the Church, which is Jesus Christ. This task which was undertaken is no auxiliary task, but an integral and necessary and continuing function of the Christian community. The seriousness with which Professor Barth takes this ecclesiological responsibility has led to a dogmatics in which the Church is not simply reflecting, but is in conversation with itself. The reader is immediately impressed by the number of excursuses in which both the prominent and the obscure theological voices from all periods of Church history are allowed to make their pertinent contributions to today's conversation—an architectural feature which, indeed, has added considerably to the length of the *Dogmatics*.

A second general feature is the important role that *biblical exegesis* plays in the structure of the *Church Dogmatics*. This can easily be detected by the great number of excursuses which are devoted to the exegetical bases for dogmatic statements about

the Faith. This stems from Professor Barth's conviction that the Bible, which is the book of the Church which contains the witness of the prophets and apostles to God's self-revelation in Christ, must be considered in utmost seriousness as the criterion for judging Church proclamation. The dogmatician must always be engaged in the task of biblical exegesis, and the exegesis must ever lead back to dogmatics.

A further characteristic, which is obvious to anyone who so much as peruses the table of contents, is the *incorporation of ethics* as an integral part of the *Church Dogmatics*. This unusual procedure follows from the author's belief that Christian ethics is no more and no less than the doctrine of the commandment of God (as event) and therefore cannot stand isolated from the realm of dogmatics in the Church. Accordingly, there is a discussion of general ethics at the close of the doctrine of God and a discussion of special ethics at the close of the doctrines of Creation, Reconciliation and Redemption.

Finally, a fourth characteristic, which is immediately apparent, is the *Trinitarian* structure of the *Church Dogmatics*. Here we do not find the Loci-scheme of Melanchthon and most old orthodox dogmatics or the creedal formulation of Calvin or the inductive logic of Schleiermacher, but a willingness to follow the structural lines of the revelation itself. That is, the architecture bears the impress of God's revelation to His Church in the Lord Jesus Christ, a revelation which demands the ultimate formulation of a doctrine of the Trinity, because the doctrine of the Trinity is the great methodological interpretation of God's revelation. We might also describe the architecture as 'revelational' or 'Christocentric', but each of these designations would have to be qualified and interpreted in terms of the Trinity, since the doctrines of Perichoresis (that God's three modes of existence mutually penetrate each other or 'inexist') and Appropriations (that a special word or deed is attributed to this or that Person of the Godhead) and the rule *opera trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa* are basic to Christian thinking about God. Thus the 'revelation', which is 'Christocentric'—and no one has seen the significance of Jesus Christ as the determinative principle for theology as has Professor Barth—is simply the revelation of the triune God: the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit. From this perspective we can appreciate the

division of the *Church Dogmatics* into its five main parts: (1) the doctrine of the Word of God, which investigates the basis for the revelation of the triune God; (2) the doctrine of God, which deals with the knowledge and reality of the one God who reveals Himself in threeness; (3) the doctrine of Creation, which concerns the activity appropriated to God the Father; (4) the doctrine of Reconciliation, the activity appropriated to God the Son; (5) the doctrine of Redemption, the activity appropriated to God the Holy Spirit.

2. SPECIFIC OBSERVATIONS

(*a*) *The Doctrine of the Word of God*

Now let us turn our attention to some of the interesting details of the architecture of the *Church Dogmatics*. First of all, we discover that in the doctrine of the Word of God we are dealing with 'prolegomena' to dogmatics. This is no accident, because Professor Barth believes that dogmatics must first forge its own epistemological tools and thus render an account of its own special pathway to knowledge before it can proceed to its main task. Prolegomena are not intended to give the revelation in Christ a natural substructure which would more or less justify it before the court of human reason, i.e. an apologetic opportunity to prove or defend the faith to those on the outside, but are an inner necessity grounded in the paradoxical fact of heresy within the Church itself. Here the two heresies that are opposed throughout the *Church Dogmatics* come to light: pietistic-rationalistic modernism, which finds its point of departure for dogmatic statements in a general understanding of man, his world or his existence, and Roman Catholicism, which begins with the existence of a Church in which Jesus Christ is no longer its free Lord, but is bound up with the existence of the Church itself.

A closer examination of the contents of the *Prolegomena* will divulge that Professor Barth begins with the Word of God, that is, with God in His concrete revelatory action in the event of Jesus Christ, who *is* the Word of God. In other words, the architecture shows us that we begin with God and not man, with the reality of revelation and not its possibility. The special way of knowledge of the Christian Faith, then, is not grounded

in any capability or possibility of man, but in God's own sovereign freedom. Man can know God only because God makes Himself known to man—this is the *petitio principii* of which the author of the *Church Dogmatics* is not ashamed. The whole volume is really a commentary on the one sentence: God reveals Himself as Lord.

Now that the Word of God is established as the criterion of dogmatics, the structure of the remainder of the Prolegomena is simply an exposition of the threefold form of this one Word of God, which, according to Professor Barth, is the only admissible analogy for the Trinity. Chapter 2 deals with the 'revealed Word' or 'Revelation of God', Chapter 3 with the 'written Word' or 'Holy Scriptures', Chapter 4 with the 'preached Word' or 'Church Proclamation'. What can we learn here? First, the order is important. Unlike most Protestant dogmatics, we do not begin with the doctrine of Holy Scripture, but with the Incarnation itself. Here we see that the 'revealed Word', which *has happened* once and for all time in the historical event of Jesus Christ, must be given a prior and determinative position above and beyond the 'written Word' and the 'preached Word', which must ever again *become* God's Word. Thus the Bible can never become a 'paper pope', but retains its basic character as witness. Second, we should note well that there is no room left for a natural theology. This does not mean that there is no natural knowledge of God, but it means that apart from God's own self-revelation man has no knowledge which can be appealed to as a basis for the knowledge of God which he has in Christ. A natural theology, therefore, has no real theological significance and deserves no place in the dogmatics of the Church.

(*b*) *The Doctrine of God*

Next we examine the doctrine of God, which purposely *follows* the exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity, a reversal of the usual procedure in dogmatics. What is the reason for this architectural manoeuvre? Just this: by previously establishing the doctrine of the Trinity as a functional and not a metaphysical doctrine, i.e. God in action and not in static being, Professor Barth is now able to avoid the usual speculative and fruitless discussion of the ontology of the Trinity and the

abstract attributes of God's Being. Here we see at work the basic insight that Christian thinking about God must move from action to ontology, from the economic Trinity to the ontological Trinity—never vice versa. There is no possible retreat from the *Deus revelatus* to a *Deus absconditus*, no going behind God's own revelation of Himself in Jesus Christ. God is antecedently in Himself exactly the same God He reveals Himself to be in His acting in history. The mystery of God is preserved just in His revelation, in the Incarnation of the Word.

Chapters 5 and 6, which deal with the Knowledge and Reality of God, reveal that the certainty and actuality of the revelation are axiomatic for theological thinking. No one acquainted with Professor Barth's theology should be surprised that the question of the existence of God is never raised. Instead, it is simply affirmed that the triune God exists as the One who freely loves, and His perfections—the term which the author prefers to that of 'attributes'—are those of the divine loving (here are coupled in the most surprising way grace and holiness, mercy and righteousness, patience and wisdom) and those of the divine freedom (no less surprising is the coupling here of unity and omnipresence, immutability and omnipotence, eternity and glory). All of this points back to the basic primacy of the revelation and to the fact that God's Being is understood properly solely from God's action.

In Chapter 7 we come to an architectural positioning of decisive importance within the *Church Dogmatics*. At the very heart of the doctrine of God we find a discussion of what Professor Barth asserts to be the heart of the Gospel: the doctrine of God's Gracious Election. Election is for the doctrine of God what the doctrine of Reconciliation is for the whole of the *Church Dogmatics*: its heart and centre and foundation, upon which everything else depends. Election means reconciliation. Thus it is not abstractly grounded in the usual omnipotence of God, but in Jesus Christ Himself, the gracious revelation of God's love. It is also not placed as a peripheral dogmatic concern, as a catch-all doctrine which takes care of everything beyond man's comprehension; it is made as central as the Gospel, which it itself is. Election is not some hidden and horrible decree, but the decree revealed in Jesus Christ, who is the electing God and the elected man. It is important to note

that the structure here follows a particular order: the election of Jesus Christ, the election of the congregation, the election of the individual. This again points to the importance and function of the Church, which is ever in the foreground of the author's thought. But what about reprobation? This receives no section of its own in the architecture, for even non-election is known only in the election of Jesus Christ. In Him God reveals a double predestination, i.e. an eternal will which contains a Yes and a No, but in the election of Jesus Christ God has intended the Yes for man and No for Himself. God Himself has chosen our rejection. From this follows the basic thought that evil is simply a power that has been overcome and condemned to impotency, that Satan is not God's ultimately real adversary. All of this is not to infer a doctrine of *apokatastasis*, however, but asserts that the Bible knows no ultimate dualism, but the supremacy of God's grace and the impotence of human wickedness in the face of it.

Directly following the doctrine of God's Gracious Election, we have in Chapter 8 a discussion of God's commandment. This is by no means an accident. Election and commandment belong inextricably together and must be viewed in that order. The correspondence to Professor Barth's famous coupling of 'Gospel and Law' over against the Lutheran 'Law and Gospel' is obvious. The two are to be differentiated, but never separated, and Law is always to be seen in the light of the Gospel. In Christian theological thinking it is of critical importance that we always move from Gospel to Law, just as we must go from justification to sanctification, from faith to works, from Church to state. In other words, here we have a Christological concept of the Law which excludes any foundation in natural law or orders of creation: God's *Nomos* and God's *Logos* are ultimately identical, for Law is the form of the Gospel. There is no Law and no Gospel in and for themselves, but only the one Word of God. This means that God's commandment is an event, not a general proposition. In our context it also means that the concrete form of election is sanctification. Jesus Christ is the sanctifying God and the sanctified man.

(*c*) *The Doctrine of Creation*

The doctrine of Creation can properly come only *after* the

doctrine of God, the heart of which is God's Gracious Election. This structural arrangement signifies Professor Barth's conviction that God is not known first of all in His creation, but in the revelation of His Lordship in Jesus Christ. Only from the prior viewpoint of God's election or reconciliation, i.e. only for the eyes of faith, does the world become a creation instead of a cosmos, does nature take on glory. From this supposition it is not surprising that the author discusses at the very beginning the relation between creation and covenant. The connexion is integral. The covenant of grace, which is concretely actualised in the history of salvation, is the inner meaning and determinative factor of all history. The first creation saga affirms that creation is the external presupposition of the covenant, while the second saga discloses the covenant as the internal presupposition of the creation.

After establishing this crucial starting point, which might be termed a Christological supposition or, seen from man's side, a supposition of faith, we can now understand in some measure the unique way in which Professor Barth handles the doctrine of Creation. Since knowledge of creation stems only from Christ's revelation, creation can only be conceived in terms of an analogy, the most inclusive term for this being *analogia fidei*, i.e. an analogy which is erected by the choice and decision of God Himself in His free grace and is only visible for faith. Here we see a powerful turning against Roman Catholicism's *analogia entis*, which subsumes both Creator and creature under the higher category of being, and modernism's various world views, which subordinate revelation to reason. Here we meet the consequences of the rejection of natural theology. From this perspective Professor Barth is now able to speak about creaturely history in terms of an analogy or correspondence to the history of the covenant; of God's creature in terms of an *analogia relationis*, that is, of an analogy between the I and Thou in God Himself and the fact that the creature is created as man and woman (this communal relation is the *Imago Dei*, which is not lost in the Fall, but which first becomes understandable in the light of the relation between Jesus Christ and His Church); of God's providence in terms of an *analogia operationis* (not *analogia causae*) between God's activity and man's activity; of the commandment of God the Creator, which is not founded

on independent orders of creation, but is related solely to the real ground of creation, Jesus Christ.

What further can we learn from the architecture of the doctrine of Creation? First, we may note an omission. There is no doctrine of the original state of man before the Fall—what is usually called the state of integrity or perfection or original righteousness. The fact that this doctrine is left out of the *Church Dogmatics* stems from the author's belief that the Bible teaches us nothing theologically significant about a so-called *Uroffenbarung*, that we can know only of man as sinner—and this from the revelation in Christ. Second, the relatively little space devoted to the 'Nihil', which encompasses the concepts of chaos, fallen creation, cosmic evil, demonology, etc., is noteworthy. This does not signify that the Nihil is not taken seriously, but emphasises the fact that Professor Barth sees in the Bible absolutely no dualism, no splitting up of reality into two conflicting, balanced principles. The Nihil belongs to the sphere of God's No, to the negation of grace, to what God has rejected. The 'chaos' of Gen. 1.2, for instance, is not some primal stuff which existed before creation, but is simply the possibility which God scornfully passed over. The Nihil, therefore, does not exist as God and the creature exist, but in a way peculiar to itself and known only to God, because it is grounded in His negation. Only in Jesus Christ do we understand the Nihil: the Incarnation reveals that the Nihil exists, and the Crucifixion and Resurrection reveal that it exists improperly and must pass away. Third, from the structure of the doctrine of Creation we can observe the large share of attention given to the creature and the relatively small amount devoted to the so-called world of nature. The stated reason for this is that the Word of God gives an ontology of man, but not an ontology of heaven and earth. Thus there is no biblical world view or biblical cosmology, whereas there is a definite biblical anthropology. Last, but not least, it is interesting to observe that Professor Barth has not hesitated to deal fully with the subject of the Angels, which he discusses more from the viewpoint of their service than their nature.

(*d*) *The Doctrine of Reconciliation*

We now turn our attention to the structural and material

centre of the *Church Dogmatics*: the crucial and pivotal doctrine of Reconciliation. This doctrine stands in the middle between the doctrines of Creation and Redemption and forms the proper link between them. Since the covenant is the presupposition of reconciliation, the doctrine of Reconciliation naturally *follows* the doctrine of Creation. In the event of reconciliation Jesus Christ, 'God with us', fulfils the broken covenant, thus making possible man's eschatological redemption. Therefore the doctrine of Reconciliation naturally *precedes* the doctrine of Redemption.

In Chapter 13 we find a synopsis of the unusually beautiful structure of the doctrine of Reconciliation. Here Christ's working Person or personal Work in the total of the happening of reconciliation is viewed under three Christological aspects in three chapters constructed in exact parallel. Chapter 14 deals with the knowledge of Jesus Christ, who is the true, namely, the self-humiliating and thus the reconciling, God—what the old dogmatics called Christ's priestly office. Chapter 15 deals with the knowledge of Jesus Christ, who is the true, namely, the exalted-by-God and thus the reconciled, man—Christ's kingly office. Chapter 16 deals with the knowledge of Jesus Christ Himself, who, as the unity of God and man, is the Guarantor and Witness of our reconciliation—Christ's prophetic office. Each of the three chapters has five paragraphs, the first of which is a discussion of the Christological aspects just outlined; this is followed by a paragraph dealing with the forms of human sin, respectively: man's pride, indolence and lie; next a paragraph on what objectively takes place in reconciliation: man's justification, sanctification and calling; then a paragraph on the subjective realisation of reconciliation through the Work of the Holy Spirit in the assembly, upbuilding, and sending of the Christian congregation; and a final paragraph on the existence of Christians in Jesus Christ in faith, in love and in hope. The doctrine of Reconciliation will close with another chapter on special ethics, in which the commandment of God is considered from the viewpoint of Law.

What can we learn from the architectural plans of this doctrine? First, we should notice that Professor Barth does not deal with independent doctrines of Christology, Soteriology, and Ecclesiology, does not investigate separately the doctrines

of the Person and the Work of Christ, as in classical Christology. To do so is to divide what can only be seen properly as a whole: Jesus Christ existing in the totality of His work as Reconciler. The existence of Jesus Christ as true God, as true man, and as the unity of both (God-man) is only understood from the completed act of the reconciliation of man with God in history. Once again we see the consequences of the principle that Being must be understood in the light of action. Second, it is obvious that the doctrine of the two 'Natures' of Christ (His divinity and His humanity) and the doctrine of the two 'States' of Christ (His humiliation and His exaltation) have been related to each other in a fresh and unusual way. Consciously deviating from the old Protestant dogmatics, Professor Barth endeavours to interpret the two States of Christ not as states which follow one another, but as two sides or directions or forms of the one material, reconciling act of Jesus Christ; to interpret the doctrine of the two States from that of the two Natures, and vice versa; and to emphasise that in all this we have to do with the one God graciously and sovereignly acting as the One who freely loves.

Third, we should note that the author has given precedence to what the old dogmaticians designated Christ's high-priestly office over His kingly office, because he feels that it is more precise and also more comprehensive. Fourth, it is noteworthy that no independent doctrine of sin, which in most dogmatics occupies a space between the doctrine of Creation and the doctrine of Reconciliation, is to be found in the *Church Dogmatics*. Instead, sin is discussed *after* Christology as an integral part of the total doctrine of Reconciliation, an arrangement which derives from the conviction that sin is only understandable in the light of the Gospel. Fifth, Christ's objective accomplishment of reconciliation for man is clearly distinguished from man's subjective appropriation of the same. This is necessary because the latter concerns the existence and working of the Holy Spirit.

Sixth, it is important to observe that Professor Barth gives priority to the question about Christendom over the question about the individual Christian when he handles the problem of the subjective realisation of grace. This again emphasises the fact that the reconciling work of Christ is appropriated by

the individual only through his connexion with Christ's earthly Body, the Church. By holding to this proper order the author is able to avoid any tendency toward the rank individualism which has continually plagued Protestantism. Seventh, we should be aware that no discussion of the doctrine of the sacraments—of Baptism and the Lord's Supper—is to be found in the three great parts of the doctrine of Reconciliation proper, but will be considered in the context of the chapter on special ethics at the close of the doctrine. The reason for this major change in the architectural plans will have to await a fuller explanation by Professor Barth himself. For now we can only speculate that it is in accordance with the fact that he hardly uses the general concept of 'sacrament' any more. Finally, in his paragraphs on the Christian life in Christ the author has deviated from St. Paul's classical order of faith, hope, and love, changing the order to faith, love, and hope. We can only ponder whether this is merely a matter of organisational tactics, since 'hope' would quite naturally lead to the doctrine of the 'Last Things', or whether it has real theological significance.

(*e*) *The Doctrine of Redemption*

The final part of the *Church Dogmatics* will consist of an investigation of the doctrine of Redemption, that is, of the activity of God which is properly appropriated to His mode of existence as Holy Spirit. It may be a surprise to some readers that man's 'redemption' is directly connected to the Holy Spirit rather than to the Son. That this is theologically correct, however, has already been grounded exegetically in I-1. In this final section Professor Barth must discuss the doctrine of the 'Last Things', of Redemption and Consummation, of the commandment of God from the viewpoint of Promise. We may expect that the Christological thread will be traced to the final page of the *Church Dogmatics*, that Jesus Christ, who is the Alpha, will also be the Omega.

Conclusion

It hardly needs to be said that this architectural investigation of the *Church Dogmatics* has merely touched the surface of our subject. We have tried to detect some of the more obvious methodological principles which result from Professor Barth's

theological thinking. In conclusion, it may be well to list some of the more important ones as follows:

(1) Dogmatics is a function of the Church.
(2) Dogmatic thinking is based on the Word of God alone.
(3) The first and last question of dogmatics is the question about God.
(4) Dogmatic thinking knows only the God revealed in Jesus Christ.
(5) Dogmatic thinking about the God revealed in Christ is automatically Trinitarian thinking.
(6) Dogmatic thinking relates every part of dogmatics to its Christological centre.
(7) Dogmatic thinking acknowledges its limits and preserves the mystery of God.
(8) Dogmatic thinking insists on the freedom of the Gospel from an *a priori* relation to human existence.
(9) Dogmatic thinking does not separate ethics from dogmatics.
(10) Dogmatic thinking refuses to admit any dualism and so refuses to take evil as seriously as it does grace.
(11) Dogmatic thinking moves from action to being, from reality to possibility, from Gospel to Law, from God's 'Yes' to God's 'No'.
(12) Dogmatic thinking knows that a dogmatics may be both architecturally beautiful *and* theologically correct.

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REDEMPTION

ON THE ANNIVERSARIES OF MOZART, KIERKEGAARD AND BARTH

'I write for lovers.'—KIERKEGAARD
'To him that hath ears to hear.'—BARTH

by ARTHUR C. COCHRANE

PERHAPS an astrologer would claim that due to some remarkable astral influence the year 1955-6 marks the 200th anniversary of the birth of Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart on 27th January 1956; the centenary of the death of Sören Kierkegaard on 11th November 1955, and the seventieth birthday of Karl Barth on 10th May 1956. The three dates are being suitably observed by music-lovers and scholars the world over. But something more than a disposition of the stars links their names together. For if, as we believe, Kierkegaard and Barth, like Luther and Calvin in the sixteenth century, represent the end of an epoch and the dawn of a new era, then according to both men, Mozart is *the* herald of a new age. Though Mozart lived in the eighteenth century, he actually represented the end of the Age of Absolutism in which he lived and which lingered on in idealism and contemporary existentialism. At the same time he marked the beginning of a new day in which men would begin, not with expressions of their own consciousness, but with grateful praise to the Creator who has revealed Himself *to* their consciousness. In Mozart's music Kierkegaard believed he had heard a No to the past: to man who is the measure of all things. Barth, on the other hand, believes he has heard a Yes to the goodness of God's creatures. Not that Mozart himself was a sort of Hegelian synthesis. With Kierkegaard and the early Barth, the No had to be uttered before the Yes could be spoken. With the later Barth the No can be heard only after a great affirmation. In any case, Mozart stands *zwischen den Zeiten*: his back to the past, his face to the future—at least as Kierkegaard and Barth have understood him.

The immense praise Kierkegaard and Barth have heaped upon Mozart exceeds all bounds, and appears to many to verge

on the ridiculous. Kierkegaard is the more extravagant in his eulogies and confesses his love for Mozart in subjective terms.

I am still too much of a child, or rather I am like a young girl in love with Mozart, and I must have him in first place, cost what it may. . . . I will form a sect which not only gives Mozart first place, but which absolutely refuses to recognise any artist other than Mozart; and I shall beg Mozart to forgive me, because his music did not inspire me to great deeds, but turned me into a fool, who lost through him the little reason I had, and spent most of my time in quiet sadness humming what I do not understand, haunting like a spectre day and night what I am not permitted to enter.[1]

Kierkegaard freely admits his complete indebtedness to Mozart.

Immortal Mozart, to whom I owe all! But, no, not yet do I owe thee all; but when I have become an old man, if ever I do, or when I am ten years older than now, if ever I come to that, or when I shall die, for of this at least I am certain, then I will say, Immortal Mozart, to whom I owe all! Then the admiration which is the first and only one I have known I will suffer to break out with all its might, suffer it to slay me, as it often has threatened to do. Then I have set my house in order, then I have completely verified the fact that I owe thee all, then I belong to thee no more, no more belong to this world, but only to the solemn thought of death.[2]

Barth refers to Mozart as the 'incomparable', in relation to whom Bach, Handel, Gluck, and Haydn are but 'naïve children of their generation'.[3]

He declares that Mozart

belongs in theology (especially in the doctrine of creation and then again in eschatology), even though he was not a Church Father and apparently was not even a particularly devoted Christian—and a Catholic at that!—and, when he was not actually working, by our standards appears to have led a superficial life. . . . For he knew something with respect to the goodness of creation as a whole that the Church Fathers, our Reformers, the orthodoxists and the liberals, the natural theologians and those mightily armed with the 'Word of God', and above all the existentialists, have not known, or at any rate have not known how to express and make accepted. And he knew something the other great composers before and after him have not known.[4]

Consequently Mozart's music is 'food and drink', 'music full of comfort and admonition, never the victim of mere technique, never sentimental, always "moving", free and liberating because it is wise, strong and sovereign music.'[5]

[1] *Either-Or*, Vol. 1, p. 38.
[2] *Stages on Life's Way*, p. 43, Cf. *Either-Or*, Vol. 1, p. 38.
[3] *Die protestantische Theologie im 19. Jahrhundert*, p. 53.
[4] *Kirchliche Dogmatik*, III, 3, p. 337. [5] Ibid., p. 337.

Since he heard the creation without resentment and without bias, he really produced not his music but the creation's own music: its twofold harmonious praise of God. The truth is he never wanted to express himself or to make an exhibition of himself, his emotions, his heart-burnings, his piety, or of any programme. He was marvellously free of any need or desire to say anything of himself. . . . He was simply an ear for the sound (of creation) and its mediator for other ears. And so he died when, as the wise ones say, his life's work was at the point of reaching its fulfilment. But after *The Magic Flute*, the clarinet concerto of October 1791 and the Requiem, who would say that it had not been accomplished? Had not everything been completed already in the works of the eighteen and sixteen year-old lad? Is it not to be heard even in what we have from the little boy Mozart? He died in misery, like a sort of 'unknown soldier', and he had this in common with Calvin and the biblical story of Moses that no one knows where he is buried. But what of that? What is a grave when a life has been permitted to render such a service that God's good creation—with its finitude—finds expression in this simplicity and unpretentiousness and therefore in such serenity, trustworthiness and insistency.[1]

Although Kierkegaard is 'prepared to find that men will consider it childish in me to insist that Mozart must have first place', he asserts: 'I am by no means ashamed of my childishness.' While Barth concedes that the appreciation of Mozart's music is for 'those who have ears to hear', he vents his wrath upon Mozart's detractors.

I do not blame them [the neo-Calvinists in Holland and elsewhere] for accusing me of being a 'monist'. But it goes too far when in doing so—obviously to vex me the more—they also allow themselves to go to the length of laying violent hands upon W. A. Mozart, with the use of unrepeatable words. They have thereby shown, of course, that they are men of imprudent, cold and hard hearts, to whom one does not need to pay any attention.[2]

This extreme language may be overlooked, we trust, once we consider the reasons why Kierkegaard and Barth accord Mozart pre-eminence. Such a consideration will also serve to bring out the difference in their theological outlook.

In seeking to understand Kierkegaard's appreciation of Mozart, a literary problem faces us at the outset. What he has to say about Mozart falls under the pseudonymous writings in

[1] Ibid., p. 338.

[2] Foreword to *Kirchliche Dogmatik* III, 4, p.x. In the preface to *Dogmatik* IV, 2, just published, Barth retracts his sweeping condemnation of the neo-Calvinists in Holland, particularly in view of G. C. Berkouwer's book, *The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth*. He assures them that 'if in the future they do not wish to say anything unseemly about Mozart, they should have nothing further to fear from him.'

which Sören Kierkegaard is portraying poetically or dramatically the aesthetic stage of human life. Only the direct religious writings bear his name, and only these give us Kierkegaard's own thought.[1] It is true that *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, in which he made formal acknowledgment of his authorship of the pseudonymous works, also bore the pseudonym, *Anti-Climacus*. But as Walter Lawrie has remarked, it was not strictly a pseudonym; 'it meant spiritual modesty.'[2] In the *Postscript* Kierkegaard stated: 'In the pseudonymous books there is not a single word of mine.'[3] We agree with Lowrie that one ought 'to use the utmost caution in searching these pseudonymous scriptures for reliable information about Sören Kierkegaard's life and thought.'[4] Nevertheless we believe there is internal evidence to warrant us accepting what Kierkegaard has to say about Mozart in *Either-Or* as being his own view. The chapter in question contains an exposition of the startling thesis that 'Christianity has brought sensuality into the world', in which it becomes clear that the aesthetic stage (and Mozart's music) can be understood only in the light of Christian faith. Kierkegaard would not have been able to describe the aesthetic, ethical and religious modes of life except from the vantage-point of his Christian faith.

In support of his contention that Christianity has brought sensuality into the world, Kierkegaard argues that 'since the sensual generally is that which should be negatived, it is clearly evident that it is posited first through the act which excluded it. . . . As principle, as power, as self-contained system, sensualism is first posited in Christianity, and in so far it is true that Christianity brought sensualism into the world. Rightly to understand this proposition . . . one must apprehend it as identical with the proposition, that it is Christianity which has driven sensualism out, has excluded it from the world.'[5] Christianity is Spirit, and Spirit is the positive principle Christianity has brought into the world. Sensualism first reveals itself as a principle in the moment that it is excluded by the Spirit. Kierkegaard grants that the sensual existed in the world before it was excluded by the Spirit. But it existed, as in Greece,

[1] See *The Point of View*.
[2] *Kierkegaard*, pp. 286-90.
[3] *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, p. 551.
[4] Op. cit., p. 288.
[5] *Either-Or*, p. 49.

as a 'psychical determination'; that is, as a harmonious qualification of the soul. It was not an enemy to be subjugated, but that which is liberated unto life and joy in the beautiful personality. Thus Kierkegaard sees the Greek *eros* as the opposite of the Incarnation.

> In the Incarnation, the special individual has the entire fulness of life within himself, and this fulness exists for other individuals only in so far as they behold it in the incarnated individual. The Greek consciousness gives us the converse relation. That which constitutes the power of the god is not in the god but in all the other individuals, who refer it to him.[1]

Consequently Kierkegaard concludes that the sensuous-erotic, as a principle excluded by the coming of the Spirit, is an idea the Greeks did not possess. The opposition between Agape and Eros, to which Anders Nygren has given prominence in his book by that name, was also substantially Kierkegaard's theme.

Now the reason Sören Kierkegaard thought so highly of Mozart was because he—especially in his *Don Juan*—most perfectly gave expression to the sensuous-erotic genius and therefore to the erotic or sensuous as a principle or power negated by Christianity. Sören Kierkegaard contends that the sensuous-erotic must be expressed and represented in its immediacy. 'In its mediate and reflective character it comes under language, and becomes subject to ethical categories. In its immediacy, however, it can only be expressed in music.'[2] By this Sören Kierkegaard appears to mean that when the sensuous-erotic is described in language, a decision is demanded of its hearers. Music is a form of expression which requires no ethical decision. It perfectly expresses the aesthetic stage. The aestheticist lives in the moment, in a world of poetry, sentiments and memories. He prides himself upon being an *observateur*. The individual is undialectical in himself and is himself the highest good and goal in life. The remedy for the aesthetic stage is despair, but 'Don Juan's life is not despair; it is the whole power of sensuality which is born in dread, and Don Juan is himself this dread, but this dread is precisely the demoniac joy of life.'[3]

Sören Kierkegaard believes that 'the significance of music is revealed in its full validity' in its power to express immediately the sensuous-erotic genius. And 'it also reveals itself in a stricter sense as a Christian art, or rather as the art which Christianity

[1] *Either-Or*, p. 51. [2] Ibid., p. 51. [3] Ibid., p. 105.

posits in excluding it from itself, as being a medium for that which Christianity excludes from itself, and thereby posits. In other words, music is the demoniac. In the erotic-sensual genius, music has its absolute object.'[1] But—let us note—as that which has been negated by Christianity.

Kierkegaard develops his thesis by discussing the nature of music as a medium. He holds that language is 'the one absolutely spiritually qualified medium' because 'in langauge the sensuous is as a medium depressed to the level of mere instrumentality, and absolutely negated.'[2] But in sculpture, architecture and painting the idea is bound up with the medium. Hence, these media, like nature, do not speak. We rightly say that 'nature is dumb'. ('It is in truth as silly to say that nature is a language as it is inept to say that a dumb man speaks.') Music, however, may be said to be a language, (*a*) in that in it the sensuous does not bulk as large as in sculpture, architecture and painting; (*b*) in that, unlike the other media it is addressed to the ear: and the ear is the most spiritual of the senses; (*c*) in that language and music have their element in time, whereas all the other media have theirs in space. Consequently music is less sensuous, a more spiritual art. Yet language is a superior medium to music because it is the perfect medium of the spirit. Music, on the other hand, is the perfect medium for the sensuous immediacy which has been excluded by the Spirit. From this circumstance Sören Kierkegaard found an explanation of the fact that 'music did not become developed in the ancient world, but belongs to the Christian era'.[3]

Kierkegaard alludes to the fact that music has always been the object of suspicion from the standpoint of religious enthusiasm. He cites a Presbyterian in a story by Achim v. Arnim: 'We Presbyterians regard the organ as the devil's bagpipe, by which serious reflection is not only lulled to sleep, but its devil's dance bewilders the good intention.' Sören Kierkegaard might have quoted from Calvin himself who held that, although believers might cheer themselves with musical instruments, and should not dissever their cheerfulness from the praises of God, they had no place in the public assembly of the saints but

[1] *Either-Or*, p. 51f. 'It is not of course intended to say by this that music cannot also express other things, but this is its proper object.'

[2] Ibid., p. 54.

[3] Ibid., p. 57.

belonged to the tutelage under the law. Paul commands us to praise God only in a known tongue (1 Cor. 14.13).[1] Accordingly until comparatively recent times Presbyterian congregations sang psalms and paraphrases only with the aid of a precentor with a tuning-fork. But Kierkegaard does not conclude that music is to be regarded as a work of the devil, 'even if our age does offer many horrible proofs of the demoniac power with which music may lay hold upon an "individual".' But we must recognise that 'in the realm of spirit music is an imperfect medium, and hence, that it cannot have its object in the immediately spiritual.'[2]

What Kierkegaard heard in Mozart, and in *Don Juan* as the epitome of all his music, was the most perfect expression of that which has been negated and excluded by Christianity, namely, the eros, the demoniac. Don Juan is the flesh incarnate or the inspiration of the flesh by the spirit of the flesh. He is the personification of desire. He expresses the exuberant joy of life. Here desire is victorious, irresistible and demoniac. It is the principle negated by the Spirit.[3]

Turning now to Barth's interpretation of Mozart, we come upon a line of thought which parallels Kierkegaard's but which never really meets it. But first of all we need to understand his conception of the relation of music to theology. We have already heard his statement that music belongs to theology. From this some have erroneously concluded that Barth has abandoned his fundamental position that God has revealed Himself exclusively in Jesus Christ as testified to in Holy Scripture, and that he recognises a natural revelation in Mozart's music. Such a conclusion could only result—as has so often happened with Barth—from a failure to hear him through or to read him carefully. He distinctly states that the music of Mozart is what it is

[1] Cf. Calvin's commentaries on Psalms 33.2, 71.22, 81.1-3, 92.1-3, 98.45, 150.3.

[2] Op. cit., p. 59. In view of Calvin's and Kierkegaard's view of instrumental music as a medium of communication—from God to man and man to God—one should not contemptuously dismiss the suggestion that it has no legitimate place in the public worship of God as such. In spite of Barth's high appreciation of Mozart's music, one ought not to conclude that he would approve of a Mozart symphony or sonata for an offertory, any more than he would approve of sculptured images, paintings, drama and the dance in the public service of God. It has been a gross error to think that the reformers were lacking in aesthetic taste, to say nothing of a theological appreciation of the arts because they excluded them from the worship of the congregation.

[3] Lack of space forbids us going into Kierkegaard's brilliant analysis of Mozart's operas.

'for those who have ears to hear', for 'the righteous'. He explains that Mozart did not see the Light that surrounds creation any more than any of us. But 'he *heard* the whole of the creaturely world which is surrounded by that Light'. Mozart did not receive a revelation of God in nature, nor was his music a natural revelation. Unlike Beethoven who thought that music is a 'higher revelation than all wisdom and philosophy', Mozart significantly never expressed himself upon the purpose of music. The facts are quite simple. The creation *is* good and praises its Creator. Mozart heard its objective goodness and praise—he too had ears to hear—and echoed it in his music. Mozart's music belongs to theology, not as theology itself, but as an echo, a confirmation of what theology knows about creation from God's revelation. It is, as it were, an inevitable sign accompanying and sealing the Word.

In the last analysis the function of music can be grounded only theologically.

> When he established the heavens I was there, when he drew a circle on the face of the deep, when he made firm the skies above, when he established the fountains of the deep, when he assigned to the sea its limit, so that the waters might not transgress his command, when he marked out the foundations of the earth, then I was beside him, like a master workman; and I was daily his delight, rejoicing before him always, rejoicing in his inhabited world and delighting in the sons of men.
>
> (Proverbs 8.27-31, R.S.V.)

Beyond all time, space and sensuous perception *the Wisdom of God plays*. It is the original harmony of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit in the Godhead. Here we think of the original beauty of the nature of God about which Barth has written in his doctrine of God. Surely the words of the poet Keats apply first and foremost to God: 'A thing of beauty is a joy for ever.' Then there is the original harmony of the Wisdom of God rejoicing in the works of creation. Finally, there is the music of the cosmos as a response, an echo of the glory of the Lord.

> Praise the Lord from the heavens, praise him in the heights!
> Praise him, all his angels, praise him, all his host!
> Praise him, sun and moon, praise him all you shining stars!
> Praise him, you highest heavens, and you waters above the heavens!
> Praise the Lord from the earth, you sea monsters and all deeps,
> fire and hail, snow and frost, stormy wind fulfilling his command!
> Mountains and all hills, fruit trees and all cedars!

Beasts and all cattle, creeping things and flying birds!
Kings of the earth and all peoples, princes and all rulers of the earth!
Young men and maidens together, old men and children.

(Psalm 148)

By reason of sin, however, man cannot hear that 'the heavens declare the glory of God'. Only in the Word, only in the perfect praise of the Father by the Son, is this heard and known. But for those who have ears to hear, music reminds us of the objective melody of creation. Music, like prayer, ascends to God. At its best it is always an answer to God's revelation. It does not displace the sermon. We are always in danger of thinking we can find in our music a direct link between God and the cosmos. Music is not the way to God. 'I am the way, the truth and the life,' said Christ. Consequently we need not expect music to save us. 'Christ has redeemed us and has restored harmony between us and the whole creation. We still do not hear this harmony, for we walk by faith and not by sight. But for those who have heard the revelation . . . the highest possibility of our music may point us to this ultimate harmony.'[1]

Thus music belongs not only to the doctrines of creation and providence but also to eschatology. Music is an anticipation of what God hears and we will once hear.

And when he had taken the scroll, the four living creatures and the twenty-four elders fell down before the Lamb, each holding a harp, and with golden bowls full of incense, which are the prayers of the saints; and they sang a new song.

(Revelation 5.8f)

The shepherds watching their flocks by night heard the indescribably beautiful music of the angels: 'Glory to God in the highest and on earth peace among men with whom he is pleased.' The music of Mozart is for Barth a foretaste of the angelic refrain. Upon hearing Walter Gieseking's playing of Mozart's piano works, a friend of mine wrote that he had the feeling of having looked into the face of absolute beauty. He would add the qualification, I am sure: this side of the Parousia!

But now we need to see in what sense Barth believes God's creation is good and in what sense Mozart's music is a witness to it. It is most significant that Barth's panegyric is found in the section of the *Dogmatik* where he deals with the problem of

[1] Jürgen Uhde, *Der Dienst der Musik* in *Theologische Studien*, No. 30, p. 25.

God and evil—the Nihil (*das Nichtige*). Evil, the demoniac, exists, Barth teaches, but not as the Creator and the creature do. It exists as that which has been negated and abrogated by God. It is in no sense an element in God, as Hegel and Tillich teach. Nor is it in any sense an aspect of creation. It is not that which constitutes the creature's finitude. It exists as that which God excludes from Himself and from what He has made. What God has willed and created is altogether good. The Nihil exists as the object of His negative will.

Barth teaches that there is a dark as well as a bright side to creation, a negative as well as a positive aspect. But he contends that the dark or negative aspect must not be identified with the Nihil. The creation in its totality, in its dark and bright side, is good and praises its Creator. It is precisely this reality and truth which he believes Mozart heard in creation and expressed in his music.

> 1756-91! That was the time in which a loving God was blamed for the earthquake in Lisbon, and when theologians and other gallant people laboriously tried to defend Him. So far as the problem of theodicy is concerned, Mozart knew the peace that is higher than all commendatory, fault-finding, critical or speculative reason. It lay powerless behind him. Why bother about it? He heard . . . the harmony of creation, in which there is a darkness but no blackness, a lack which is not yet a defect, a sadness which cannot become despair, even a gloom which never degenerates into tragedy, an infinite melancholy which nonetheless is under no compulsion to make itself into an absolute. Therefore he also heard gaiety, yet also its limits. He (saw) the light shining just because it emerged out of the shadows. He (tasted) a sweetness which is also sharp and therefore never ends in satiety. He heard of a life that does not fear death though it knows it well.[1]

Yes, Mozart knew about death. He knew about man's limitation. In this respect, Barth believes, he is unique among his contemporaries in the Age of Absolutism. Unlike the 'naïve children of their century'—Bach, Handel, Gluck, Haydn—Mozart had

> the pensive melancholy or the terror of knowing about the boundary before which the absolute man, in his most resplendent stature, stands as one who is blessedly ignorant. He heard, like his Don Juan, the steps of the guest of stone. But, like his Don Juan, he does not make the mistake of continuing to play in the presence of the guest of stone.[2]

[1] Op. cit., p. 338.
[2] *Die protestantische Theologie im* 19. *Jahrhundert*, p. 53.

Mozart knew that death in itself belongs to God's good creation. On 4th April 1787 he wrote to his father:

> Since death (strictly speaking) is the end of our life, in recent years I have made myself so familiar with this true, best friend of man that its image no longer holds anything terrifying for me but much that is reassuring and comforting!—And I thank my God that He has not begrudged me the happiness of granting me the opportunity (you understand me) of coming to learn about it as the key to our true blessedness.—I never go to bed without reflecting that (young as I am) perhaps tomorrow I will no longer be.—And yet no one who knows me will be able to say that I have been ill-humoured or sad.—Every day I thank my Creator for this happiness and from my heart I wish it for all my fellow-men.[1]

Barth insists, moreover, that Mozart did not hear an

> average, neutral sound: he heard the positive more strongly than the negative. He heard the latter only in the former. Yet in this unequal apportionment he heard both together. . . . In Mozart's music we have to do with a shining proof, I might say a compelling proof, that it is a slander of creation to say that because it includes a Yes and a No it has any part in the Chaos.[2]

Thus in the dominant Yes Barth believes he hears in Mozart's music there is also the negation of the Nihil, the demoniac, the *eros*. Barth, of course, would not identify *eros* with the demoniac as Kierkegaard has done. But he would doubtless see in *eros* a human concretion of evil. The No to sin and evil is heard only in the Yes to the goodness of creation. If evil, if sin and *eros* exist in the world, then they exist only as lies, as a calumny against the truth of the goodness of God's works. According to Kierkegaard, Mozart's music expressed that which has been negated by Christianity. According to Barth, Mozart's music echoes the grateful praise of a creation from which the Nihil has been negated and excluded. Barth has heard in Mozart's music a Gospel in which the law is implied. Kierkegaard has heard a law condemning the sensual-erotic man in which the Gospel is implied. Theologically Barth's position, we believe, is the correct one. But has not Kierkegaard given us a faithful interpretation of the opera *Don Giovanni*? As far as the libretto is concerned, it definitely preaches the law. The sensual, unrepentant man perishes in the flames of a Dantean inferno. Then, and for that reason, the epilogue, like a Morality Play, calls

[1] Cited by K. Barth, *Kirchliche Dogmatik* III, 4, p. 676.
[2] Op. cit., p. 338f.

upon men to choose between heaven and hell, and to repent. The motivation is not love but fear.

Actually Kierkegaard and Barth are not talking about the same thing. Barth is speaking about creation; Kierkegaard is speaking about the principle of *eros* in man. They agree that evil and *eros* have been negated and excluded. It is therefore impossible to play one against the other at this point, as Hans Ur von Balthasar seems to have done.[1] If for Kierkegaard the *eros* is excluded in the coming of Christianity and the Spirit, then there is reason to believe that for him too the creation is good. Indeed, there is abundant evidence in his writings that such was the case. His fondness for the theatre, his high appreciation of the arts, and his intense sympathy for so-called worldlings, show him to be anything but an ascetic. Moreover, bearing in mind that what Kierkegaard had to say about Mozart falls under the aesthetic literature, one cannot with full assurance conclude that he did not also hear Mozart's music echoing the creation's praise of a good Creator.

Barth and Kierkegaard also *seem* to differ at another point. Kierkegaard sees the negation and exclusion of the demoniac occurring in the coming of Christianity and the Spirit. For Barth the negation of sin and evil occurred once and for all in the death of Jesus Christ. Barth sees the Nihil *ontologically* excluded by God's action in the death of Christ; Kierkegaard sees it excluded *noetically* in the message of Christianity through the Spirit. Now it would be easy to go astray here, and to class Kierkegaard with the existentialists, pietists and sacramentalists, among whom there is so much confusion as to what really saves us—Christ in His death, or existential faith, or sacraments. The tendency is to dub Kierkegaard subjective and Barth objective, not only in their theologies but in their interpretations of Mozart. The time has come to put an end to this erroneous contrast. The following quotations from Kierkegaard's book on Adler should dispel the myth.[2]

> Christianity exists before any Christian exists, it must exist in order that one may become a Christian, it contains the determinant by which one may test whether one has become a Christian, it maintains its subsistence apart from all believers, while at the same time it is the inwardness of the

[1] *Karl Barth, Darstellung und Deutung seiner Theologie* (Köln 1951), pp. 36-8.
[2] *On Authority and Revelation*, tr. Walter Lowrie (Princeton 1955), pp. 168-70.

believer. In short, here there is no identity between the subjective and the objective. Though Christianity comes into the heart of never so many believers, every believer is conscious that it has not arisen in his heart. . . . No, even if no one had perceived that God had revealed himself in a human form in Christ, he nevertheless has revealed himself. . . .

The Hegelian philosophy has in its system no room for a qualitative revelation. . . . It has not bluntly denied (the concept of revelation), but it has volatilised it so far that at last it becomes a determinant of subjectivity, the simple identity of subject-object.

Kierkegaard, we may be sure, would have 'a veneration for the dogmatic, qualitative concept of "revelation"' with which Barth works, and he would be aghast at the current effort to de-mythologise the Cross and resurrection of Christ and to 'explain' them—in Hegelian fashion—in terms of an existential experience. Kierkegaard was not primarily a dogmatic theologian. Yet dogmatics was the presupposition of all his writings. It was the objective standpoint from which he could speak about the subjective reality of revelation in which the individual becomes not only a hearer but a doer of the Word. On the other hand, it would be equally wrong to imagine that Barth is so engrossed with the objective work of God in Christ that he has neglected the subjective reality of it for the believer.

If evil has not been excluded from creation, if its exclusion waits upon our subjective knowledge and experience of it, if its exclusion is not rather something to which we may passionately relate ourselves, then in fact the creation is not in itself God's good creation. Then the music of the angels and of all earthly creatures is denied. Then the music of Mozart could never echo the harmony of the cosmos. At best it could be only an expression of ourselves—our aspirations, our fears, our piety. Mozart's music is definitely not that. It echoes the praise of a creation from which the Nihil has been excluded in Christ and the praise of those who by the Spirit relate themselves to the truth. This is the twofold significance of Mozart's music for Barth and Kierkegaard which we do well to ponder on their respective anniversaries.

THE RELEVANCE OF BIBLICAL JUSTICE TO INDUSTRY[1]

by GEORGE GOYDER

JUSTICE, according to Aristotle, is giving to every man his own. But what is a man's own, and how is it to be determined relative to what belongs to other men? We call fair distribution between persons by the name of justice, and in doing so we acknowledge that justice stands over and between men as something prior to and outside a man's will or even the State's will. The moment we invoke 'justice', we in fact appeal to a supreme Being as the source of justice. Either God disposes of the world, determines the order of His creatures, and endows them with the qualities necessary to that order, or justice is based on power, and the expression of justice is the edict of the State. Either there is a Supreme Lawgiver who is the source of Jus or right and therefore of law, or there is no objective right but only the will of the powerful. Hugo Grotius agrees with the Stoics in deriving Jus from Jove.

In the Bible justice expresses the righteousness of God, as Love expresses His goodness. Justice is called the way of the Lord,[2] and the habitation of God's throne.[3] The Almighty is said by Job to be rich in justice.[4] When Christ returns to rule the kingdoms of the earth he brings with Him judgment and justice.[5] Judgment is justice in action, the particularising in events of the eternal forms of justice. The nature and scope of God's justice is revealed in the dealings of God with Israel, His servant nation, in the Old Testament. Justice is not to be looked for in the New Testament, for God does not duplicate His revelation. Just as Christ died once, rose again and will finally return once in glory to judge the earth, so God has revealed His Law, which is His will for men, once, and will restore it at His coming. Love is the ultimate revelation of God

[1] Paper read at the Annual Conference of the Evangelical Fellowship of Theological Literature, St. Aidan's College, 6th July 1955. [2] Gen. 18.19.
[3] Ps. 89.14. [4] Job 37.23 (Moffat). [5] Isa. 9.6, 7, and Jer. 23.5.

to *man*. But justice is God's ultimate expression of His will for *men* in their corporate relations. In the sphere in which it is relevant, that of society and the laws governing society, justice, not love, is the absolute value. An arbitration in a case of breach of contract cannot be settled by love; it is the proper work of justice. But justice, to be just, must be done by men in the spirit and intention of love. 'The highest requirement of systems, institutions, laws, is that they should be just, while it is required of man that he should meet his fellowmen not in justice, but in love.'[1] To say we need more Christianity in the docks or in the mines is to admit that there is a problem of giving to every man what belongs to him, which cannot be solved except by the application of justice. Justice requires division. Love does not divide, it gives. Justice establishes order, love transcends order. Both are necessary, and both are of God. When Christ was asked to mediate in a case of justice He asked: 'Who made me a divider over you' and declined.[2] But Christ also said that not one jot or tittle of the law should pass until all be fulfilled.[3] Christ not only confirmed the law in word; He paid the price of the law to the uttermost. He re-established the righteousness of the law,[4] and reconciled man to God's righteousness by His own mediation.[5] When we belittle the majesty, the awful splendour, of God's Law as revealed in the Old Testament, we lose an essential element in our understanding of Christ's sacrifice for our sin.

Our failure to hold the Old and the New Testaments in right relation confuses Christian witness and the power of the Christian Gospel. One of the stratagems of the Enemy is to raise confusion in the minds of Christians between the spheres of love and of justice. It is nearly a century since F. D. Maurice wrote: 'The worst cant of our days comes from those who wish by all means to uphold a Religion, and have no faith in a God who upholds justice and truth.'[6] It would be optimistic to suppose that this lesson has been learnt by the Church. That God's justice, His will for human institutions, as revealed in the law of Moses, is 'a perfect pandect of all the works and duties that God requires at our hands'[7] is a truth that needs to be learnt

[1] E. Brunner, *Justice and Social Order*, p. 25. [2] Luke 12.14.
[3] Matt. 5.18. [4] Rom. 7.12. [5] Rom. 8.2-4.
[6] F. D. Maurice, *The Commandments considered as Instruments of National Reformation* (1866), p. xvi. [7] L. Andrewes, *The Moral Law Expounded* (1642), p. 74.

and applied by our generation. God's law is, or ought to be, the rule of our life. 'Thy righteousness is an everlasting righteousness and thy law is the truth.'[1] The fact that the ceremonial ordinances of Moses were taken away by Christ's coming, and that the judicial precepts of the Deuteronomic law no longer apply, does not mean that Christians are free to live without the Law. No Christian man is free from obedience to the Moral Law.[2] We are bound by a higher obligation than David's, to study the Law day and night.[3] Christian freedom from the law of sin and of ordinances does not mean freedom from the law of righteousness, but freedom to do righteousness from the heart. We are not redeemed *from* the righteousness of God by faith in Jesus Christ, but into it. The law of God is our agenda, things we are to do. 'While we are no longer under the Law, we are still with the Law.'[4]

The point needs stressing for we must be willing to believe in the Law of God before we can see its relevance to our situation. Just as denial of an absolute justice has brought half the world into bondage to gross injustice, so our refusal to obey and apply God's Law as the source of social freedom threatens us with social and political upheaval and ultimately with slavery to human laws based on the will of the powerful. Peace and freedom are given to those who study His Law and keep it. 'Great peace have they which love thy law.'[5]

There is a relative and an absolute justice, and they are not to be confused. If we lose sight of what absolute justice is, we lose the very possibility of putting relative justice into effect.[6] For we cannot know the degree of justice applicable to the circumstances and to the sinfulness of men unless we know the direction in which we have to move towards absolute justice. Unless we keep God's absolute righteousness before us we shall find ourselves adrift on a sea of injustice without compass or rudder. As Brunner has put it: 'The optimum of the relatively just lies between overreadiness to adapt to reality and excessive rigour in maintaining the abstract idea of absolute justice.'[7]

In interpreting God's Law we have, as A. R. Vidler puts it,

[1] Ps. 119.142. [2] Article 7 of the 39 Articles C. of E.
[3] Ps. 1.2 and 19.7. [4] St. Augustine. [5] Ps. 119.165.
[6] Brunner, *Justice and the Social Order*, p. 227. [7] Op. cit., p. 95.

'to walk on the razor edge between legalism and antinomianism.'[1] The Divine Law is a spirit. It is the will of God, His righteousness, made flesh. It is probably no accident (if we may judge by the number of times He quotes from it) that Deuteronomy was Our Lord's favourite book in the Bible. Deuteronomy enshrines the Law, the will of God for men in their social and corporate life. So long as we remember this we are guarded from antinomianism. As to legalism, we may give thanks for the Divine words, but we may not worship them as words, for they are flesh. We must always seek the meaning behind the command. Yet we shall only find God's meaning if we believe God is speaking to us in His commands no less than in the Person of His Son. John Wycliffe calls Jesus Christ the author of all the Holy Scripture. When we read, and seek to apply the teaching of the Law, we must do it believing in the absolute perfection of its source and intention, but looking behind the flesh of the words and its application, to the eternal meaning the words enshrine.

In what way then is biblical doctrine relevant today to justice in industry? The Law of the ten commandments is a complete summary of the will of God for men in society. But God has disclosed other social principles than those contained in the ten commandments. Usury, or unjust bargaining, is one of those moral precepts which in the Bible is placed alongside the great sins specified in the commandments. In Ezek. 18 usury is classified with adultery and theft. In Ps. 15 we read that that man is blessed who is pure, does not lie or slander, and does not lend his money upon usury. This makes it clear that usury is prohibited by the moral commandments. It belongs to the command 'thou shalt not steal', where it has been placed by Calvin and Lancelot Andrewes. Its prohibition belongs to the permanent moral law.

The Mosaic prohibition of usury rests upon three passages —Exod. 22.25, Lev. 25.36 and Deut. 23.19. The last mentioned permits usury on loans to the stranger, a distinction not found in Exodus or Leviticus. The apparent inconsistency is resolved by the definition of the stranger in Lev. 19.34—'the stranger that dwelleth with you shall be unto you as one born among you.' The stranger from whom interest may be taken is the

[1] A. R. Vidler, *Christ's Strange Work*, p. 53.

stranger living in a foreign land (Deut. 15.3), *not* the stranger living in the midst. This distinction is not a quibble. To lend freely to one's neighbour, whether stranger or not, was a charitable and communal obligation, then as now. But to lend to a stranger living in a foreign community, which recognised no common ties and was not bound by the Mosaic Law, meant in the then state of society, undertaking a heavy risk. Loans within the primitive community could be secured either on the person or the land of the borrower, subject, in the case of Israel, to the periodic release provided by the Mosaic Law. But loans outside the community could not be secured and interest (called usury) was, therefore, permitted. In the primitive state of Old Testament society no distinction was drawn between usury and interest because, as a practical matter, risk did not arise within the community, and cost to the lender was incalculable, even if it existed. Risk might be negative; that is to say, it might be safer to lend than to withhold a loan. Prince Kropotkin tells the story in his 'Mutual Aid' of an Eskimo ceremony at which those who prospered by trading, periodically distributed their surplus to the members of the tribe as a safeguard against future misfortune. In a moment of emergency, neither a blizzard nor a polar bear can be bought off with a present of money. In such conditions, safety lies in prior charity, and to dispose of one's surplus in good time, is prudence.

Medieval canon law started from the presupposition, so different from our own, that there is a moral authority to which considerations of economic expediency should be submitted. The doctrine of usury was the cardinal feature of the social teaching of the Church. Ashley[1] describes it as 'the centre of canonist doctrine'. Its purpose was, and is, to define the limits of justice in business. It is concerned with all bargains and its intention is that bargaining power shall not be used unjustly. 'The truth is that any bargain in which one party obviously gained more advantage than the other, and used his power to the full, was regarded as usurious.'[2]

Usury may thus result from any bargain between capital and labour by which one takes what rightly belongs to the other. It is possible for usury to arise when a company exploits the

[1] Ashley, *Economic History*, Part II.
[2] Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, p. 153.

consumer by reason of a monopoly, or when the members of a trades union restrict entry to a trade and then exploit that fact to exact the highest possible wages. Most of us can think of examples of this kind of usury. More common is usury arising when the return on capital invested in industry is out of balance with the rewards of labour. We find it hard to recognise this kind of usury only because we have lost the key to understanding contained in God's Law. We cannot find the relatively just, if we no longer understand the meaning of God's absolute prohibition of usury.

What results when we attempt to apply the medieval view of usury to our present financial system? If we take first the medieval principle of *lucrum cessans* or cost (the more doubtful of the two medieval categories of allowable interest), the highest morally allowable interest charge in present conditions would appear to be set by the rate at which Government can borrow—at present about 3% on short-dated Treasury bills, rising to 4% in the case of small savings. Long term borrowings by Government cannot be taken into account under the present heading, since they contain an element of *damnum emergens* or risk, arising from the steady fall in the value of money in terms of goods. We may say that somewhere between 3% and 4% is the rate of allowable interest in existing English conditions under the heading of *lucrum cessans*, or cost.

As to the other medieval principle of *damnum emergens*, or risk, it is difficult to generalise, since risks vary so greatly. But the degree of risk involved in holding British Government stock is small apart from the risk of a fall in the value of money, as the long term rate at which Government borrows—about 5% —sufficiently proves. Many of the finest private companies stand almost on a parity with Government in point of security. A mortgage debenture in one of these, carrying 7% interest in perpetuity, looks like usury. Half this rate plus $2\frac{1}{2}$%, or 6% total interest, would seem to be a reasonable return. Some industrial companies already limit dividends to 6%, of which one of the best known is the Lincoln Electric Company in the U.S.A. More important is the fact that no sanction is to be found for paying interest in perpetuity and it is prohibited by the moral law, as William Temple pointed out.[1] When the

[1] *The Christian News Letter* for 7th August 1940.

owner of capital has been repaid his capital plus an amount sufficient to cover the depreciation in purchasing power, plus a sum to cover the annual risk and cost, there is no moral justification for further payment.

Where risk is real and continuing as in speculative industries like mining, the rate of interest may be high. Even so, returns should not necessarily be permanent. An investment which began as a risk may end by being as safe as 'the funds'. There is nothing wrong in taking high payment for great risks. But when risks have ceased and the original capital has been repaid once, twice, or twenty times, then natural and moral law alike cry 'halt!' We have allowed company law in the past century to turn shares into property rights, from which proceeds the false idea of their permanence, whereas common shares based on justice would give the owner a fair return and compensation for the risk run, but not the right to a *permanent* control of the enterprise.

The question arises as to whether common shares (because they stipulate no fixed payment of interest) can be considered usurious, seeing that the essence of the medieval definition of usury involved contracting for a fixed gain in advance. Are not common shares the logical counterpart of the non-usurious limited partnership or 'commenda' of medieval times? Certainly the position of the capitalist in the 'commenda', or limited partnership, has much in common with the owner of common shares in a modern business. But whereas the partner in a 'commenda' risked his capital in return for a proportion of the profits—usually fixed at 50%—the shareholder today risks his capital in return for the entire residual profit. And whereas the 'commenda' was limited in time, the joint stock company is permanent. Finally, the medieval capitalist had no right to interfere in the management of the 'commenda', which was the right of the tractator or entrepreneur, whereas the modern capitalist is said to 'own' the business although he may know less about it than he knows about the life-cycle of the oyster. A common share carrying limited management rights, of limited duration, and entitling the owner to part but not all of the disposable surplus, would seem to reproduce the essentials of the 'commenda' and to be free from usury. By contrast, the position of the common shareholder in existing joint stock

companies, particularly when net assets exceed the gross value of the share capital, seems usurious and unjust. A State intent on doing God's Law would insist on the limitation of return on common shares, when the risk of loss of capital has disappeared or become merely nominal. To retain all voting rights in the hands of a body of shareholders after their risk has ceased, is usury. The solution offered by the Bible, and put forward in 1940 by William Temple, is to limit by law the maximum life of ordinary shares to fifty years or an agreed date of redemption, whichever is earlier. It is a strange fact that whereas in the U.S.A. a company may buy in its own shares, in England it is illegal to do so. Much thinking has first to be done before the outlines of a morally just economic order can be drawn. It was John Ruskin's achievement to have seen clearly the need for this, a century before his time, in the very year in which the great statute consolidating the law of limited liability first saw the light (1862).[1]

Economic injustice includes, but is not exhausted by, financial injustice. Both were classed as usury by the canonists. Today industry has become a partnership involving workers, capital, and natural resources on a gigantic scale. This partnership is carried on in limited liability companies. The word *company* derives from cum panis. Capital and labour are, literally, bread-sharers in industry. They are not by nature opponents, but colleagues. They serve two outside parties by their combined efforts: the consumers of the goods and services, and the community as a whole. The community may be local, national or world-wide according to the nature of the enterprise. The problem of justice in industry is to give to each of these four parties—workers, shareholders, consumers and the community—what belongs to it by right. We note that workers and shareholders are not in a parallel position: the worker of necessity must bring his whole personality with him to work, although he may not be able to employ it all; whereas the shareholder can be somewhere else at the same time as he exercises his function of being a shareholder.

The trouble with our industrial employment is that we have not attempted to discover what we hire, when we hire a man. The employer, when he hires an employee, thinks he hires a

[1] J. Ruskin, *Unto this Last* (1862).

hand or an operative, or some brains. He accepts as a gift the whole man who has to accompany his purchasable faculties to work, and regards himself as being under no obligation to make the work such as will employ the whole of the worker's personality. Employers are content to employ parts of men, because they imagine that it will cost them less and because they hope to order this material more satisfactorily to their own ends. If the nature of his work is such that his other faculties can be freely used (as in the case of the craftsman), the worker can remain a whole man because he sees the object of his work and employs his whole nature in his task. But this is not the case with the ordinary industrial worker. His inventiveness and imagination, and even more his social sense and moral nature, may scarcely be employed at all. Either they may lie in disuse, atrophy and die, or they may be given voluntarily to the service of the employer in sheer desperation or ignorance, or they may revolt.[1]

We started by saying that justice requires that a man's own be given him. This means recognising the integrity or wholeness which constitutes his unity as a person. As a child of God a man needs to be able to serve God in his work. To do this he needs to know what his job means in relation to the whole of which it is a part, and to have some freedom of action to function as a whole person. Freedom has been described by Graham Wallas as the capacity and opportunity for continuous initiative. Unless a man has this in his work he is not a free man. It is fundamental to the dignity of man that he should in a real sense 'own' his work. He is entitled to be confirmed in his rights as an owner in respect of that function which he fulfils by his own efforts. The less of the whole man actually hired, the more ownership the man needs in the work actually done. As far as possible he must do it in his own way, in his own time, and subject to his own conditions. The importance of a man 'owning' his work grows, as less and less of the man is employed. For otherwise that part of him which is not being used may become dangerously turbulent. Work is the fertiliser of human personality. If *we* employ only a part of a man, we must let *him* employ the rest of himself, subject only to the requirements of the task. In mass production, technology sets

[1] See Niell Brennan's *The Making of a Moron.*

rigid limits to the employment by a man of his own personality. This makes it all the more intolerable when a man is denied the right to employ the whole of himself in affirming and identifying himself with the purpose of the enterprise, and in discovering for himself the best way in which to do the small part of the project which is his.

We find then that justice in industry requires the definition of industrial purpose in social, and not purely in financial terms. Otherwise the wholeness of those working for the company is denied, and if denied, frustrated and perverted. It is often assumed that what belongs to an industrial worker is his wages. But this is only a partial truth. The worker is entitled to his hire; but wages, however high, cannot by themselves satisfy the worker. The worker is a person, and is entitled to be rewarded for his work as a person, and not only as a pair of hands or feet. As a person in relation to other persons, the worker is entitled to the respect and the initiative which goes with the function he performs. In his researches at Yale, Professor Bakke found that the highest priority of the worker, higher than his need for money, is what Bakke called 'social respect'; that is, recognition by his employers and fellow workers. This indicates the weakness of profit-sharing in seeking to bridge the gulf between the purposes of the worker and of the employer. The worker, if he is unable to contribute to the company all that he as a person would like and feels he can contribute, will not necessarily take a higher view of the company because he is offered a share in its profits. On the contrary, it may make him despair of being understood and treated as a 'person' by his employers. The offer of a share in profits may call out the same reaction felt by a conscientious man when offered a bribe, unless he is already being treated, and not merely paid, as a partner in production. Frustration, like most diseases, can be made worse by a wrong remedy than by no remedy. It may agitate the trouble. The fundamental need for the worker in industry is for justice, which means recognition of what he is, and opportunity to become what he can become. He is prevented from enjoying this freedom so long as industry pursues an end which is unrelated to the worker's real needs as a person. Profitability is the life blood of business, without which a company sooner or later dies. But we do not pursue

life for the sake of our bloodstream, and it is radically unjust for industry to pursue profit to the point where it does not allow men at work to be treated as persons. And this, unquestionably, is what industry does.

When we consider the nature of industrial purpose, we find there is much loose thinking about the ownership of industry. We assume that because shareholders have the power to buy and sell a company, to control the appointment of the directors, and to vote the annual dividend, that this means that the company is the shareholders' property. But to say this is to confuse power and right. The right of ownership in a family business expressed in shares is derived from the proprietors' responsibility for the venture as a whole, and for those associated in it. Where the responsibility has passed into the hands of thousands of absentee shareholders, the right of proprietorship should cease too, if justice is to be our measure. We talk as though modern large scale companies were the property of those who provide its capital, in the same way as the old family business was property when limited liability was introduced in 1855. But this is mistaken. A public company is not in law the property of its shareholders. Lord Justice Evershed, giving judgment in the case of Short Bros. in 1947, said:

> Shareholders are not in the eyes of the law part owners of the undertaking. The undertaking is something different from the totality of its shareholdings.

Although the law allows shareholders to exercise the right to buy and sell shares in the company, it does not give them the right to call themselves the 'owners' of the company. They are owners of the shares, a very different thing. The law of the land, while it gives to shareholders *de facto* rights of ownership, retains *de jure* an important distinction between the company as an entity and the owners of its share capital. In the eyes of the law the company is a corporate person, owing duties which go beyond the rights of the shareholders. But as I have pointed out elsewhere,[1] these duties are at present undefined, and company law is in a social and legislative vacuum which encourages irresponsibility and industrial disorder. The situation calls for the re-examination of justice, as a biblical and practical concept.

[1] George Goyder, *The Future of Private Enterprise* (B. Blackwell, 1951).

When we seek to apply what we learn in the Bible about justice to our industrial system, we find that we cannot justify an absolute claim by one party to the control of industry, to the exclusion of the interests of other parties—workers, consumers and community; for in its nature industry is a partnership.[1] If we start from the view that one party has exclusive rights to 'own' industry, we shall find ourselves hampered in acting responsibly to the other three parties, except by way of concession. In strict justice the shareholders of a company ought no more to be called its owners than are its workers. Neither in fact 'own' the company. What does biblical justice tell us about the shareholder? The shareholder abstains from consumption so long as he invests his money and he is entitled to be repaid the cost of his abstinence. What this cost is, may be measured by reference to the return on Post Office and Trustee Savings, at present a little over $2\frac{1}{2}\%$. In addition, if the investor takes a risk he is entitled to be fairly rewarded for that risk. In a free market the reward must be high enough to attract fresh capital to industry. But this does not justify the claim by capital to control a company in perpetuity. Nor does it constitute a natural right on the part of shareholders to retain the exclusive right to divide the profits for ever. The profits of a company do not belong to its shareholders, but to the company. This becomes an important distinction when it is recognised that the directors serve not the shareholders only, but the workers, the consumers, and the community. It is for the directors to decide upon the just distribution of a company's annual surplus, bearing in mind the company's needs and obligations as a whole. Many companies now face the practical necessity to limit dividends in order to do a measure of justice to the other claims made upon them. Full employment has compelled us to reconsider the meaning of justice in industry.

If workers are to become effective members and partners in their work-associations, if they are to be treated as persons, they must know what the objects of the company are, and these objects must be expressed in terms which they can make their own. It must be made clear that the company's profits are not the property of shareholders but will be divided according to

[1] This proposition may be deduced from Lev. 25.23, where land occupies the place in the economy now held by the factory.

the needs of the company, its future growth, and the just claims of all who work with and depend upon it. In justice to the community the company should pay back to it at least as much as it takes out. Until it does so a company cannot be said to act justly, for anything less is an act of injustice to the workers, whose social amenities and personal health may depend on the company's policies towards the community in which the company functions.

The shareholders are entitled to a dividend corresponding with the risk they bear and the market price of capital. To secure that the consumers of the goods receive fair value for money, and that the result of the company's activities is beneficial and not harmful to the community, are likewise obligations of the directors. The application of justice lies in the balancing of these claims. No large industrial company can expect to function efficiently if it fails to recognise its obligations to make some tangible contribution to the social and physical amenities of the district on which it depends, and from which it draws its labour. So long as our industrial companies by their activities, damage and destroy the community's amenities, foul the air, the water and the countryside, acquiesce in ribbon building, and ugly factory construction, they are failing men and women as social beings, and are doing injustice. The whole community reaps the resulting whirlwind of industrial strife.

Our practical problem is to make industrial companies into human associations of persons serving a worthy social purpose. That purpose must be one which can command the loyalty of ordinary men and women by the austerity with which it faces the problems, and by the answers it gives in practical terms to the competing claims, of shareholders, workers, consumers, and community. This is the work of justice in industry.

I hope I have shown that biblical justice needs re-examination in its relation to modern industry. God's Laws are eternal, but their application is a never-ending task for the Church. This is a task which clergy and laity must do together. Only as the Church rediscovers itself as a congregation of faithful men and only as it becomes pledged to study and apply God's Law to the situation in which men live and work, does it seem to me that Christianity can again make a compelling appeal to men.

Jesus Christ declares Himself as the Lord of all life, who foresees and cares for men in their social relations as well as in their individual needs. We must follow Christ in applying His principles to industry, as we do in our personal lives. Industry today is the socially constitutive sphere of society. If our industry is not founded on God's Laws, our society will degenerate into satanism.

CONSIDERATIONS ON THE DEFINITION OF A SACRAMENT[1]

by The Rev. J. C. CAMPBELL

In the Westminster Confession, the Larger and Shorter Catechisms, a section with the definition of a sacrament precedes the sections interpreting Baptism and the Lord's Supper (W.C.F., Chap. 27; L.C., Qq. 161, 162, 163; S.C., Qq. 91, 92). In considering these it is important to remember that the authors of these statements were not interested in propounding a sacramental theory of religion for its own sake. They were confronted with an existing sacramental system and practice which appeared to them as idolatry and superstition. What we find then in our standards is not academic discussion but polemical and critical reaction to an existing situation with a view to cleansing the worship of God from error and corruption. The starting point in Scripture and the institution of Christ ensured that the essential points were brought into prominence. Nevertheless it is legitimate to inquire whether some of the elements and emphases in the teaching have not been influenced and affected by the historical situation, the general outlook and atmosphere and the modes of thought of that time.

One point that deserves attention is what appears to me to be a certain tendency to diminish the status of the outward element and of the celebrant.

> The grace which is exhibited in or by the sacraments rightly used is not conferred by any power in them; neither doth the efficacy of a sacrament depend upon the piety or intention of him that doth administer it, but upon the work of the Spirit and the word of institution.
>
> (W.C.F., Chap. 27, para. III)

The Larger and Shorter Catechisms speak in similar terms. It is reasonable to suppose that this sharp disqualification of element and administrant has its origin partly in the reaction against the crude externalism of the existing worship in the

[1] Paper read at a Conference of the Scottish Church Theology Society, Crieff, 1955.

Roman Church and also in a keen awareness of its numinous power. This same awareness appears in the warning against superstitious regard for church buildings in the Appendix on days and places for worship in the Directory for the Public Worship of God. The Reformers and their successors well knew the powerful spell of these rites and buildings. This spell had to be broken. One can understand therefore the emphasis on the inwardness of the appropriation, the necessity of faith and the inward work of the Spirit as the efficient power in the sacraments.

There are two things to be asked here, however. The first is whether there is not also involved in this definition a conception of the spiritual which relates it to the inward and unseen whereas the outward is regarded as mere matter, a possible source of illusion or even of worldliness and sin. There is no doubt that in the sequel this emphasis on inwardness has led to a craving for some inward experience or awareness through the sacrament, as the reality of it, when perhaps some quite different kind of awareness of God's presence and purpose is required such as a deeper awareness of other lives as sharing with us in the grace of God or a hallowing of His gifts to us in creation. It is to be remembered that in the Bible the Spirit is not related to pure inwardness but to the whole of being. It speaks of spiritual food and spiritual drink, spiritual bodies and spiritual kinds of service.[1] This sharp division of man into inward and outward finds little support in Scripture.

This one-sided emphasis on inwardness as the real and essential aspect of spirituality sometimes provokes a reaction in the direction of over-emphasis on the outward element as such as the objective reality in Christianity. But this is a narrow impoverished conception of objectivity based on an abstract materialism which assumes that only the material as such is real. It is merely the other product of that sharp separation between outward and inward world which exalts the one at the expense of the other and loses that wholeness of being that is attested in Scripture and affirmed in the sacramental relationship. It is the wrong kind of objectivity that is meant here, the objectivity of things and not the objectivity of a relationship grounded in God in Christ.

[1] Cf. Otto Weber: *Versammelte Gemeinde*, Neukirchen, 1949.

The reference to the inefficiency of element and celebrant in themselves is directed no doubt in the one case against the *ex opere operato* view of the Sacraments and superstitious beliefs arising therefrom, and in the other case provides an assurance that unworthiness of any kind in the celebrant does not invalidate the Sacraments for believers. That was no doubt a real and important issue to clarify in the situation confronting the authors of the Confession. But is that all that is to be said? Is there not something more positive to be affirmed about the place and function of element and celebrant in the Sacraments? Does this emphasis on unworthiness do justice to God's use of His own creation and creature in the Sacraments? Without infringing on His glory and sole efficiency, does not God's relation to the creation and creature involved in the Sacraments confer on them a certain dignity and reality, a higher status and office in which they come more fully into their own within the sacramental relationship and yet at the same time owe all that they have and are to the grace of the electing God who has chosen them in Christ for this work. Both element and celebrant in the sacramental relationship are placed under the command and promise of God, Creator and Redeemer. In virtue of that promise there is real anticipation in the Sacraments, through the Spirit who changes men from glory to glory, an anticipation of the fulfilment when this mortal shall have put on immortality. In virtue of that promise also there is a stirring of the new creation within and under the forms of the old, the element becomes significant with intimations of the glory that is to fill the earth. To celebrant and element there comes a sufficiency that is of God.

The disqualification of the elements as operative factors in the Sacraments suggests a critical attitude towards the use of symbolism in their interpretation. For if the effective power is not in the elements themselves it cannot reside in any inherently illustrative or symbolic capacity in them. That a general doctrine of symbolism underlies a number of interpretations cannot be doubted. But such interpretations tend to stress merely the cognitive function of the Sacraments. The sign expresses more clearly than words can do the saving truth or action. There is present here again a tendency to emphasise inward appropriation by the individual, a necessary part of the

sacramental action but not the whole of it. However attractive such an approach may be, it does not have a very solid basis on the biblical view of creation. It is based rather on a view of nature as the outward expression of an unseen spiritual world. Such an outlook is alien to the Bible. There indeed we hear of heaven and earth, things invisible and visible, but while they are related to one another, intersecting and working together within the economy of God, they are not regarded as necessarily related as inward and outward aspects of the same thing. In the Bible the whole creation and its various parts are endowed with a certain wholeness and completeness of their own in God's sight apart from their meaning for man. They are good in their finitude as grass that withers, flower that fades, sparrow that falls to the ground and as the whole order of things in heaven and earth that will be rolled up like a garment. This outlook appears in the book of Job where nature is clearly not regarded as symbolic. Where there does appear to be a certain natural symbolism in the Bible as in the bow of the covenant (Gen. 9.12-17), it is not a symbolism inherent in the nature of things but a gracious act of God giving a part of His creation the special office of witnessing to His mercy and faithfulness towards creation as delivered and preserved from a return of chaos. The positive relation of the creation to man is where it has the function of sustaining life. But in so far as this has a bearing on the interpretation of the Sacraments it does not denote a cognitive function but rather a relation of being. Thus in the Lord's Supper the bread represents the life-giving presence of Christ. In the case of baptism the notion of cleansing associated with water is not sufficient to interpret the whole meaning of the rite. In John 3.1-8 and Rom. 6.1-5 this natural symbolism is absent. In both Sacraments the significance is given not primarily by the symbolism inherent in the elements but by Christ's words of institution and interpretation and by Christ's action in setting the elements and their use into a special relation to His redemptive acts which they do not have of themselves.

Question 88 of the Shorter Catechism (of L.C., Q. 154), which deals with the communication of Christ's benefits by the word, Sacraments and prayer, is phrased so as to emphasise the personal action of Christ. 'The outward and ordinary

means whereby Christ communicateth to us the benefits of redemption are his ordinances.' In Question 92 of the Shorter Catechism, where a Sacrament is defined, the language used suggests a certain depersonalising of grace: 'By sensible signs Christ and the benefits of His covenant are represented, sealed and applied to believers.' The passive voice here replaces the active of Question 88. The same depersonalisation by dissociation from the personal act of Christ appears in the phrase 'means of grace' and in Question 163 of the Larger Catechism where the parts of a Sacrament are divided into an outward and sensible sign and the inward and spiritual grace there signified. Grace is not something conveyed or conferred. It is the personal presence and action of God in Jesus Christ creating a relationship with men within the conditions of this world. Paul speaks of the 'grace wherein we stand' (Rom. 5.2), meaning a relationship restored by Jesus Christ, a state of grace. It is naturally not a passive state that is meant. Paul goes on in the same context to speak of it in dynamic terms, 'grace reigning through righteousness' (Rom. 5.21), the domination of man's time corrupted and frustrated by sin and death by the redeeming presence and action of God in Christ. Although there is no reference to the Sacraments in these passages they speak nevertheless of events to which baptism and the Lord's Supper stand in living relation and from which they derive their meaning and power as integral parts of His saving work for men. The character of grace in the Sacraments as personal presence and action of Christ Himself must be brought out as clearly as it is here. The dependence of the earthly acts of Christ's ministry on the supreme acts of revelation in the death and resurrection and Pentecost may be illustrated as follows. In John 13.7 Jesus says of the act of feet-washing: 'What I do, you do not know now, but you shall know hereafter.' That is to say that the situation which alone could interpret the meaning of the action was not yet complete and in force until the death, resurrection and enthronement of Christ were accomplished. The same thing applies to the meaning and efficacy of baptism and the Lord's Supper. The meaning of what was being done at Jesus' baptism was not clear to John (Matt. 3.13-15). Neither was the significance of what was being done at the Lord's Supper clear to the disciples (Luke 22.24). The situation

that interpreted these acts did not exist until Easter and Pentecost were past. Jesus was then revealed as interpreter of Scripture (Luke 24.27, cf. John 14.26, the Spirit as remembrancer and interpreter of Jesus' words), as Lord of baptism into his community (Acts 2.41, 47) and as Lord present and acting at the Supper (Mark 14.22, Luke 22.19), and present in the witness of His people (John 13.20). It is in the light of this historical situation in which human acts depend on saving events for their significance, validity and power and in virtue of them anticipate the coming of the Kingdom in power that I would understand the reference in the Confession (Chap. 27, para. III) to the inadequacy of the human act or person, an inadequacy that is, however, indeed overcome by the reign of grace, by the effective penetration of man's time and existence by the Risen Lord present and acting in the word, Sacraments and witness of His Church.

A survey of some Old Testament material bearing on the cult may help our approach to the New Testament material. The late Aage Bentzen wrote: 'The remembrance of the facts of salvation meant, in the ancient world, that one experienced again these facts just as in Christian worship, above all the Lord's Supper.' (*Messias, Moses Redivivus, Menschensohn*, p. 5 f). The basis of Israelite worship as reflected in the Psalms is the ancient festival of the Covenant of which the basic tradition is perhaps recorded in Joshua 24. The cult provided a representation of the redemptive acts of God, particularly those associated with the period of the making of Israel in the wilderness and at Sinai.[1] Not only was there a participation in the saving events represented in the cult but a solemn proclamation of the presence of Jahweh was made. The normal form of this self-proclamation is what we find in the preface to the decalogue: 'I am the Lord thy God who brought thee up out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage' (Exod. 20.2, cf. Ps.46. 10). In the Psalms there is also frequent reference to Jahweh remembering his Covenant, e.g. Ps. 105.8, 'He is mindful of his covenant for ever.' This is to be taken as Weiser (*A.T.D.*, Psalmen I, p. 18) says not as an act of inward recollection but as 'the actualisation of a historical tradition in a cult act performed as a divine institution'. That a real representation of

[1] Cf. A. Weiser, *Das Alte Testament Deutsch*, Bd. 14, pp. 11-29.

the acts of salvation was intended in the cult appears from such references as 'Come and behold the works of the Lord' (Ps. 46.8). Many psalms also have an eschatological outlook towards Jahweh's final victory and dominion over all the world, as in Psalm 102.12ff, 'But thou O Lord shalt endure forever; and thy remembrance unto all generations . . . so the heathen shall fear the name of the Lord and all the kings of the earth thy glory.' It is to be noted also that some psalms witness also to the judging as well as the saving action of Jahweh in the cult, a reminder not to be at ease in Zion.

> Today if you will hear his voice
> Harden not your heart as in the provocation
> And as in the day of temptation in the wilderness
> When your fathers tempted me, proved me and saw my work.
> (Ps. 95.7-9)

A parallel to this conception of the presence of Jahweh judging those who do not realise the true nature of his presence is found in Hosea 5.12: 'Therefore will I be unto Ephraim as a moth and to the house of Judah as rottenness'; and 13.7-8: 'Therefore I will be unto them as a lion: as a leopard by the way I will observe them: I will meet them as a bear that is bereaved of her whelps.' So Paul could warn the Corinthians to remember the nature of Christ's presence in the Sacrament lest they eat and drink judgment to themselves by unworthy partaking.

This conception of Jahweh as present in the cult and yet not bound to it, free to judge and reject as well as save, is a feature which distinguishes the Old Testament cult from that of other peoples. In the latter deity and cult ritual were essentially related and the ritual was regarded as having an efficacy by its mere performance so that there was virtual identity between ritual performance and the action of God. That such a way of thinking of the efficacy of cult acts could invade Israelite minds we can see from references in the prophets. Thus Jeremiah says: 'Will ye steal and commit adultery and swear falsely and burn incense to Baal and walk after other Gods whom ye know not, and come and stand before me in this house which is called by my name, and say we are delivered to do all these abominations' (Jer. 7.9-10). The nature of Jahweh's presence in Israel's life and cult was not natural. One is tempted to speak of it as historical; but history too can be

regarded as binding God to certain patterns, places or purposes just as much as nature. Although the presence of God with man constitutes and gives meaning to history, God remains Lord of history. But God's presence with His people is something more than merely historical. It is something more than the intersection of man's time from above giving it new and purposive direction. The relation may be more adequately expressed in terms of the election of grace as attested in Israel. This is a relation that transcends the distinction between nature and history and cannot be fully expressed in terms of either. There is in Israel a revelation of the gracious will of God for His people, but also of His gracious dwelling with them as inseparable elements of His election Love. This effective presence of the living God is clearly expressed in Deuteronomy where there is a vivid sense of God's abiding purpose and the penetration of man's time by God in His saving acts and presence. 'The Lord God made a covenant with us in Horeb. Not with our fathers did the Lord make this covenant, but with us who are all of us alive here this day' (Deut. 5.2-3). We find this conception in the prophetic attitude to the cult and institutions of Israel. They take them in earnest as places where Jahweh's glory really dwells and as a token of a real purpose of Jahweh to dwell with men and fill the whole earth with His glory (Isaiah, Ezekiel), a purpose that cannot fall to the ground because it is rooted in His essential nature revealed in His election love of Israel which is sole and sufficient ground for a new work of grace surpassing the old. 'It is not for your sake, O house of Israel, but for the sake of my holy Name which you have profaned among the nations . . . and I will vindicate the holiness of my great Name among the nations . . . for I will take you from all nations and all countries and bring you into your own land. I will sprinkle clean water upon you and you shall be clean from all your uncleanness' (Ezek. 36.22ff).

I have chosen the formulation, 'election of grace', to define God's relation to and presence in the cult, institutions and life of Israel. This formulation underlines the historical given-ness as grounded in the act of God in His grace towards man, and also that He is present with His people in the cult not simply as an object of worship but as the effective agent and bearer

of that worship. It is his effective presence, expressed in such concrete designations as the dwelling of his glory (kabod) and of his name (shem), that constitutes that worship as a real living relationship between God and man, a relationhip touching man at all levels of his being, inward and outward, individual and corporate, historical and natural, yet creating and preserving a wholeness. It also underlines the fact that in this relationship God is present not only as personal will but as being.

Such a presence of God in the Sacraments seems to be brought out in the Confession and Catechism (W.C.F., Chap. 25, para. III; L.C., Q. 154), where the presence of Christ is stated to be the effective power of all acts of worship which are also His gift. He is spoken of as present in the Sacraments and as the author and substance of them. In considering the nature of His presence in the Sacraments it is necessary to avoid thinking in terms of distinctions and contradictions derived from and inherent in the fallen nature of man and so to oppose outward and inward, material and spiritual or speak of interchange of properties and substances. The gift of God in the Sacrament declares and brings a new integration of life, a wholeness that must not be broken down again. The Sacraments have many dimensions. They have historical depths, and future relevance, concrete point, inward meaning and outward appeal, and while it is legitimate to explore and define their richness, it is not so to define the exact source of its meaning and power. This is not a matter to be searched out. To give that meaning and power is the work of the Holy Spirit who is not to be equated with mere inwardness nor with any dynamism conceivable by man. He uses all the resources in the Sacrament to reach man at all levels of his being according to his need.

Both biblical witness and the Confession indicate that God makes Himself known in the Sacraments. There is a cognitive element. It is here important to remember that the Sacraments are integrally related to what God has done and shown Himself to be in the witness of scripture to His saving acts and revelation of His will. They are Sacraments of the Gospel. They are the provision made for men by God who shares with them His knowledge of their need, what He requires of them, does for

them and has in store for them. They have to be seen in the context of His saving purpose, His judgment and mercy, His demand and deed, His promise and fulfilment. They are not meant to develop a private and irresponsible piety. It is significant in this respect that the Sacraments place us within the sphere of the Church with its concrete tasks and hopes in which we are called to share with others in a communion of faith and love and hope. It is necessary to discern the nature of the God who builds us up in His fellowship by the Sacraments.

Finally in defining the nature of a Sacrament we must leave room for the mystery of God's being. It is not enough to remember the historical context in all its rich relationships and associations. It is not enough to ponder the human meaningfulness of the Sacrament, its social implications and its consecration of the material life. Even if we let it speak of the penetration of divine love into man's sinful state, the divine long-suffering, the toil and sacrifice, the Cross and its humiliation, we have still not exhausted the riches of God's grace. That could diminish the full meaning of the Sacrament. The God who brings us into fellowship and keeps us in fellowship with himself in the forms of this world that is passing away, is still the God who is high and lifted up. The God of grace is the God of glory. It is God in the fulness of His being who gives us fellowship with Himself in the Sacraments. As Isaiah and Ezekiel were given to see and to tell their people that it was God in His glory into whose presence they came, so in the Sacraments the Church worships Him who having suffered rose again and sits at the right hand of majesty, and looks forward to the revelation in power and glory of that victory by which it lives, in which it believes and which it praises in communion with the hosts of heaven.

THE REFORMS OF HEZEKIAH AND JOSIAH

by The Rev. E. W. TODD

In the first volume of *The History of Israel* (Oesterley and Robinson), Dr T. H. Robinson points out that at the time of the fall of the northern kingdom of Israel, Judah remained loyal to Assyria, and he goes on to suggest[1]: 'It is possible that some part of the more southerly hill country was handed over to Ahaz, for we know that the Assyrian monarchs did take this means of rewarding vassals who had remained faithful when those around them were in revolt.' Some confirmation of this, as Dr Robinson points out, may be found in the fact that some twenty years later when Judah *did* rebel on the death of Sargon, Sennacherib claims to have captured forty-six fortified cities of Judah, for as the narrative of Sennacherib's Third Campaign from the Taylor Cylinder says: 'But Hezekiah of Judah, who had not bowed himself under my yoke, forty-six of his fortified towns, fortresses, and small cities in their neighbourhood innumerable, with casting down of battering-rams and assault of siege-engines, with attack of infantry, of mines . . . I besieged, I captured.' (See Burney's *Notes on the Hebrew Text of the Books of Kings*, Appendix 5.) The biblical records refer to 'all the fenced cities of Judah' (cf. 2 Kings 18.13) and to 'Sennacherib's being encamped against the fenced cities' (see 2 Chron. 32.1). To reconcile and harmonise the Old Testament accounts with what is known from other sources of the Assyrian campaigns is not easy; that much is easily admitted. Nevertheless there is this Assyrian claim to have captured forty-six fortified cities, a claim which, as Dr Robinson remarks, is difficult in regard to the little kingdom of Judah as she was in the days of the divided monarchy—a difficulty widely admitted and also pointed out by Baynes (*Israel among the Nations*). It is quite easy to dismiss the claim as an exaggeration—even Assyrian kings were known to exaggerate their victories! But the suggestion of Dr Robinson does help us to see that the claim

[1] See p. 380.

as it stands is not so impossible as it might appear at first sight. Further it is our present purpose to suggest that if accepted the suggestion does also throw some light on the narratives in the Old Testament of the reforms of Hezekiah and Josiah.

1. Hezekiah's Reform

2 Kings 18.1-8 records Hezekiah's attack on the worship of the high places and his suppression of the serpent cult. The account concludes with the statement that Yahweh was with him, that he prospered and rebelled against the king of Assyria, and that he smote the Philistines unto Gaza and its borders. The account in Chronicles (2 Chron. 29 ff) is very much longer, describing preliminary repairs to the temple and the setting in order of all the service of the house of the Lord. This is to be found in 29, and of this account, Curtis (*I.C.C., Chron.*) writes: 'The whole narrative is largely, if not entirely, imaginary' (p. 463). Then there follows in 30 a significant account of Hezekiah's sending to all Israel and Judah, writing letters to Ephraim and Manasseh, inviting them to send representatives to Jerusalem for a solemn observance of the Passover, and the king is said to have made a proclamation to this effect throughout all Israel from Dan to Beersheba. The king's couriers met with scorn and derision from the majority, but a few from Asher, Manasseh and Zebulun humble themselves and come to Jerusalem. Then there follows the recital of the destruction of the altars in Jerusalem, followed by an extension of this iconoclastic zeal to the cities of Judah, all Judah and Benjamin, to Ephraim also and Manasseh.

Such are the accounts of Hezekiah's reform in Kings and Chronicles. Many scholars have doubted the authenticity of any such reform[1] although on the whole most would be prepared to accept as authentic the story of the attack on the serpent cult, believing that the remainder of the story is an exaggeration of this milder reform, an exaggeration in the light of the account of Josiah's later measures. Others have accepted the general lines of the Kings account, notably Kittel[2] and Skinner.

[1] Cf. Wellhausen, *Prolegomena to the History of Israel*, pp. 480ff (English Translation 1885). But the objection which Wellhausen alleges here against the authenticity of the reform in anything like the manner described in Kings, Kittel endeavours to answer in the reference given below.

[2] Kittel, *History of the Hebrews*, Vol. 2, pp. 356ff (Eng. Trans. 1896).

The latter points out that the reform is not dated in Kings and he would assign it to the period after the Assyrian invasion of 701, when Jerusalem so signally escaped. In this connexion notice the reference in 2 Kings 18.8, for in 701 Sennacherib had given a portion of Judaean territory to the king of Gaza[1] and the reference to the campaign against the Philistines may reflect a struggle to regain this lost territory. The narrative of the reform as it stands in Kings is not without difficulty. Burney has suggested (*Notes on the Hebrew Text*) that it is the work of a Deuteronomic editor, but that it is based on a much briefer account[2] (now to be found in vv. 4b, 7b and 8) of which vv. 7b and 8 were probably taken from the Annals. In other words there does seem to be strong evidence at least for an attack by Hezekiah upon the serpent cult, and as Lods writes: 'It is plausible to suppose that the editor of Kings was *enlarging* on an event which *had actually occurred*' (*The Prophets and the Rise of Judaism*).

If this much be accepted, what are we to say concerning the corresponding account in Chronicles? Lods is of the opinion that for the period before the exile, the Chronicler relied mainly upon the Kings accounts, with certain additions. Some of these may, in his opinion, be derived from reliable sources, but on the whole they appear to be in the nature of tendentious variations. There are certain details, notably the elaboration of the account of the solemn cleansing of the temple and the offering of the sin-offering, in this account of Hezekiah's reforming measures, which are in keeping with the whole treatment in Chronicles and which might be ascribed to this category. But is the reference to the king's attempt to extend his reform northwards to be similarly dismissed? Curtis (*I.C.C.*, *Chron.*) writes: 'It is very difficult, if not impossible, also to conceive of Hezekiah as having historically sent such an invitation to the inhabitants of the semi-hostile northern kingdom at

[1] Again see the Narrative of Sennacherib's Third Campaign from the Taylor Cylinder—in Burney's *Notes on Hebrew Text of Kings*, Appendix 5.

[2] In verse 4a we have a series of perfects with weak waw—usually reckoned to be a sign of later style—concluding with וכרת את־האשרה וכתת נחש הנחשת with the variant ואת for וכתת. The LXX has at this point *καὶ ἐξωλέθρευσεν τὰ ἄλση καὶ τὸν ὄφιν τὸν χαλκοῦν*, i.e. only the one verb. Is it therefore possible that to an existing account beginning 'And he destroyed the brazen serpent' (v. 4b) there has been added a later expansion describing an attack on the high places generally?

the commencement of his reign before the fall of Samaria.'[1] Perhaps so, but if we can accept the suggestion of Dr Robinson that part of the old northern kingdom (the district around Bethel and Gibeah) was under the jurisdiction of the king of Judah after the fall of Samaria and before the revolt on the death of Sargon, and if we can date the reform before the latter event, then the attempt to extend his reforming zeal northwards is not quite so impossible. The serpent cult was fairly widespread and was certainly not confined to Judah. The mere fact that vv. 7 and 8 of 2 Kings 18 make specific reference to the rebellion against Assyria and a campaign against the Philistines is hardly sufficient reason for dating the whole thing after 701; it may be no more than a telescoping of history in a brief summary, but in a sense a chronological summary. For the reform —even if directed only against the serpent cult—was not without political significance. As Baynes has pointed out,[2] a reform which attacked the serpent cult must surely have made short work of the Assyrian altar which Ahaz had set up in Jerusalem.[3]

On this basis therefore we date the reform of Hezekiah prior to the revolt on the death of Sargon. This reform was in itself a political movement, an assertion of Judah's independence. On the death of Sargon and in the unrest which inevitably followed, this assertion of independence found expression in open revolt. Part of the old territory of Benjamin being under the jurisdiction of Hezekiah which had been also the scene of reforming tendencies, was taken away from him. Thus the addition in Chronicles, while it is an exaggeration of something which did actually take place, is not a complete fabrication, which is a more easily understood situation especially in view of the later attitude to the northern kingdom on the part of the Judaeans.[4]

[1] p. 471. [2] *Israel amongst the Nations*, p. 89.

[3] 2 Kings 16.10. On the other hand some scholars have suggested that the serpent cult, having come from Egypt, is a measure of their dependence upon Egypt—i.e. an attack upon it implies a renunciation of Egyptian help and a return to Assyrian allegiance. But the serpent cult does seem to have been widespread in Palestine (cf. the evidence from Beth-Shan; Alan Rowe, *The Topography and History of Beth-Shan*) and whatever its origin it is doubtful if their relations with Egypt are directly involved here.

[4] Lods (*The Prophets and the Rise of Judaism*) differs from this view and suggests that if Hezekiah's act is viewed as a political measure it must be dated at a time when the king was not being ruled by Assyria and was in complete opposition to

2. Josiah's Reform

In 2 Kings 22 we have a description of the various acts of reform undertaken by Josiah. It is not relevant to our present purpose to enter into a discussion of the cause of this reform and the nature of the law-book found in the temple. It is with other aspects of the reform that we are concerned; this time even the Kings account says that he destroyed the altar at Bethel, defiled the high-places from Geba to Beersheba, and that he took away the houses of the high-places that were in Samaria.[1] Once more this mention of an attempt to extend the reform northwards has been the subject of much scepticism, but again is it not possible that there is some basis of fact underlying it?

For Josiah's reform was not without political significance; his abolition of the sun-cult was (as Pedersen points out) in agreement with this whole policy, and in seeking to extend the reform northwards he was attempting to assert his authority over part of the northern kingdom, at any rate that part of its southern territory which had once been under the jurisdiction of a king of Judah. It has often been urged against the authenticity of the narratives of these two reforms that such a close parallel exists between the two. We cannot of course exclude the possibility that the narrative of the earlier reform under Hezekiah has received modifications and additions in the light of the account of the later reform under Josiah, that in fact the earlier account is history as it ought to have been in the mind of the editor. But as we have seen there are reasons for thinking that the present narrative does contain an earlier account embedded in it; and the evidence for an attack on the serpent cult is strong. The later editor merely exaggerated the scope and the extent of the measures which he attributes to Hezekiah. But as regards Josiah, he may have deliberately followed the example of his predecessor and attempted to regain what had been the position of Hezekiah. And if we accept the suggestion that has been made, that he was animated by a picture of

Isaiah, i.e. between 705 and 701. Nevertheless it seems possible that before 705 Hezekiah's thoughts had turned to rebellion, or else why seek to improve Jerusalem's defences by constructing the Siloam water-tunnel?

[1] But this last statement along with its whole setting in vv. 16-20 is usually held to be a later insertion.

himself as a king after the old Davidic pattern over a united kingdom, the attempt becomes quite understandable.

One other point must be made. 2 Kings 23.29 describes how Pharaoh-Necho of Egypt went up against the king of Assyria and how Josiah went up against him and so met his death at Megiddo, but beyond the brief statement, 'And he slew him at Megiddo when he had seen him', we are not told precisely how. Earlier it was assumed from this that the Egyptians were hastening to secure some part of the now moribund Assyrian empire for themselves.[1] More recently, however, it has come to be accepted[2] that Pharaoh-Necho saw that the real danger was from Babylonia and that it was in their interests to bolster up the tottering power of Assyria. Thus when Nineveh was captured in 612 by the Babylonians and the Medes, Egypt was supporting the Assyrians. The weakness of Assyria in the reign of Josiah lends support to the account of his independent political activity. Further as Dr A. C. Welch has pointed out, it is necessary in the Kings account merely to change one Hebrew letter and the whole sense is changed. Thus the Egyptian king gathers his army and marches to the support of his ally, but finds that he is too late; now the essential thing is to secure his rear against attack. Josiah by his religious reforms has directly challenged and defied the Assyrian power, and was now endeavouring to extend his influence in the north. He must therefore be removed. Whether the rival armies met in battle or whether as seems more likely, Josiah was summoned to Megiddo and there executed, is not certain. But what is certain is that directly or indirectly his death was due to his challenge of the Assyrian power. And his action in doing so was not on this view an idle dream of his own, but was a deliberate attempt to recover the authority which had belonged as recently as the time of Hezekiah to a king of Judah.

[1] See for example, R. L. Ottley's *Short History of the Hebrews* (1904).
[2] As for example by N. H. Baynes, *Israel amongst the Nations* (1927), see page 97.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Protestant Tradition. By J. S. Whale. Cambridge University Press, 1955.

This book, as one would expect from its author, is vigorously written, shows wide erudition, and is concerned with matters of fundamental importance. But, for this reviewer, it has presented two considerable problems. First, it is difficult to see it as one book with its parts inevitably growing out from a central theme, although this is what is intended—rather it has two different subjects, one concerned with the sixteenth-century continental Reformation and English separatism, and the other which is concerned with the Church of Rome, the Totalitarian State, and the Ecumenical Movement as seen by an English Freechurchman who is aware of the values of sixteenth-century Protestantism. To many readers this may not prove to be troublesome: but there is a second and more serious problem for this reviewer. The book may not only be described as having two distinct and not inevitably united parts; it also seems to aim at two different kinds of reader. Is the book intended for what may clumsily be called the 'intelligent, religious layman' or, since Dr Whale is a theologian and historian of high repute, does he intend his book as an offering to the smaller company of his colleagues in theological science? Perhaps he intends both, for, whilst there is lucid exposition of matters most interesting to the 'intelligent, religious layman', there is also a fulness of learned allusion and frequent use of unexplained technical terms which would dismay him. At which level is a reviewer to appreciate this book? In fairness to Dr Whale I must deal with both. Writing first, therefore, of the book as suited to more general reading, *The Protestant Tradition* can be seen as a stimulating and readable account of various aspects of sixteenth-century Protestantism and certain modern dangers to the spiritual heirs of that Protestantism, written by a practised author who combines the gifts of sensitivity to the re-creation of the past, and virile statement of personal judgments on selected theological matters. Dr Whale divides his book into four parts entitled 'Luther', 'Calvin', 'The Sect Type', and 'Modern Issues'. He describes Luther's theology as made up of such paradoxes as Law and Gospel, Calvin as the systematic Churchman and logician of grace. The 'Sect Type' of Church is shown as grounded in Elizabethan separatism with side reference to the Anabaptists,

and its primary principles are shown to be 'personal, voluntarist and spiritual'—i.e. a community whose members are personally committed, guided by the Spirit, and independent of the State. The last section begins with an excellent and well-documented and disturbing survey of the 'Roman Church and Toleration'; moves on to the 'Totalitarian State and the Crown Rights of the Redeemer' which reports the important stages of the controversy between Church and State in Christian history and ends with Hitler rather than the contemporary scene; and, lastly, comes 'Sectarian Division and the Ecumenical Movement' wherein Dr Whale is an enthusiastic supporter of the movement, approaching its problems from the theological doctrine of the Person of Christ, and the 'nature of the Sacramental'. Dr Whale is always readable, interesting, and informative—even in his digressions—raises fundamental questions and provides personal and stimulating answers. The book will be widely read, have some real influence and stimulate at least Free Churchmen to see the inner principles of their inheritance from the angle of the Protestant tradition and how it affects certain aspects of their contemporary situation.

That is one level of appreciation, but in this journal we must ask more searchingly and at a deeper level what Dr Whale's book contributes to Reformation studies, historical and dogmatic, and how far his analysis of the Protestant tradition is valid and shown to be essential to our handling of modern problems. At this level I doubt both the method of his presentation of his material and also the validity of his interpretation of the Protestant tradition. First, the presentation: Dr Whale has an individual and well-handled style but its effectiveness is reduced by his almost sensuous love of the foreign phrase, sometimes where it is not only unnecessary but positively confusing, e.g. 'Gabe und Aufgabe' is given as a chapter heading, and left unexplained save by oblique paraphrase in the text. Again, Dr Whale writes urgently, his characters are shown as 'desperately fighting on two (or three) fronts'; for him a matter is not simply real, it is 'agonisingly real'—he freely uses the ardent adverb, people 'strive ceaselessly', things are 'ruthlessly opposed' or they have 'terrifying thoroughness', and Calvin's predestinarianism arouses 'stupefying horror'. The weakness of this kind of writing is that it defeats itself, especially when sprinkled over with single words and phrases in a variety of tongues. The style is the man, but we want to see not only the man—however impressive his learning or vital his personality—but also objectively and clearly the subject he discusses. Again Dr Whale's technique of using a footnote for an afterthought, or indeed an important qualification of what appears in the text, or for the scattering forth of the contents

of his card-index, tends to side-track the reader's attention rather than help him forward, and gives the impression that Dr Whale is not content to give us his text but also wants to write his own commentary on it. There is also a large collection of names which adorn a footnote or enlarge a paragraph, e.g. Bernini, James Joyce, Dr George Macleod, Kipling, Carlyle's mother (in Lallans too!), and William Pitt—sometimes with only peripheral relevance. This way of stimulating the reader can be overdone: he turns a page with expectation and swiftly scans it to see who it is this time—Joan of Arc? George Robey? Herodotus? Mozart? This may seem a captious criticism (and there are sections free of this onomastic rash), but my point is that it is overdone; further, it is not suited to the exposition of dogmatic theology and must be handled sparingly in historical writing. Again, from another point of view Dr Whale's presentation may sweep an unsuspecting reader off his feet. For example, to close the chapter dealing with the 'Spiritual Principle' in the Protestant tradition he gives nine pages to an enthusiastic account of Montanism in which he almost persuades the entranced reader that Montanism was a legitimate assertion of the necessary guidance of the Holy Spirit. But surely the early Church was right in condemning Montanism for the truly blasphemous assertion that the Phrygian prophets possessed the Paraclete (the Apostles had only been given the Spirit) who told them more than was in the Gospels and indeed more than Christ Himself taught on earth. If Dr Whale considers his digression to be really relevant to the Protestant tradition then either he has misunderstood Montanism or the Protestant tradition. This brings us to ask what is meant here by the Protestant tradition. Fundamentally Dr Whale is saying that it is represented by Luther's paradoxes, Calvin's doctrinaire logic and churchmanship, and the personal spiritual voluntarist principle of English Free Churchmanship and Anabaptist idealism. In the first place how can Calvinist Churchmanship and Anabaptist principles be united in one effective whole? They may represent different aspects of sixteenth-century Protestantism but not one theological witness, yet Dr Whale's book suggests that they are one. Secondly, how far is it helpful to describe Luther's thought in a series of arbitrarily chosen paradoxes (leaving aside the question of whether some of these are paradoxes at all)? This approach tends to conceal from us the unity and dynamism of Luther's thought—the intelligent layman not directly acquainted with Luther might think from this method that Luther was only shadow-boxing. In any case it imposes an artificial framework on Luther's thought. On Calvin Dr Whale has an interesting and valuable chapter on the development of the idea of the Church in the various successive

editions of the 'Institutes'. He repudiates Calvin's doctrine of predestination opposing to it a biblical doctrine of election. But his criticism seems to me to be weakened by two misunderstandings. First, Dr Whale insists that Calvin's thought here is the result of remorseless logic. But it is not; rather Calvin was being loyal to his own experience wherein he found that God mastered him by His sovereign will, and to the Scriptures which say that God is sovereign but man is responsible for his sins. Again, Calvin insisted—as does Scripture—that election is in Christ, though Dr Whale ignores this both in his discussion of Calvin and of what he himself holds to be the scriptural doctrine. Further, Dr Whale's gift of self-expression carries him away at this point, for he says that 'Calvin was neither a knave nor a fool, he himself described this (predestination) as *decretum horribile*, the horrible decree'. Here Dr Whale makes Calvin something more than a knave or a fool; he makes him a blasphemer. For how could Calvin, given his idea of God, accuse Him of acting horribly? Besides, *horribile* should be translated 'awe-inspiring' which is what Calvin meant, and he speaks of the awesomeness of the doctrine more than once.

We need today a useful study embracing both the theology and history of what is essentially Protestantism, a study which would be written out of the present concern with biblical and Reformation theology. Dr Whale's book is rightly directed but it has not made sufficiently clear the inner movement of Protestant history and dogmatic theology as a living force. Here his book is not sufficiently contemporary. Dr Whale writes in terms of tensions and in the eclectic manner of the thirties when it was common form to point out at the same time not only how good the reformers were but also how wrong, and justify one's interest in the Reformation by sparkling with paradoxes—we have got beyond this stage now as such books as Dr Rupp's *Righteousness of God* show.

The book is well produced and there are hardly any errors in printing, but a second edition will see corrected the misspelling of 'terrestrium', p. 35. The date of Castellio's *De Haereticis* should be 1554 not 1544. On p. 230 Dr Whale quotes a well-known saying which he attributes to Voltaire writing to Helvetius; this scholarly precision is irritating when we recollect that Voltaire never wrote these words to Helvetius or anyone else, and that they were first introduced in print in 1907.

BASIL HALL

Kingdom and Church, A Study in the Theology of the Reformation. By T. F. TORRANCE. Oliver and Boyd, 1956. Pp. viii + 168. 16s.

PERHAPS the most valuable insight of modern scholarship into the

meaning of the Gospel has been the re-discovery of the eschatological perspective of the New Testament, and not the least rewarding of the results of this discovery has been to re-recognise the significance of this theology in any sound doctrine of the Church. Any fresh thinking on the doctrine of the Church or the Kingdom must give full weight to the eschatology of the Bible and the Reformers, and this is precisely what this book offers in full measure.

It is now a commonplace of theological thinking how the eschatological outlook of primitive Christianity was set aside as a false, historically conditioned limitation of the real Christianity, and how through Kant to Albrecht Ritschl and his successors the this-worldly ethical ideal of the Church and the Kingdom played a disastrous role in our theology. This danger is passed. The danger now lies less in no eschatology but rather in a false emphasis in our eschatology. Brunner thinks that Dodd in his realised eschatology has overshot his mark, in that he pays too little attention to the element of expectation as opposed to that of secure possession of the full Messianic salvation. Equally Bultmann emphasises eschatological realities as present and only present, and this is superficial and erroneous. We have the fulness of salvation admittedly, but it is important to realise the circumstances in which we have this fulness and that the enemies virtually hold the field. It is always a matter of 'not yet' as well as 'but already', though the New Testament may place the accent now on one and now on the other. Brunner emphasises that the Christian community is always messianic and eschatological in character. It is a mystical unity of visible people under an invisible, ever-present, eternal Christ, but this mystical unity has the paradox at its centre that it is rooted in history, viz. that the eternal Lord is none other than the Jesus of Nazareth.

When this fact is carefully assimilated, our whole theological attitude is not only changed but intensified, particularly towards such intensely eschatological realities as Church and Kingdom. It is found that the theology of Kingdom and Church is a unique theology which transcends not only all rational conceptions of human societies, but all other vocabularies: it is also a new experience of powers and gifts which lie beyond the boundaries of the ordinary work-a-day world. The Church is a paradox: she knows herself to be bound up with the saving history of the past, rooted and living in it, but at the same time, as though she had already said goodbye to it, she looks for a salvation which is not there and yet is certain to come. The Church is messianic: she is the fellowship of the Messiah—the very word Christians means 'Messiah-folk'. Her existence and her purpose can be described

only in eschatological terms of a transcendent consummation that is yet to come. The new age has dawned, but we await its full noonday. It is obvious that if we view the Church and Kingdom in eschatological terms rather than in mere humanist or rational or moral terms, we see them both differently. We do in fact see them as the New Testament sees them, and as the Reformers saw them.

It is with this theme that the book under review deals. It examines the Reformation idea that the Church is the sphere of the Kingdom of Christ, and the means by which the Kingdom expresses itself in history. The author examines that teaching as it is found in three of the great theologians of the Reformation period—Luther who started it, Calvin who modified and systematised it, and Bucer who tried to make England accept it in a form less disturbing than Luther and Calvin conceived it. These Reformers (among others not discussed) attempted to reform the medieval Church by showing her her real, true, traditional and universal theology, as found in the Scriptures and in her Patristic tradition, as well as by exposing all innovations, falsities and superstitions. Torrance shows the genuine eschatological thinking of all three, and gives, with a convincing originality, their teaching both on the doctrine of the Church and the nature of the Kingdom as an eschatology of faith in the case of Luther, an eschatology of love in the case of Bucer, and an eschatology of hope in the case of Calvin.

In his section on Luther his handling of the eschatological tension of Luther's theology of the Word of God is rewarding and refreshing. Similarly, his treatment of the dialectic of *simul justus et peccator* is a short masterpiece of concentrated insight. His original and suggestive section on the *larva dei* in the section on the Orders of Creation (pp. 34ff), peers right into the depth of Luther's theology. His discernment into Luther's gravimina against the Papacy on the one hand and *Schwaermerei* on the other hand and on their respective theologies of the Church and Kingdom is thoroughly sound (particularly pp. 30, 37, and 57f). His long section on the Church and Luther's handling of the problems of the organisation and institutionalising of the Church, with its subsections on *Beruf* and Sacraments, which brings his valuable chapters on Luther to a close, need special mention. But all this is but to snatch a handful of jewels from an Aladdin's Cave. In the present theological debate on Church Unity we need to do some hard work and frank thinking on the doctrines of Church and Kingdom. The debate would proceed more firmly, and to a clearer goal, if there were a few more protagonists who could write and think like this. The value of such a book is that the author moves throughout the source material with the unerring touch of a master.

In reviewing a work of such theological weight, a reviewer is reluctant to offer adverse criticism, but a few points call for mention. I cannot assent to Torrance's opinion that Luther resigns the *executio verbi* to the secular power in the last resort, although Lutheran countries offer a great deal of evidence in support of Torrance's view. In the last instance and in *all* circumstance there was for Luther no dualism in this matter. There was only one God. God reigned. In the last resort, he denied any ultimate power either to the Church or the State, for both are under judgment, will always be under judgment. It is precisely this eschatological judgment of God which prescribes and limits the authority of both in this world, and gives to the Christian man his criterion of judgment on both. The Church and the State each seek to find a static judgment as a sort of authoritative (or even divine) *modus operandi*, but all judgments of both authorities are alike under condemnation in the eschatological judgment of God. Is the author hankering after a theocratic state? Can any more be claimed for the Church than the *jus verbi*, knowing full well that the Church as an institution is just as damned as the State as an organisation, and just as damnable? On this matter much fresh thinking is needed by all of us, and the worst offenders on the theology of the Kingdom and the secular power are the Germans themselves; but even Rupp in his excellent book *The Righteousness of God* is very thin here.

A more definitive place might have been given to Luther's early and abiding certainty that his conception of the Church was that of the true Catholic Church, reformed and purified of an anthropocentric, humanist, Pelagian theology as well as of heathenish innovations. It might also have been more positively maintained that Luther's thinking (like Calvin's and the best reformers') was based on sound Patristic learning, as well as on a sound historical and critical judgment. Also, the work Luther did (as well as the significance of his work for evangelical theology), in evangelising the Mass and all the Liturgy, together with his provision of a robust worship for the people of God, are not adequately estimated, nor is his faith in sound education from Grammar School to University as the ally of wholesome theology. All of these are important insights in Luther's idea of the Church and of the Kingdom.

The book suffers a little in that its section on Martin Bucer is too slight. The author is aware of this, and no more need be said, but it would have made the book more valuable still, particularly for Anglicans, had the author seen his way to offer a fuller statement. Bucer cries out for study. But what Torrance says about Bucer, in that he is a third type of Reformation idea realising the idea of the Kingdom through the priesthood of every individual believer, the

Word of God playing the role of an eschatological tension of love, is both sound and true.

In section three on Calvin, the author considers Calvin's thought on the Kingdom and the Church as an eschatology of hope, and throughout makes illuminating comparisons with Luther. He interprets Calvin's eschatology in terms of Christology, i.e. he makes an analogical transposition of Christology to the whole understanding of the Church. The author shows Calvin's fight for a sound theology of the Kingdom and the Church on the one hand against the Papacy with its false doctrine on the continuation of the Church, and on the other hand against the Anabaptists who had none. Torrance defends Calvin's doctrine of election by showing the Kingdom under two aspects: as prepared for the elect, and also as continually growing in the world. This saves Calvin's doctrine from the violence of being submitted to, and therefore ruined by, a humanist, logical examination. Here Torrance brings out the significance of a sound grasp of the meaning of the Ascension, seeing predestination as the *prius* and eschatology as the *posterius* of the Christian Faith. In his sections on the Ascension, Between the Advents, and The Two Conditions of the Kingdom, he continues his eschatological-Christological analysis of Calvin's theology of the Church as the Church under the Cross in the certain hope of its triumph—or to continue the analogical thought-form, of its Ascension. (This theology of victory already won was also an essential element of Luther's theology, as it was of the Fathers generally. Aulén in his *Christus Victor* has understood Luther, even if he has exaggerated his Christology.)

Here Torrance is at his best and most original, adducing a galaxy of superb quotations and references from Calvin. It is in fact Ascensionist theology. Within this eschatological framework of the Advent that was and the Advent that is to come, Torrance sets out Calvin's theology of the Ministry of the Word and Sacraments, and shows that the Church and the Kingdom are correlative. He ends with Calvin's well-known ideas on Church Order. He maintains that the correlativity of Church and Kingdom understood in terms of the eschatological tension gives the theology of Calvin's ideas on Church Order. The book concludes with a fine essay on the differences between Luther and Calvin, which differences Torrance sees as due essentially to Calvin's eschatological-Christological understanding of the Kingdom and the Church.

This book is the best contribution to the current theological debate known to me. The book is marked on the one hand by that brilliance of theological judgment, and on the other by that refreshing and infectious sincerity of religious conviction expected of Tor-

rance. It is precise and powerful, pithy and provocative. It is a valuable and authoritative contribution on the meaning of Reformation theology, as well as on its significance for the theological debate now going on in the world. It brings to the fore the essential, biblical basis of the theology of the Church and the Kingdom, and how the Reformers, on a background of sound Patristic learning, revived that theology within a medievalism which had forgotten it. It shows that all too rare mastery of the Reformation sources, and is streaked with brilliant and provoking insights, and has much weight given to it by the author's own patent faith. One could have wished it longer. It is difficult to assimilate, but that is due partly to its concentration, and partly to its originality of thought. Its numerous Latin and German quotations might intimidate anybody born south of the Tweed; it is surely advisable nowadays to translate *all* quotations into English.

JAMES ATKINSON

Paulus und die Heilsgeschichte. By JOHANNES MUNCK. Acta Jutlandica, T.6. Copenhagen, Ejnar Munksgaard, 1954. Kr. 28.00.

DR MUNCK, who is professor of New Testament exegesis at the University of Aarhus, is known in this country by articles on St. Paul and kindred subjects which he has contributed to *J.T.S.* and other journals, and he has so committed himself to the pursuit of this particular interest that the present volume on *Paulus und die Heilsgeschichte* may, as he humorously suggests, be said to have written itself. No reader will, however, be insensible of the immense amount of painstaking work and constructive insight which have gone to the elaboration of its central thesis, or will fail to recognise that, whether or not all of Dr Munck's positions can be sustained, a powerful jet of new ideas has been turned on to Pauline studies which cannot but have renovating and stimulating effect.

It is Dr Munck's contention that the modern understanding of St. Paul has suffered from the tendency to secularise and to demythologise both the Apostle and his thought. St. Paul has been explained too easily. He has been categorised and labelled. Thus he has been represented as a great missionary statesman with a kind of nineteenth-century world-outlook, rather than his own intense apocalyptic thought-world, as background and standard of reference. Alternatively he has been exalted as theologian, albeit not a systematic one, or as mystic. What has not been considered—to the lasting detriment of the modern understanding—has been Paul the *Apostle*, Paul the man raised up by God who preached Christ to the Gentiles with the exalted consciousness of hastening on the final advent of Christ and the inauguration of the World to Come. To

this *eschatological* side of the Apostle's calling and mission the modern mind has turned a blind eye. And Dr Munck has seen in all this imperfect categorising of St. Paul the continuing influence of ideas which have not shaken free from the Tübingen philosophy of history. He proposes accordingly to clear the ground for a new approach to the subject, and in the first chapter of the book he examines anew the evidence of the Epistles and Acts as to the apostle's *calling*. The evidence of these documents lends no support at all to the psychological theory which the modern mind thinks to be able to deduce from Romans 7, viz. that St. Paul's conversion came about through the previous disintegration of his Judaism. On the contrary Paul represents himself in Galatians as at the very pinnacle of his Jewish zeal and integrity when conversion came to him, and in Philippians he speaks of his legal attainments as 'gains' which, nevertheless, he ruthlessly slashed away for the sake of the knowledge of Christ and of being found in Him. The 'kicking against the goad', to which one of the narratives in Acts refers, has to do, not with earlier struggles of conscience on the part of Paul, but with the new compulsion laid on him by Christ: 'Woe to me if I preach not the gospel!' The call came when he was an enemy of God. It was not any movement away from the Law that led him to Christ, but the intervention of Christ in his life that broke him away from the Law. In the end Dr Munck can discover no analogies to St. Paul's conversion except in the supernatural illuminations granted in *Heilsgeschichte* to figures like Isaiah or Jeremiah, and equally supernatural was the convert's interpretation of his destiny, his sense of being called to be the apostle to the *Gentiles*.

Dr Munck does not appear to entertain the possibility that the convert at Damascus was thrown into the arms of followers of Stephen already conscious of the world-mission of the Church. He is prevented from making any such surmise by his undeviating insistence on the unity of the Church at Jerusalem. But whether through Ananias or not—and Dr Munck will not exclude the possibility that Ananias mediated to Paul the Lord's commission to him to go to the Gentiles—the sense of a unique predetermined God-given apostolate to the 'nations' was lodged in Paul's soul from now onwards. This comes startlingly to light in 2 Thess. 2. Here Dr Munck, following Cullmann, considers that the 'restrainer' or 'restraining force' which holds up the last events of history—the overthrow of Satan and the Parousia of Christ—is Paul himself, for not until the accomplishment of Paul's appointed mission to the Gentiles will the stage be set for the world's salvation. A fuller exposition of this point of view, indeed a complete philosophy of history, unfolds itself before us when, passing beyond Cullman, we

come to Romans 11, a passage in which, thinks Dr Munck, Cullmann has taken only a 'stepmotherly' interest. There St. Paul develops on a grandiose scale a view of *Heilsgeschichte* according to which in the will of God two apostolates have been set up for the conversion of the world in this last age of time. One is the apostolate to the Jews, committed to St. Peter and others. This has been pursued but has failed to effect the salvation of Israel: 'Lord, who hath believed our report?' The other is the apostolate of Paul. It is to the 'nations', and it is still in progress. The 'fulness of the Gentiles' which Paul is pursuing is the complete representative offering of the gospel to the nations, for by the success of this mission the Apostle, still reaching towards the west, hopes to produce a reaction of feeling on the part of the Jews, a divine 'jealousy' which will fling them into the arms of the Redeemer, and so bring about the final salvation. We are to consider St. Paul, therefore, as borne forward on the wings of a high historical-suprahistorical sense of destiny. Only so do we realise what it means for him to be put in trust with the gospel to the Gentiles, a commission which he describes as a 'mystery'. Cf. Col. 1.25-7, Eph. 1.9, 3.1-10.

Inevitably an interpretation like this cannot but react at every point on our understanding alike of the history and of the theology of St. Paul. Dr Munck does not deal with the theology, but he has a good deal to say about the history, and here we may often feel that his exegetics carry him on to somewhat uncertain and crumbling ground. In a long series of chapters on Galatians, 1 Corinthians, 2 Corinthians, and Romans, he seeks to demolish what relics of the Tübingen hypothesis still cling around the figure of the apostle in his relation to his Judaising opponents. Here Dr Munck takes his fundamental stand on Gal. 2.1-10, the firm concordat achieved at Jerusalem between the leaders of Jewish Christianity and Paul. This agreement he regards as having been loyally accepted and loyally maintained by both sides throughout the whole course of their relations. The Judaisers encountered by St. Paul in Galatia, and referred to in Gal. 2.4-5, were not emissaries sent from Jerusalem, but were Gentile Christians, products of St. Paul's own evangelism, who in wishing to have themselves circumcised and bound by the Mosaic ordinances were going beyond what Paul himself regarded as appropriate for incorporation into Christ and the Israel of God. But while such tendencies to 'over-conversion' may not have been unknown in the Gentile Churches, it is by no means clear that they did not have some roots in propaganda, albeit not official, emanating from Jerusalem. Dr Munck will have difficulty in persuading his readers that the Judaisation carried on in Galatia was 'a Gentile-Christian heresy only possible in the

Pauline Churches'. He is more successful in establishing that at Corinth the rivalries or parties in the Church owed no part of their existence to Judaising propaganda introduced into the community from without. They were a purely internal phenomenon, a product of the Greek-Christian proclivity to interpret Christianity as 'wisdom', to which the apostle has his answer. Even in 2 Corinthians 10-13 Dr Munck discovers nothing to show that the intrusive 'false apostles', though 'Hebrews' or Jewish Christians, were Judaisers. The infiltration of these wandering preachers was unfortunate. It could not have occurred at a worse time for the apostle, following as it did on the composing of the differences hitherto existing between the Corinthians and himself, but it does not appear that his quarrel with these intruders was over doctrine. Rather was it over the question what constituted the signs of an apostle of Christ, and here nothing is left for Paul but to press the contrast between the self-exaltation of these 'apostles' and the daily crucifixion for the sake of Christ to which he had himself submitted.

Dr Munck's chapter on Romans, 'The Manifest of Faith', is relatively unrewarding because like Dr Nygren he abandons the attempt to relate the Epistle to known circumstances within the Roman community. This, as the present reviewer has sought to show elsewhere,[1] is a disappointing limitation of approach. The Epistle to the Romans demands and will bear a much closer inspection than Dr Munck has here accorded to it. But it is not possible to cover in detail the whole general richness of Dr Munck's pronouncements. There are four closing chapters, on 'Jewish Christianity according to Acts', 'Israel and the Gentiles', 'Paul and Jerusalem', and 'Paul before the Emperor', all valuable for the breadth and insight of the inquiries. As will be seen, Dr Munck has throughout presented a very virile challenge to thought and criticism, and has undoubtedly at many points exposed himself to attack. It is not, however, proposed here, following the example of most bad reviewers, to cover up the work with criticisms before its contentions have had a chance of being heard. Dr Munck has certainly done one very great thing. He has struck sparks from the rock of St. Paul's apostolic consciousness, and done it in a way which cannot but throw light about the interpretation of many things in his gospel and theology.

WILLIAM MANSON

An Existentialist Theology. By JOHN MACQUARRIE. S.C.M. Press, 1955. Pp. xii + 252. 18s.

ONE is tempted to say without more ado 'This book is indispensable

[1] *The Epistle to the Hebrews* (1951).

reading.' Only recollection of the wide variety of the theological public gives pause to such a statement. The present writer has learnt so enormously from it that he conceives all but professional theologians already versed in the existentialist approach to theology must do the same. The working minister, at any rate, who is wondering what existentialism really is, what its influence upon the great NT theologian Rudolf Bultmann and the current demythologising controversy amounts to, and what its long-term effects upon theological thinking generally are likely to be, will find here that Dr Macquarrie has written the very book for which he has been waiting. Here is a sustained exposition, of masterly scope and lucidity, of what existentialism means in its most influential and formative exponent, Martin Heidegger (although he himself makes some show of repudiating the label) involving the author in an attempt at rendering a simplified and intelligible version of perhaps the most formidably difficult philosophical treatise of modern times. We know that Dr Macquarrie is engaged, along with an American colleague, in a translation of *Sein und Zeit* (1927) and the first fruits of his labour in this enterprise are here presented incidentally in the Glossary of German Terms at the end of the book. This alone is something to be grateful for. His main task, however, is to show how Heidegger's phenomenological analysis of human being forms the prolegomena to Bultmann's NT theology, where it leads to a characteristic understanding of the biblical matter, in itself of the greatest interest, but still more so as reflecting upon the nature of religious thinking in general. For Bultmann is not merely an NT specialist, not merely a biblical theologian; he is a theologian in the wider sense as concerned with the fundamental problem of the mutual relations of understanding, faith and revelation, and in particular with the problem of communication in our time. In his view existentialism as learnt from Heidegger helps us to free the Christian message from certain limiting accidentals, and so assists the presentation of the permanently valid Word of God addressed to the characteristic human situation. This does not mean that Dr Macquarrie's book is simply one more contribution to the demythologising controversy. This matter receives specific discussion but is far from occupying the centre of attention. Dr Macquarrie is among those who conceive that certain disturbing features in Bultmann's reductive treatment of Christian origins are more the result of his remaining Liberalism than of his existentialism. In this work we go behind the details of this special controversy to the more fundamental concerns in terms of which it must be determined. And while it must be said that Dr Macquarrie appears to find Bultmann's existentialist approach to the problems of Christian

theology illuminating and in its essentials valid, to the extent of suggesting a hope of healing the breach between religious thought on the one hand and scientific and philosophical thought on the other, yet it must be clearly stated that he is critic as well as expositor of Bultmann. It is a corrected and supplemented existentialist theology which offers this hope, one which gives due place to biblical belief in God and His saving Word in the Gospel (both of which Bultmann fully intends to preserve, whether or not his existentialist presuppositions limit or jeopardise either in the result). Some of the most valuable pages in Dr Macquarrie's book are those where he indicates criticism of his hero, or where he shows that existentialism will hardly cover all the religious ground.

What then are the features of Heideggerian existentialism which lead Bultmann to suppose that it may be profitably used in the understanding and explication of the Bible and its message of God's grace and salvation? Dr Macquarrie's book sets forth a relation at two levels: there is a formal affinity between the categories of Heidegger's phenomenological analysis of human being or existence and the biblical representation of the relations between man and God; and there is a material resemblance in the account both give of the human situation.

Bultmann believes that Heidegger's phenomenological description of the nature of human being (which is for him the first stage of an ontological endeavour after a doctrine of being in general) and the consequences of that analysis for knowledge of all and any sort whatsoever are sufficiently sound and justified to render them necessary prolegomena to biblical studies in particular. We cannot here elaborate a detailed account of the analysis itself—that is done to admiration in the book under review. Suffice it to say in this connexion that 'being-in-the-world', which is the special kind of being which man has or is, involves him in a fundamental 'being-with' both things and persons, of a sort which renders description of either impossible without reference to the other. The knowledge of the nature of his own existence which is given along with his existence in man's case is a knowledge more certain than any other; and this existential knowledge is a knowledge of his environment as related to his own purposes and 'projects', whether of life or thought. Science is a specialised 'project' which tries to view things as 'objects' in abstraction from the more immediate concerns of living—more specialised but not more privileged, and not less a subordination of things to human being in the widest sense than the point of view which regards them as the 'tools' of enjoyment or action. This is not pragmatism in the old sense, nor is it technology: it is existentialism based on phenomenology, and it must pass for

the new form of epistemology—the new 'critique of pure reason'. Bultmann does not so much say that this new *a priori* of human knowledge must of necessity be used in our approach to the Bible statements about God and man as that we find it already acknowledged there: some such doctrine of the 'togetherness' of knower and known is implicit in biblical thinking—it is already 'existentialist' thinking. The Bible is not speculative doctrine concerning objective realities determinable by science or philosophy: it is description of experience of God and man in living relation not otherwise known or knowable outside existentialist participation. Theology is phenomenological analysis and description of believing experience. This view of the nature of religious truth in Bultmann is illustrated by Dr Macquarrie from numerous examples of his exegesis of Pauline and Johannine terminology. This is a most valuable and rewarding feature of the book. Thus the Heideggerian 'being-in-the-world' Bultmann finds as the root meaning of the Pauline conception of *soma*, which stands for an idea of human as embodied existence, transcending the Greek dichotomy of soul and body; while the meaning of *sarx* is illuminated by the concept of 'inauthentic existence' in Heidegger. The reviewer is not quite convinced by the exegesis of the 'spiritual body' in terms of existentialist categories on p. 44f. Is it not more natural to think that this *is* a piece of 'speculation' (however regrettable) on the part of the Apostle? He is speaking to a Gentile audience, and suggesting 'with what body' the dead will come in the resurrection. Much more certain it is, however, that the Bible doctrines of Creation and the creaturely being of man are less speculative statements in the 'Greek' manner than religious statements of the absolute dependence of the world and man upon the sovereign will of God. The problem of the possible limits and limitations of this view of theological doctrines as phenomenological description, in particular the question of whether this approach can ever transcend its anthropological starting-point, are matters less acutely raised in Bultmann than in Tillich, whose constructions are similarly dominated by existentialist presuppositions.

More important than any methodological influence of existentialism upon Bultmann's theology is the coincidence in matter and mood between Heidegger's picture of the place and plight of man in the world (and not just the modern world!) and the biblical doctrine of man's fallen state. Human existence, we remember, is defined by Heidegger as 'being-in-the-world'. Man finds himself set in a context which he did not create and which determines and limits his very being in inescapable relation. This very knowledge of his existence given to man along with his existence yet sets a

distance between himself and himself. In virtue of his very self-consciousness man has a relation to himself, so that it is open to him to choose himself in accordance with an idea of himself. Freedom is the form of his 'authentic existence'. But man rarely and only in varying degree so chooses himself. For the most part man surrenders his authentic being to the world he finds himself 'along-with' and which enters into his very being as 'being-in-the-world'. He is swamped, more or less completely, in the pursuit of things, or in the impersonal attitudes of mass-thinking and stock reactions to the problems of living. Who cannot see in this Heideggerian category of 'inauthentic being' the counterpart of the biblical doctrines of sin and fallen man? In his own language Heidegger declares with the Bible 'All have sinned and come short'—but he does not add 'of the glory of God'! That significant addition is the Bible's special province and peculiarity. Meanwhile we may remark 'How striking the affinity of the thought here!' Does not Heidegger's account of the depersonalised, dehumanised, deindividualised human being come home to the bosom of modern men as the very picture of themselves and their discontents and calamities in this age? Will this analysis not help the preacher and the theologian pertinently to interpret the Gospel message in the modern world, especially in its preliminary call to repentance? Is not the very core of man's sin, of which the Bible speaks, the 'love of the world'? Does not Jesus tell us of the danger that a man may gain the whole world and lose his own soul? Does not the NT writer set before us the ideal of the Christian life as that a man should be 'in the world but not of it'? Must not the Christian language concerning 'sin' gain new pertinency and point from acquaintance with the phenomenological descriptions of 'inauthentic existence'? Are not Bible and existentialist philosopher in the end speaking about the same thing?

It is in terms of 'authentic' and 'inauthentic existence' that Dr Macquarrie lays out his book. After an Introduction dealing with the methodological influence of which we have first spoken, the bulk of the book is divided into two parts: Part One—Existence as Inauthentic and Fallen; Part Two—The Christian Life as Authentic Existence. A concluding chapter deals with reflection on results of the inquiry. This does not mean that in the first part we have exposition of Heidegger followed by account of his influence on Bultmann, then in the second part the Christian supplement in correction of aberrations and defects in this 'Existentialist Theology'. In both parts we have an exposition of Bultmann's version of the biblical matter under the influence of Heidegger's existentialism and a testing of how this stands up to the fulness of Christian truth. Once again, we cannot hope to give even a summary of Dr Mac-

quarrie's fully detailed argument. The sum of the matter may be said to be that he conceives that, although much light may be derived from Heidegger through Bultmann on the biblical idea of human nature as fallen, there is yet a grave defect in the utmost that existentialism of this sort can show us as to how man may be redeemed and the life to which he is redeemed by the Word of God which confronts him in the Bible. This is not surprising. The Bible defines the authentic existence from which man has fallen in terms of a conception of human being *in relation to God*. Man's togetherness in relation is not just with 'the world' but with God. His fall is not from an idea of his relation to himself, drawn from a description of the form of self-consciousness, but from a knowledge of himself as a child, not of chance and facticity, but of God; all which is to say, his fall is into *sin*, which is a term not in the existentialist vocabulary. Similarly, the authentic existence to which he is redeemed is the freedom of the children of God; and this is by the grace of God in the Gospel. The Parable of the Prodigal Son would, we conceive, in the existentialist version of Heidegger stop short at the verse 'And when he came to himself': that is all that we can conceive Heideggerian man doing when he realised 'O wretched man that I am!' For one of the fundamental limitations which Bultmann or any other Christian theologian must inevitably find to the usefulness of Heidegger in his task is that God does not enter into or emerge from the phenomenological analysis of human being, according to this philosopher. We are told that Heidegger does not like to be called an atheist: of God he 'does not deny His existence': he 'affirms His absence'. Dr Macquarrie elucidates this 'cryptic remark' on pp. 71ff. No more than Laplace has he 'any need of that hypothesis'. Indeed he would deny that hypotheses are in his line: he deals in 'analysis'. But there are rumours that, on his own statement, Heidegger is 'turning again to theology'; and perhaps the final ontology, to which the phenomenology is preliminary, may present us with something different as the outcome of the 'quest for being'. In the meantime Dr Macquarrie is not convinced that the existentialist approach necessarily commits us to non-theism. In a most interesting section (pp. 71-7) dealing with the 'disclosure of existence' based on 'affective states' in Heidegger, he suggests an alternative reading of the ontological implications of *Angst* (a technicality lending itself too easily to popular and often facetious use, for the correct interpretation of which the reader is referred to Dr Macquarrie and his Glossary before-mentioned). 'Creaturely feeling', which is a possible description here on the phenomenological level, of man's mood on discovery of the 'sea of facticity' in 'the world in which he is found and to which he is bound', contains in such ter-

minology a suggestion of the finding of the ground of being, both of man and his world, in God. There is thus a possible 'bifurcation between the theistic and the non-theistic interpretations of being, so far as these are built upon the existential analytic' (p. 74). It is specially interesting to find Dr Macquarrie call in the help of Otto here in further explication of his suggestion; there being a widely current feeling that the usefulness of Otto has been exhausted, his analysis of luminous awe being confined to the psychology of religion. Dr Macquarrie evidently thinks that the 'analysis of affective states' (which in Heidegger is equally authoritative along with the understanding in the disclosure of existence to man) may well have ontological implications.

But if the existence of God is only doubtfully disclosed in the existential analytic this is not a matter in which Bultmann follows Heidegger or appears to be adversely affected by his influence. Bultmann not only believes in God: he is a Christian theologian expounding with such help as existentialism may give him the Gospel of Divine forgiveness and restoration. These are not the outcome of existential analysis, but the Message of a Divine intrusion of the Bible God into human history and experience. It is true that both of these have to be understood in a Bultmannian sense. There is an elaborate doctrine of History involved in the account of the 'mighty acts' of God for human salvation, as described in Chapter VII of our book. If the appearance of these factors in Bultmann come upon us with something of the effect of a 'rock in the sky' in the context of this book, that is reassuring as to Bultmann's fundamental Christianity. He is not seeking to save us after all by 'the wisdom of this world'. 'An Existentialist Theology' runs the title of this book: 'theology' is the noun, 'existentialist' the adjective. For Bultmann there is first a theology to explain, and existentialism may help to explain and commend it in the set-up of the modern world. But the theology is not the problematical outcome of the existentialism. It is the Word of God in the Gospel.

There are other points at which the 'broad ugly ditch' between phenomenological or existentialist analysis and the Christian word of salvation and the new life in the world discloses itself, in Dr Macquarrie's account of Bultmann and Heidegger. It is impressive, for example, to find the philosopher making room for a phenomenological account of Conscience, in which Dr Macquarrie finds points of positive value: 'It does justice to both the cognitive and affective aspects of the phenomenon' and, in contrast to theories which treat Conscience as some sort of intact and separate faculty of human nature not otherwise explicable, Heidegger's version 'succeeds in relating it to the whole structure of the being of man' (p. 142). But

the disclosure to the inauthentic self of the authentic self does not provide any power to pass from the fallen state to any other. And here Bultmann, who gives a theoretical exegesis of *syneidesis* in St. Paul which is practically Heidegger's account, 'is as clear as anyone about the inadequacy of conscience to fulfil the function which Heidegger assigns to it, and is fully aware that at this point existentialism and Christianity go different ways' (p. 152). Not only so, not only does existentialism as such lack any message of the enabling grace of the Christian God in the Gospel, but it seems to this reviewer that existentialism—or is it the phenomenological methodology?—lacks any power to present us with a genuine *ought*. Heidegger surprisingly speaks of Conscience involving man in Guilt of a sort. Dr Macquarrie allows that its presence and function in Heidegger is both obscure and paradoxical. But beyond the paradoxes and obscurities he mentions is there not the further mystery of how inauthentic man comes to find himself guilty *because he accepts responsibility*? Why am I guilty rather than merely unfortunate or miserable? Why should I choose my authentic being? Can phenomenology ever deal in anything but Kantian hypothetical imperatives? A further discrepancy between existentialism and the full Christian standpoint, and one in which Dr Macquarrie finds Bultmann perhaps himself implicated, is in the biblical doctrine of Love. The ontological analysis of Love in existentialism both in Heidegger and in Tillich remains infected with the individualism of its starting point (p. 213). The NT conception of fellowship, of the redeemed community, is lacking—lacking in Heidegger particularly because, of course, he lacks the constitutive reality of the prior Love of God. Even when we start talking of the *Thou* we need not therefore have passed beyond analysis of the individual consciousness: the authentic existence of the individual and his preservation may be our chief concern.

Here we must bring the present review to a close, and a multitude of fascinating topics raised and discussed in Dr Macquarrie's book remain unmentioned. Nothing has been said about one of the most characteristic and striking matters in Heidegger, namely that human existence as such is essentially 'existence unto death'. The reader will find in Dr Macquarrie not only how Heidegger's view of death as 'man's most intimate and isolated possibility' differs in its exaggeration and preoccupation from the biblical view, but also in what way Heidegger differs from the most prominent representative of existentialism on the literary scene, Jean-Paul Sartre. Perhaps this particular matter is not so important for the theologian concerned with existentialist influence on Bultmann; but Dr Macquarrie's treatment shows that he is not unmindful of the reader whose interest is

stronger on the side of general literature. But this is, we remind ourselves, a book for theologians: for theologians in the making (this is something the divinity student should certainly buy, and so ease his passage through the theological lecture-course)—and perhaps still more for theologians in the remaking! The challenge of existentialism is there for theology: everyone interested in the future of theology must meet the problem presented by the rise of this modern method of approach to philosophical and theological questions. A distinguished exponent of existentialist philosophy (claiming almost patent rights in the term *Existenzphilosophie*) has lately asserted that the existentialist phase is now over. A theologian whom we personally read with pleasure always has greeted Dr Macquarrie's book as a token that theology is about to pass into an era dominated by existentialist presuppositions and approach. Which is right? Dr Macquarrie's book should be read as part of the answer. This is a piece of pioneer work of the first importance.

JAMES BROWN

Jewish Religious Polemic. By OLIVER S. RANKIN. Edinburgh University Press, 1956. Pp. 256. 18s.

THE discussions translated and commented on by the late Professor Rankin are significant to the theologian mainly as indicating certain crucial problems in biblical interpretation and certain interesting episodes in their history. In spite of constant disagreement over the sense of passages like Shiloh in Gen. 49 or the *'Almah* in Isa. 7, Christian exegesis drew much from the spirit of Jewish interpretation, the influence of which can be seen in many passages of the King James Version. This book shows how certain scholars went beyond the Bible itself and sought to press the *Talmud*, the *Midrashim* and even the *Zohar* into the service of Christian interpretation.

Professor Rankin held that, because of the literal-mechanical views of inspiration used by Christians, the Jews were able not infrequently to get the best of the argument; and he opposed the continuance of such views in the Church of the present day, and was suspicious of modern theologies which, rejecting fundamentalism in its grosser aspects, yet retained an excessive respect for traditional interpretations. In this judgment there is an important truth. The Rabbinic tradition distinguished between Halakha, the law of conduct, which was fully binding and which saw meaning in the minutest detail of the text, and Haggada, the narrative tradition, freely composed, less authoritative, and less insistent upon literal accuracy. The Church, for which historical events and ethical activity were related in a different way, did not draw this distinction for the most part. But it sometimes allowed the Halakhic approach

to exegesis, perhaps because of its authoritarian stringency, to guide its treatment of its own texts. This Rabbinic inheritance has obscured for the Church the fact that the biblical tradition was in origin not Rabbinic but priestly-prophetic, or as we might more generally say, cultic. While Rabbinism is of great importance in the New Testament, it remains true that the early Christian movement was a great revival of both the priestly and the prophetic.

These last observations go beyond what Professor Rankin himself has said. As all who knew him would expect, his edition of these out-of-the-way texts is both erudite and amusing, a fitting monument for his genius in understanding the pathos and the grandeur of medieval Judaism.

JAMES BARR

Das Gesetz Erfüllen. By HENRIK LJUNGMAN. Lund, 1954. Pp. 140. Kr. 14.

'I AM not come to destroy but to fulfil.' What is the meaning of the words familiarly so translated in Matt. 5.17, and how does this verse fit together with the two or three following? The most important question is the meaning of πληρῶσαι. Ljungman discusses the three senses most commonly ascribed to it: (1) 'to do or perform the law'; (2) 'to finish or complete the law'; (3) 'to validate the law, to hold it valid'. None of these is satisfactory to him. He believes that vv. 18-19 belong together with v. 17, and that πληρῶσαι connotes the law in its totality, as against any disintegration of the law. It is important that the verb πληροῦν is so commonly accompanied by some form of πᾶς or ὅλος. In translating καταλῦσαι moreover we have to give some recognition to the simplest sense of λύειν, i.e. to loosen. Did the coming of Jesus mean the disintegration of the law, or does it not rather effect the unity of the scripture, so that *all* should come to pass of which the scripture has spoken? The Pharisees feared that Jesus would be a disintegrating force, but are themselves accused of failing to keep the command of God integral. In order to understand Ljungman's argument the English reader would have to abandon the traditional 'fulfil' and use instead the simple and literal 'fill'. 'The scripture is "filled" so to speak by Jesus word for word in the development of events in which He Himself is the centre, from the birth at Bethlehem to the death on the cross.' As Jesus fills up the law, the righteousness of His followers becomes over-full or brims over (περισσεύειν) unlike the Pharisaic righteousness.

A similar interpretation is now given of the words at Jesus' baptism, πληρῶσαι πᾶσαν δικαιοσύνην, Matt. 3.15. As He came to fill

up (all) the law, so He is baptised to fill up all righteousness. The theology of 'filling' is the same in both places.

Two remarks may be made about this work. Firstly it does not fail to expose the thinness of a good deal of interpretation of these two passages, as when scholars have told us that Matt. 5.18 must have been spoken only in irony as a caricature of Jesus' opponents (T. W. Manson) or that it is a Judaistic statement clearly never made by Jesus (Bultmann). This book is an example of what has been called 'depth exegesis', worked out in detail from Old Testament passages which have moulded the sense of words, and with responsible use of materials from the New Testament outside of Matthew. This exegesis captures many hints of the passages which would escape notice in a more superficial treatment. The reviewer does not see any sign of the theological bias sometimes alleged to go with this sort of approach.

Secondly, if this interpretation is even approximately true, it has the great advantage of taking these sayings out of the merely legal-practical sphere in which they are so often seen and integrating them with messianic-priestly views of Jesus' mission. The Saviour's work is interlocked with the Church's service and the discussion of the law is woven into soteriology and eschatology. This approach will be of great importance for all who are concerned with the place of Gospel and Law in society, and gives many fresh insights into the Sermon on the Mount as a whole. Not everything in the book is equally convincing; but in general its thesis is valuable and marks a distinct advance in the understanding of certain key passages.

James Barr

Urgemeinde, Judenchristentum, Gnosis. By H. J. Schoeps. J. C. B. Mohr, Tübingen, 1956.

Though brief in compass, this stimulating study contains abundant material to provoke discussion and perhaps to prompt a reconsideration of some conventional theories on the subject of Christian origins. While we may not follow Professor Schoeps all the way, we are indebted to him for the raising of important questions.

The book is a sequel to the author's earlier studies, and especially to his *Theologie und Geschichte des Judenchristentums* (Tübingen, 1949). Criticism of this work centred mainly on two questions: the relation to the *Urgemeinde* of the Jewish Christianity of the second and third centuries, as represented by the pseudo-Clementine literature; and the author's theory that this Jewish Christianity was not Gnostic, but in fact anti-Gnostic. In the present volume Professor Schoeps modifies his opinion on certain points, but on others he re-affirms his earlier position. In particular he now seeks to draw in support

of his thesis on the evidence of the Dead Sea Scrolls, which were not yet available when the earlier book was written.

The first section is devoted to Jewish Christianity and the *Urgemeinde*. Here Schoeps argues that the account of Christian origins preserved in Acts is that of the winning side and that for a true picture we must take into account the views of Paul's opponents as preserved in the Clementines. It may be granted that the Ebionites are the descendants of the Judaising wing of the Church, but how far the Ebionite account of the early days is historically accurate is a very different matter. Schoeps admittedly claims only that this material is an instructive secondary source, but others may feel that it is tendentious and polemical; moreover, as Schoeps observes, it has been worked over two or three times before reaching its present form. On some points of detail the author is open to criticism: (*a*) it should no longer be taken for granted that Gal. 2.1-10 and Acts 15 refer to the same event (cf. Duncan's commentary on *Galatians* for example); (*b*) his suspicions of the historicity of Stephen may be questioned—Professor William Manson (*The Epistle to the Hebrews*, London, 1951) has sought to 'integrate the epistle afresh into the history of the world mission from its inception in Stephen'; (*c*) not all scholars are so sceptical of the historical value of Acts.

On the second question the author's views provoked an even sharper re-action, which only served to reveal the 'terminological inexactitude' (W. D. Davies) with which the words *gnosis* and Gnosticism are employed. Reviewing the various current theories, Schoeps argues that we should now stop talking of Jewish or Christian Gnosis: Gnosis is never anything but pagan, although there are in Christianity reminiscences, even an adoption of Gnostic terminology, and there was in Judaism something which seems akin to Gnosticism, but in reality has nothing to do with it. Space does not permit a further discussion, but this whole section deserves careful consideration.

Heterodox Judaism, Jewish Christianity, Christian origins and Gnosticism—the field is very wide and extremely intricate, but Professor Schoeps has provided a useful and well-documented guide to many of its problems.

R. McL. Wilson

God and Man in Early Israel. By J. W. D. Smith. Methuen, 1956. Pp. 122. 5s. 6d.

This is a study of eight great Israelite leaders from Abraham to Solomon, and is intended for pupils working for Religious Knowledge in the General Certificate of Education. The history of the

period is given in outline, with appropriate references to extra-biblical historical data and archaeological evidence; and problems of literary criticism occasionally appear. The time of the Judges is given very summary treatment. Attention is constantly given to the basic religious meaning and difficulties such as miracles are not avoided.

The basic problem that occurs to the mind of the reviewer is whether the biblical traditions will really tolerate treatment in the style of biographic writing. The method to be adopted is stated on p. 15: 'In order to appreciate the teaching of the stories we should read them as actual experiences of historical individuals.' The question of the validity of this approach is a big one, for apart from Dr Smith's book it affects the preaching in hundreds of pulpits every week. Although archaeological evidence has, as is mentioned in this book, disproved some of the old arguments that the Patriarchal narratives are anachronistic, this does not prove that these particular events were connected in this particular historical chain. The connexions between the units, which determine their meaning, are sometimes not factual but are determined by cultic development and theology.

This difficulty is greater because so much interest is taken in the inner personal motivation. We have for example quite a detailed study of the considerations which may have been in Abraham's mind on leaving Haran. Jacob's struggle at the Jabbok is the painful growth of self-knowledge. Each of the leaders is presented in his personal inward pilgrimage. The difficulty here is that the stories were, as Dr Smith knows, not written as biographies, or not so in every case. Thus there is an inequality of treatment in that David, who has what is something like a biography in the Bible, and Joseph, in whose story biographical and psychological interest is strong, fit much better into the method than Abraham, Jacob or Moses, figures of tradition round whom quite disparate materials have gathered. The real centre of such narrative complexes is not in the person to whom they are attached but in the circles of tradition in which they have been nourished. Dr Smith has written up the Patriarchal age on a basis of the biblical text seen through literary and historical criticism, something in the manner of H. H. Rowley among Old Testament specialists, but without giving room for the history of tradition on the lines of Noth. But the study of the development of tradition cuts completely across the lines of literary-historical criticism.

The great divine actions receive a similar treatment, inward and psychological. At the burning bush we should concentrate on the inner meaning of Moses' experience. Events like the crossing of the

Red Sea or the collapse of the walls of Jericho could have been caused by earthquakes—but the important thing is the impression of divine guidance and intervention received by the Israelites. Is it possible to express the objectivity of the narratives by so inward and subjective an analysis? But any criticism of Dr Smith's book on this score would have to bear in mind the great difficulty of problems like this and the fact that many Old Testament specialists can hardly be said to have got any farther than he has in answering them. The only way in which the reviewer thinks that the objective divine action may be more profoundly shown forth is by the use of greater attention to the cultic-theological determinants in the formation of tradition.

The book is well written and readable, and should be well enjoyed by young people. A number of points of history and interpretation might be questioned in detail. There are some misprints in the references to biblical passages.

James Barr

Free Churchmanship in England, 1870-1940, with special reference to Congregationalism. By John W. Grant. Independent Press, London, 1955. 19s. 6d.

It was a hazardous venture for a young Rhodes scholar to attempt to survey for a doctorate a field so recent as this, knowing that his work would be submitted to the judgment of some older scholar who knew personally many of the protagonists, and who had formed his own appraisal of their works in their immediate settings. In this case the hazard has been abundantly justified. Dr Grant has given us a rich and rewarding book.

Three denominations come under review: the Congregationalists, the Baptists, and the English Presbyterians. Methodism receives only an occasional mention in passing. The reasons for this restriction are historical. The first three all dissented from the Church of England on grounds that had to do with the doctrine of the Church and all three belong, in the main, to the Genevan tradition. It is in the Savoy Declaration that Dr Grant sees what he calls 'classic' Congregationalism. Re-interpretations of it, and divagations from it were inevitable in the changing theological, philosophical and social climate of the seventy years under review, and with the precision of a barograph, Dr Grant records these preserves and the reactions to them in Nonconformist England. It is an interesting point that his barogram might almost serve for any section of the Protestant world, and many in other lands will find in it data and light for the interpretation of their own immediate past.

The temptation in a survey of this nature is to confine oneself to

the teachers who deliberately made contributions to the subject, and to ignore the changing assumptions implicit in the actual ordering of Church life. But Dr Grant discusses the churchmanship of the denominational leaders, whether representing majority or minority views, as well as that of the theologians, and the theologians in turn are considered in their relation to the controversies of their own churches in their own days. The result is an illuminating study of a time, during part of which Nonconformity in England was making its maximum impact on the life of the people, and during another part, popular thought was making successful inroads on the integrity of the Church's heritage in the Gospel.

As we are led on from phrase to phrase and pass from figure to figure, we become aware that we are in the hands of one who has a conscience about details, but we are more vividly aware of a thinker who can marshal these details to form a coherent picture of Churches 'where orthodoxy and an articulated doctrine of the Church prevailed at the beginning and the end of the period studied, heterodoxy and carelessness about Church order in the years between' (p. 392). To chart the oscillations and perturbations is no small achievement; to identify and to describe the forces from without and within which produced them is a greater; but, in it all, to give glimpses of the constant guidance of God in reviewing the life of the Church and recalling her to her task is an achievement greater still. And all three must be ascribed to Dr Grant.

Two words of criticism may be appended. While full use has been made of the *Congregational Quarterly* (which, by the way, is dated three centuries too early on p. 417), this is more than can be claimed for other periodicals. Only one article in the *British Quarterly Review* is cited in the bibliography, and no mention at all is made of the *British Weekly*, or of its first editor, Dr Robertson Nicoll, whom many would regard as the *Directeur* of the Nonconformist conscience at the height of its political influence. Then, there is a certain vagueness in many of Dr Grant's references to contemporary Scotland, a vagueness which at one point passes into error. On p. 62 he lets it be inferred that the United Secession and the United Presbyterian Churches were active in England until 1876, whereas the activity of the United Secession had come to an end a generation earlier, when in 1847 it had united with the Relief Church to form the United Presbyterian.

HUGH WATT.

Thomas Becon. By D. SHERWIN BAILEY. Oliver and Boyd. 15s.
Hugh Latimer. By HAROLD S. DARBY. Epworth Press. 21s.

IN many respects Thomas Becon and Hugh Latimer played similar

roles in the history of the English Reformation. Neither of them could claim to be a great scholar. Neither of them contributed to the theological development of the Reformation. Neither of them had any primary responsibility for the actual course of events, although Latimer, of course, was in closer touch with the active leaders than Becon. Both of them were essentially popularisers, the one by means of his writings, the other by means of his preaching. Their real importance for their age was greater, perhaps, than might at first appear, for it was their work to put across the message of the Reformation, and to apply its teaching, in wider circles than those which had any direct theological interest.

In view of the similarity of their work, it is surprising that Becon has lapsed into comparative obscurity since his own generation, whereas Latimer has continued to claim the attention of the biographer and historian. This is not because the sermons of Latimer are intrinsically more readable nowadays than the writings of Becon, although we can recognise the qualities which made Latimer an impressive preacher to his contemporaries. It may be due partly to the fact that Latimer did occupy a higher and more influential position than Becon. But for the most part it must surely be attributed to the striking testimony which he bore to his beliefs in his death. If Latimer had taken refuge abroad, as he might have done, it is doubtful whether he would have been remembered today as one of the three greatest of the Anglican Reformers. As it is, he will always command attention, even where the name of Becon is ignored or unknown.

The lack of interest in his subject means, of course, that Dr Bailey had has much the harder historical task. He has had to contend with the lack of precise or accurate information on many points. He has had to make his own assessment of the personality and achievement, and indeed the theological teaching of Becon. He could not count upon any great enthusiasm for the study except amongst those who have an acuter historical interest. Yet the very difficulties are also opportunities. The lack of biographical material means that the author can go back to the sources and supplement the information, or correct the misinformation which does exist. He is not committed either to a repetition of what is already known, or to the attempt to achieve originality by a revolutionary overturning of accepted judgments. He can try to win back for Becon, if not a place of pre-eminence, at any rate the practical importance which he certainly had in his own time.

On the whole, Dr Bailey has met his difficulties and seized his opportunities. He has corrected quite a number of errors in relation to the life of Becon. He has judiciously weighed the evidence where

precise information still eludes us. He has given a convincing portrait of Becon the man, and formed a useful estimate of the work of propaganda which he did. In passing, he has been able to throw many sidelights on contemporary conditions from his writings, which he has read carefully and intelligently. The work suffers from a certain compression which was necessary to publication. In particular, the account of Becon's theology, with which Dr Bailey has apparently little inherent sympathy, is sketchy and unsatisfactory. But an original and solid contribution has been made to our knowledge, not only of an individual Reformer, but of certain aspects of the English Reformation as a whole.

The new biography of Latimer, which is published posthumously, is necessarily of a different character, for although there have been no recent biographies the field has been fairly fully worked by previous writers. Certainly, there are one or two obscure periods even in the life of Latimer, especially during the latter part of the reign of Henry. And in this book there is a useful discussion of the most likely events during these periods. Again, for the most part the author does not rely on his predecessors, but goes back to the sixteenth-century sources, which give to his work not only a greater accuracy but far more of the 'feel' of Latimer and the world in which he moved and lived. But it is still the case that most of the story has been unfolded before, and the success of the book depends upon the ability of the author to give a new life and vividness to it, and to its central character. There can be no doubt that he has succeeded in this task. Latimer himself is portrayed with real insight and power. Good use is made of his sermon material both to illustrate his methods and to light up the contemporary scene. The part which Latimer played is accurately assessed, and the reason for his influence rightly perceived. The final and most dramatic part of the story, the trial and martyrdom, is told with a restraint which is more impressive than rhetoric, being founded upon the accounts given in Foxe and Ridley, and extracts from the prison writings of Latimer himself.

Mr Darby lived to complete the manuscript, but not to see the actual publication of his book. However, the proofs have been checked by friends, and a very useful index has been added. There is also a select bibliography referring to the more valuable sources and historical studies. Attention may perhaps be called to one rather obscure footnote on p. 230, where a fairly obvious allusion by Weston to John Knox and the Black Rubric is referred to Alesius and his Latin translation of the 1549 Communion office. But in general the references are accurate, and avoid the fussy pedantry which mars so many historical studies. It is to be hoped

that at a time when we are again beginning to appreciate the Reformers, and the importance and power of preaching, this readable but informative account of Latimer will enjoy a wide circulation, especially amongst those who participate in the same ministry. It certainly fulfils the purpose of re-presenting to our own generation a character who contributed so effectively to the development of the English church and nation.

G. W. Bromiley

The Pattern of Christian Belief. By J. W. D. Smith. Nelson. 12s. 6d.

Dr Smith is engaged in the training of Scottish teachers who will share in Scripture teaching in school. He knows therefore, by experience, how difficult a book the Bible can be for many, who have good will to understand it, yet require guidance to see the essential unity in the midst of its infinite diversity. So he has written this 'essay in biblical interpretation' to provide such guidance, and has succeeded in writing a book for which more than teachers will be grateful.

In an appendix he sets out 'A Biblical Pattern for Teachers' under the heading 'The Drama of Salvation', and this is in effect a summary of his book. The pattern which he sees is the pattern of God's action in history, to which the Bible bears witness—with the early chapters of Genesis for prologue, and the book of Revelation as epilogue. To unfold the pattern he uses skilfully the agreed results of modern scholarship, allied to a really original exegetical skill, so that the great events of salvation history and their meaning stand out clearly. The psychological knowledge which characterised his earlier books is here employed in a new way to translate the biblical idiom into the 'terms appropriate to the modern man', while never losing sight of the uniqueness of the Bible message.

It is meant rather as a compliment than as a criticism of this book to say that sometimes the archaeological and other scholarly explanations hinder the swift march of the action which it unfolds, although we realise that many will find these pauses, like a Shakespeare glossary, necessary to help them to understand. At times, as in his treatment of the miracles, Dr Smith sounds a little like a disciple of Bultmann, but if he does, it is because he is concerned to show, 'the meaning of events for religious faith'.

All who are concerned with Bible study—ministers or teachers—will find this book helpful and stimulating. It would provide material for an excellent course preparatory to Bible study, and is itself suggestive of passages for study. There is a pleasing absence of quotation, and the combination of theological, historical, and psychological insights is particularly intriguing. John Gray

The Doctrine of Justification by Faith. A. R. Mowbray and Co. 7s. 6d.

Both theologically and ecumenically, this is a valuable little book, and preachers who are bent on doctrinal preaching (as everyone of them ought to be) will discover much help in it. It contains five papers on different aspects of the great theme, and its object is 'to clarify the views of different schools of thought in the Church of England', and the subject was chosen because it is believed by the two groups of Churchmen who shared in the discussions that 'misunderstandings of the relation of Justification by Faith and the Sacraments' had been the underlying cause of much recent controversy'. There is no lack of candour in the examination of a subject so central to Reformed theology, and so peculiarly the very heart of the Gospel.

It is held that this doctrine, however, seems to occupy a singularly small place in the modern theological debate, and it might even be seriously asked if it is still rightly accounted a foundation stone. And so this book is compiled to expose the whole conception to searching scrutiny. How can faith itself be prevented from becoming a 'good work'? The dangers of the doctrine are fearlessly faced—antinomianism, the law-court atmosphere in the spiritual transaction, its tendency to individualism, its proneness to disparage the Church and the Sacraments. On the other hand, much preaching is Pelagian (and almost all children's addresses savour of this heresy); the conception of merit is present even among very evangelical preachers more than we care to admit. No doubt God is able to employ it for His great ends, but a fresh appropriation of this doctrine will always be a corrective and a protection. Even official Roman theology does not teach salvation by works.

In the terms in which this book defines it, this doctrine cannot but remain central. It is not just to be equated with conversion-experience, and, while it must remain the leading feature of the great Catholic-Protestant division, it is richer than many Protestants suppose. The main contention of this book is that it is not incompatible with sacramental grace, and yet the Sacraments are not meritorious works either. There are excellent pages on baptism (53 to 68). What 'faith *alone*' really means is carefully examined—the one right attitude to God, even if the phrase itself is not strictly scriptural. The main weight of the argument is behind the view that the man of faith is always *justus et peccator.* In the last chapter the idea of the necessity of Incarnation, even if there had not been a Fall calling for Atonement, is discussed and approved.

George S. Gunn

Liturgies of the Religious Orders. By ARCHDALE A. KING. Longmans, Green & Co. London, 1955. Pp. 431. 50s.

MANY people suppose that Roman Catholic worship is the same everywhere, and indeed it is sometimes claimed by opponents of a vernacular liturgy that the use of Latin makes it possible for a Roman Catholic to follow the service in any part of the world. How far that is from strict fact is made clear by a volume such as this. Father King is already well-known for his liturgical writings. His book, *Notes on the Catholic Liturgies*, published in 1930, was a useful guide to the variations between the liturgies. But he has undertaken a much larger and more detailed task. His two-volume *Rites of Eastern Christendom* (Rome, 1947-8) led the way and is being followed by three works which are to give similar detail for the Western Church. The present volume, though second in the series, has appeared first, and the next will deal with the Liturgies of the Primatial Sees, which include Lyons, Braga, Milan and Toledo. Finally will come a volume on the Roman Liturgy itself. The author thus exhibits the great differences both in ritual and in ceremonial, in architecture and in ornament, which exist within the Roman Church.

This work on the Rites of the Religious Orders will prove most useful to all liturgical students. There is nothing else in the English language so detailed, so complete or so convenient. It forms an interesting counterpart to the more purely historical works on the Orders, such as those of H. M. Colvin, David Knowles and others. Five Orders are surveyed in five chapters—Carthusian, Cistercian, Premonstratensian, Carmelite and Dominican, while an appendix describes the purely English Gilbertine rite. In each case, there is first a short history of the Order itself. The distinctive features of the architecture, the church ornaments, vestments and chant associated with the Order and its particular relation to the Christian Year, are pointed out. The history of each Rite, showing the reasons for its origin and the influences on its development, and all this in relation to the Roman and other liturgies, forms a fascinating study. The many references in the footnotes add greatly to the value of the book. Each chapter has its own bibliography and there is a general bibliography in addition, and a good index. The reader will not miss the valuable and interesting appendixes, which discuss such subjects as *Missa Sicca*, the Lenten Veil, and *Flabellum*, as well as special points connected with rites and ceremonies. There are almost fifty illustrations, many from photographs taken by the author and these are helpful and are well reproduced. Indeed the volume is in every way an example of excellent format and typo-

graphy. The succeeding volumes from the same pen will be eagerly awaited.

JOHN A. LAMB

Der Gottesdienst im Neuen Testament. By GERHARD DELLING. Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, Göttingen. 1952. Pp. 160.

A CHURCH'S worship is in some respects a more reliable source of information about the essence of its religion than either its dogmatics or its claims. The study of early Christian worship is therefore one of the most necessary of all New Testament studies. The contribution which Delling seeks to make to the now considerable collection of modern liturgical studies is to pursue the search for the real and essential characteristics of early Christian worship, not merely describing all the phenomena and as far as possible not entering into the complex differences of opinion on the development of worship, but trying to get beyond these things to the specific marks and the true atmosphere of early Christianity. The result is a most useful handbook of early Christian worship written in the stimulating language of Christology and eschatology.

Delling begins by distinguishing the New Testament from the heathen and Jewish concept of worship. For the New Testament there can be no access to God except through Christ, and no righteousness through worship, indeed no righteousness at all, except as the gift of God through Jesus Christ. Worship is caught up into the movement of redemptive history. Preaching, celebration of the Lord's Supper, baptism, all of them are part of it, with reference both to Christ's already completed work and to the Parousia. The Christian community has been founded by Christ as the community of the end in which God Himself is present through His Spirit. Christian worship is therefore an affair of God with the community. Spiritual gifts—prophecy, speaking with tongues, revelation—are confirmation of its eschatological character, for God's dwelling with men is promised for the end. The present is a foretaste of that fulfilment.

Delling has a valuable chapter on the format of the Christian service of worship, not on the form and order of it, which it is impossible to determine, but on the governing principles. From the widely recognised connexion between heavenly and earthly liturgy in the book of Revelation, Delling argues that one of these governing principles is that the worship of earth should be parallel to the worship of heaven. A second great principle he finds chiefly in Paul's concern for the *οἰκοδομή* the 'edifying' or 'building up' of the community.

For the component parts of the service the author claims a far

greater measure of independence and originality than is often granted. The real source of many liturgical formulae, such as the trinitarian formula, the formula 'faith, hope, love', doxologies, the formula ἄξιος . . . λαβεῖν, *Maranatha*, *Abba* and *Amen*, lies in a rich and growing life of worship. Confession is a mark of allegiance to the community and praise and hymn singing are spontaneous thanks for the fulness of grace in Christ. The Christian has a 'new song' given with the Christ-events. Reading of the word, preaching, prayer, baptism and Lord's Supper are each in turn examined. In the latter two the completeness of the connexion with Christ and of the renewal of life makes their distinctiveness easily recognisable. Baptism moreover is done by the Church in the name and under the instructions of her Lord. The Lord's Supper is fellowship with God through Christ and a foretaste of the 'eating in the Kingdom of Heaven' of which Christ spoke.

In the last chapter the author speaks of one of the most outstanding marks of early Christian worship, its fellowship. Heathen religion, certainly in the early Christian era, was a private affair. The Christian community has unity in Christ: that thought governs the whole of its worship. It lives in Him from the time and from the fact of the breaking in of God's Kingdom in Him; it lives in Him in the presence of the Kingdom; and it lives in Him while looking to the final coming of the Kingdom. If any one word can express the essence of early Christian worship and answer the question of this book it is probably the word 'eschatology'.

The book has a valuable bibliography.

A. Stewart Todd

Sakrament und Musik. By Gerhard Kappner. C. Bertelsmann Verlag, Gütersloh, 1952. Pp. 92.

The interest which scholars of the present day are showing in liturgy forces upon them and upon the whole Church the question what is the climax of the Church service, and while that question will be answered differently in detail the author believes the general answer is unanimous. The climax of worship lies in the coming of the Lord to the people under the visible signs of bread and wine. That means that the music associated with the Sacrament has a special importance. The author therefore devotes his attention to three questions: what happens at the Lord's Supper, what sort of music can be claimed as an adequate expression of what happens there, what then should the musical form of service for the Lord's Supper be.

Because the theological meaning of the Lord's Supper is a matter of eschatology, adequate music for the Lord's Supper, Kappner

insists, will have to share its eschatological character. Because in the Lord's Supper we are already at the marriage feast of the heavenly king the music will be festive and jubilant but we cannot execute such music without remembering who we are, *simul justus, simul peccator*. The music of the Lord's Supper may represent Christ's work of salvation in the here and now of the divine present; it may not set up in itself the new world of glory.

Kappner then turns to give the historical answers to these questions in an account of the development of the Lord's Supper and its music in the early days of the Christian community, in the Roman Mass, in the Lutheran service of Luther's own conception and of the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Lutheran Church, and until the time of Bach. His estimate of the distinctive contribution of the Reformation is one of the most valuable insights in the book. That contribution was to reassert the unity of Word and Sacrament as it is found in the worship of the early Church, to rescue music from meditation and description, its only role in the Roman communion service, and to give it instead the function of proclamation. Luther was determined to re-establish the priesthood of all believers by giving the congregation an active part in the conduct of the service. Congregational singing served the double purpose of giving the people an opportunity to make public confession of their faith and of proclaiming the Gospel. This held especially for the communion service and Kappner finds it incomprehensible that the hymns Luther gave the people to sing can give place today to silent prayer punctuated by scripture sentences. The people's praises offered together with the praises of the heavenly host were their thanks for the gift of Christ received in the Lord's Supper and to these praises instrumental music was of course a natural addition.

There arose then the spiritual concert and with it the danger that music would have the upper hand and, forgetting its duty to proclaim, merely accompany. From there, it was but a short step to soft organ background music during communion with the number of hymns greatly reduced.

The author's remarks on the nineteenth-century liturgical revival are a wholesome warning to all who seek liturgical revival today. It failed because it did not return to the Gospel as the standard of all forms of worship. Where the foundations of liturgical and musical thinking are secure in the Word, however, and where the context is clearly that of prayer for the coming of the Spirit, Kappner sees unlimited scope for liturgy and for music in the celebration of the Lord's Supper, above all for contemporary music, which has a rich tradition to work on and a wide scope in music for wind instruments

and strings as well as organ. It is unfortunate that in issuing his challenge to contemporary musicians Kappner says nothing more of the conflict hinted at earlier in the book in which music, as belonging to the forms and fashions of this world, is necessarily involved when brought into line with eschatology—the conflict between the divine pattern of history and the pattern of secular history and therefore between the liturgy of heaven and the liturgy of earth.

The book concludes with a suggested order of music for communion in a Lutheran church.

Though this book is written from within the Lutheran tradition and for Lutherans in the first instance, and though some of its chapters are somewhat overburdened with references to German Church music, the work contains in its basic arguments much that is of interest and value to all branches of the Church.

A. Stewart Todd

And He had Compassion on Them. A handbook on the miracles of the Bible. By William Barclay. Church of Scotland Youth Committee. 6s.

For the author's obvious sincerity; for his great erudition which again and again enables him to produce just the right classical or rabbinic quotation or historical detail; for his passionate belief that every individual, however unlovely, matters to God and ought to matter to Christians, and that respect for rules and regulations ought never to be allowed to prevent us from loving and serving people; for his remarkable ability to present what he has to say in a readily intelligible and interesting way—for all these the present reviewer has tremendous respect. From that proneness to remain snugly in an academic ivory tower, caring little for the needs of ordinary men and making little or no effort to speak or write in as intelligible a manner as possible, which unfortunately is all too common among theologians, Dr Barclay is singularly free. He has more than most contemporary British theologians put his erudition and ability at the service of the ordinary Church member; and that is something which cannot be done without real self-sacrifice. In view of all this which can, and which in fairness must, be said, the reviewer finds it an uncongenial task to go on to criticise this book in the way that he feels bound to do.

A feature of the book which shakes at least one reader's confidence in the author's statements generally is his inordinate use of extreme or superlative statements. On p. 27, for example, we are told that 'The child stereotypes a story, and the ancient mind did exactly the same. It is indeed true to say that there was practically no

chance of the stories of Jesus being altered. They *had* to be told every time in exactly the same way. . . . Distortion would have been next door to impossible in the circumstances of that age.' While thoroughly agreeing that the Gospels are reliable, we cannot help feeling that this exaggerated statement only weakens the force of the argument. On p. 47 we read 'Damien was exactly like Jesus Christ. He cared for the men for whom no one else cared.' But was he really *exactly* like Jesus Christ? Again, 'There was not another person in all Decapolis who would have approached this dreadful madman at all' (p. 70). But according to Mark 5.4 the man had often been bound (presumably by other people) with fetters and chains. Of the blind man of John 9 we are told, 'There is no figure in the New Testament who stands out more clearly' (p. 209)—surely too sweeping a statement. 'Never in history' is a dangerous beginning for a sentence of a mortal man, but on p. 238 we read 'Never in history was there such a savage attempt to wipe out a nation's faith.' Another such sentence occurs on p. 258, where we are told that 'Paul never wrote to a more hostile audience'. Is this provable with reference to the extant letters? And may not the apostle have written many other letters which have not been preserved? A similar assertion occurs on p. 282: 'If there had been no Resurrection, the certainty is that we would never have heard of the Cross.' But there is no such certainty; we might well have heard of it, just as we have heard of Socrates' hemlock. Some of the author's dogmatic assertions are particularly unfortunate, as when he allows himself to say: 'If that attempt [of Antiochus] had succeeded and the Jews, under their tortures, had denied their faith, *Christianity could not have come.* The fate of the world was literally in the balance and only the unbreakable loyalty of the Jews to God made the future coming of Christianity possible' (p. 239). Dr Barclay himself says on p. 133: 'No wise man will ever be dogmatic about what is and what is not possible.' It is extremely rash to dogmatise about what God could not have done.

These examples are enough to show that this is a book in which every sentence needs to be read critically. In fact, it is more suitable for the theological professor who is used to being critical than for the Bible-class leader who, it is to be feared, may often take a good deal on trust. Such a free use of extreme and unqualified assertion is surely liable to lead to a rigid dogmatism. And a rigid dogmatism of the theological left wing is at least as dangerous as a rigid dogmatism of the right. Both tend to breed closed minds.

In his Foreword the author states the principles he has had in mind with regard to the miracle stories: 'First, I am convinced that every miracle story in the New Testament goes back to an actual

deed of Jesus and of His disciples, and that not one of them is just a fictitious story. Second, I am convinced that of all the miracles we shall some day see the explanation, for I am certain that again and again Jesus was taking natural events and in them was discovering God and showing God to men.' The various miracles are explained or rationalised accordingly. For example, Jairus's daughter was not dead but in a coma, and Jesus by a penetrating diagnosis saved her from being buried alive (pp. 121ff). The explanation of the miraculous draught of fishes is that 'Jesus with His skilled and clear-sighted eyes saw exactly where the net should be cast' (p. 139). The healing of the centurion's servant from a distance is made easier of belief by modern research into Extra-sensory Perception (p. 156f). As to the feeding of the five thousand, the author apparently inclines to the view that it was 'a miracle of the awakening of fellowship in men's souls'. 'Jesus produced the five little rolls and the two little fishes. "This is all I've got," He said "but let's share it." And thereupon everyone produced what he had, and when all was pooled there was enough and more than enough' (p. 163). With regard to the raising of Lazarus the author asks: 'Is it possible that Lazarus had committed some terrible sin which shattered the home in Bethany, that he had done something which made his name stink like the stench of a corpse, that he was dead to shame and dead to honour . . . and that Jesus came and raised this Lazarus from sin . . .? Is it possible that here we have the greatest conversion story in the New Testament?' (p. 223). (Incidentally, in connexion with the problem why this miracle story is absent from the Synoptic Gospels, it is worth recalling Archbishop Temple's suggestion that so long as Lazarus was alive it would have been dangerous for Lazarus for attention to be drawn to it (cf. John 12.10)—a suggestion Dr Barclay does not mention.)

The penultimate chapter deals with the Virgin Birth. After the preceding chapters we are not surprised that for himself the author rejects it. But it is a pity that he does not seem to have considered the weighty treatment of the subject in Barth's *Kirchliche Dogmatik*, I-2, pp. 187-221 or even the readily accessible brief discussion of it by J. K. S. Reid in *A Theological Word Book of the Bible*. Many of the assertions of this chapter are open to dispute. Dr Barclay is not the first person to assert that the genealogies in Matthew and Luke come from a source which regarded Jesus as the son of Joseph and knew nothing about the Virgin Birth. But to assert that this is 'perfectly clear' (p. 270) is scarcely judicial. We cannot agree that, if legal sonship rather than natural is meant, 'the point of the pedigrees is gone'. And when Dr Barclay says, 'It may safely be said that the Fourth Gospel does not refer to the Virgin Birth' (273),

he has the weight of C. K. Barrett's new commentary (pp. 137f, 273) against him.

On p. 276f we read: 'If we are to take the story of the Virgin Birth physically and literally, we are confronted with one great difficulty. It will mean that Jesus was not fully man; it will mean that He came into the world by a way in which no other man entered the world; it destroys His likeness with men . . . it would wreck the fact that He was fully man.' To the reviewer this argument seems extraordinarily naïve. If the Incarnation is true at all, it is a mystery, which is not patient of such easy dogmatism.

In his last chapter Dr Barclay comes out strongly in favour of the historicity of the Resurrection and affirms quite clearly the truth of the Empty Tomb. Of this we are very glad.

It is extremely difficult to be fair to a book, with the theology of which one strongly disagrees; and the reviewer hopes that no one will accept his opinion without testing its fairness. His opinion, for what it is worth, is that the theology of this book is pathetically unsatisfying; that the New Testament witness to the miracles of Jesus has not really been seriously faced; that in the picture which emerges the figure of the historical Jesus has been considerably blurred by the superimposition of a figment of Liberal Protestant imagination; and that it is more than a pity that the Church of Scotland Youth Committee has thought fit to publish the book as a handbook for the instruction of Scottish youth.

C. E. B. Cranfield

Lively Oracles. By Ian Pitt-Watson. Church of Scotland Youth Committee. 1s. 9d.

This booklet consists of 'Seven Studies for Youth Fellowships on Great Themes of the Bible'. Each study is followed by questions for discussion and an admirably brief epilogue.

The aim of these studies is to make young people aware of the unity of the Bible and to set forth 'the plan of Salvation by encouraging detailed study of representative passages'.

The passages have been carefully chosen. The studies are written with a refreshing directness. The analogies used really illustrate (e.g. p. 17). The constant biblical reference is most useful for the book's main purpose. Nonetheless a doubt remains whether these seven chapters are not leaders' talks rather than studies, and whether more explicit guidance than the brief foreword and the occasional directive is needed to transform them into studies. Incidentally, how many of our young people could read Genesis chapters 1-3 'with the greatest care' in 'about ten minutes'?

However, intelligent young people will be much wiser on the

central truths of the faith and their biblical basis after reading this book, and Mr Pitt-Watson speaks the language of this generation.

JOHN GRAY

The Enterprise of Faith: A Handbook for First Communion. By INNES LOGAN. Church of Scotland Youth Committee. 2s.

IN this revised edition of an earlier booklet with the same title, the writer seeks to provide an aid for religious teaching at the critical point of Admission to the Lord's Supper, which intending first communicants can read and study. His intention is to help them to think about what they are doing, and to have 'certain essential information lodged in the mind'. The book is divided into two parts.

The first part deals with what is involved in becoming a full member of the Christian Church. Much of the value of this section would depend upon what kind of instruction has been given to those who will read it. For the section on the Bible covers too much too easily, and some of the statements on Christian morality lack plainness, unless they are seen as the summing up of teaching, which has already been given orally. But ministers, who intend to give this book to first communicants, could plan their own teaching in the Communicants' Class to overcome such limitations.

The second part could be used with profit by all first communicants. In it carefully chosen questions and answers from the Shorter Catechism are given together with the Apostles Creed, the Ten Commandments, and the Lord's Prayer. These are to be memorised 'to form a body of truth representing the faith that is in us'. There are helpful notes on 'Reading the Bible', a useful list of suggested books for study and devotion, as well as prayers for various occasions.

This is a book for parish ministers to examine with the needs of their own first communicants in mind.

JOHN GRAY

Pastoral Ministration. By PAUL E. JOHNSON. James Nisbet and Co. 15s.

THE complaint is often made that 'the cure of souls' is a neglected subject in ministerial training, and the call often goes out for a course in pastoral psychology. It can hardly be intended that every minister should be equipped to be a practising psycho-analyst, but there is little doubt that most ministers would do more effective pastoral work if they knew more about this subject than they normally do. Here is a good book from the pen of the professor of the psychology of religion at Boston University, written out of great knowledge, and always with reverence and tenderness.

Professor Johnson's basic conviction is that there is a great danger

of 'going through the motions of the pastoral office while the actual needs of persons may not be met or even understood'. 'Persons have problems because they are persons. Every problem is of, by, and for persons.' He is also well aware of the possibility of pastors becoming 'problem-centred' instead of 'person-centred'. In all pastoral relationship what is most needed is 'empathy', the perception which comes as one person enters into the feeling or spirit of another person, a dynamic relationship of love without which all knowledge is in vain. The state of modern society makes this more necessary than ever but adequate training is essential. In virtue of his office, the pastor is the most privileged member of society, and pastoral calls ought to be 'adventures in unselfish friendship'.

Following on this background, the book consists mainly of six chapters expounding the pastor's office in practice. There are detailed examples of good and bad pastoral conversation and counselling. 'The dread power and poison of guilt and anxiety which can never be self-cured, and the heavy responsibility of sharing people's confidence, are ably dealt with under confession. Preparation for marriage, help in marriage and family difficulties, encouragement to the vast army of lonely people some of whom wish to remain lonely, what to do with the ever-increasing number of old people, ministry to the sick and dying, what to say about death to children, the Christian conduct of funerals—on all these there are valuable pages. Ministers themselves usually have no minister, as they discover when they fall sick—hence the importance of the chapter on 'The Pastor Himself', dealing with his own spiritual life, his continued study, his problems of right relationship with other ministers and with his own family.

In all this kind of work, the problem of time is more serious than Professor Johnson allows for. He regards it as possible for a pastor to visit each person 'at least once a year', 'by calling three hours a day for five days a week at thirty minutes per call, it is possible to approach fifteen hundred calls a year.' But many of the cases of pastoral ministration referred to in this book could not be dealt with in half an hour, and would require repeated visits. Indeed most people who have attempted this have discovered that it tended to absorb strength, time and patience, almost to the exclusion of everything else.

In the Bibliography, it is reassuring to find two old books like Gladden's *The Christian Pastor* and Watson's *The Cure of Souls*. But in recent years several wise and helpful books on the subject have been published in this country—by authors like Guntrip, Martin, Northridge, Hughes, Forder, Waterhouse—which might well have been included.

One final reflection on this serviceable and high-toned book is that it does not seem to realise sufficiently that the biggest of all human problems is that there is something in human nature which radically resists the Gospel, alongside the equally radical craving for what the Gospel alone can supply. This grim paradox has a great deal to do with all the other problems surveyed in this book. The main part of a minister's counselling has to deal with this fundamental human situation.

GEORGE S. GUNN

Theological Training in the Modern World. Edited by KEITH R. BRIDSTON. World's Student Christian Federation.

Truly Called: Studies of the Training of Men for the Ministry of the Church Overseas. Edited by DOUGLAS WEBSTER. The Highway Press.

IT is inevitable that there should be periodic reviews of the course of training for the Ministry, and all the Churches have been engaged of recent times in the issue of reports on this subject. Fresh examinations of the curriculum of study have appeared at intervals in the last two generations, and the reading of some of them confirms that there is nothing new under the sun. Nowadays the discussion is closely linked to the acute problem of the scarcity of students; but there is very little solid evidence that dissatisfaction with the course of training is among the primary causes for the dearth of candidates. It is most unlikely that the responsible authorities in any Church could produce concrete evidence in the shape of a number of men who have given an intelligent, penetrating scrutiny to the training available and found it so unsatisfactory for present conditions that they turned aside from the ministry altogether.

The first brochure is intended to be a preliminary statement, and a further document is to be expected in the light of reaction to this one. As a result of the work it was doing for theological students, the World's Student Christian Federation decided more than two years ago to initiate an enquiry on theological education throughout the world, and entrusted the preparation of the report to Dr Keith R. Bridston. He has done the work with remarkable thoroughness and understanding; and he is probably in agreement with the editor of the other booklet referred to in this review—'The problems which beset the training of the clergy are legion. In Great Britain no one feels satisfied with the present system except those who know nothing about it.'

Many Christian traditions are now taking part in this conversation. The most serious issue of all is that dealt with in the first chapter, on the relevance of the clerical vocation. It is suggested

here that those who have turned away from the pastoral ministry, as they see it today, have included 'the keenest minds of these last years'; but it would not be difficult to produce facts to the contrary. It is true that in modern times we have rightly widened the conception of vocation, but that must not be allowed to discriminate against the need for full-time specialist service in the Church. It is also true that the former type of parish-life is breaking up, and the background of life against which the Ministry has to exercise itself now is vastly different from two generations ago; and if that is not being taken account of in training, it is a serious blemish indeed. The Church has continually to ask itself if it has a clear enough view of what it is training its ministers for. In the last resort the degree of the sense of relevance depends on a full grasp of a full gospel—for it has to be a full gospel or no gospel at all. All the subjects of a theological curriculum have to be taught in that framework, and that ought to be sufficient to prevent colleges becoming 'minister-factories' in the undesirable sense of that term.

Doubtless it is the Church's duty to face up to such questions as greater variety in training, the selection and equipment of men (and women) for specialist ministries, the more adequate provision for the life of devotion in the training, the effective relationship of theological training to the general life of the world so that students for the ministry are not isolated in a kind of ghetto, and the all-important learning on all the training and work of the ministry of the world-expansion of the Christian religion in the modern period. On all these questions the report has stimulating things to say. Is it likely, however, that most ministers who have found satisfaction in their ministry over a period of years would testify that they are still, in every important sense, the most highly privileged person in the community—and that in virtue of their calling, its relevance and its fascination? Most of them would also say that they could ill afford to do without nearly everything that was provided for them in their college training, that the maintenance of 'the classical curriculum' is as necessary as ever, and that the quality and reward of the ministry depends on the use made of the tools provided. It would be a great benefit to get together in retreat and conference young ministers who have had some years' experience to make fresh assessments of these long-standing problems.

The biggest of all the problems of the young Churches overseas is that of the ministry. Four chapters in the little book *Truly Called* describe the actual training in four areas which are vastly different from each other and from us. But there are some uncanny similarities too especially in the bearing of lucrative, counter attractions, and in the problems of the devotional life. Ministers in the home

church would do well to give an hour or two to the careful reading of this vivid pamphlet which ends with a resounding call for many more recruits to the missionary ranks.

GEORGE S. GUNN

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SCRIPTURE AND TRADITION

Remarks on the Problem of Tradition in Theology today[1]

by Professor KRISTEN EJNER SKYDSGAARD

The problem of Scripture and tradition is again causing much discussion both among Catholic and among Protestant theologians. It is certainly no exaggeration to say that since the Reformation this question has never been so much to the fore as it is today. And the outstanding characteristic of this discussion is the fact that both sides realise the problem can no longer be posed in the same way as it was during the Reformation period, and especially during the period of great religious controversies after the Reformation. That is a good sign, for it is the first condition for progress in interconfessional discussion. The development of the Roman Catholic and Reformation Churches, and especially the new theological situation, compel us to re-examine the teaching of Scripture and of tradition, and the relation between them. This research is now being carried out very thoroughly by both confessions—but the situation is still by no means clear; it remains very complex. From both confessions we are waiting to hear what the outcome will be.

I

First we will briefly outline the development in Catholic theology since the Reformation. The theologians and church leaders who attended the Council of Trent understood tradition as a number of beliefs handed down orally (*oraliter*) by Christ and the Apostles—as distinguished from the truths contained in the Bible. So the famous definition of the Council of Trent will be understood as follows: 'The holy, ecumenical, general Council of Trent declares *hanc veritatem et disciplinam contineri in*

[1] Tr. by E. M. Evans from the German edit. published in *Kerygma u. Dogma*, 1, 3, July, 1955. Vandenhoeck. For full bibliographical references see *Kerygma u. Dogma*, 1, 3, pp. 161ff. (Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht, Goettingen).

libris scriptis et sine scripto traditionibus, quae ab ipsius Christi ore ab apostolis acceptae, aut ab ipsis apostolis Spiritu Sancto dictante quasi per manus traditae ad nos usque pervenerunt. The Church *omnes libros tam Veteris quam Novi Testamenti . . . necnon traditiones ipsas, tum ad fidem, tum ad mores pertinentes, tamquam vel oretenus a Christo, vel a Spiritu Sancto dictatas et continua successione in Ecclesia Catholica conservatas, pari pietatis affectu ac reverentia suscipit et veneratur.*'[1]

The conception of tradition expressed in this statement is a *static* one: the various divine or divine-apostolic traditions not contained in Scripture (for it is these traditions which are meant here, not the *traditiones ecclesiasticae*) were already in existence at the time when the Apostles were founding the churches and were handed down orally by the Apostles. Some of these traditions were already included in the Scriptures quite early, others much later. But they were all there from the very beginning. There is no question of a *development of* tradition.

This conception of tradition held by the Council of Trent is not necessarily that of the Old Catholic Church.[2] According to Irenaeus, for instance, tradition (which was truly preserved in the Catholic Church—especially in Rome—but not by the Gnostics) is identical with the teaching of the Apostles as reported in Holy Scripture. *Paradosis* (tradition) means the same as the *Kerygma* of the Apostles as stated in the Bible.

Irenaeus is acquainted with the idea of the *traditio activa*, but the content of tradition (the *traditio passiva*) is identical with the teaching of the Apostles reported in the Bible, and with the whole *Heilsgeschichte* described in the Old and New Testament, the *oikonomia tou Theou*. When he describes the content of the apostolic tradition he does so with the help of Scripture and of confession. But in his writings there is no question of any development of tradition.

At the time of the Council of Trent the matter was not as simple as it had been in the second century, in the time of Irenaeus. For in the meantime the Church had grown older! Scripture and tradition are no longer two ways of expressing the same thing, differing only in the way in which they transmit

[1] Denzinger, *Enchiridion Symbolorum*, 783.

[2] M. J. Congar, 'Théologie', *Dict. Théol. cath. XV.*1, p. 464; and G. Ebeling, *Die Geschichtlichkeit der kirche u. ihrer Verkündigung als theol. Problem*, 1954, p. 38ff.

the truth of God's revelation. Scripture and tradition have now become two independent sources of revelation, differing both in method and in content. Scripture does not contain the whole of Christianity, nor the whole teaching of the Apostles. It needs implementing by tradition—the revelation which is not included in Scripture. Catholic theology today admits that:

(1) this conception of tradition is not necessarily the original one;
(2) that since the Council of Trent the conception of tradition has changed. But the conception held by the Council of Trent still predominates in many Catholic books.

During the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the Catholic concept of tradition hardly changed at all, but during the nineteenth century it entered a new phase. With the books of Cardinal Newman and Möhler and the studies of the whole Catholic school at Tübingen, Catholic theology advanced to a much more dynamic and living concept of tradition. Here one can really speak of the development of a dogma. What happened? Scripture and tradition are no longer two static quantities, quite separate from one another; in actual fact there is only one great living tradition, the Church itself in its divine reality, in which everything (dogmas and everything else) is included and developed through the inspiration and guidance of the Holy Spirit.

'The progress which the nineteenth century brought in the concept of theological tradition can briefly be described as the emphasis on the organic element.'[1] 'The principle of Catholicism is the vital totality, the One Soul which permeates the whole Body of Christ and carries all its parts.'[2] Or in G. Florovsky's words: 'Perhaps we should say that it was the rediscovery of the sacred character of the historic process of the Church which appeared most. The identity of the Christian faith was to be guaranteed by universal consent through the ages.'[3]

Tradition is the living history of God on earth, in which He reveals Himself. This tradition includes the whole history of Israel, and centres in the history of Jesus Christ, and its purpose

[1] J. A. Ternus, *Divus Thomas*, p. 35. [2] op. cit. p. 37.
[3] 'L'œcuménisme en XIXe siècle', *Irénikon*, 1954, p. 251.

is the Church. The *traditio divina* comes to us solely through the Church; for the Church is mankind in a state of receptivity towards God, *sicut materia recipiens influxum Dei agentis et docentis*.[1]

This new concept of the principle of tradition corresponds to the new concept of the Church, according to which the Church is understood as the great primeval Sacrament, the mystical Body of Christ—an aspect of the Church which had not been perceived immediately after the Reformation, when stress was laid on its institutional and juridical aspect. From now on tradition is regarded as a principle of life and growth. Early Christianity, as described in the Books of the New Testament, is indeed 'complete' but it is not yet fully developed. Many things are only there in embryo. New revelations are not given to the Church. The revelation ended with the death of the last Apostle. But there is a constant and continuous development of this one revelation, an explanation of dogma which is constantly growing deeper, richer and clearer. In the revelation as given to us in Scripture and tradition there is a wealth 'which surpasses the religious consciousness of the present age and whose womb will bear fruits for the future growth of the *depositum fidei*'.[2] In this way the Catholic theologian speaks of a development of dogmas—an idea which is difficult in itself, but which is generally recognised.[3]

One of the important points in this development is the religious consciousness of the Christian community. This *sensus* or *instinctus christianus*, is that forward-driving force which is connected by a certain *connaturalitas* with the divine things of which Thomas of Aquinas also speaks,[4] and which may also be considered as a main source of faith (side by side with Holy Scripture) in the definition of a new dogma. This applied especially in the case of the definition of the dogma of the Assumption of Mary.[5] The liturgy and the deductive work of theologians also play an important part, of course, in this living tradition. Seen from this point of view, Scripture also assumes its natural place, and an important one. It is one of the

[1] R. Bernard, 'St. Thomas d'Aquin', *Somme théologique* (Edit. de la Revue des Jeunes), *La Foi* 1, 1937, p. 367.

[2] J. A. Ternus, *Scholastik*, 1935, p. 27. Thus also K. Adam, *Das Wesen des Katholizismus*.

[3] See Marindola, *L'évolution homogène de dogme catholique*, 1924.

[4] *Summa Theologica II* a *II* ae, q. 45 a2.

[5] See the bull *Munificentissimus Deus*, *Acta Apostolicae Sedis* 42, 1950, p. 758.

most important organs of this tradition. In the consideration of tradition, in this *renewal* that is taking place today in Roman Catholic theology giving it power and life, the most important element is undoubtedly exegesis. Already before the great Bible encyclical of Pius XII, but especially after it (the *Divino afflante Spiritu* of 1943) Catholic Bible-research grew much more intense. That is well known and generally recognised, and this Bible-movement is certainly only just beginning, both among learned theologians and among the laity.

In the living tradition Scripture has its special place, and many Catholic theologians insist on the primary importance of Scripture, as the essential source having supremacy over tradition. But of course tradition must ultimately be the decisive factor, in its full extent. And that is also quite natural in the whole outlook of the Roman Catholic conception of Christianity. Scripture must always be interpreted by tradition. There cannot be any antithesis between Scripture and tradition, because ultimately the meaning of Scripture is determined by tradition both in the liturgy, in theology, in the religious consciousness of the Church as a whole, and (especially) in the infallibility of the doctrinal authorities. The wheel has run full circle. The Bible is the organ of tradition in the sense that it must be listened to with reverence as the divinely-inspired expression of the basic revelation of God through the Apostles through the whole of tradition. The Bible contains the truth about God—though not indeed in its full development and clarity. But through tradition as *traditio explicativa et completiva* the content of Scripture becomes clear and unequivocal. In this respect we have a long period of development before us, to which the various ages, and perhaps also the different races and cultures, will make their contribution.

Scripture must be read through the living tradition. Only in that way can it be understood, and then enrich and purify tradition in its turn. Isolated from this living catholic tradition Scripture is bound to be misunderstood and falsely interpreted. On the one hand it stands at the beginning of tradition and hence superior to tradition, since tradition has nothing to add but is only the constant, living understanding of Scripture. On the other hand it is firmly and ineradicably interwoven with that tradition—and this is most clearly apparent to those who

do not belong to this Roman Catholic tradition. This is like the little Franciscan Portiuncula Chapel which is built into the great Santa Maria degli Angeli. One can only approach the little sanctuary through the big church, which has been built on to it. The most sacred place in the whole building is the poor little Chapel of Saint Francis, which is surrounded on every side by the great cathedral.

We have spoken of the living tradition, but we have only once mentioned the decisive factor in this tradition. Everything we have said so far—however true it is from the Catholic point of view—may be misunderstood unless we mention the decisive role of the *viva vox magisterii*, without which there cannot be any legitimate tradition at all.

Möhler's conception of tradition involved certain dangers, because Möhler's emphasis on the action of the Holy Spirit pushed the importance of the hierarchical authorities on doctrine into the background and made it difficult to give due stress to the element of objective authority; so that Möhler is sometimes (though without much reason) regarded as a pioneer of modernism with his heretical conception of tradition, because he could not separate himself clearly enough from the conception of the immanence of the Holy Spirit in the Church (derived from Schleiermacher) (*pneumatozentrischen Gemeindesubjektivität*).[1] In our own time, although the idea of the *sensus christianus* of the Church as a whole is not abandoned, strong emphasis is laid on the decisive role of the infallible doctrinal authorities; this emphasis is apparent both among the majority of theologians and in the papal encyclicals. Notably in the encyclical *Humani generis* of 1950, the Pope expressly reminds certain exegetes and dogmaticians that the primary organ of tradition—without which there is no tradition and no legitimate explanation of Scripture—is the infallible doctrinal authority. Definite perception of truth is not bestowed either upon the listening Church, or upon theologians, but only upon the infallible doctrinal authority—the Pope and the Bishops. That is why these authorities are the only people who can ultimately distinguish between true and false tradition, or who can decide what tradition really is. Some of them go so far as simply to identify tradition with the infallible doctrinal author-

[1] J. A. Ternus, *Divus Thomas*, p. 36.

ity—and that is perhaps the logical consequence of this whole train of thought. 'Rome speaks; that suffices, that all Christians (learned and unlearned, theologians and non-theologians) accept the truth proclaimed in the obedience of faith, without it being necessary for them to go back to the sources from which the Church draws that truth.'[1] The present Catholic conception of the relation between Scripture and tradition has its strong points, but it also contains a great tension, which is certainly concealed from most theologians and lay people, but which some of them certainly perceive. On the one hand a new view of the importance and uniqueness of Scripture; on the other hand an energetic emphasis on tradition, which ultimately turns Scripture merely into one source of the great supernatural stream of tradition, and not even the most important one. For the most important source must logically be the infallible doctrinal authority. This tension is relieved—if not removed—by the conception of living tradition.

In a very valuable book, *La Théologie catholique au milieu du XX. siècle*, Professor Roger Aubert in Louvain concludes his work with this same idea of the living tradition. He admits that the latest phases of mariology, the new dogma concerning the Ascension of Mary and the ideas on the importance of the Virgin as an advocate of our salvation, are not found either in Scripture or in the oldest tradition of the Church. That is why mariology has brought Catholic theologians back again to ecclesiology and forced them more and more to deepen that important ecclesiological concept of the *traditio vivans*—a concept which contains a tension in itself, because tradition means *conservatio* whereas life means movement, evolution and progress. This living tradition cannot be understood without the living, contemporary voice of the infallible doctrinal authority. 'The role of the Church's teaching office (the Bishops and the Papacy) as conceived by Christ consists in transmitting God's revelation intact to men in every generation, not in the form of a dead relic but giving every generation "explications" concerning it—"explication" being understood in the etymological sense as a commentary revealing the different aspects and unsuspected implications of which one gradually becomes aware through the action of the Spirit of Christ which is

[1] G. Filograso, *La Civilità Catholica*, 1951, p. 147.

present in the Church and especially assists its teaching office, the Spirit which constitutes the soul of the mystical Body but expresses itself mainly through the visible and hierarchical structure of the Church.'[1] The Roman Catholic position cannot be defined better or more clearly. Here the idea of the living tradition is made so clear, that every danger seems excluded. The tension is removed, and there seems to be no more uncertainty or disagreement. The living tradition is the working of the Holy Spirit which animates and inspires the whole movement both among the ordinary believers and (especially) in the *magisterium hierarchiae* (the Bishops and the Papacy). Tradition here means development, explication and evolution.

This Roman Catholic conception is strongly realistic. One might be tempted to formulate it as follows: that which has become 'actual' is true. That is to say, that which has 'actually' happened in the history of the Church and in the general consciousness of believers—the conclusions of the theologians, the liturgy, the *praxis pietatis* of the faithful who may sometimes unconsciously be superstitious—that which becomes 'real' as *traditio ecclesiastica* or as *traditio popularis* (and it is not always easy to distinguish between the two) *may* solemnly be decreed to be a divine revelation—and this possiblity has often become a fact. We know how carefully, cautiously and prudently all this is done by the persons responsible, but—and that is probably one of the most important characteristics of the Roman Catholic Church—in principle it is a fact that what is 'real' (i.e. that which assumes concrete form, that which is 'psychological-empirical') is *true*—with of course the all-important addition: if it is recognised or proclaimed true by the infallible teaching office. God makes use of this concrete human teaching office as the final and ultimate instrument for revealing His truth.

Roman Catholic realism with regard to this concept of living tradition is of course based on different points, but one of them is certainly an unreflecting conception (which is traditional and is therefore felt to be natural), which regards the relation between what is real and what is true, between the horizontal and the vertical, between religion and revelation, between religious human history and God's history

[1] p. 97.

with men, as something remarkably unambiguous and 'positive'.

The question which Catholic theologians must also ask themselves concerning their idea of tradition is this: is it really critical enough in its conception of that relationship? Is not the whole question of that relationship much more sharply put (and answered) in the Bible? The question is not whether God uses what is human and visible at all as His instrument. To deny that would involve denying the incarnation itself and the reality of the Church. We are not concerned with any sort of 'Protestant' puritanism or spiritualism but only with the question, whether the Roman Catholic concept of tradition is not too uncritical in its attitude to the *status quo* in the Church. Does not the whole of living tradition (as we see it in the Roman Catholic Church and its history—this tradition which is often great and beautiful and which contains the greatest treasures) show that the ultimate court of appeal and critical authority—which decides what is true and what is false—has wielded too little genuine authority, and has been too uncritical? And 'critical' here means 'true to the Bible'.

Protestant theologians have no right to speak in a superior way, as if they knew everything better; but they have the right to ask this question. It is even their duty to do so—in the hope that some of the Roman Catholic theologians will themselves take up the challenge which this question presents. That would be a good and hopeful sign. It would certainly open up a fresh opportunity for a fruitful discussion, which would perhaps in its turn give Protestant theologians an opportunity to reconsider this subject, which certainly presents difficulties.

II

Let us now turn briefly to the problem of Scripture and tradition in Protestant theology. Within the space of this article we can, of course, only briefly outline the questions involved.

When this question has been dealt with in Protestant theology it has usually been tackled first from the aspect of Scripture. Usually Protestant theologians have been extremely critical and disparaging in their views on tradition. For Protestants the word 'tradition' has always been tainted. Its importance as the object of controversial theology and the central role

which it has played (and is still playing) in Roman Catholicism make Protestants prejudiced and sceptical of this concept which involuntarily creates a picture of a tradition of human doctrines and customs. It is typical that in the subject-index of the 'Creeds of the Evangelical-Lutheran Church' if one looks under the word 'Tradition' one is referred to 'human ordinances'. And if one then looks under 'human ordinances' one finds nothing but descriptions of the transmission of ceremonies, church statutes, orders of service, etc., which have no divine validity but which must be regarded as *adiaphora*—if they do not conflict with the Gospel. It is anti-Christian to make them into obligations or even necessities for salvation.

'Tradition' has no theological relevance here, but is pushed right to the periphery. In connexion with the question how the apostolic message comes to us today, tradition has no recognised role. It is rather the idea of *Scripture* which comes up as the sole medium for God's message. Scripture and tradition are regarded as diametrically opposed—Scripture being regarded as the original, undistorted message of God and tradition as the later version, which has become distorted by human ideas. Hence there is an antithesis between Scripture and tradition; the one excludes the other.

Now one of the characteristics of modern thought is the tendency to a new outlook with regard to 'tradition'. This applies both in the sphere of philosophy and in that of theology. A kind of rehabilitation of the idea of tradition is taking place in theology, partly due to the ecumenical situation since the Amsterdam Assembly of 1948 and especially since the Conference of 'Faith and Order' at Lund in 1952, and partly due to the progress of biblical research during the last seventy years or so. This rehabilitation is twofold. Research into the meaning of the word—both in its Greek usage (e.g. by Plato[1]) and in its Hebrew, late-Jewish, Rabbinical and early Christian usage—shows that *tradition* plays an extremely important role in regard to the meaning itself, and not only in regard to subordinate questions. The word 'tradition' receives relevance because it means quite simply oral instruction in its philosophical or religious content, or oral transmission. This clearly shows that the old antithesis between Scripture and tradition must be

[1] See J. Moffatt, *The Thrill of Tradition*, p. 16f.

revised. It is no use trying to solve the question by going back to Reformation times. Scripture cannot be taken unquestioningly as an expression of the original message, because Scripture itself is part of a tradition which existed before being written down. Tradition existed before Scripture.

Research on the Old Testament and on the New Testament has recognised for a long time the enormous role played by tradition. Tradition has clearly proved that an oral tradition was in existence before our Synoptic Gospels, earlier than Mark's version, earlier even than Matthew and Luke. This early Christian tradition contained both the words of Jesus and stories about Him, especially the apostolic *kerygma* in its more or less fixed forms. The Gospels in their basic form are expressions of this original *kerygma*.

Before we proceed to describe the special nature of this tradition, it is important that we should realise clearly the extent to which the concept of tradition dominated the religious milieu in which Christianity was born. It is impossible to understand the historical Jesus without describing His relation to the religious tradition which stamped the Judaism of His age.

1. *Jesus and the Rabbinical Tradition*[1]

Tradition was connected particularly with the Law, the *Thora*, which was known not only in its written form but also in the form in which it had been handed down by word of mouth. *Thora* means 'instruction' and denotes God's revelation to His people through Moses. Moses was the founder both of the written and of the oral *Thora*—the written Law which was constantly adapted to life by new regulations, and its continued living interpretation. This tradition was not handed down by the prophets but by the Rabbis and Scribes, whose authority was therefore very great. The unwritten Law was also received by Moses on Mount Sinai and had just as much authority (if not more) than the written Law. A Rabbi who wants his opinion to be supported by authority must be convinced that it belongs to the unbroken chain of tradition; for owing to this unbroken transmission, tradition springs direct from God Himself. The *Mishna* tract *Pirquê Aboth* enumerates all the

[1] See W. Bacher, *Tradition u. Tradenten in den Schulen Palästinas u. Babylons*, 1914. J. Bonsirven, *La judaisme au temps de Jésus Christ*, 1, 1934, p. 263ff.

members through whom the tradition has passed, from Moses to Rabbi Hillel.

Jesus rejected this oral tradition as a merely human tradition; He declared it invalid, a mere human invention. What did Jesus put in its place? It would be inadequate to say that He put 'Scripture' in its place; for although He often points to what is 'written' the decisive factor is His own authority, as opposed both to oral tradition and to the written Law. With His 'but *I* say unto you', Jesus placed Himself on an infinitely higher plane than the Rabbis who explained the Law, and thereby evoked the mistrust and hatred of the Scribes. In His immediate relation to the Father Jesus is the Lord of tradition. He alone is able to say what God's will is and therefore what is the real meaning of the Law. He did not come to destroy the Law but in order to reveal its true meaning. When 'explaining' the Law in this way, He regarded His own authority as far more important than tradition, and this was one of the reasons which led to His crucifixion.

2. *Jesus and the early Christian tradition about Christ*

In the early Church a new tradition now arose, which partly opposed and partly fulfilled the tradition of the *Thora*. In Christianity the Law was replaced by Christ Himself. He is the end of the Law. It cannot be said more strongly, that Jesus is the Messiah, the Lord of the Jewish *Thora*-tradition. From the very outset the new tradition was 'Christological'—and the fact that the 'liberal' research into the life of Jesus understands the 'Christological' as something later which gradually formed around the original 'historic Jesus' must be regarded as an error. If we remove layer upon layer, it is not true that we shall find our way back to a historic figure which is free from 'the mystery of Christology'. The early Church always confessed Jesus as Christ. In the tradition of the early Church the essential factor was not a purely historical one; it was believed, praised and glorified. 'In the earliest New Testament writings, and in the earliest parts of the Gospels, we find already a Christ who is interpreted, applied and actualised.'[1] Martin Kähler was one of the first to draw attention to this in his book *The so-called 'historical' Jesus and the historical Biblical Christ.* The

[1] H. v. Campenhausen, *Tradition u. Geist im Urchristentum*, p. 355.

Christology of the early Church varied very much in form, but in every case its conception of Christ was based on a paradox: Jesus is seen both in the dimension of time as a man, whose life is traced from birth to death; but at the same time He is seen in the perspective of eternity (which cuts across history) as the Risen Lord who is still present in the Church. The early Church was based on this twofold foundation, both parts of it being considered equally true and essential; and it is this view which is continued in the belief in Christ as true man and true God. This is expressed in different ways from the earliest times through the Gospel of Mark to Paul and John, up to the Creeds of the early Church.

Here arises the question (in parenthesis) which is the main problem of New Testament research, 'the riddle of the New Testament': Who is the Lord of this tradition? What guides and determines this tradition of Christ? Is the early Church's tradition of Christ plainly and honestly the product of a theological world of ideas, consisting partly of the Old Testament expectation of the Messiah in its late-Jewish form, and partly of a Hellenistic myth concerning the redemption of man? Or is this tradition rooted in Jesus Himself, in His realisation that He was the Messiah, i.e. in His realisation that He had received a mission from God, through which God would bring about the salvation of man? Does the tradition of Jesus the Christ include an understanding of His words and actions and also of what happened to Him, which was ultimately Jesus' own understanding of these things? The Christian Church itself did not doubt that its faith in Christ, which was expressed in its creed, was in harmony both with Jesus Himself and with what the Old Testament prophesied concerning Him. Attention must be drawn only to one point: Jesus' relation to the Messianic prophecies and to the tradition of the Messiah and of the Son of Man which lay behind them. During the New Testament period there were several different Messianic traditions, partly based on different interpretations of the Old Testament, partly on Jewish history, and partly on the apocalypticism of late Judaism. The tradition of the early Church represents Jesus as entering into this tradition, recognising the idea both of the Messiah and of the Son of Man, and describing Himself as its fulfilment. But at the same time the early Church

portrays Him as the Lord of tradition, because in His authoritative interpretation of the Old Testament and through His unique relation to God He declares that the Messiah must fulfil the task entrusted to Him by God *in a different way*. This new conception of the Messiah and of the Son of Man, Jesus' freedom in face of tradition and His opposition to it, gave rise to the dramatic tension between Jesus and the people, and even between Jesus and His disciples, and forms the real heart of the story of the temptation.

3. *The* Kyrios *and the apostolic Tradition*

The early Church's tradition of Christ was the tradition handed down by the Apostles. What the Tannaites are in the Jewish tradition the Apostles are to the Christian tradition. It is important to emphasise that the Apostles did not regard themselves primarily as passing on a new *doctrinal* tradition based on the ideas and commandments of a certain man; they regarded themselves as proclaiming God's great *deeds* in history and especially through Jesus Christ. The 'new' tradition was entirely different in nature from the old one, although certain traditional expressions were still used. Tradition now means handing on a message, whose centre is the crucified and risen Lord Himself. *This* tradition is in every way greater than the old one. Teachings were indeed handed on, but these were always part of the message, never an isolated *theologoumenon* or *gnosis*, and had no importance apart from the message. We shall come back to this point again.

The tradition concerning Christ is concerned to remind the Church constantly of the original story, by preventing its faith in Christ from developing into a mythical redemption-story divorced from history. Because it is the story of God's living act in actual history, the Church knows that it is bound to a definite event in a definite place. And not only that. 'The important point is not to pass on the facts purely as such, but to explain their significance as God-given events and their decisive redemptive significance for believers today.'[1] The centre of tradition is therefore always the living Christ Himself. That is why in the legalistic sense tradition was not the same everywhere in the early Church. The great diversity and even

[1] H. v. Campenhausen, op. cit. p. 355.

tension between the early Christian traditions, as described in the New Testament, would not have been possible if it had been a question of handing down a law, a definite doctrine, or a religious supernatural *gnosis*. Christ is one and the same, but the tradition concerning Him is expressed in different ways. Unity lies not in a common, fixed creed but in the Risen Lord Himself. This fact explodes the former concept of tradition and doubtless explains why the word 'tradition' played a relatively unimportant part at the time of the Apostles.

The risen *Kyrios* is not only the essence of tradition but also its cause, its source. Oscar Cullmann has suggested the following interpretation[1]: when Paul (in 1 Cor. 11.23) uses the expression '*from the Lord*' it does not mean that he received the words of Holy Communion through a tradition in the Church with the hisorical Jesus as the first member chronologically, nor that these words came to Him through a direct revelation from the Risen Lord Himself. Paul is referring here to the historical tradition of the Church, whose source is the Risen Lord, and in which He still speaks and acts. The tradition of the early Church not only had Jesus as its historical Founder and Beginning; it also had Christ as its permanent Subject. The continuing process of tradition with the Apostles as its bearers is also determined by Christ; just as the expression *Evangelion Christou* means both the Message concerning Christ (ob. gen.) and also the Message preached *by* Christ (subj. gen.). In accordance with this, and contrary to the Jewish tradition in which the Scribe was the custodian of tradition, the Apostle is called to preserve and carry on the treasure of the faith 'by the Holy Ghost which dwelleth in us' (2 Tim. 1.14). 'The tradition concerning Christ is protected by the Apostles' and the message which they hand down is therefore not a human message, but comes from the Lord Himself. A Christian tradition existed from the moment when the Apostles, who had lived with Jesus, shared His sorrows and seen Him after His resurrection, proclaimed their message: 'this Jesus of Nazareth who was crucified has been raised up by God as Lord and Messiah; we have seen Him; we have been commissioned to proclaim salvation in His name!' That is a primary moment in the history of the Christian Church—antecedent to any

[1] *La Tradition*, p. 12ff.; *S.J.T.* vol. 3, p. 181ff.

Scripture and any written word. Based upon this message, this word, there was a Church as well, which was baptised, which celebrated Holy Communion, which taught and spread the message, and praised God's great deeds daily, through word and deed. In spite of all the diversity in this Church, and in spite of all the contradictions, the tradition was clear and unequivocal. It was expressed most clearly in the confession made at Baptism.

4. *Tradition and Scripture*

Let us try to summarise what has been said so far and make it somewhat clearer. What is the nature of *this* tradition?

Tradition means receiving something and handing it on. A distinction must be drawn here between two things which should, however, never be separated: (1) *What* is received, adopted, believed and passed on? (2) *How* is it received and *how* it is passed on? We must therefore distinguish between what is handed on, the *traditum*, and the act by which it is handed on.

The uniqueness of the Christian tradition is revealed when we answer these questions. It is something quite unique, because the living Lord, *this* Jesus, this Christ, the Crucified and Risen Lord, is the content and absolute Lord of this tradition.

First the question of the content of tradition. It concerns the salvation of men. The Christian faith says: this salvation is in Jesus Christ and in Him alone. Salvation is brought about by His coming to men as their Saviour and Redeemer, their Brother and Lord. Then man is saved. It is very important to emphasise this personal and actual character of tradition. The tradition which comes to us and is passed on only has meaning, if it is directed towards this event. A *merely* doctrinal tradition or a tradition of historical facts has no importance in itself. It only becomes important when it brings about an encounter between the living God in His salvation and man, and if it is directed at every point towards this encounter. The early Church fully realised that it had to hand on a doctrine, but never a doctrine 'on its own account', rather a doctrine which does not achieve its purpose unless it leads to faith, to salvation. The word *kerygma* means two things at once: the

content of the message and the *act* of announcing it. If I want to describe and explain the content as a divine revelation apart from the act of announcing the message, then I have misunderstood the essence of this tradition concerning Christ in the early Church. For the living Lord can never become a mere doctrine, however biblical and 'apostolic' it may be. Nor can the living Lord become a stream of tradition, however 'living' it may be.

But on the other hand (and this must be particularly emphasised today) *without* this essential content, *without* the Apostles' teaching concerning Jesus Christ the God-Man who through His life and death, His resurrection and exaltation, manifested the Lordship of God, the act of preaching becomes empty and meaningless. The words of Paul are literally true: 'If Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain' (1 Cor. 15.14).

Apart from this essential content (which is unique and which often repels us by its hardness) one cannot see how to prevent the faith developing merely into a deeply reflective 'point of view' or into an existential understanding of one's self. But that was never the opinion of the early Christian message. In this question the real concern is the *esse* of the Church. And in my opinion it is one of the most urgent tasks of modern Protestant theology to perceive that it must try to hold together what must not be divided and what was never divided in the early Christian *Kerygma*. The early Christian message never spoke about doctrine alone, nor did it give a mere report of historical events; the message was never given without the teaching or without the account of the actual facts. In the living Word of the message, to which instruction also belongs, and in the Sacraments, God's unique act of salvation in Jesus Christ is present. Tradition in the Church is always directed both towards this eschatological act of God in Jesus Christ and to the recognition of what has happened within the Church.

It will now be possible also quite briefly to answer the question *how* tradition is fulfilled. Implicitly the answer has already been received. Tradition is fulfilled when the Church —on the basis of the Apostles' message which rests on the person and the work of Jesus Christ—lives in accordance with that message by celebrating Baptism and Holy Communion.

When the Church preaches the message, teaches, bears witness, baptises, celebrates Holy Communion, and praises God—often in face of great opposition and insecurity—then tradition is being carried on. This is a *living* tradition in the strictest sense, living not in the sense of developing or growing in religious vitality but in the sense that here something is *happening*, the living Lord Himself is present and active. That is the quickening action of the Holy Spirit. This connexion between tradition and the Spirit is one of the special characteristics of early Christian tradition. The Spirit is the presence of the living Christ in the Church. And the fact that the Spirit which is one with the Lord (2 Cor. 3.17) determines tradition means that tradition can never be identical with the tradition fixed by history, although it cannot exist without this either. The Lord alone has freedom. Over-hasty identification here means that the Church is in grave danger of becoming its own master. Complete separation means abandoning historic Christianity. In both cases Christ as the living Lord of tradition is denied.

Any beliefs which go beyond this genuine tradition are merely 'traditions', *traditiones ecclesiasticae* or *traditiones populares*, to borrow these expressions from the Roman Catholic Church. They may be good and useful traditions which can be maintained, or which are indispensable. But they may be bad, useless traditions which must be destroyed, in order to save the Christian message (which is the true tradition) from being overlaid by human rules or by 'religion'.

Finally, however, we are faced by the important question: What is the importance of the Bible in this connexion? We have been talking about tradition up to the present, and I think it is right—both historically and factually—to begin with oral tradition. We must not forget that for over 150 years 'the Church lived, preached, baptised and celebrated Holy Communion before it received a Canon of New Testament writings as an instrument for the exercise of apostolic authority'.[1] The Scripture is the first, basic testimony of what happens in the Apostolic, Protestant and true Catholic tradition. Scripture is the witness of God's eschatological act of salvation, by which the Church is upheld and constantly renewed. Scripture is the first witness of true tradition. From the historical point of view, Scrip-

[1] P. Brunner, *Schrift u. Tradition*, p. 20.

ture is itself part of the early Christian tradition, and is both the result of a tradition and the expression of what that tradition is. But *in* tradition Scripture (including both the Old and the New Testament) has a voice of its own, which determines tradition. Theologically therefore it is not accurate to speak of Scripture as a seed which must grow, or as a beginning which must be developed. Does not this way of speaking miss the whole point? Scripture certainly is not earlier than tradition. But *in* tradition it has to exercise the office of watchman: it has to call the attention of the Church and of its tradition (its various traditions) 'back to the centre', constantly purifying it and teaching it to make room for Christ Himself as the Lord of tradition. Therefore it is solely through Scripture that true authority can maintain itself in the Church.

From what has been said here it is clear that there can never be any question of choosing *between* Scripture and tradition. Tradition existed from the very beginning in oral witness. Jesus did not command His apostles to write, but to preach. The Church is 'a house where people speak, not a house where they write', says Luther; and he goes on: *in ecclesia non satis esse libros scribi et legi, sed necessarium esse dici et audiri.*[1] It is an illusion to imagine that direct access to the Bible can be divorced from the living oral preaching of the message. But *in* the Church and *in* tradition Scripture has an absolutely pre-eminent and essential place and cannot be replaced by anything else. By this we do not mean merely reciting or re-tracing Scripture, nor just any doctrine of its being inspired; we mean listening to the Bible and studying it together in obedient exegesis. Scripture has a centre and a circumference. It contains the decisive message of the Apostles and their fundamental insights—and it shows us the life of the Church in the first century of its history. Scripture is the first witness of *tradition*, i.e of the apostolic *kerygma* of God's act of salvation—and is itself a historic tradition. On the one hand Scripture stands in the midst of God's eschatological act of salvation, directly and purely. Thus Scripture is the expression of true tradition. On the other hand, Scripture includes tradition, or perhaps it would be more accurate to say 'traditions'. So that Scripture also shares in the mystery of God's revelation. It does not

[1] Cited from P. Schempp, *Luthers Stellung zur heiligen Schrift*, 1929, p. 33.

escape the dialectic between 'tradition and traditions' (Ebeling) nor between 'historical *paradosis* and historical tradition' (Gloege). But this does not deprive the Bible of its unique value and its exclusive authority. On the contrary: it is precisely this which gives the Bible freedom in the setting of tradition, and which frees the Church from being dominated by an isolated Book containing so and so many verses, thereby binding the Church all the more firmly to the living witness and the fundamental insights, to the *teaching* of the Bible as a living testimony. Christianity is not the religion of a book the letters of which have to be deciphered by learned scholars and then approved by the Church authorities; nor the religion of a book which the individual can read and interpret in isolation. It is not a question of me, the individual, and my Bible. The Bible belongs to the Church. The voice of the Apostles, in which the Church believes it hears the voice of Christ Himself, is heard wherever the Church listens to their testimony as handed down through the Bible and through the Creed, in a spirit of praise and adoration. As a member of this Church the individual can then also read and study the Bible.

But we can no longer speak of Scripture *and* tradition, in the usual sense in which these words are used. Scripture and tradition cannot be considered as two separate entities. But we cannot accept the modern Roman Catholic concept of Scripture *within* tradition as an organ (although a fundamental one) of the living stream of tradition through the ages. This view amounts to saying 'Scripture extended in tradition', tradition as the development of the seeds contained in Scripture. But in the concept of tradition that we have traced here, there can be no question of such an evolution or of such biological growth. These ideas are derived from an entirely different concept of revelation, and we must ask Roman Catholic theologians to consider seriously whether this idea of living tradition (as interpreted in *this* way) really corresponds with the biblical view of revelation. A Protestant concept of tradition is concerned primarily with an *event*, i.e. handing down the sacred Word of God that people may hear and believe, and with penetrating deeper and deeper into the biblical insights connected with this act of salvation. This is also a living tradition, but how different from 'tradition' as understood by

modern Roman Catholic theology! We are both advancing towards the same idea, but there is a tremendous distance between us.

And yet this word '*living tradition*' can perhaps form a basis for discussion between Roman Catholic and Protestant theologians who are prepared to listen to one another—in spite of the different interpretations laid upon it by the two confessions.

Catholic theologians are devoting more study than ever before to the historical exegesis of the Bible; and Protestant theologians are devoting more and more attention to the problem of tradition.

When the Church's tradition (both in the Catholic and in the Protestant Church) is illumined by Scripture (i.e. by Scripture as the living testimony of God's act of salvation in Jesus Christ and of the biblical insights gained thereby) then something happens in tradition. Then *the* tradition comes to life and many 'traditions' (which appear very important perhaps today) die a natural death. Tradition then becomes what it is intended to be: the testimony of God's great acts as handed down from generation to generation, not as an account of an event in the past but as God's act of salvation here and now.

In this hope we can continue our theological study, even when it seems to be rather hopeless. Our faith teaches us to hope against all hope.

Since writing this article there has come to my notice a recent publication on this subject from the pen of Professor Geiselmann: *Das Misverständnis über das Verhältnis von Schrift und seine Ueberwindung in der katholischen Theologie* (*Una Sancta*, Sept. 1956. pp. 131-150). This is an article of such outstanding importance that although I cannot now discuss it here I must at least draw attention to it.

Professor Geiselmann declares that in the decree of the Council of Trent about Scripture and tradition the *et* between *libris scriptis* and *sine scripto traditionibus* (Denzinger, op. cit., 783) does not mean *partim-partim*, an expression which was actually proposed at the Council but only to be rejected. Thus the interpretation given by Roman Catholics after the Council (e.g. by Bellarmine and Canisius) was a misunderstanding of

the intention of the Tridentine fathers, a misunderstanding, however, which lasted right into the nineteenth century. Holy Scripture, as far as its content is concerned, is sufficient and complete. There cannot be two sources of revelation, but only one, the Scripture. But Scripture has to be preached and the interpretation of the Church is authoritative for the community of the faithful.

If this is a true interpretation of the Council of Trent and of post-Tridentine theology as well it will cause considerable controversy and upheaval in present-day Roman Catholic theology.

FAITH AND TRUTH[1]

by The Very Rev. Mgr. H. FRANCIS DAVIS

I am not here concerned with the harmony of faith and reason, but rather with the inner meaning of faith as an acceptance of truth on the Word of God. The second half of the article will indicate a difference of emphasis among Protestants and Catholics as to the connotations of the word 'faith'. It will attempt to justify the Catholic tradition, while suggesting that the difference of emphasis need not necessarily imply lack of common ground for mutual understanding.

The argument is briefly this. In faith we receive as the Word of truth God who has revealed Himself personally in His Church, whom to reject knowingly would be, according to the Scriptures, sin and folly. God is seen in faith as a pillar of light in the night of the world's wisdom, leading us to the chosen land of final union with Him. In relation to the day of divine wisdom, He is a pillar of cloud until that destination is reached. If this faith is living, while it is light for our guidance and darkness to our sight, it includes nevertheless in actual life the comfort of hope and the warmth of charity. Different methods of understanding this complex have led to a 'Protestant' and a 'Catholic' way of treating faith that have tended to hinder mutual understanding. Whether we speak mainly in terms of justifying faith or in terms of the three theological virtues, it is of prime importance that we do not forget faith's basic relationship to truth. When we distinguish faith, hope and charity, we cannot forget that hope and charity are built upon the word of truth that comes by faith. This Word of truth is not abstract. It comes to us concretely, in datable events and prophecies, for God comes as a Person who deals with men through a historical People, first the Chosen People then the Church.

As a receiving of God's Word of truth, faith is expressed in the first confession demanded of Christian and Jew: 'I believe in

[1] Paper read before the *Society for the Study of Theology*, April, 1956.

God'. It was demanded of the Jew before there were creeds. It was obvious from the start that it would be demanded of Christians as a condition of Baptism. For, even if it be true that, for a period, 'I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God' was the first baptismal confession,[1] this form of creed most emphatically implies belief in God, whose Son Jesus Christ is declared to be. In the words, *credo in Deum*, we put ourselves, in a matter of ultimate truth and reality, on the side of God over against every other light or authority. In the violent words of the psalmist, the believer cries: 'Man's faith is false.'[2] 'Man is a breath that passes: in Adam's sons there is no trust.'[3] 'So, in the holy place, I contemplate thee, ready for the revelation of thy greatness.'[4]

Yet, in confessing our belief in God, we do not need to reject His creation, nor the created minds that have had some success in discovering its meaning. For, as St. Thomas says, 'the real meaning of existents rules and measures truth in the human mind.'[5] There is a meaning in existents, and there is a power in the human mind to be informed by this meaning. But, in the case of faith, continues St. Thomas, it is 'engaged with the first measure of all reality, and this is a measure which cannot be measured.'[6] For faith puts us into direct contact with the first truth, which is the cause and exemplar of existents. Philosophy and science are human achievements, and suffer from the uncertainties and imperfections of human achievements. Faith is a divine gift, and rejoices in the faithfulness of all that comes from God.

In the words, *I believe in God*, we commit ourselves, mind and heart, by intention irrevocably, to His reality and faithfulness. We recognise that we are not, and He is, truth: the God of truth who invites us to share His truth and goodness. This confession is, in modern terms, existential. God has spoken. We confess that we have known His voice. As the Apostle said in triumph, 'when you had received of us the word of the hearing of God, you received it not as the word of men, but (as it is indeed) the word of God, who worketh in you that

[1] Cf. Joseph J. Crehan, S.J., *Early Christian Baptism and the Creed.*
[2] Ps. 116.11. Knox tr. (Vulg. 115.2).
[3] Ps. 62.9. Knox tr. (Vulg. 61.10).
[4] Ps. 63.2 Knox tr. (Vulg. 62.3).
[5] *Qq. Disp. de Spe*, 1, ad 7. Tr. from Thomas Gilby, St. Thomas Aquinas, *Theological Texts*, no. 351.
[6] op. cit., loc. cit.

have believed.'[1] The Word of the God of faithfulness has been made known to the children of men, and in that Word we acknowledge that we personally, mind, heart and whole being, are His. At the same moment, as we recognise His voice as the God of Israel, we realise Him as the great personal lover who has adopted us.

Because God is truth, the Scripture revelation speaks of unbelief as unwisdom, ignorance, folly, lying, doubt about God's Word or goodness or call; in short, what we might today term 'godlessness'. It could take the form of a guilty refusal to admit God's Godhead. At a lower level, it could be a refusal to hear His voice, or to believe in His vocation for us. In Numbers[2] Moses was said not to believe in God when he began to doubt of the vocation to which God's Word had called him. The chosen people were blamed for not believing in God, when they turned to idol-worship and no longer recognised that He, and He alone, is God. 'My foolish people have not known me.'[3] 'They have not known, nor understood: for their eyes are covered that they may not see, and that they may not understand with their heart.'[4] Or they had denied, or forgotten, or not heard: or had perverted the words of the living God. Or they refused to listen to the prophets. Or all knowledge had gone from the land. Or they simply did not seek Yahweh.

God reveals Himself to us at certain times and places, in certain words and works, and through a People. The Church is the community to which God has spoken, and we are its individual members of the Church to whom the Head of the Church, the God-man has come. Incidentally St. Thomas, following earlier writers and certain liturgical prayers, supported by recent interpretations of the connexion between the *qehal Yahweh* and the *ekklesia*, held that the Church existed from the foundation of the world. It seems that God has always revealed Himself to the individual through His people. Faith enables first the Church and then the individual through that Church to recognise His Word of Truth.

He comes, and is accepted, as the Truth. Since God is Truth, St. John of the Cross dares to say: 'Faith gives and communicates

[1] 1 Thess. 2.13.
[2] Num. 20.12.
[3] Jer. 4.22.
[4] Is. 44.18.

to us God Himself.'[1] St. Thomas, in his scholastic language, says that God, and God alone, as the Supreme Truth, is the object of faith. It must be borne in mind that 'Supreme Truth' here does not represent an abstraction, as it might in Aristotle or Plato, but truth in its most concrete and personal and existential—the actual living truth by whom all reality was created. By saying God is the object of faith, St. Thomas means that it is the essence of faith to bind us to the source of truth. By Supreme Truth, he means truth *in essendo*, *in cognoscendo*, *in dicendo*, *in agendo*, i.e. God is, knows, says and acts nothing but faithfulness and truth. God at the same time is, knows, says and acts nothing but love; but in God, His truth is loving, and His love is truth.

More concretely, St. Thomas means that the true and faithful God, who alone is true and faithful of Himself, made Himself known to His Church, and, through that Church, to each individual, and gave to Church and to each individual member the power to receive Him. The Word was made flesh. The Church has seen the Word 'with her eyes, looked upon, and handles with her hands, the word of life,' and we have received it 'not as the word of man, but (as it is indeed) the word of God, who worketh in you that have believed.'[2] And we shall be received in Heaven by Him who sits on a White Horse, faithful and true, judging and fighting with justice, whose name is The Word of God, King of Kings and Lord of Lords.[3]

Faith is a pillar of light in the night of this world, leading us to the 'chosen land'. In other words, the moment when the word is spoken, and the moment when it is heard, look forward to the last moment of history, when its promises will be fulfilled. Faith is always existential, and always eschatological. It is our foretaste and pledge of the full life of God, that is to be ours in the eternal beatific vision. It cannot be fully understood except by one who remembers that it is a transitional state. 'Dearly beloved, we are now the sons of God: and it hath not yet appeared what we shall be. We know that when he shall appear we shall be like him: because we shall see him as he is.'[4] Faith

[1] I have lost the reference. But it is typical of many passages in St. John of the Cross.
[2] 1 John 1.1 and 1 Thess. 2.13.
[3] Cf. Rev. (Apoc.) 19.
[4] 1 John 3.2.

is already in a dark manner that same truth which will be vision in eternity.

This is why it is a pillar of cloud to the 'day' of eternal vision. Faith shares something of the light of vision, but more of the darkness of hearing. It is, for our purposes, as good as sight, but less comforting. Hearing reveals to us the same world as seeing, but only on a basis of trust. When God comes by hearing, He comes as truth just as certainly as if he came by seeing. This is why we may speak of the 'eyes' of faith. We are so certain, by God's grace, that we seem to see. To those who live in the darkness of unbelief, faith is truly a bright light. But it is a cloud, even dark night, compared with the brightness of direct facial presence. Failure to realise this has led some people to try to divorce faith from truth altogether. 'I see nothing; therefore there is nothing' says the unbeliever. 'I see nothing; therefore faith is mere submission of man's proud intellect to God's glory,' seems to say Stauffer. 'I see nothing; but God sees for me, and I grasp His hand, and believe His word with all my heart and mind and strength,' should be the meaning of the Christian who confesses: *Credo in Deum.*

It is precisely because faith is truth, supreme truth, without light, without any true light, that it is always basically a kind of trust or reliance. This is surely why *pistis*, with its inseparable undertones of trust or reliance, is the natural word to express it rather than *gnosis*. One fears that one of the temptations to which the Gnostics succumbed was a desire to invent a light, seen by the initiated, where they should have rested content with a faith that is not sight. On the other hand, the natural association of trust with hope has perhaps led Catholics to forget that there is also a kind of trust involved in faith.

'He that is of God heareth the words of God. Therefore you hear them not, because you are not of God.'[1] Our Lord was saying, in effect: You do not trust Him who is alone God, who alone is man's refuge and strength. If we accept the Christian faith, we do it in recognition that God has redeemed us, and is still with us in His Church. We thereby recognise that His thoughts should be our thoughts, His ways our ways, His prophets our prophets, His Son our brother and master and Lord. He alone has a right to our complete and utter faith and

[1] John 8.47.

surrender. He even has the right, as St. Paul says, to lead our minds into captivity; but this will not be to untruth, for He alone is truth.

Faith means a recognition of God's coming, wherever and whenever He has come. It involves hearing His voice wherever and whenever He has spoken. He who has spoken 'at sundry times and in divers manners . . . to the fathers by the prophets, last of all in these days hath spoken to us by his Son.'[1]

The Jews who guiltily rejected the prophets were accused of incredulity. The disciples on the way to Emmaus were slow 'to believe all the things which the prophets have spoken.'[2] It is not the subject of this lecture to discuss how a man can be expected to find out a true prophet. Suffice it to say that the Scriptures have always taught that there is a grave sin of incredulity, which consists in refusing to believe when God has taken adequate means of revealing Himself.

Believing in God means, then, reliance upon Him. If we saw, we should be relying upon ourselves. St. Thomas tells us that the difference between the unhesitating self-committal of faith and our vacillating loyalty to many of our own intellectual convictions is the difference between life by the first truth, and life by reflections of that truth. Since the supreme truth is not an abstraction but a personal friend, a 'Thou', faith has the character of a two-sided personal loyalty, God towards man and man towards God. It is this personal characteristic of faith that made Newman say: 'No one is a martyr for a conclusion, no one is a martyr for an opinion: it is faith that makes martyrs.'[3]

But the essence of faith is the belief that follows upon trust. Faith is conviction, yet is not reached in the way that conviction is normally reached. It is not the result of the skill or wisdom or researches of the believer. St. Thomas distinguishes faith from every form of science or opinion, and Thomists do not favour the word '*scientia*' to express it. In normal life, truth is recognised by those who can see the light. But there no light is visible. The strongest of lights illumines the truths believed, but the believer has no skill to see it. As St. Thomas put it, faith sees by the vision, not of the see-er but of the object seen. Or, again, St. Augustine says: 'Faith has its eyes with which it

[1] Heb. 1.1, 2. [2] Luke 24.25.
[3] Newman, *Discourses to Mixed Cong.*, 181.

sees in a certain way the truth of the thing it does not see, and it sees most clearly that it does not see what it believes.'[1] Abraham both accepted God's Word as so true as to warrant his surrender of his whole life to its truth, and he saw equally clearly, as St. Paul tells us, 'the deadness of his own body . . . and the deadness of Sarah's womb'.[2] For St. Isidore, faith is that by which we truly believe that which we have no power whatever to see.[3]

Incidentally, it is interesting to note the importance, to the mind of St. John of the Cross, of the darkness that accompanies faith in the spiritual purification of the soul. 'Not only', he writes, 'does it give no knowledge and science, but, as we have said, it deprives us of all other knowledge and science, and blinds us to them, so that they cannot judge it well. For other sciences can be acquired by the light of understanding; but the science that is of faith is acquired without the illumination of the understanding, which is rejected for faith; and in its own light it is lost, if that light be not darkened.'[4] Thus begins the second dark night of the soul, which is the healing darkness of faith. This is how theologians interpret St. Paul's 'through a glass darkly' and walking 'by faith and not by sight', and St. John's 'Blessed are those that have not seen, but have believed', or St. Peter's 'whom having not seen, you love'. Again, 'faith cometh by hearing', and 'every one that hath heard of the Father and hath learned cometh to me.' Hearing, as such, is done in darkness.

But the darkness of faith does not reduce it to the level of opinion. Opinion is always by virtue of a light that is not sufficiently clear to make up our minds to a state of open knowledge. In faith, it is God who possesses the mind. 'My sheep hear my voice.' It is through the Father's drawing that we are able to come to Him.

And He does really enable us to come to Him. As Professor Wingren[5] has said, His Word is a creative word. This Word gives us a new being, a new mind, a new heart, enabling us to exist by and in Him, believing by His truth, loving by the share

[1] Ep. 120, ii, 8. P.L. 33, 456. My translation.
[2] Rom. 4.19.
[3] Isid., Diff. i, 486.
[4] *Ascent of Mt. Carmel*, ii, 3, 4. Works, tr. by Allison Peers, I, 72.
[5] Cf. paper read at the *Society for the Study of Theology*, Oxford, 1956; see below, next article, p. 379.

he gives us of His love. Not only with our heart, but also with our mind, must we come to Him.

So it happens that, though the truth of God's message is not seen, but only believed, yet something of it is understood. The blind man does learn something of reality by hearing, though he cannot see it. He is bound to rely on others for his knowledge of the world. Here Professor Torrance's[1] word 'rely' is obviously better than 'trust'. You may say: but our words cannot convey any truth except concerning what we have seen. I answer: the Word of God who addresses us knows our words and their capacity for conveying truth, and is able to bring about in faith some measure of understanding of the things of God, even through the inadequate medium of human words. Otherwise He would not have spoken. His Spirit is able to protect us through His Church from misunderstanding.

Here I would like to pass on to another consideration. It has been contended so far that the words 'I believe in God' involve a decision, first of God's Church, then of the individual, through the Holy Spirit in both Church and individual, for the God of truth and love. This decision is historical and concrete. God spoke in time. Church and individual accept Him in time. The Word, the supreme truth, has appeared; and we have heard Him. Yet it is intrinsic to the faith-acceptance that we have only heard, not seen Him. Because it is entirely dependent on hearing, it is a kind of reliance. Because reliance on another, it is darkness in oneself. Yet it is truth and understanding, and can be expressed in language, even though more imperfectly than other truths.

In the first part of this paper, we contrasted the relationship of faith to divine truth with other attitudes to truth in general. In this second part, I wish to contrast the relationship of concrete living faith to truth with its relationship to hope and love. This is a matter in which there has often been misunderstanding between Catholics and Protestants through their different traditions in the manner of explaining man's response to God's call. The Protestant is inclined to include the whole of man's self-committal under the term 'faith'. The Catholic, following a more analytical method of theology, divides man's response into the three theological virtues of faith, hope and charity.

[1] Cf. paper read at the *Society for the Study of Theology*, Oxford, 1956.

So it has come about that faith, for the Catholic, being contrasted with the other two virtues, is concerned solely or mainly with God as truth. For the Protestant, faith is assimilated to the other virtues, with the result that it is easily fused, even to the point of identification, with hope and love. The Catholic analytical method has tended perhaps to be more informative, while the Protestant synthetic method has been more concrete. In practice, Catholics and Protestants have sometimes argued at cross purposes, as each has been tempted to misunderstand the word 'faith', as used by the other.

At least since the time of St. Augustine, actual living faith has been recognised as a highly complex state of soul. It is a living self-committal, expressed by St. Augustine in the words *credo in Deum*. In fact, he was convinced that it was this living complexity that distinguished *credo in Deum* from both *credo Deo* and *credo Deum*. His words are well known. 'If you believe in Him, you believe Him: but it does not follow that he who believes Him, believes in Him. Again, we can say even of His Apostles: we believe Paul; but not: we believe in Paul. We believe Peter; but not: we believe in Peter. *For to him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is reputed to justice* (Rom. 4.5). What then is believing in Him? It is to love Him in our faith, to choose Him in our faith, to go to Him in our faith, and to be incorporated into His members'.[1] Even St. Thomas recognised the distinction, and wrote: 'To believe in God as our end is characteristic of faith informed by charity: this faith thus informed is the beginning of all good works; and to this extent believing is said to be the work of God.'[2] Prat explained that believing in God is resting upon Him as on an unshakable support, taking refuge in Him, tending towards Him.

St. Thomas's words make it clear that faith was never meant to exist divorced from the other two virtues. For faith is the entrusting of the mind to God's word; and all our human relationships must be based upon the mind. 'Believing God' should immediately lead us to 'believe in God'. In real life each postulates the other. How could a person believe God's word of truth in full sincerity without committing himself to Him? Faith, as the Catholic theologian says, without the self-

[1] *In Jo. Ev.*, tr. xxix, 6. P.L. 35, 1631. My translation.
[2] *In Jo. cap.* vi, lect. iii. My translation.

committal of charity, is not saving faith. As St. Thomas puts it elsewhere, faith not only 'enlightens the mind', but 'also warms the affections, telling us not merely that God is first cause, but also that He is saviour, redeemer, loving, made flesh for us.'[1] The logical conclusion, then, of faith is the total committal expressed in the phrase, *credo in Deum.*

This committal, every aspect of which is equally the gift of God, none of it a human achievement, is threefold; and no Christian is a true Christian, living in the grace of God, until this threefold relationship with Him is verified. These aspects are called faith, hope and charity or the theological virtues, as we were saying; and they have been regarded as pre-eminently the God-related virtues since St. Paul himself.

Their God-relatedness can be variously expressed. Thomists say that they all have God in His personal reality as their object. Their relationship to God in each case seems to involve a sort of trust. This may be due to the fact that the other two are built on faith, which is itself a reliance. The trust that is faith is an unconditional adherence to God as the voice of truth—the voice that judges all other voices, the proto-truth. There is a second kind of trust that commits us utterly into God's hands as the sole means and term of human happiness. This is technically called hope or *elpis*, though probably some Scripture passages may refer to this kind of trust with the word *pistis*. It is this second kind of trust, namely 'hope', that corresponds most nearly to the popular meaning of 'trust' in English. The third kind of unconditional trust is the self-entrusting and self-giving that is called in the New Testament *agape* or charity. As from God to man, it is self-giving, in the strictest sense. As from man to God, it is a self-giving which, since we already belong to God, is more in the nature of a self-entrusting or a self-surrender to His will. It differs from hope in so far as it abandons to God's will all our interests, even our own happiness. It does not, however, contradict hope, since faith tells us that our happiness is God's will for us, and hope our obligation. We perhaps only know through faith that the miracle of *agape* is in some degree possible to fallen man, under the influence of God's grace.

[1] *Com. in 2 Cor.*, ii, lect. iii. Tr. by Thomas Gilby, St. Thomas Aquinas, *Theological Texts*, no. 353.

The followers of the Reformation seem normally to have included all man's essential relationship with God in the word '*pistis*' or faith, with the frequent result, it seems to the Catholic, of confusing the three theological virtues, and making of love and hope the essence of faith. Mr Woolcombe has suggested that faith was originally a structure-word, involving many constituent elements, as can be seen from its varying contexts. Though this be admitted, human weakness demands explicit recognition of the constituent parts of that structure. The exclusive use of the word 'faith' to express all the essential aspects of the Christian attitude to the God that reveals Himself has led in some circles paradoxically to a weakening of the truth-aspect of living faith in favour of its love and hope aspects.

Thus Anders Nygren defines faith as 'unconditional trust in the living will of God'.[1] He describes Luther's idea of faith in these words: 'In this way Luther can speak of faith as implying nothing else than an *assensus*, a *yes* to "God's work and promise", but this *yes* is at the same time an expression of the very highest trust, which is to say, an expression of man's having been subdued by the will of God.'[2] Even more strikingly, in *Agape and Eros*, he writes: 'Faith includes in itself the whole devotion of love, while emphasising that it has the character of a response, that it is reciprocated love. Faith is love towards God, but a love of which the keynote is receptivity, not spontaneity.'[3] Emil Brunner writes: 'Faith is self-surrender, willing submission. Unbelief is the disobedience of the man who will not renounce his independence.'[4]

All this is, of course, an excellent statement of man's proper attitude towards God, but it is rather what St. Augustine and St. Thomas would call charity than what they would call faith.

The matter is more complicated, from the ecumenical point of view, by the frequently-expressed Protestant opinion that Catholics have an inferior concept of hope and charity, which prevents these virtues from being included in what the former regard as true, living faith. Catholic hope, they say, rests on human merits; and Catholic charity, they claim, is a high form of Platonic *eros*, motivated by sublimated self-interest. I suggest

[1] Gustav Aulén, *The Faith of the Christian Church*, 328. [2] op. cit., p. 75.
[3] *Agape and Eros*, tr. Philip S. Watson, 1953, 127. Dr Nygren is here giving his interpretation of St. Paul.
[4] *Revelation and Reason*, tr. Olive Wyon, 1947, 35.

that they are here assuming more agreement than really exists among either Catholics or Protestants as regards the true understanding of these virtues. Can one really say that there is a Catholic and Protestant view, for instance, on the meaning of disinterested love? At least this must be said from a Catholic point of view. Hope rests ultimately solely on Christ's merits. Charity, everyone agrees, is pure love of God for His own sake, with a correspondingly 'divine' love for our neighbour. No one can pretend that any theology or philosophy as to the precise degree of selflessness this involves would be universally accepted. Whatever explanation is accepted, the Catholic theologian would always claim that, of the three virtues, charity is the most selfless, and involves a deeper dependence on God than the other two without charity. All three virtues are gifts of God, 'but the greatest of these is charity'.

In a good Christian life, the three virtues are inseparable. Yet they represent different attitudes. Faith, as contrasted with the other two, is our utter committal of ourselves to God as to our guiding light. Since we must begin by guidance, St. Ignatius of Antioch says that faith is the beginning, and love the end. This basic character of faith is well expressed by the Jesuit, De Caussade: 'The soul, enlightened by faith, judges of things in a very different way to those who, having only the standard of the senses by which to measure them, ignore the inestimable treasure they contain. . . . The soul that recognises the will of God in every smallest event, and also in those that are most distressing and direful, receives all with equal joy, pleasure and respect.'[1] 'Faith', he added, 'changes the face of the earth: by it the heart is raised, entranced, and becomes conversant with heavenly things. Faith is our light in this life. By it we possess the truth without seeing it; we touch what we cannot feel, and see what is not evident to the senses. By it we view the world as though it did not exist. It is the key of the treasure house, the key of the abyss of the science of God. It is faith that teaches us the hollowness of created things; by it God reveals and manifests Himself in all things. By faith the veil is torn aside to reveal eternal truth.'[2]

This faith is of little value until it is joined to the two sister virtues. Only then is it truly logical. Belief that God is what

[1] De Caussade, *Abandonment to Divine Providence*, 17. [2] op. cit., 16.

He has revealed Himself to be naturally leads to hopeful trust in His love and Christ's merits. This, in turn, should lead to the entire self-surrender of love to God's will.

The distinctive importance of each theological virtue and their mutual interdependence in the true Christian life are illustrated by St. John of the Cross with his metaphor of the livery of three colours—white, green and purple—which enables the soul to travel under the protection of its divine lover, and be safeguarded from its enemies. The 'white garment of faith was worn by the soul on its going forth from this dark night, when, walking in interior afflictions and darkness . . . it received no aid, in the form of light, from its understanding. . . . By the words of thy lips I keep hard ways. Next, over this white tunic of faith the soul now puts on the second colour, which is a green vestment. . . . For this green colour of living hope in God gives the soul such ardour and courage and aspiration to the things of eternal life that, by comparison with what it hopes for therein, all things of the world seem to it to be, as in truth they are, dry and faded and dead, and nothing worth. . . . Over the white and green vestments, as the crown and perfection of this disguise and livery, the soul now puts on the third colour, which is a splendid garment of purple. By this is denoted the third virtue, which is charity This not only adds grace to the other two colours, but causes the soul to rise to so lofty a point that it is brought near to God.'[1]

St. Bernard, and ancient writers generally, tell us that faith needs charity to be living faith, to be that faith that truly binds God to the soul. It is possible without *agape* still to retain a certain belief in God's word: but, though it be a faith sufficient to move mountains, it will not avail until charity returns. The faith that accepts God and His Christ and Christ's mystical Body, together with our adopted sonship and membership of that Body, forms a living whole with the hope and love of children. 'If you really believed,' it is sometimes said, 'you would not fail to put trust in God.' Trust in the heart and committal of our whole self should follow upon belief in the mind. Believe God, and you will believe in Him.

A strong reason for maintaining the distinction between faith, hope and love, even where they are actually joined in justifying

[1] *The Dark Night of the Soul*, II, 21. Works, tr. Allison Peers, I, 471-3.

faith, is to ensure the preservation of the distinctive meaning and value of faith. Where this value is confused with hope, faith's relationship to God's Word of truth is weakened. It easily becomes a vague trust that all is well. In reality, there should be nothing vague about Christian truth, even though it includes mysteries beyond human comprehension. Christian truth is neither vague nor abstract. Cullmann is one of those that have clearly put before us how God's revelation to man has been in terms of actual time and events. Moses and the prophets, and last of all Jesus Christ, were sent by God at datable moments of history. The tendency of Bultmann's theology to minimise the importance of Christ's datable life and death, in favour of what some writers call his existential-historical reality to each of us each day of our lives, removes his theology from traditional Christianity. In spite of his insistence on the historical character of Christianity, the historicity of Christ's life and death on earth becomes for him almost as irrelevant as it would have been for Aristotle or Plato or Hegel.

The Christian faith is a hearing of the voice of the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob and His Son, Jesus Christ, through whom His Father spoke, during the short time He was in this world; and through whose life and death He revealed Himself. For this reason, the Christian creed is not satisfied to say merely: 'I believe in Jesus Christ.' We consider it necessary to add a series of objective-historical statements to make it clear that our faith understands Him as one whose appearance in datable history was all-important for our redemption: 'born of the Virgin Mary, who suffered under Pontious Pilate, was crucified, dead and buried, and so forth.' The creed might almost have been written as a faith-protest against some second-century Bultmann. This Jesus who appeared on earth some nineteen centuries ago is the one in whom we place our hope, out of love for whom we leave all things to follow Him. It is this kind of faith, and this only, upon which all distinctively Christian response to God is based.

Christian, like Jewish, faith has never been merely a vague abandonment of oneself to the Supreme Being, with a general recognition of one's sinfulness and a confidence that God will forgive. The Christian knows Christ and His heavenly Father

through the Holy Spirit in His Church; for which reason the creed continues: 'I believe in the Holy Ghost, the Holy Catholic Church.' It is through the Holy Ghost that the meaning of Christ's proclamation, the meaning of the Christian gospel, has come down to us. Belief in the Holy Ghost implies not only acceptance of God and His Son and their Spirit, but belief in the action of that Spirit within the Church.

The above account of faith, it will be seen, does not accept Martin Buber's suggestion that there are two kinds of faith, one of which is belief in a truth and the other faith in a person. Faith has two objects. It is a way of reaching truth through trust in the ultimate personal Truth. For, in the supreme Truth, 'person' is no longer distinct from 'thing' nor from 'truth'. I have no doubt that a bogus faith is conceivable, which would be nothing more than the acceptance of certain unproved and personally unguaranteed propositions, as though they were passwords to the kingdom. But such faith would be bogus, since it could not truly command inner confidence. There is something like this when the followers of a school of thought—it sometimes happens to theologians—bind themselves uncompromisingly to a sort of party-line to defend the opinions of their group, even where the Word of God leaves the question open. It is the Word of God only, which came to us in Christ and the prophets at certain points of time and place, and is preserved in the living Church, which God's gift of faith enables us to accept in our hearts today, that remains the object and basis of Christianity. And it is accepted *as* the Word of God, the Supreme Truth. Those who guiltily refuse that word, when it reaches them, would be classed by Our Lord among those who cannot hear His voice, because they are not of God.

Christianity has always meant this, or it has meant nothing. It is surrender to God as the supreme truth, together with the recognition of Him where He has broken through into our world, together with the acceptance of His judgment on our sin, and surrender of our selves and lives to His service.

JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH IN PROTESTANT THOUGHT[1]

by The Rev. Professor Dr GUSTAF F. WINGREN

It is appropriate to begin this presentation with an extended citation from Luther, where this founder of 'Protestant thought' develops what he means by 'justification by faith'. We read in the Large Commentary to the Galatians:

> Faith lays hold upon Christ and has Him present, enclosing Him as the ring encloses the precious stone which is set in it. And he who is found to have laid hold upon Christ with such a faith and have Him in his heart, God counts for righteous. This is the reason or the merit through which we receive the forgiveness of sins and righteousness. Because you believe in Me, says God, and because your faith lays hold upon Christ, whom I have given to you to be your Justifier and Saviour, therefore be thou righteous. . . . And it is altogether necessary that God *accepts* us or *counts* us as righteous, first because we *are not* yet in this life wholly righteous, rather in this life sin always remains in the flesh. This sin remaining in the flesh God purges from us. Further we are also sometimes abandoned by the Holy Spirit and *fall* into sin, like Peter, David and other saints. But then we may always fall back upon this doctrine, that our sins are covered and that God will not impute them unto us (Rom. 4.7f). Not as though sin were not to be found. . . . On the contrary: sin is actually present, *and the pious know of it*, but *God does not know of it*. For Him it is hidden, since Christ the Mediator stands between us and God. Because we lay hold upon *Him* in faith, sin may not be sin. But where Christ and faith are absent, there is no forgiveness of sins, no concealing of sin, but there sin is imputed and judged. So does God will that the *Son* should be glorified, and that He Himself might be glorified in us through the Son. When we have in this way taught concerning faith in Christ, we teach also concerning good works. Because you through faith have laid hold upon Christ, through whom you are righteous, you are now to proceed to love God and your neighbour. Call upon God; thank, praise, laud and confess Him; serve your neighbour and do good to him; attend to your call![2]

'Justification by faith' is clearly the same thing as 'justification through Christ'. Faith lays hold upon Christ, as a ring encloses its precious stone. Because Christ is righteous, therefore faith 'makes man righteous'. Sin evidently remains in this

[1] Paper read before the *Society for the Study of Theology*, Oxford, 1956.
[2] W.A. 40:I, 233.17-234, 21.

righteous person, but this sin is unable to detract from this person's righteousness *before God* (*coram deo*). The person himself is aware of his sin, but *God* does not know of the sin: God sees *Christ*, the precious stone, and finds no sin in the person. But in this connexion it is of special interest to note that an activity against sin is well under way in the person. During the course of life God purges sin from the person. At other points in Luther it is expressed in this way, that 'the old man is daily crucified and put to death and a new man daily rises', that is the event of death and resurrection, which just is the event of *baptism*. Baptism continues to be realised each day, until death and resurrection have finally occurred, that is to say, until the resurrection of the dead at the last day. Furthermore it is clear, that the justified person is exhorted with his deeds to obey God's will, just *because* he now is righteous: to thank, laud and praise God! Serve your neighbour and do good to him! Work and toil are thus directed toward the *neighbour*, while the song of praise and thanksgiving rises up to God.

Now that we have considered such a long and detailed text about justification, we may set forth the following *central problem*: When Luther expressly speaks of God's gradually driving out sin through struggle in man and exhorts man to praise and work, why does he lay such emphasis on the fact that justification takes place through faith *alone*, without any works? One can arrive at an answer to this question only by strictly concentrating one's attention on what was said in the long citation above about justification as the removing of sin *before God*. It is *coram deo* that man is righteous, when he lays hold on Christ in faith. 'Sin is actually present, and the pious know of it, but God does not know of it.' Luther speaks often of 'heaven' and 'earth' as two different kingdoms. In heaven Christ reigns with His Gospel, that is to say, with pure giving and grace. Man enters this heavenly Kingdom through faith, which receives and lays hold on the Gospel and thereby on Christ Himself. But the neighbour lives on earth, and one does not believe and trust in him. One does not receive salvation from him, but rather serves the neighbour in one's daily work. We may set forth the following proposition: If man seeks to take the *works* which God commands him to do and bring these works *before God*, man thereby abolishes God's

order both in 'heaven' and on 'earth'. For in heaven the Gospel reigns alone. Here to seek to place works *before God* as a means of justification is an attempt to depose Christ from His throne. Man allows his works to compete with the King of heaven. But at the same time *the neighbour* is pushed aside in the *earthly* kingdom, for works are not done for the neighbour's sake, but in order that I might adorn myself with them before God. Christ is 'dethroned' in heaven and the neighbour is 'dethroned' on earth. Faith is abolished and destroyed in heaven, love and service are contaminated on earth. They have received an accessory religious motive and have thereby lost their purity, their character of pure and unselfish service to the *neighbour*. The work and toil on earth are commanded by God in relation to the neighbour. In relation to God, on the other hand, man can only thank, laud and praise, just as the receiver thanks and sings the praises of the Giver, the Creator.

When Luther inserts the little word *alone* and speaks of 'justification by faith alone', this does not mean any lack of interest in works. The situation is rather the contrary. He is precisely interested in the *purity of works* when he inserts the word 'alone'. Through emphasising that justification occurs by faith alone, Luther wishes first to keep the God-relationship free from all thoughts of merit, and second to keep the relationship to the neighbour free from all religious selfishness. No deeds for the neighbour may be done out of 'feigned' love for the neighbour and with striving after my own salvation as the hidden motive under the 'feigned' love for the neighbour. Works are to be done here on earth with the neighbour as the only end. Therefore works must not be done by a person who veiledly pursues his own salvation, but they must be done by a person who already *is* saved, and who is certain of his righteousness before God. Such saved, righteous and jubilant people are created by the *Gospel*, through which Christ Himself comes and gives Himself to man, so that man can lay hold upon Him, as the ring lays hold upon the precious stone.

But it becomes clearer if we express all this in another way. When we take offence at the little word 'alone' and wish to supplement faith with something else which is to be added to faith, then as a rule we are thinking of two magnitudes standing over against one another: on the one side God, on the other

side man. Here man is the lower, the empty, the merely receptive side. But we do not think of a hostile power against God, an active enemy standing against God, which continually distorts and destroys what God creates and gives. We think only of God on the one side and the finite, limited individual on the other side. In this context the formula 'faith alone' makes a poor impression—it is as though the whole struggle and all the activity of life were to disappear out of human existence, and man had only one religious function left: faith, only faith, no works. But Luther has not conceived the situation in this way. His point of departure is this, that a power hostile to God is continually rising in rebellion, and—above all!—that this power hostile to God reaches its culmination and its most refined form just in man's *religious* life. *He who thinks that all religiosity is good cannot at all understand Luther's doctrine of justification.* The point of departure for this doctrine is the confrontation with a religiosity and a morality of great strictness and refinement, which in Luther's opinion in its most inner root is *selfishness*, a creation of perverted, legalistic man, who uses *all* for his own ends, who elevates all his works before God in order thereby to make himself righteous, and who unceasingly deprives the neighbour of those *services* which the neighbour needs, and deprives Christ of the *praise* which is due to Him. Against this hostile, satanic power God sets His Word of justification by faith, faith alone, and through this Word the song of praise is raised to Christ alone, who makes all so righteous and pure before God that nothing is lacking, while at the same time all human deeds and work 'are thrown down upon the earth'—*there* you have a function to perform. *There* you are to be engaged in the welfare of the neighbour and human community!

In the foregoing we have several times mentioned the *Gospel* or the *Word*. The attire in which Christ is clothed when He comes and establishes His dominion is just the Gospel, the spoken, the preached word. Here is a point, it seems to me, at which English theology has particular difficulties in understanding Luther. My impression, when I read English discussion of Reformation theology, is this, that one at times interprets Luther as though he were a revivalist from the eighteenth or nineteenth century, that is as if 'faith' were an

experience in the style of a pietistic break-through. And then when one on the other side reacts against this historically incorrect picture of Luther, one brings in counteracting *objective* elements into the picture: Luther emphasised the sacraments and the Church. It is true that he did emphasise the sacraments and the Church. But if I may now continue with a terminology foreign to Luther, a terminology which has been determined by the opposition between Anglicans and Free Churchmen, I should like to formulate the matter in this way: The most important sacrament is *the Word*, the orally spoken Word, taken out of the Scriptures and put in men's ears, in the same way that the bread and the wine are extended to men's mouths. 'Faith' is not an experience which man may have apart from the Word. Rather 'faith' is awakened in the heart by the Word of the Gospel, and cannot be awakened apart from this Word. It is toward this Word that faith clingingly directs itself. Faith 'lays hold upon' the Word and thereby upon Christ, who dwells in the Word and comes in the Word. Luther's discovery of the meaning of Rom. 1.15-17 is often described pietistically as Luther's 'conversion' in the monastery, but the pietistic conversion is something else. The pietist already knows what the Word of the Bible means. In his 'conversion' he becomes certain that this Word refers *to him*, that he may apply it to himself, and so forth. But Luther's discovery in the monastery was a discovery of *what was written* in Rom. 1.15-17, that is: that *righteousness is given in the Word of the Gospel and received in faith*, and when he had discovered that, this discovery of *the meaning of the Word* was *eo ipso* a discovery of *the righteousness which is a gift*. The Word of the Gospel includes within itself man's righteousness. When the Word of the Gospel is spoken it gives the righteousness which dwells in the Word to man.

But if one thus draws a distinction between Luther and later revival movements, it is equally important to draw a distinction between Luther and a common Anglican view, in which the sacraments are emphasised. For in this Anglican view the sermon as a spoken Word is not itself a giver of God's grace. The sermon can speak of grace and it can describe for the hearer the sacraments and the Church as instruments and organs for God's grace. But ordinarily *the sermon itself* is not

viewed in Anglican theology as an instrument and organ appointed by God, through which grace *is given*, through which, accordingly, grace and forgiveness, that is to say, justification, streams into the listening individual, so that he through listening in faith *becomes righteous*. But this is the way Luther thinks. His doctrine of the Word is related to the Old Testament doctrine of the Word as creative. This creative Word has become flesh in Christ and is now sent out into the world through the apostles and their preaching. It reaches us directly out of the pages of the Bible and it is heard in preaching and thus contacts us.

God wills that we should exclusively direct ourselves to and hold fast upon the Word. He wills that we should select the core and not the shell, and esteem the housefather more than the house. In Peter and Paul he wills that we should not admire or adore the apostolic office but *Christ*, who speaks in them, and God's own *Word*, which *proceeds from their mouths*.[1]

Such a doctrine of the Word, as something through which Christ now comes to us, builds upon the presupposition that Christ is living and active. The term 'faith' provided for Luther a possibility of depicting this activity of *Christ*, whereas on the other hand 'reason' was viewed by him as something through which *we* seek for ways to God, whereby the activity becomes our own and Christ is deposed from His royal throne.

The human reason has the law as its object: this I have done, that I have not done. But faith in its proper function has absolutely no other object than Jesus Christ, God's Son, delivered up for the sins of the world. Faith does not look upon love (that is, not on *man's* love), it does not say: What have I done? Which sins have I committed? Which merits have I achieved? But rather it says: What has *Christ* done? What has He merited? Then the Gospel truth answers: He has redeemed you from sin, the devil and eternal death. Faith therefore sees that in this person, Jesus Christ, it has the forgiveness of sins and eternal life.[2]

Since in later times this connexion of faith with Christ's activity and presence has to a certain extent been dissolved, and since 'faith' has become *a* human act, namely an inner psychic process implying the exclusion of *other* human acts, namely 'works', one can put the question whether the term 'justification by faith alone' does not at times hide and conceal the reality, which should be expressed through this term. For the reality is: justification through *Christ* alone. This is what

[1] W.A. 40:I, 173, 19-23. [2] W.A. 40:I, 164, 19-28.

Luther intended. But in modern times the term 'faith alone' suggests rather: justification through a kind of human effort, inner psychical efforts as distinct from other efforts, from 'works'. The original Reformation doctrine of justification by faith alone placed the fact that the active, living Christ comes to us in the centre, in such a way, that this doctrine spontaneously issued in a positive approach to 'works'. The doctrine of justification moves directly into a doctrine of daily work, of the earth and of the neighbour, in which all human effort in the service of the good is positively valued. Christ is given and bestowed upon us in justification. We may now give ourselves to our neighbour, summoning all our powers in his service. *Nothing* of our power need now be used for the purpose of making ourselves righteous before God. All of our energies can be put at the disposal of human need.

But now it is right to say something also about justification and the sacraments according to Luther. We have just emphasised that preaching in the present as the spoken word gives righteousness or the forgiveness of sins, that is to say, justifies the hearer. This preaching does in so far as *Christ Himself* now speaks *His own Word* through it. Christ's Word reaches us through the Bible, and preaching is nothing else than a voice now sounding, through which the Word of the Scripture—that is, Christ—speaks. Preaching is subordinated to Christ's own Word. In exactly the same way baptism and holy communion are subordinated to Christ's Word. It is Christ's Word in baptism and holy communion, which gives to baptism and holy communion the power these sacraments have, a power always to restore anew 'the forgiveness of sins', that is, justification. For 'justification' and 'the forgiveness of sins' are the same. Man's righteousness *before God* consists in the fact that sin is hidden and taken away in Christ.

It would be incorrect to say that baptism and holy communion stand *under* preaching and that preaching alone is an instrument for the Word. On the other hand it is correct to say, that preaching, baptism, holy communion are all three instruments for *the Word*, that is to say, for the living *Christ*, and that baptism and holy communion in this sense are subordinated to the Word (but not to the preaching). This means that baptism and holy communion are directly connected with

justification by faith alone. When Christ (the eternal Word of God) justifies through faith alone, He uses the sacraments (and preaching) as the external means. Here it will be sufficient to cite certain central passages from Luther's two catechisms.

> To be baptised in the name of God, this is not to be baptised by men, but by God Himself . . . not because this water in and of itself is nobler than other water, but because *God's Word and command* are added to it. . . . For this is the very essence of the water: God's Word or command and God's name, which treasure is greater and nobler than heaven and earth. (The Large Catechism)[1]

The 'Word' which is here referred to is the words of institution, through which Christ establishes baptism, but these words continue in the present to accompany every baptismal act, and they are a Gospel united to the act of baptism, spoken directly by Christ or God Himself to the baptised one and to all who listen, a *promise* of salvation. This promise lying in the Word is received by man in *faith*. Baptism is each day for the baptised one an open promise of justification, which remains even though the baptised one may fall. Therefore the Christian is to be 'clothed in his baptism' every day. He is not to depart from baptism but rather is to return to it, and with baptism as a weapon he has to beat down all temptations. Here the Word connected with baptism is the actual basis for trust:

> The water indeed does not do it, but the *Word of God*, connected with the water, and our faith which relies on that Word of God. . . . (The Small Catechism)[2]

The question why we have received in the sacraments means which give us the same thing as the preached Gospel, is one Luther never asked. Such a question first arises when one no longer thinks in terms of a hostile power against God, a power which threatens man's eternal life. Then it becomes natural to ask what preaching offers, what baptism offers, what holy communion offers (it being understood: if the sacraments do not offer something *other* than that which the Word offers, there is no reason for using them!). But if health is constantly threatened, there is nothing unusual in saying that nutritive food gives health, sun and fresh air give health, gymnastics and exercise give health, physicians and medicine give health, and so forth. Luther and the Reformation live in such a thought-

[1] W.A. 30:I, 213, 12—214, 6. [2] W.A. 30:I, 381, 6-8.

world. God through *many* means gives us this one thing: the forgiveness of sins, righteousness, life, salvation.

Consequently justification returns as the main theme, even when we move from baptism to holy communion. Here too Christ's words of institution are placed in the centre. But the words of institution are not regarded as words of consecration, spoken by the priest over the bread and the wine, while the elements are elevated and presented before God. Rather these words are creative words of promise, which at the distribution of the bread and the wine accompany the elements into the receiving individuals, so that the words reach the ears of the communicants in the same way as the bread and the wine reach the mouths. Of this the Formula of Concord says some time after Luther's death:

> The true and almighty words of Jesus Christ, which He spoke at the institution of holy communion, were not only efficacious at the first communion, but they continue to be valid, working, and are yet efficacious, so that by the virtue and the power of the same words, which Christ spoke at the first communion, the body and blood of Christ are truly present, *distributed and received* in all places where holy communion is celebrated according to the institution of Christ *and His Word is used.* For where one holds fast to His institution, speaks His Word over the bread and the chalice, and then *distributes* the blessed bread and wine, there *Christ Himself* through the spoken words, by virtue of the first institution is *powerful through His Word,* which He would have repeated.[1]

And this Christ's own coming in holy communion has the same hostile power to overcome as always: the claim of human works to be able to climb up to God's heaven. The doctrine of Christ's real presence in holy communion directs itself polemically against the doctrine of the offering of the mass. Christ is 'distributed' and 'given' to the communion guests, but He is not offered by the priest and presented before God. This polemical thrust is altogether the same as in the doctrine of justification by *faith*, that is, by the fact that the living Christ comes to us, as opposed to justification by *works*, that is, by our working with a dead Christ before a passive, receiving God.

But the connexion with justification by faith becomes especially clear in Luther's words about holy communion in the Small Cathecism. There one sees also, how the Word in communion is a Word of promise and dispensation, the Gospel

[1] *Die Bekenntnisschriften der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche*, 2nd ed., 1952, p. 998.

upon which faith lays hold, as the elements are received by the mouth. Since holy communion is a constantly new offering of the forgiveness of sins, holy communion is a constantly renewed act of justification. Now the citation:

> What is the benefit of such eating and drinking? It is pointed out in these words: Given and shed for you for the remission of sins. Through these words the remission of sins, life and salvation are given unto us in the sacrament; for where there is remission of sins, there is also life and salvation. How can the bodily eating and drinking produce such great benefits? The eating and drinking, indeed, do not produce them, but the *words*: Given and shed for you for the remission of sins. For besides the bodily eating and drinking, these words are the chief thing in the Sacrament; and *he who believes them* has what they say and *declare*, namely the remission of sins.[1]

These words about holy communion relate themselves naturally to those words about justification, with which we introduced our presentation.

> Faith lays hold upon Christ and has Him present, enclosing Him, as the ring encloses . . . the precious stone. And he who is found to have laid hold upon Christ with such a faith and have Him in his heart, God counts for righteous. This is the reason or the merit through which we receive the forgiveness of sins and righteousness.[2]

And just as one can draw a direct line from justification to the struggle of the Christian life and to deeds in the service of the neighbour, so there is also a direct line from the sacraments out to human community and the social life. We have already in an introductory manner suggested this with respect to baptism. Baptism is realised as a daily death and a daily resurrection in the work of the earthly calling. And the same is true with respect to holy communion, especially in Luther's earlier writings. The doctrine of the sacraments also reveals itself to be a part of the doctrine of justification by faith in that the doctrine of the sacraments is seen to include a clear concern for works, namely—here as elsewhere—for the freeing of works from egocentric religious motives. Through baptism and holy communion it is Christ, the Justifier, who comes, and He comes in the power of His *Word*, without men's works bringing about His presence. But that person to whom He comes is placed by the Lord of the sacraments in a daily struggle and a daily ministry in relation to his fellow men.[3]

[1] W.A. 30:I, 390, 4-391, 3. [2] W.A. 40:I, 233, 17-19.
[3] See, for example, W.A. 2, 748, 6-26 (a sermon on holy communion from 1519).

LUTHER AND THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH[1]

by The Rev. Professor GORDON RUPP

It is important for the historian that he should exercise a salutary scepticism towards his materials and his sources, but even more important that he should adopt this detachment towards himself, and when confronted by apparent confusion and contradiction in some great figure of the past, to ask whether perhaps he himself as historian may be asking the wrong questions, and evaluating another century in the themes and categories of a later age. This is particularly true about Luther's doctrines of the Church. For while there is no doctrine of the Church which does not somewhere blur its edges (by reason of the eternal and eschatological dimension intersecting the empirical and historical plane) and Luther's is no exception, there is I think a demonstrably consistent core to his teaching, from the beginning to the end of his career.

From the intricate and profound Luther studies of the last thirty years, two assured findings emerge. The first, that as Heinrich Bornkamm has said 'the inner, personal experience of Luther, and his scholarly and above all exegetical discoveries cannot be separated'.[2] This seems worth stressing since the modern professional historian is singularly unhandy with theology, and especially Protestant theology, and only too

[1] The substance of this short essay was read before the Tenth World Congress of Historians in Rome, 6th September 1955. It bears a relation to a paper read by the distinguished Roman Catholic historian, Hubert Jedin, 'Zur Entwicklung des Kirchenbegriffs im 16. Jahrhundert'. (*'Relazioni'* vol. 4, pp. 59ff, ed. G. C. Sansoni, Florence 1955). In this luminous and learned address Professor Jedin distinguished three elements in late medieval ecclesiology, the curialist Papalism, the Conciliar ideology, and a so-called 'spiritualist' doctrine represented by mystics and heretics. On p. 65 he asserts that 'the decisive years for the development of Luther's doctrine of the Church are 1517-20 . . . and all three elements in the late medieval doctrine are operative in him'. This I take to be a serious misstatement of Luther's development and doctrine which I sought to adjust in the short 'communication' delivered to the Congress later the same day.

[2] H. Boehmer, *Der Junge Luther* (ed. Bornkamm, 1939), 362.

eager to plunge into the foggy categories of psychology or religious experience.[1]

The second is, that Luther's theology in its main outlines antedates the Church struggle which began with the Indulgence controversy in 1517 and is in no sense a mere rationalisation of that conflict. It is above all plain, as Karl Holl showed, that the main elements of Luther's doctrine of the Church may be found in his first course of lectures on the Psalms 1513-15.[2]

The consequences of this are most important. For it means that to find the pedigree of Luther's doctrine of the Church in the 'spiritualist doctrine of the Church' expounded by heretics and mystics in the later middle Ages is simply to take the old Protestant fallacy about 'Reformers before the Reformation' and turn it upside down. For if Luther's doctrine of the Church, in its main stresses, can be found as early as 1513-15 he wrote them at a time when he himself was an ardent papalist, with no sense at all that what he believed about the nature of the Church need conflict with acceptance either of its hierarchical structure, or of the supremacy of the Pope. Luther always insisted that he began as an enthusiastic and even extreme papalist, and as far as I know, none of his opponents contradicted him on this point. Even the Occamist element, so difficult to assess, in his background, was like that of Gabriel Biel, not the anti-papal brand. It is indeed interesting to observe that Luther accepted the divine authority of the Pope at a time when the young Sir Thomas More believed that the papal supremacy was a matter only of human law.

Luther's stress on the Church as primarily the Communion of Saints, the People of God, is not derived from late medieval theories but returns to the doctrine of the mystical Body which in modern times has been so eloquently expounded by such Roman theologians as Pères Mersch and de Lubac.

When the article on 'the Church' in the *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*[3] quotes St. Augustine's definition of the

[1] Here one must differ from the exclusively religious interpretation of Luther put forward by Professor Le Febvre and perhaps underlying the remark of Professor E. J. Léonard (*Relazioni*, 4. 80. 'La notion et le fait de l'église dans la reforme Protestante'). Luther's ecclesiology bears permanently the trace of this 'inutilité de l'église' to use too strong a term in his determining religious experience.

[2] Gesammelte Aufsätze, *Luther*, 292ff.

[3] *Dict. Théol. cath.*, Tome 4, Partie 2, col. 2109.

Church as 'comprehending all the just from the time of Abel to the end of the world' and the statement by St. Thomas that the Church *secundum statum viae* is the *congregatio fidelium*, it cites the doctrine which Luther found in the Scriptures, in the Fathers, and, as he loved to insist, in the Apostle's Creed.

In his first lectures on the Psalms this thought is expressed in succinct aphorisms, many of them taken from St. Augustine though Luther himself does not stress the phrase 'invisible Church' or the doctrine of election as much as the ecclesiologies of Augustine or Huss. But he does insist that the Church is *sola fide perceptibilis*,[1] to be recognised by faith alone. To the unbeliever the Church is simply a strange human institution, its identity unintelligible, as in the analogy suggested by Ernst Rietschel, music may be a meaningless blur of sounds to the tone deaf. As those who have an ear for music hear the pattern and the harmony, so by faith the Christian recognises that this absurd and puny fellowship, abject, despised, persecuted in history, is the Bride of Christ wearing the Form of a Servant.

This does not at all imply that the Church is unreal. 'When I have called the Church a "spiritual assembly",' he wrote against Emser in 1521, 'you have insultingly taken it to mean that I would build a Church as Plato built a State that never was.'[2] Luther's stress on the inwardness of the Church was rather as William Pauck suggests, a protest against the impersonalising of the Church by the lop-sided institutionalism of the over clericalised and secularised Church of his time. The first thing to be said about the Church is that it exists *coram Deo*, and the second that it consists of persons.

But the magisterial theme of Luther's ecclesiology, and its integrating element, is the doctrine of the Word, for it links his doctrine of the Church inseparably with his doctrine of salvation.[3] It is a cardinal point of Luther's theology that sinful man cannot, in this fallen world, meet God face to face. This would be to confront *Deus Nudus*, God in His Majesty, and it would be unbearable. God in His kindness has met this situation in the Incarnation of the Eternal Word, His dear Son, and second in the Church and in the means of Grace, and

[1] Holl, 296ff. Rupp, *The Righteousness of God*, 317ff. [2] W.A. 7. 683.9.

[3] Just as, if we ignore Luther's theology and concentrate only on his religious experience, the ecclesiology becomes an alien and disparate element.

so has made faith the medium of our commerce with Himself, the grand means of our schooling along the way to heaven.[1]

So in his remarkable letter to Amsdorf who had been made Bishop of Naumberg in 1542 he says:

> For the Church must appear in the world. But it can only appear in a covering (*larva*) a veil, a shell, or some kind of outward clothes which a man can grasp, otherwise it can never be found. But such a mask is a Married Man, or somebody in domestic life, John, Peter, Martin, Amsdorf, etc., and yet none of them is the Church which is neither man nor wife, Jew nor Greek, but Christ alone.[2]

The famous sentence in 'Wider Hans Worst' (1541) which is often quoted to show Luther's 'spiritualist' views is really a careful, balanced sentence in which the second half is as important as the first, 'O it is a high, deep, hidden thing is the Church, which nobody may perceive or see, but can only grasp by faith in Baptism, Word and Sacrament.'

The polarity of Word and Sacrament is asserted in the famous definition of the Church in Luther's Schmalkaldic Articles (1538): 'Thank God a child of seven knows what the Church is, the holy believers and the lambs who hear their shepherd's voice.' And we must not here, nor elsewhere, mistake Luther's limpid simplicity for sentimentalism. The reference to John X was of immense practical significance for the Reformation. The first Thesis of the disputation of Berne (1528) with its immense consequences for the Swiss Reformation began with a similar reference: 'The Holy Christian Church whose only head is Christ, is born from the Word of God, and abides in the Word and hears not the voice of strangers.'[3] It is this theme of the creative Presence of Christ, in His Church which is the nerve of all the really creative work of Martin Luther, the German Bible, the classic Catechisms,

[1] I have given references in *The Righteousness of God*, 320ff. See W.A. 45.522.7: 'For we cannot suffer yet the clear sight and showing forth of His majesty and so it must be covered and veiled and behind a thick cloud. So it is decided that he who would grasp them both, the Father and the Son, must do so through the Word.' WML. 5. 292-3 (Philadelphia edn.): 'They are called Word, Baptism, Sacrament and Forgiveness . . . of God Himself: for it is His will to act for the comfort and good of us poor feeble men through them and not through his unveiled, evident bright majesty, for who could bear that for an instant in this sinful poor flesh?'

[2] W.A. Br.9. 608.

[3] W.A. 51.507.9. In this tract, and in 'Of Councils and Churches' (1539) Luther extends these visible manifestations to include a called and ordained ministry, public worship, the Keys, and to be 'under the Cross' of persecution.

the incomparable hymns, the not insignificant liturgical writings, the massive collections of sermons and commentaries —all concerned one way and another to let the Word go free. It is the Word who is the touchstone of doctrine, and the author of creative innovation.[1]

But if the essentials of Luther's doctrine of the Church antedate the Church struggle, it was naturally and inevitably affected by the momentum of events 1517-21. In the months preceding the Leipzig Disputation he read intensively the Decretals, and Church History (studies which moved his mind more drastically than the reading, months later, of the *De Ecclesia* of Huss). It was one consequence of his initial papalism and the pace of this new *Blitzkrieg* that he could find no halfway house, no halting place in the Maginot line of the Conciliar ideology. Thus in the Leipzig Disputation the climax came when Luther declared that among the articles condemned by the Council of Constance were many that were truly Christian. And when in the fateful days following the Diet of Worms Luther was granted what he had sought in vain for three years, a reasonable hearing before learned judges, the discussions broke down not about Papal supremacy but on the question of the fallibility of Councils. Naturally, like many of his fellow countrymen, Luther welcomed the possibility of a great German council which could deal with national grievances, and he approved, though never with the fervour of Calvin or Cranmer, the thought of a 'truly, free, Christian Council'. But there is little exaggeration in what he said in 1541:

> For ourselves, we have never desired a Council to reform our Church. For God the Holy Ghost has so cleansed our Church through His Holy Word, . . . that we have everything (thank God) pure and holy, Word, Baptism, Sacrament, the Keys and all which pertains to the true Church . . .

[1] *Werke* (Münich ed.) 3.94. 'For the soul of man is an eternal thing: above all things which are temporal: therefore it may only be ruled and embraced by the eternal Word . . . so that it is invidious to try to rule the conscience before God in terms of human law and custom' WML. 4.359. 'What is altered according to God's Word is no innovation, for all customs must give way to God's Word as your own law says. For God and His Word are older than you: they will also be younger than you and we, for they are eternal' W.A. 12.192.34. 'For what is not new that Faith does? Was it not a new thing when the apostles instituted their ministry? Was it not a new thing when Abraham offered his son? Was it not a new thing when Israel crossed the sea? Will it not be a new thing when I shall pass from death to life? But in all these things it is the Word of God and not the novelty which matters.'

holy and pure without human accretions . . . only our life has not kept pace as we should like, as the prophets and apostles also used to complain.[1]

Above all, in these months Luther moved to drastic repudiation of his allegiance to the Roman Church. Some words written in June 1520 perhaps mark the point at which he hardened his heart, with that finality which accompanied his repudiation of Karlstadt, Zwingli and Erasmus and which was no doubt a defect in his temperament.

Farewell unhappy, hopeless, blasphemous Rome. The Wrath of God hath come upon thee as thou deservest. We have cared for Babylon and she is not healed. Let us then leave her that she may become a habitation of dragons, spectres and witches.[2]

But other stresses were born from these months. Out of the isolation and loneliness, came an awareness of true Christian solidarity, beautifully expressed in his Sermon on the Sacrament of the Altar, his expositions of the Fourteen Psalms of Consolation, and of the Magnificat, his fine exposition of the pioneers of the Old Testament in his lectures on Hebrews. Then, as he became entangled with the theologians of the Curia, a new insistence on the Real Presence of Christ on earth as ruling in the midst of the Church. 'Christ in heaven is the head of the Church: and He ruleth alone.'[3] 'Christ is in heaven in the form of a Ruler, and needs no Vicar, but He sits and sees and knows all things, and all power is His. He needs a Vicar who will be in the Form of a Servant, that form in which he walked on earth, preaching, toiling, suffering and dying.'[4]

The signs of this present Rule of Christ are the visible forms of Word and Sacraments, to which Luther later added the 'notes' of the Keys, public worship, an ordered ministry, and to be 'under the Cross' of suffering and persecution.[5]

The priesthood of all believers is the corollary of this, the consequence of a view of the Church *coram Deo*. This doctrine becomes explicit in the period 1520-3,[6] but if as a technical expression it lapses in Luther's later works, the idea remains fundamental to his impressive doctrine of *Weltliche Obrigkeit*, of the secular power, and of the callings of Christian men, for Luther's doctrine of the Church must never be studied in

[1] *Wider Hans Worst.* [2] W.A. 6. 329. [3] WML. 1. 357. [4] WML. 2. 109.
[5] In 'Councils and Churches' (1539) and *Wider Hans Worst.*
[6] We cannot here discuss the alleged evanescent congregationalism of Luther and the question of the autonomy of the *Gemeinde*.

isolation from his doctrine of the Two Kingdoms, and the three hierarchies (the home, politics, the Church) while Törnvall has finely shown how both doctrines find their unity in the one all-embracing Rule of God. Like much else in Luther these doctrines become coherent when we consider them in terms of that eternal dimension, *coram Deo*.

From 1523 onwards there came upon him daily the care of the Churches. More than most men, Luther tackled what came to him day by day, the least doctrinaire of all the Reformers (not forgetting Zwingli). It would be a fair criticism that he has most to say about the centre of the Church, and too little about the circumference. Certainly we must go elsewhere, to Strasbourg and the Swiss cities, Basel, Zürich, Geneva to find an intricate discussion of that which was to obsess the second generation of Reform and to perplex and strain it for the next century and a half—the new third dimension of the Protestant ecclesiology, which added to Word and Sacrament—the Discipline of Christ.

Luther's vehement and often outrageous 'No Popery' is different from that of the moralists, from Geiler of Kaysersberg, Wimpfeling, Colet, Savonarola. 'We oppose the Pope', he said, 'not as Muntzer does, *propter personam* but *propter Deum*.[1] The Papacy was not simply a tyranny for him. By its entanglement with politics and law, with the great game of war and diplomacy, and the perversion of the machinery of pastoral care, the Law and Gospel have been disastrously confused, and the souls of men and women brought into the very kind of legal bondage from which Christ came to set men free. For such a tyranny there can be only one category, the demonic, biblical tyranny of Anti-Christ.

Like many of Luther's doctrines, it has a medieval pedigree, but he gives it his characteristic impress, and one with consequences for the Protestant appeal to history. When Robert Barnes wrote his *Lives of the Popes* (1535), Luther wrote a Preface for his English disciple in which he affirmed that the facts of history themselves testify 'as though indicated with a finger' and in a way which cries aloud, the doctrine in Daniel and Paul of the great Adversary.[2] The doctrine of Anti-Christ

[1] W.A. 40. 1. 178. [2] W.A. 50.5. On the doctrine of the Pope as Anti-Christ, W.A. Br.1.359.29, W.A. Br.2. 48.26.

determines the complicated structure of the famous Magdeburg Centuries of Flaccius Illyricus (1559-74). What has not I think been noticed is that this same time-scheme is taken over by the English historian John Foxe as the frame for his great *Acts and Monuments of the Martyrs*, not least in the division of history into two periods after the year A.D. 1000, the period of the Rule of Anti-Christ, and the time of his revealing in his true colours. The pessimism of this view of Church History is not to be exaggerated. The primary insistence is not that history is increasingly dominated by demonic forces, but the theme of a conflict within Christendom, in which evil is held in check by the abiding presence of the Word of God.

These first Protestant Church-historians have little to say about a Fall of the Church in the time of Constantine. It is Thomas Muntzer for whom the falling away from primitive Christianity is a central theme, in the notion imbedded in his Prague manifesto, which he claimed to find in Hegesippus and Eusebius, that the virgin Church was defiled in the time of the disciples of the Apostles, in the sub-apostolic age. For Luther and his friends Constantine is the good symbol of the godly magistrate. The Magdeburg Centuries in its second volume tells how Constantine not only repaired the state of the Church, but 'even increased its splendour' and it is no accident that it is this particular volume which was dedicated to Queen Elizabeth of England.'[1]

The Protestant answer to the taunt 'Where was your Church before Luther?' was given by Luther in *Wider Hans Worst* in the claim that the evangelicals are the 'true, old Church', one with the continuing people of God, now shining out once again 'like the sun from behind the clouds'. In his great course of lectures on Genesis (1535-45) Luther has a remarkable discussion of the story of how Esau and Jacob collided in their mother's womb. He takes the exegesis of Paul and Augustine and applies it, not to the theme of predestination, but to a dynamism within Church-history. In *The City of God* Augustine traced a dualism within history of two ultimate societies, and Luther transfers this to the story of the Church. Here too there is a dualism, the biblical constrast between an Israel 'after the

[1] *Ecclesia Historica integram ecclesiae ideam . . . complectans, congesta per aliquot studiosos et pios viros in urbe Magdeburgica.* Bas. 1559.

flesh' and 'after the Spirit'. As in the world, so in the Church there is the temptation of *cupiditas*, the lust for *dominium*, an absorption in worldly pressures. Luther does not unchurch Rome, and he stops short of a complete dualism. Rather he sees this tension and conflict as running through all Church-history.

> The Holy Spirit wants us to have the two brothers perpetually before our eyes, and as a daily proverb. For at all times we are either Esauites or Jacobites, . . . and even if we were to conquer the Pope and his men, and if our doctrine which belongs to the true Church were to prevail, yet even out of our midst there would arise new Papists and Turks, who would sell the name of the Church (as Esau sold his birthright). So it is always, Cain and Abel, Esau and Jacob.[1]

This dynamism, like the doctrine of Anti-Christ, is bounded by eschatology. Luther's doctrine of the Church is, as Père Congar says 'an ecclesiology of crisis' but the phrase itself suggests a return to New Testament dimensions. If, like the first Christians, Luther believed the end of history was at hand, like them too, he believed that each syllable of recorded time might be a *Stündlein*, an hour when God confronts men with judgment and salvation. And if the life of the Church on earth is by faith, and so, as Luther says, not in the indicative but in the imperative and optative mood, it will be revealed at the end of the day that the grand theme of human history has been the Royal Progress of the Word.

[1] W.A. 43.418.6. On this doctrine see P. Congar. *Vraie et fausse Réforme dans L'église*, Paris, 1950; and for a critique, Rupp, op. cit. 328ff.

MARK'S UNDERSTANDING OF HISTORY

by The Rev. Professor JAMES M. ROBINSON

1. *The history of Marcan Interpretation*

A century of intense research[1] on Mark has largely failed to reach generally accepted conclusions either as to the theology of Mark, or as to the degree of legitimacy and the methodology of using Mark as a source for discussing Jesus. This confusion in Marcan research is due in large measure to a failure to reach clarity as to Mark's understanding of history, a problem which should logically have been resolved before any attempt was made to use Mark as a historical source for the study of Jesus. The nineteenth century, reaching its climax in H. J. Holtzmann, assumed that since Mark was the earliest gospel it was most historical, i.e. that Mark wrote history with much the same presuppositions as did the modern historian.[2] History consists in the interaction of human wills and actions, and is to be explained by locating the causal connexions in the intentions and actions of men. For example, Mark 6.14-29 records the beheading of John by Herod; the next paragraph records Jesus withdrawing to privacy for rest with the disciples. Mark was assumed to mean—although remarkably enough he in no word hinted it—that one event followed chronologically upon the other and was caused by the other.[3]

[1] Intense study of Mark really only began with the establishment of Marcan priority over Matthew and Luke, which was first seen by Christian Gottlieb Wilke, 'Über die Parabel von den Arbeitern im Weinberge Matth. 20.1-16', *Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie*, I (1826), 73-88, and was proved by Carl Lachmann, 'De ordine narrationum in evangeliis synopticis', *ThStKr*, VIII (1835), 570-590, Wilke, *Der Urevangelist*, 1838, and Christian Hermann Weisse, *Die Evangelische Geschichte kritisch und philosophisch bearbeitet*, 1838.

[2] The classic proof both for the Marcan priority and for the historicity of the Marcan presentation is Holtzmann's *Die synoptischen Evangelien*, 1863. The history of this bifocal 'Marcan hypothesis' is given by A. Schweitzer, *The Quest for the Historical Jesus*, 1910, pp. 193ff, and H. J. Ebeling, *Das Messiasgeheimnis und die Botschaft des Marcus-Evangelisten*, 1939, pp. 19ff.

[3] The detailed explanation of the Marcan order continues to be obscure, but the motive in this case may be to suggest the time lapse between the sending out (6.7-13) and the return (6.30ff) of the 'twelve'. Cf. E. von Dobschutz, 'Zur Erzählerkunst des Markus', *ZNTW*, XXVII (1928), 193-198. The choice of the

At the turn of the century the reaction in Marcan research came. Wrede[1] declared that Mark was built not upon a historian's presuppositions, but upon dogmatic tenets; Schweitzer[2] affirmed that the narrative was held together not by psychological, pragmatic motivations, but by eschatological doctrines tried out in history; Wellhausen[3] said the gospels are primary sources for the Christology of A.D. 70, but only secondary sources for the history of A.D. 30. The shock of this reaction led W. Erbt,[4] A. Drews,[5] and H. Raschke[6] to extreme interpretations of Mark in terms of astral mythology, allegory, the non-historicity of Jesus, gnosticism, and Marcionism, and the introduction of Wrede's view into England by R. H. Lightfoot[7] has produced similar treatments of Mark in the past few years by P. Carrington[8] and A. M. Farrer.[9] Meanwhile form-criticism[10] proved that Mark did not write history as a modern historian. However the form-critic Martin Dibelius curbed any all-too-hasty conclusion to the effect that Mark was consequently not at all interested in history, by observing that apparently Mark was the first to collect material about Jesus into a gospel, thus 'historicising'[11] the kerygmatic and didactic fragments circulating in the early Church. Schniewind[12] and

Herod story for this function may be due to Mark's inability to present stories of Jesus unaccompanied by disciples, and/or a desire to prepare for the allusion of 9.13.

[1] *Das Messiasgeheimnis in den Evangelien*, 1901.

[2] *Das Messianitäts und Leidensgeheimnis*, 1901 (Eng. tr. *The Mystery of the Kingdom of God*), and *Von Reimarus zu Wrede*, 1906 (Eng. tr. *The Quest of the Historical Jesus*).

[3] *Einleitung in die drei ersten Evangelien*, 1905, 2nd ed. 1911. Although Wellhausen recognised the theological influence throughout the gospels, he was careful to confine this extreme statement to Q and Mark 8-10. However, the impact of Wellhausen's presentation was more general, as is documented by R. Bultmann's appraisal, 'The New Approach to the Synoptic Problem', *The Journal of Religion*, VI (1926), 341.

[4] *Das Markusevangelium*, 1911. Emphasis: astral mythology.

[5] *Das Markusevangelium als Zeugnis gegen die Geschichtlichkeit Jesu*, 1921. Emphasis: non-historicity of Jesus.

[6] *Die Werkstatt des Markusevangelisten*, 1924. Emphasis: Marcionism.

[7] *History and Interpretation in the Gospels*, the Bampton Lectures of 1934.

[8] *The Primitive Christian Calendar; a Study in the Making of the Marcan Gospel, 1952.* Emphasis: Mark a lectionary built on the church year.

[9] *A Study in St. Mark*, 1952. Emphasis: complicated hidden patterns of numbers.

[10] K. L. Schmidt, *Der Rahmen der Geschichte Jesu*, 1919.

[11] This term occurs not only on p. 218 of *From Tradition to Gospel* (1935), but also occurs pp. 225 and 226 of the German original (*Die Formgeschichte des Evangeliums*, 2nd ed., 1933), but is obscured by the translations 'would-be history' p. 224 and 'touched . . . up' p. 225 of the Eng. ed.

[12] 'Zur Synoptiker-Exegese', *ThR*, n.F., II (1930), 129-189.

K. L. Schmidt[1] followed this hint and defined the Marcan focus as neither history in the nineteenth century sense, nor speculation in an anti-historical sense, but rather as a theology grappling with the problem of history. This solution continues to pick up adherents,[2] but the sole monograph which has appeared is that of H. J. Ebeling,[3] who moves directly to the existentialistic implications of the Marcan interest in history without having first worked out Mark's understanding of history itself. The present study devotes itself to that by-passed problem.

2. *The Marcan introduction*, 1.1-13

Already the first verses of Mark pose questions unanswerable on the older assumption that Mark was an objective historian. Why does Mark (cf. also Q and the kerygma in Acts)[4] think a gospel should begin only with Jesus' baptism,[5] and why is the introduction built upon the ministry of John the Baptist, rather than about Jesus?[6] Why is so much said of John, and so little? Why does Mark describe in detail John,[7] but not Jesus? Why does Mark leave out information on John which we know from later references he possessed?[8] The introduction begins with prophecies of the Messiah's preparer, and all that

[1] Already in 'Die Stellung der Evangelien in der allgemeinen Literaturgeschichte' in the Gunkel *Festschrift* (1923), II, 126. More fully in 'Das Christuszeugnis der synoptischen Evangelien', Beiheft 2 of *Evangelische Theologie*, 2. Aufl. 1936, pp. 7-33.

[2] O. A. Piper, 'Das Problem des Lebens Jesu seit Schweitzer', Schmitz *Festschrift*, 1953; E. Käsemann, 'Das Problem des historischen Jesus', *ZThK*, LI (1954), 125-153.

[3] *Das Messiasgeheimnis und die Botschaft des Marcus-Evangelisten*, Beiheft 19 to *ZNTW*, 1939.

[4] Acts 1.22 is co-ordinate to Mark 1.1 in making a break between Judaism and John, while Acts 10.37, making a break between John and Jesus, is more co-ordinate to Mark 1.14 and Luke 3.20f; cf. also Luke 23.5; Acts 13.24f; 19.3f.

[5] Answer: For Mark the gospel is not personal or biographical, but temporal or historical, i.e. it begins at a point in time when a certain thing happens, rather than consisting simply in a person and consequently beginning with his birth.

[6] Answer: The introduction is not the personal background of Jesus introductory to a biography, but the prophesied period of preparation antecedent to the coming of the Messiah. With the arrest of John (1.14) that preparation is completed (9.11-13).

[7] Answer: Not out of biographical interest, but to prove that John conforms to the prophesied role of Elijah redivivus (cf. 9.13).

[8] Answer: Such information (cf. 2.18; 6.14-29; 11.32) did not fit into the scope of the prophecy of a preparer. John's baptism is the only biographical trait not necessitated by the prophecy, and it is made to conform to the prophecy of a herald ('preaching' baptism), and to the preparation for Jesus (whose ministry is only here called a 'baptism', so as to make John's baptism its preparation).

is said of John is slanted to make him fit that role.[1] The prophecy is put together to express a part of the kerygma,[2] and the history is ordered to conform to the prophecy. Is it just coincidence that the introduction begins with future prophecies, and at the end of the introduction the main narrative begins with emphatic perfect tenses ('The time *has* been fulfilled and the kingdom of God *has* drawn near'), or is this observation to be taken as a hint that something decisive has happened between v. 1 and v. 15?

Just as the first half of the introduction was built on the prophecy of the preparer and the correlative presentation of John, the second half of the introduction consists of John's prophecy of the Coming One, and the correlative presentation of Jesus' baptism and temptation. John's original prophecy of one who would baptise with apocalyptic wind and fire (cf. Q) is altered by Mark by dropping 'fire' and understanding 'wind' as 'Spirit',[3] so as to be suited for the fulfilment in the Spirit which descends on Jesus at the baptism and drives Him into the temptation. The 'stronger one' of the prophecy is revealed as Jesus in the temptation, which is interpreted in 3.27 as the binding of the 'strong' Satan[4]; while Jesus overcomes the 'strong one', John is handed over (1.14) to the enemy, making clear the difference in their strength, conformable to the prophecy. But the significance of the baptism and temptation narrative is not only evident from its formal

[1] E. Lohmeyer, 'Zur evangelischen Überlieferung von Johannes dem Täufer', *JBL*, LI (1932), 302, subdivides the description of John into four units corresponding to the four members of the prophecy. The Marcan presentation cannot properly be schematised to this extent. But the basic insight is correct.

[2] Since the prophecy is a connexion of two prophecies, and is not a modern scholarly exegesis of the passages, it cannot be looked upon as the ultimate source of the introduction, but must be traced back to the faith of the early Church, although perhaps through the medium of some collection of testimonies.

[3] Cf. E. Schweizer, 'The Spirit of Power', *Interpretation*, VI (1952), 260, and his forthcoming article on *pneuma* in Kittel-Friedrich, *ThWb*, Vol. VI.

[4] This exegesis of Mark 3.27 has been advanced by G. Hoennicke, 'Die Teufelsidee in den Evangelien', *Neutestamentliche Studien für Georg Heinrici*, 1914, p. 211; Joachim Jeremias, *Jesus als Weltvollender*, 1930, p. 59; A. Fridrichsen, 'The Conflict of Jesus with the Unclean Spirits', *Theology*, XXII (1931), 128f; A. Schlatter, *Der Evangelist Matthäus* (1929) to 12.29; W. Grundmann, *Der Begriff der Kraft in der neutestamentlichen Gedankenwelt*, 1932, p. 49f, 70; E. C. Rust, *The Christian Understanding of History*, 1947, p. 143. The main opponent of this view, E. Klostermann (*HNT*, 2nd ed., 1926), conceded (3rd ed., 1936) to Grundmann on the basis of Isa. 49.25; Test. Levi. 18.12; Test. Zeb. 9.8; Luke 13.16; Acts 10.38 that the figure of speech was more suited to Grundmann's exegesis, but persisted, now on insufficient grounds, in maintaining his exegesis of Mark 3.27.

relation to John's prophecy; the language of the baptism and temptation narrative is such as to indicate that Mark is trying to call attention to some decisive significance of these events. 'Cosmic language', i.e. language going beyond the immanence of human interaction by referring specifically to the transcendent cosmic and spirit-world forces at work in history—such language is relatively rare in Mark, but is heaped together in great profusion in the introduction: the heavens opening, the voice of God, the descending Spirit driving the Son of God to encounter Satan, with a supporting cast not of human beings but of wild beasts and angels. This unusual passage, similar in tone to the apocalyptic gospel incorporated in Rev. 12,[1] is Mark's attempt to say that here an event of cosmic significance is taking place: God's voice breaks the silence which since Malachi[2] had robbed history of ultimate meaning, the Spirit of the end of time[3] descends on Jesus, driving Him into the decisive encounter with Satan, the prince of this evil aeon, an encounter whose final outcome will be the inauguration of God's reign.[4] Mark begins his history at the point where history rises to a final climactic plane, consisting in a cosmic struggle between the Spirit and Satan for the mastery of the world, a struggle first evident in the temptation with which Mark begins, a struggle whose outcome is revealed by the resurrection with which Mark ends.

3. *Cosmic language and exorcism narratives*

When cosmic language occurs in the body of Mark's gospel,[5]

[1] E.g. the movement from the Baptist's crowds to the wilderness could seem introductory to 'war in heaven', especially in view of the similarity of the description of that 'war' to the temptation: 'Michael and his angels going forth to war with the dragon; and the dragon warred and his angels' (Rev. 12.7).

[2] Str-B, I, 125ff.

[3] For the eschatological significance of the Spirit in the early Church cf. such passages as Luke 4.16ff; Acts 2; Paul's concept of the Spirit as 'first-fruit' or 'down-payment' of the *eschaton*; cf. further Schniewind, 'Zur Synoptiker-Exegese', *ThR*, n.F., II (1930), 155f; Jeremias, *Jesus als Weltvollender*, pp. 15-21.

[4] The observation—e.g. by Klostermann in his debate with Grundmann, cf. above—that Mark does not record the outcome of the temptation, may not have sufficiently accounted for the intimate relation between the good news announced in 1.14f and the issue at stake in the temptation.

[5] 3.22-30, Satan behind the demons and the Spirit behind Jesus; 8.27-9.13, Satan inspiring Peter, the transfiguration, the heavenly voice designating Jesus as God's Son, the apocalyptic reference to the angels with the Son of Man; ch. 13, the Marcan apocalypse; the passion narrative: Jesus named Son of God 14.61; 15.39; a splitting of the veil separating from God 15.38, the session of the Son of Man at God's right hand and His future coming 14.62; the resurrection.

it serves not to detract from the historically-stated bulk of the narrative, but rather to advance the historical action.[1] Further, it provides an avenue of approach into the body of the Marcan material, for the cosmic references highlighting the narrative reveal that the whole of the history of Jesus is seen as the continuation of the climactic struggle between the Spirit and Satan begun in the temptation. This is most evident with regard to the conflicts with demons, for the discussion of exorcism 3.21-30 identifies these conflicts as a conflict of the Spirit and Satan. Yet the exorcism narratives themselves[2] are not couched in cosmic language, but already are much more historical in presentation than was the baptism and temptation narrative. Admittedly any discussion of demons goes beyond the modern language of historical immanence. Yet the exorcism narratives as presented by Mark are in several respects nearer to modern historiographical concepts than was the baptism and temptation narrative. The exorcisms are public,[3] not esoteric; they are encounters between two embodied persons,[4] arguing with their physical tongues, and involved in physical contortions, while the temptation envisaged the Spirit as separate from Jesus, coming down upon Him and driving Him into the wilderness, and Satan as separate from a human body. In view of the fact that Mark envisages the exorcisms as the same cosmic struggle, it is remarkable that he avoids cosmic language and gives expression to the deeper significance of the conflicts only by the clear-cut hostility[5] and the basic dual-

[1] 3.22-30, climaxing with an accusation of blasphemy and eternal sin, heightens the Jewish intention of 3.6 and draws attention to the exorcisms; 8.27-9, 13, besides revealing the heavenly dimensions of Jesus whose history is being recorded, provides the theological interpretation of the disciples' opposition dominating ch. 8-10; the Marcan apocalypse puts the passion narrative into a theological perspective (cf. Lohmeyer, *Theol. Blatter*, Oct. Nov. 1941, summarised by R. H. Lightfoot, *The Gospel Message of St. Mark*, Ch. IV); the flashes of light in the passion narrative keep the theological significance of the cross from being drowned in sentimentality; the resurrection makes the whole history Gospel.

[2] 1.23-27, 34.39; 3.11f, 15; 5.1-20; 6.7, 13; 7.24-30; 9.14-29.

[3] This is patent in 1.23-27; 3.11f; 9.14-29; in 5.1-20 the effects are public. In the other instances there is no suggestion of secrecy, which, for Mark, is somewhat remarkable.

[4] O. Bauernfeind, *Die Worte der Dämonen im Markusevangelium*, 1927, pp. 56ff, maintains that the demons of 3.11f are disembodied. This view is at best an argument from silence, and insofar as the two verses conform to the normal presentation of exorcism narratives (e.g. bowing down before Jesus), the passage is best understood as a case of demon possession. Cf. the arguments of Ebeling, *Das Messiasgeheimnis und die Botschaft des Marcus-Evangelisten*, p. 120.

[5] O. Bauernfeind, *Die Worte der Dämonen im Markusevangelium*, has proved that the 'confessions' of the demons are incantations.

ism[1] evident in the presentation of the exorcism stories. Doubtless Mark has 'improved' the presentation of the exorcisms, but his relative restraint here, in employing not so much cosmic language as a stylistically accentuated dualistic pattern (perhaps already latent in the oral form), raises the question as to whether other Marcan material, even less 'cosmic' in tone (due to the absence of references to 'demons' and 'Son of God'), may not also be envisaged by Mark in terms of the cosmic struggle between the Spirit and Satan.

4. *From the debates to the crucifixion*

The debates of Jesus with the Jewish authorities[2] and the disciples[3] form a body of Marcan material which is couched in even more historical language than were the exorcisms, insofar as the debates are described without references to the participation of members of the spirit world. Yet an analysis of these debates reveals various traits which indicate that they too are envisaged as a continuation of the same eschatological struggle, such traits as: repeated allusions to the Pharisees as 'tempting'[4] Jesus in the debates, an activity characteristic of Satan; the characterisation of the attitude of the Jewish authorities and the disciples as 'hardness of heart',[5] with all the connotations of superhuman intervention which this concept involved; the specific attribution to Satan of the disciples' opposition when it first begins (8.33), and Jesus' warning against 'temptation' in Gethsemane (14.38); and the sharply hostile[6] and antithetic[7] presentation of the debates, where a dualistic schematisation points to a

[1] This dualism consists not only in the unrelenting opposition of Jesus to the demons reflected throughout the narratives, but also in the contrast between the status before and after the exorcism, a trait also accentuated in the healings and nature miracles.

[2] 2.1-3, 6; 7.1-23; ch. 11-12.

[3] Primarily concerning Jesus' passion and their unwillingness to suffer, 8.31-10.45, but anticipated in their lack of understanding 4.13ff, 40; 6.49-52; 7.17-23; 8.14-21.

[4] 8.11; 10.2; 12.15; in 12.13 they try to 'trap' Him.

[5] Jewish authorities: 3.5; 10.5; disciples: 6.52; 8.17.

[6] The sense of hostility inherent in the debates with the Jewish authorities is augmented not only by the designation of them as members of official Jewish groups (cf. R. Bultmann (*Die Erforschung der synoptischen Evangelien*, 2nd ed., 1930, pp. 17f), and by the references to 'tempting', 'trapping', and 'hardness of heart', but also by statements that they 'err' (12.24, 27) are guilty of 'hypocrisy' (12.15), follow immoral ways of life (12.38-40), and plot Jesus' death (3.6; 11.18; 12.12; 14.1; 14.53-15.1)).

[7] E.g.: the ambiguity of Sabbath healing is reduced 3.4 to the clear alternative 'do good or do evil', 'save life or kill'; the confusing problem of ceremonial cleanliness is reduced to the clear alternatives (7.7-9) 'man's laws' or 'God's laws'.

presupposition other than the relativism of merely human squabbles.

The passion narrative is an apparent exception to the thesis that Mark's history is presented in terms of the cosmic struggle inaugurating the end of time, for the passion narrative is remarkably relativistic in form,[1] and lacking in the element of struggle. Yet the repeated Marcan references to the passion prior to the passion narrative itself[2] make it abundantly clear that Mark conceives of the passion narrative as a final conflict with Jesus' enemies, culminating in the resurrection[3] as Jesus' victory over them.[4] The absence of struggle after Gethsemane does not mean for Mark that Jesus has given up the struggle, but rather that He has renounced any effort to avoid the struggle with the centre of Satan's dominion, death itself. Thus Jesus' passivity at the trial and execution corresponds to His willingness and at times eagerness to be led into debates by the Pharisees,[5] to be led into encounters with disease,[6] and in general to keep Himself involved in the struggle, rather than avoiding it. The disciples struggle for existence, but in Gethsemane Jesus overcomes their 'temptation' (10.38), stops struggling to avoid death, and determines to struggle with death. It thus becomes evident that the whole of the history of Jesus, from the most sublimely supra-historical communion with the Father at the baptism to the most wretchedly historical forsakenness at the crucifixion, is envisaged by Mark in terms of a cosmic struggle in history between the Spirit and Satan for the rule of the world, a struggle whose ultimate outcome for Mark would consist in the imminent fulfilment of the early Christian hope in the final coming of the reign of God[7] and the destruction of evil.[8]

[1] The alternations of Matt. and Luke document these ambiguities.

[2] 2.20; 3.6; 8.31; 9.12, 31; 10.33f, 38, 45; 12.8; 14.1, 21, 22, 24, 27, 36.

[3] The resurrection is anticipated: 8.31; 9.9, 31; 10.34; 12.10f; 14.28, 58.

[4] In 8.31; 9.31; 10.34; 12.10f the close association of the resurrection to the mention of Jesus' enemies indicates the resurrection served as a vindication of Jesus over His enemies (cf. also 14.21); 14.28, 58 lack any reference to His enemies, but accentuate His vindication or victory; 10.45 points to the role of the cross as a 'ransom', whereas 9.12; 14.21, 36.49 had made it clear that the cross is in the programme of God.

[5] The nearest parallel is 3.3.

[6] Clearest in 5.34, 36; 10.49.

[7] The fact that Mark thinks apocalyptically of the kingdom is documented by 9.1, especially in its association with 8.38; and in 9.47, where the kingdom stands as the alternative to Gehenna.

[8] The contrast in 10.30 makes this clear.

5. *History since* A.D. 30 *in Mark*

Does Mark's understanding of Jesus' history provide him with a pattern for understanding history as a whole, or is his understanding of Jesus' history limited by him to Jesus? Certainly Jesus is for him an exception, and the cosmic struggle which formed the basis of Jesus' history is won at the resurrection. Does Jesus' victory consequently ransom the believer from history, so that the believer in this life communes mystically with eternity, while world history rushes on meaninglessly around him? Or does Jesus' resurrection free the believer from the fate opposing any meaningful achievement in history, and, by revealing God's creative action within history, call upon the believer to involve himself in the struggle against evil, assured that since the turning point is past, ultimate victory is certain? Is Mark freed from history,[1] or freed for history?

The question as to whether Mark understood history subsequent to Jesus in the same way as he understood Jesus' history is made all the more acute by the fact that Mark did not understand history prior to Jesus in the same way as he understood Jesus' history. The analysis of the Marcan introduction proved that with the coming of the Spirit a *novum* entered history, and the eschatological struggle *began*. Unfortunately the ending of Mark is too obscure textually to permit of any similar analysis.[2] But before inferences can be drawn from the introduction regarding history after A.D. 30, one must

[1] This alternative is not only a realistic problem in view of the prevalence of such views in the mystery religions of the day, but is implied in the various monographs (listed above) associating Mark with gnostic, Marcionite, and astrological movements. Bultmannian definitions of history (e.g. Ernst Fuchs, 'Christus das Ende der Geschichte', *Evangelische Theologie*, Jahrgang 1948-49 [1949], 457, note 18) accentuate its meaninglessness, and Bultmann calls for the 'de-historicising' of life (*Das Urchristentum im Rahmen der antiken Religionen*, p. 87; cf. also 'History and Eschatology in the New Testament', *New Testament Studies*, I, [1954], 5-16). Yet Bultmann does not wish to be understood mystically, but retains the formal pattern of 'historical' encounter, condemning any 'de-historicising' of life (sic! *Das Urchristentum*, p. 65).

[2] Such conjectures as those of F. C. Burkitt, *Christian Beginnings*, 1924, p. 83, and W. K. Lowther Clarke in *Theology*, XXIX (1934), 106f, to the effect that Mark wrote a Church-history similar to Acts 1-12, cannot be substantiated. Nor can the ending at 16.8 be regarded as so well established as to serve as a basis for far-reaching conclusions. Even among those who accept the ending at 16.8, interpretation of the meaning of that ending varies from Lohmeyer's concept that the parousia is predicted in 16.7, so that intervening history is by-passed, to C. F. Evans' view (' "I will Go Before You into Galilee" ', *JThS*, n.s., V [1954], 3ff) that the gentile mission is here predicted, thus giving to Church-history a high significance for Mark.

investigate the effect of the introduction upon Mark's understanding of history prior to Jesus. Mark is not a precursor of Marcion and the Epistle of Barnabas in his treatment of Jewish history. The validity of Old Testament prophecies (1.2; 7.6; 9.12f; 11.17; 12.10, 36; 14.49), laws (7.10; 10.7f, 19; 12.29-33), exemplary events (2.25f) and personages (9.12; 11.9; 12.26, 47) is recognised by Mark. It is a Marcan universal principle of history that the God-sent witness suffers, in the Old Testament 12.2-8, in the case of John the Baptist 9.11-13, in Jesus' own case, and in the case of the Christians 10.38f. Nor is Jesus separated from Judaism by the theological gulf separating different aeons; rather Judaism, Jesus, and the Christain Church are united by a common existence in the 'present (evil) aeon' 10.29. Since the sharp shift taking place at Jesus' baptism does not wipe out all relevance of and points of connexion with antecedent history, the possibility must be admitted that the sharp shift taking place at Jesus' resurrection may not wipe away all the relevance of and all points of connexion with subsequent history.

When one turns to an analysis of Marcan allusions to events subsequent to A.D. 30, it becomes clear that he looks forward to a consummation which will be a future event in time and space (13.32: 'day and hour'; 13.33: 'the time'). Thus the outlook of the Marcan Christian is horizontal, through time, not vertical, out of time; his attitude is that of 'watching' (13.34, 35, 37), 'taking heed' (13.5, 9, 23, 33), 'staying awake' (13.33). Furthermore this future temporal event will be composed of the same ingredients (e.g. 'kingdom of God', 'Son of Man') as the past event of Jesus, and will be the completion of Jesus' historical struggle.[1] The Marcan apocalypse makes it clear, however, that not only the final consummation, but also the events in the interim between the resurrection and the consummation are seen in the two-fold focus of historical event and divine action. The Marcan apocalypse has enough clear

[1] Jesus' ministry is seen by Mark as a 'coming' (1.24, 38; 2.17; 10.45) of the 'Son of Man' (2, 10.28; 8.31; 9.9, 12.31; 10.33, 45; 14.21, 41), just as is the final consummation; his awareness of the similarity of the two events is perhaps documented by the terms he employs with regard to the second 'coming' to distinguish it from the first: 8.38: 'in the glory of his Father with the holy angels'; 9.1: 'in power'; 13.26: 'on clouds with much power and glory'; 14.62 'with the clouds of heaven'. The most remarkable passages are 8.38; 10.45; 14.62, where Mark's identification of the two comings is apparent.

allusions to first century events to make it certain that many of the things being discussed are historical in nature; yet the apocalypse has enough apocalyptic, Danielic language to make it clear that these historical events are understood *a priori*, theologically.[1] It is history proceeding out of the mouth of the resurrected Lord: 'I have told you all things beforehand' (13.23). Thus Church-history carries out Jesus' prophecy, Jesus' life, and here we have the explanation for the fact that events in Jesus' life are seen by Mark from the *Sitz im Leben* which they have in the early Church. The Church relives the life of Jesus, not just in its cultic moments,[2] but in its historical experience,[3] for in the Marcan apocalypse the *history*[4] of the Church is cosmic struggle between the Spirit and Satan. An illustration of this understanding of Church-history as a continuation of Jesus' history is to be found in the role of the Gentiles. It is an undisputed fact of the history between Jesus' time and Mark's time that Christianity moved from Jewish and Palestinian confines to an inter-racial and international religion. This fact of Church-history is interpreted theologically by Mark as proceeding from Jesus. The multiplication of stories about Jesus and Gentiles[5] is Mark's way of saying that the Church's gentile mission is not a divergence from the history of Jesus, but a continuation of it. The gospel of Mark is moulded not only in terms of the cult, but also in terms of the historical life of the early Christians, and provides the key to their understanding of their own history.

[1] G. R. Beasley-Murray, *Jesus and the Future*, 1954, gives a history of the interpretation of Mark 13, in which the various identifications of Marcan language with first century history and with apocalyptic language are recorded.

[2] Evident in the Lord's Supper (14.22-25) and in the allusion to the Lord's Prayer (11.25), as well as in the whole cultic significance demonstrated by form-criticism.

[3] The 'history of religions school' tended to confine its application of the *Sitz im Leben* insight to cultic aspects, since the relationship was understood mystically; the fact that the same phenomenon occurs outside of the cult indicates that the key to the *Sitz im Leben* problem must be sought on a broader basis, involving an understanding of one's own history in terms of antecedent history.

[4] The experience of the Church depicted in the Marcan apocalypse involves such world-historical matters as courtroom proceedings (13.9, 11), international wars (13.7f), messianic pretenders (13.5f, 21f), perhaps the Caligula incident of A.D. 40 (13.14), and a flight scene (13.14ff) often seen as appropriate for the reaction to a military invasion.

[5] Esp. ch. 6-8. Cf. G. H. Boobyer, 'Galilee and Galileans in St. Mark's Gospel', *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, Manchester*, XXXV (1952-53), 334-348; 'The Miracles of the Loaves and the Gentiles in St. Mark's Gospel', *Scottish Journal of Theology*, VI (1953), 77-87.

6. *Marcan attitudes toward Jesus' history*

Mark's gospel contains not only his construction of Jesus' history; it also includes various attitudes which secondary personages in the narrative take toward that history, and Mark's evaluation of these attitudes. Since Mark understands his own history along the same lines as he understands Jesus' history, an analysis of how he evaluates various attitudes toward Jesus' history will reveal his attitude toward his own history. It is thus the purpose of this section to demonstrate that Mark's understanding of history goes beyond a schematisation or theological construction of the historical data at his disposal, and involves a subjective attitude or stance correlative to that historical scheme; a by-product of this demonstration should be a clarification of the direction in which a Marcan 'philosophy of religion' would move.[1]

The attitude of awe or amazement occurs often in Mark, and the Marcan Jesus is certainly a lofty enough figure to arouse such a numinous response. Yet Mark makes it clear that loftiness is only one element in the paradox of Jesus' person (cf. especially 8.27-33), so that an attitude which reflects only this aspect would be expected to be deficient. As a matter of fact awe is too often associated by Mark with cowardly fear, and by failure to understand the meaning of Jesus' history (4.41; 6.49, 52; 9.6, 32; 10.24, 26). Jesus disagrees when seekers are kept from Him out of respect for His person (10.13-16, 46-52), and commends the faith of those who force themselves upon Him (1.34, 36; 10.52). The ambiguity involved in the awe of the crowds (1.27) is revealed in Jesus' home town (6.1-6), where awe is accompanied by frank unbelief, and brings Jesus' redemptive history to a halt. Jesus Himself displays the attitude of amazement only in the two places where He is at His weakest, when He is unable to work miracles in His home town (6.5) and when He is disagreeing with God's will in Gethsemane (14.33). On the other hand amazement is

[1] The investigation's point of departure in the philosophy of religion presented in Rudolf Otto's *The Idea of the Holy* is not arbitrary, but is based partially upon the fact that this approach has been applied to Mark (e.g. by Olof Lindton, 'Der vermisste Markusschluss', *ThBl* VIII [1929], Col. 229-243), but especially upon the fact that Mark seems at first sight to show marked similarities to the categories of the numinous. It is only when such a correlation is investigated in detail that its deficiencies become apparent.

typical of the authorities who put Jesus to death (12.17; 15.5).

Closely associated with the attitude of awe and amazement is the fascination which characterises the crowds in their attitude toward Jesus. If Mark's suspicions with regard to awe are partially attributable to the fact that the attitude of awe leads to reserve, distance and disengagement, thus hindering the history which Mark advocates, may not the other aspect of the numinous experience, namely fascination with the numen, be for Mark a history-creating attitude which he consequently advocates? However, the fascinated crowd does not have Mark's approval. He does not identify them as the chosen people by such sacred titles as *Israel* or *laos* ('people'), but consistently designates them as the secular *ochlos* ('crowd', a term Luke carefully reserves for Gentile crowds),[1] or as 'adulterous and sinful generation',[2] 'those without' (4.11). The Marcan crowd vacillates, but finally falls on the side of opposition and rejection.[3] Fascination sprouts rapidly, but just as rapidly withers under the sin's heat (4.5f).

The Marcan alternative to the numinous response is the attitude of 'faith': 'Do not fear, just believe' (5.36; cf. also 4.40). The attitude of 'faith' is specifically commended as the source of the history Mark records (2.5; 5.34; 9.23; 10.52; 11.22-24). In Jesus' home town 'lack of faith' (6.6) prevents the history from taking place. In this Marcan usage 'faith' means courage as initiative, risking oneself to Jesus and involving oneself in the issue on the assumption that results can be attained. For 'faith' in Mark is not simply boldness, it also involves an assumption; 'believe' is for Mark a transitive verb. Although there is not one Marcan term to designate the object of faith, all the objects which Mark employs point to the assumption that God is at work in history.[4] The presence of God's action calls forth man's action, so that the attitude of 'faith' can be described by verbs of action which have also a passive, responsive undercurrent: 'obey' (1.27;

[1] Cf. Strathmann, *ThWb*, IV, 48-52.

[2] 8.38. The introduction of the 'crowd' 8.34 into a scene hardly suited to the presence of a crowd can be due to a desire to have at hand a group suitable for the designation in 8.38.

[3] Contrast e.g. 12.12 with 15.15.

[4] 1.15: 'the gospel'; 11.22: 'God'; 11.23: 'that what one says (viz. asks in prayer) will happen'; 11.24; 'that you received'; 11.31; John as 'from heaven'; 13.21: that (a false) 'Christ' has come; 15.32: 'Christ King of Israel'; 5.36; 9.23f: that saving action (miracle) will happen.

4.41), 'follow' (especially 8.34; 10.21, 28), 'repent' (1.4, 15; 6.12). Between hybris and passivity lies believing action.

The presence of a theological assumption in the Marcan concept of 'faith' is documented by the fact that there is another concept which Mark uses in antithesis to 'fear' or 'awe' (6.50-52; 9.32; cf. also 9.6; 6.1-6) to designate the highest attitude toward history, namely the attitude termed 'understanding'. However 'understanding' in Mark does not consist simply in comprehending any certain doctrine. Just as 'faith' as an act of courage involved a certain assumption, 'understanding' as a theological assumption involves an act of commitment. Failure to understand is not due to lack of intelligence, but to hardness of heart (6.52; 8.17), the action of Satan (4.15); correct understanding comes only as a gift of God (4.11). When Jesus interprets the 'parable' about what defiles (7.17-23), so that the disciples may 'understand', He does not give an intellectual clarification, but an exhortatory repetition of the original explanation, this time addressed more to the will than to the intellect. 'Understanding' is an inner appropriation of the existential meaning of what is said; it is the laying hold of the truth so that truth becomes the assumption expressed in courageous action, which is faith.

7. *The eschatological society*

History does not consist merely of actions or events, but also involves the resultant traditions and customs, a people or society, and, in the long run, a culture. If Mark really sees Jesus and the Church as the historicisers of the Jewish eschatological hope, one must look in Mark for the beginnings of such a tangible, cultural manifestation of the eschatological history. The present section is intended to show that Mark's theological interest in history continues on into this most concrete and empirical aspect of history, and, as a by-product, to indicate the direction which a Marcan religious sociology would take.

In the exorcism stories, and also the healings and nature miracles, a resultant status of order and idyllic communion is often contrasted with the confusion and segregation prior to Jesus' decisive action.[1] However, it is not just the exorcisms

[1] Compare 5.15 with 5.3-5; 5.19 with 5.2f, 5; 9.27 with 9.17, 18.22, 25; 6.42-44 with 6.34-37; 8.8f with 8, 1-5; 4.29 with 4.37f. Cf. also the evidences of the completeness of the cure 1.31, 44; 2.11f; 3.5; 5.34, 43; 7.35; 8.25.

and miracles with their obviously theological connotations which indicate Mark's awareness of a residual history of theological relevance, a 'history of the kingdom of God', but the same is true with regard to such banal historiographical facts as the fragmentary nature of the Marcan sources and Jesus' itinerant way of life, upon which any history of Jesus must be built. To the lack of historical connexion between the Marcan pericopes, there corresponds a stress upon the fact that Jesus comes into each situation from God.[1] Furthermore the breaking of one's natural historical ties which discipleship to an itinerant preacher involves, together with the natural creation of a new group of travel companions, is given by Mark theological significance.[2] For the idea of giving up all to become a follower of Jesus had for Mark much the same spiritual connotation it has for us today. Thus the band of disciples is for Mark not merely an empirical, theologically irrelevant factor; rather it is a theologically understood society. Apart from the theological origin of the designation 'the twelve', Mark's favourite designation of the group as 'those who were with Jesus',[3] supported by the way in which Mark has the disciples present when the history takes place,[4] makes it clear that the society is understood theologically in terms of the eschatological history they witness. This separation from a traditional society and regrouping into an eschatological society is further documented by the Marcan comments about family relationships, where it is evident that the separation of Jesus (3.31, 31-35; 6.1-6) and His disciples (1.20, 36) from their natural[5] families is conceived of as a religious sacrifice

[1] Instances in which a 'coming' without a connected itinerary is connected with a 'coming' from God: 1.21 connected with 1.24; 1.35 connected with 1.38; 2.13 connected with 2.17; 10.1 connected with 10.45; 11.11 connected with 11.10.

[2] Instances in which following as joining an itinerant band is given a spiritual meaning: 1.16-17a, 18 interpreted by 1.17b; 2.14 interpreted by 2.17; 10.21 interpreted by 10.17. The 'following' involved in 2.15; 3.7; 5.24; 6.1; 15.41 is given deeper meaning in 10.28-31.

[3] The concept of the 'twelve' as 'sent' away from Jesus 3.14 is used only with regard to the mission of the twelve 6.7; 6.30. The other concept given 3.14, 'so that they could be with him', seems Mark's dominant characterisation: 11.11; 14.17; 14.67; 9.8; 2.19; 3.7; 4.36; 8.10; 5.40; (1.36?); 15.41; 5.18; 14.14, 17, 18, 20, 33 (contrast 14.43, 54, 67).

[4] The disciples are bearers of special instruction: 4.10, 34; 7.17; 9.28, 33, 35; 10.10, 23, 32; 13.3. They bear the kerygma: 8.27-31; 9.9, 31; 10.32-33. They are witnesses of special events: 1.29; 5.37; 9.2; 14.3-11, 18ff, 33.

[5] Mark is not opposed to family relationships as such: 1.16, 19, 31; 2.11; 5.19, 21ff, 36, 40; 7.10-13, 24ff, 28; 8.25; 9.24; 10.1-12, 19; 15.21, 40. But a tendency

(10.28-30), and their communion together is described as a spiritual family presided over by God.[1]

The fact that discipleship involves a separation from one culture in order to be embedded in a new eschatological culture is perhaps most clearly documented by the Marcan treatment of table customs. When Jesus refuses to fast, the difference in custom is traced back to the eschatological history (2.19); when the Church fasts, it is not traced back to the continuing influence of Judaism, but, remarkably enough, is also traced back to the new eschatological history (2.20). Jewish customs of ceremonial cleansing before meals are rejected at length 7.1ff, but Gentile table customs are equally clearly rejected (10.42), both to be replaced by a Christian custom of mealtime communion. This is evident not merely in the last supper, whose *Sitz im Leben* in the early Church may be most obvious, but is not at all unique. The two miraculous feedings of the multitudes point to the dependence of this society upon God's action.[2] Furthermore the particular characteristics of this table custom, e.g. its inclusiveness, are explained theologically. 'Tax-gatherers and sinners' are welcome, because Jesus came as a physician to the sick (2.17). Gentiles are admitted on the basis of the theological order of history which even Paul conceded, 'first the Jews and then the gentiles' (7.27f), and in view of the eschatological abundance of crumbs falling from the children's table (7.28), an abundance which is also accentuated as the main point of the two feedings of the multitudes (6.43f; 8.8f; 17-21). The Christian table communion is characterised by a specific ethic, which differentiates it both

is evident to relativise family ties and to regroup individuals in terms of religious considerations: the family nearness of Andrew to Peter yields to the spiritual nearness of James and John to Peter 3.16-19; 13.3; 5.37; 9.2; 14.33, while the relationship of James and John is restated as 'sons of thunder', 3.17, except 10.35, where the blood relationship is accentuated in their unworthy association.

[1] In the listing of the family sacrificed, the 'father' is listed 10.29, but in the spiritual family of fellow-Christians the 'father' is not replaced 10.30; the same omission is evident in 3.35. This argument from silence is supported by the positive evidence that God is the Father of Jesus, 8.38; 14.36, and Jesus is His Son (1.1); 1.11; 3.11; 5.7; 9.7; 12.6; 14.61; 15.39, so that they bear these titles absolutely 13.32; God is the Christian's Father 11.25.

[2] The fact that the two feedings of the multitudes are eucharistic is evident from the form of presentation. Cf. Pfleiderer, *Primitive Christianity*, 1909, II, 25ff. The eucharistic tone of the saying about the bread cannot be reduced to the coincidence of normal mealtime language (cf. Str-B I, 685), for in Mark 2.26 the language of the LXX has been altered in a eucharistic direction, making the presence of some attracting force evident (cf. Riesenfeld, *Jésus transfiguré*, 1947, p. 321).

from Jewish and from gentile table customs, and identifies it with the action of Jesus.[1] From all these varied aspects it is clear that Mark is conscious of Christian history not simply as various saving actions, but also as a society with its traditions, customs, and ethic, orientated to the eschatological action in history as its formative principle.

[1] 6.34; 7.21-23; 8.2; 10.43-45. The two-fold significance of the term 'serve' (cf. Beyer, *ThWb*, II, 92) is present in Mark (serve tables: 1.13, 31; 15.41; ethically: 10.45), so that not only 10.38ff, but also 10.43ff, have eucharistic relationships, calling for the ethic of humility in the mealtime customs commemorative of Jesus' sacrifice and anticipatory to the eschatological banquet.

THOMAS CHALMERS' ASTRONOMICAL DISCOURSES: A STUDY IN NATURAL THEOLOGY?

by The Rev. Professor DAVID CAIRNS

A few years ago a leading Scottish theologian drew attention to the recent tendency among continental Protestant theologians to 'write off' natural theology. This, he suggested, had been accepted with undue complacency by certain Scottish writers, and he rightly drew attention to the fact that there was a great, indeed a predominant, tradition in the Christian Church, which accepted natural theology, and that among Scottish theologians, no less a man than Thomas Chalmers would have been shocked at the suggestion that natural theology was invalid.

This remark led the writer of this article to think again about natural theology, and also to study Chalmers' Astronomical Discourses, which up to that time had been familiar to him only through quotations from some of their more purple passages. The result of some of these reflections is offered here.

This article will not attempt to deal with the fascinating, important and difficult question of the legitimacy and validity of natural theology, but an attempt will be made to distinguish it from certain other types of apologetic, and the question will be raised whether and how far natural theology is to be found in the Astronomical Discourses, which are by common consent Dr Chalmers' most important apologetical work.

Natural theology may be defined as 'The attempt to find, outside the Christian revelation, arguments for the existence and certain attributes of God which are cogent for the reason of an honest sceptic.' If this definition be considered not too narrow, but generally acceptable, then there will be two marks characteristic of all natural theology. The first will be the conscious and explicit refusal, for the time being, to use specifically Christian presuppositions. The second mark will be the

conviction that the proofs offered have demonstrative force, and that nothing but lack of intellectual acumen, or a sinful and blinded will—with the possible addition of an element of invincible ignorance—can prevent our interlocutor from seeing the force of our arguments.

If this definition be accepted, then natural theology will be merely one type of apologetic. There seem to be at least two other types.

In the first type the apologist will argue from the Christian position, thinking out the implications of Christian belief in various fields of thought, and stating them in such a way as to maintain a conversation with the unbeliever in the world, and the unbeliever in his own soul. His will be a *fides quaerens intellectum.* It is not always at once clear whether a certain piece of apologetic belongs to this type of apologetic, or to natural theology. For, while in the modern western world there are many unbelievers and it is not hard to find one, it is hard to find a man whose thought has not been deeply imbued by Christian concepts and ways of thought. Even men consciously opposed to Christianity may hold and value certain beliefs which they cannot logically stand by without accepting the full Christian revelation, or at least a theism tinged by Christianity. A legitimate, if dangerous, task of apologetic which would not be an incursion into natural theology, would be the attempt to demonstrate to such a man that those beliefs to which he eagerly clings, demand the full Christian faith. There is a cheap and specious kind of apologetic which tries to make the whole existence of morality depend upon the acceptance of the full Christian faith, and no attempt is here made to defend this. But even apart from such deformations, there is a danger in this type of argument. We intend to fan the smoking flax into a flame, but we may actually quench it. We may make the man with whom we are talking decide, not to accept the faith, but to scrap what remains to him. And yet this task of apologetic is a legitimate one, and it is not natural theology, for the argument does not imply that we are ignoring the positive basis of Christian faith on which we stand.

There is another situation somewhat similar to the one just described, where again the ambiguity may arise whether natural theology is being used or not. Here again both partici-

pants in the conversation are agreed upon certain Christian presuppositions as in the former case, but here both are clearly men of belief, though belief may be stronger in one than in the other. When the Psalmist wrote: 'The heavens declare the glory of God', and Christ, to quote Chalmers' words, drew from the beauty of the lily 'the delightful argument of confidence in God', were they embarking on natural theology? It is rather a soulless dissection of these wonderful sayings to examine them in this way, but we might say that, in so far as the Psalmist and Christ were both speaking within the context of biblical revelation, to men who already believed that 'God is mindful', these two sayings should probably not be considered as natural theology. Of course, to the Psalmist, who believed in the God of the Covenant, the heavens really did declare the glory of God, and to Christ the beauty of the lilies really did reveal His providence. Both were justified in seeing there a confirmation of the faith which they already had, and both were justified in strengthening the faith of others by pointing out that revelation in nature to them.

A second type of apologetic which is distinct from natural theology, is the demonstration of the error of certain objections to Christian belief. Here the apologist sets out to show that these objections or difficulties rest on misunderstandings of Christian teaching, or confusions of thought. The misunderstandings of Christian teachings and their correction need no explanatory comment. But an example may be given of the clearing up of a confusion which has led to an objection to Christian faith. The apologetic answer to the old positivism would be an attempt to show that it was a confusion of thought which led to the conclusion that all who make the claim to truth must approximate to the procedure of the natural sciences, the procedure of theory and experiment. When he has cleared up this confusion, the apologist has shown that Christian faith is not necessarily illusion because it does not use experiment or hypothesis exactly as natural science does, and 'verification' cannot mean the same thing here as it does in the natural sciences. In such a discussion, the apologist is indeed arguing with his partner merely as one rational being with another, and his own Christian presuppositions are well in the background, and thus he is somewhat like the natural theologian. But he

is different from him in this, that he is seeking, not so much to prove theism, as to remove difficulties in the way of belief.

Having thus defined the limits of natural theology, and distinguished it from two other types of apologetic, we may now go on to enquire how far natural theology is to be found in Dr Chalmers' Astronomical Discourses, and how far they contain arguments which are examples of the other kinds of apologetic.

The study of these lectures, confident in their splendid and flamboyant oratory, and occasionally almost toppling over into the absurd, does yet give the reader a vivid sense of the power and passion of Chalmers as an apologist and a preacher. It is said that while they were being delivered (on Thursday afternoons in 1816 in the Tron Church of Glasgow) shops and businesses were closed in order to give masters and employees a chance to hear them. Here we are in touch with a great mind, a man who makes us feel that the world is a grander place, and grace a more wonderful mystery than we had realised. There is in the discourses a repetitiveness which may indeed be an expression of Chalmers' skill in hammering home his points in the minds of his hearers. It is not enough for him to say a thing twice, he often says it in different words six times. Consequently each discourse does not contain a great deal of logical material, and it is not impossible to summarise the arguments of the seven discourses within the limits of this article. My purpose in so doing will be to ask how far his arguments still hold for today, and further to inquire whether this is really natural theology at all.

The first discourse is called 'A Sketch of the Modern Astronomy', and in it Chalmers attempts to disarm beforehand those narrow-minded Christians who may feel that the whole project is useless and unworthy. St. Paul, he argues, made himself all things to all men, if by any means he might win some. And if Gentile Christians had not understood what was the drift of his reasoning against the Jews, it would have been seemly for them, not to despise and condemn Paul, but to be glad that their common faith was being commended to others, even if it were in terms that were above their own comprehension. Chalmers asks for a like considerate treatment at the hands of 'declared professors of the truth'.

The first discourse introduces the main theme of the lectures. After a description of the solar system, in which he achieves the feat of not mentioning any planet save the earth by name, Chalmers sketches in the background of the vast stellar universe which lies in the outer darkness beyond. From the littleness and insecurity of man's estate he draws the Christian conclusion that we should be humble and grateful to God because 'He is mindful of us'. But—and now we come to the main theme of the discourses—'this very reflection of the Psalmist has been appropriated to the use of infidelity, and the very language of the text has been made to bear an application of hostility to the faith. "What is man that God should be mindful of him or the son of man, that he should deign to visit him?" Is it likely, says the Infidel, that God would send His eternal Son, to die for the puny occupiers of so insignificant a province in the mighty field of His creation?' (p. 53).

In some respects, times have not changed since Chalmers' day. The psalmist, on seeing the glory of the universe, was astonished at God's grace. For, on the strength of God's covenant and revelation of Himself to his people, he knew that God *was* mindful of man; the size and splendour of the Universe made him realise afresh the condescension of such an act, and he gave God the praise. Today Fred Hoyle takes the same text and misunderstands and misreads it in the same negative sense as did the infidels of Thomas Chalmers' day.

Chalmers concludes the first discourse with the statement that it is right that every such sceptical argument 'should be met and manfully confounded, nor do we know a more discreditable surrender of our religion than to act as if she had anything to fear from the ingenuity of her most accomplished adversaries.' Surely there are few Christians who would not feel their hearts thrill when they read this sentence. If this be natural theology, then the more of it we have, the better. But is it natural theology? Surely it is rather that type of apologetic which sets forth to point out the misunderstandings and false presuppositions on which these apparently so formidable arguments against the Christian faith rest. It is content with demolishing the foundation of error and misunderstanding on which they are erected.

The second discourse is called 'The Modesty of True Science'

and it is built round the figure of Isaac Newton. All men today, says Chalmers, agree in praising Newton, but the greater part of them have no true understanding where his greatness lay. It lay in his use of scientific method. All his wonderful discoveries had their origin in this, that he accepted nothing without evidence, and this principle limited the scope of his assertions also, so that where clear evidence was not available, he would never venture, but in 'the humble form of a doubt, a conjecture, or a question' (p. 72).

Now, part of the argument of the infidels against Christianity rests on the assumption that God's plan of salvation is assumed to have reference only to this tiny world among vast universes. And here, Chalmers continues, they all, from Voltaire downwards, are resting on pure speculation, for which there is not the slightest shred of positive evidence. 'For all they know, many a visit has been paid to each of them (the other worlds) on the subject of our common Christianity, by commissioned messengers from the throne of the Eternal' (p. 79). Newton composed a commentary on the Book of the Revelation, and therefore Voltaire made him the butt of his gibes, saying that this commentary was a proof of the dotage of the human understanding. But Newton was really more scientific than Voltaire, not only because he avoided unverifiable speculations about other worlds, but because of his outlook on the Christian faith, an outlook displayed in the commentary so frivolously derided by his critic. For in this commentary, says Chalmers, 'we see the very same principle which carried him through all the profoundest and the most successful of his investigations . . . the tenacious adherence to every one doctrine that had such valid proof to uphold it as could be gathered from the field of human experience', and the rejection of all merely plausible arguments which had no solid foundation in evidence.

For Newton accepted the Bible as the record of an actual communication from God to the inhabitants of this world, seeing in the miracles a proof that Christ was the approved ambassador of God. He further relied on the trustworthiness of the human testimony paid to Christ by the apostles, and he trusted the confirmatory evidence of fulfilled prophecy. 'These formed the solid materials of the basis on which our experimental philosopher stood' (p. 89).

It is not necessary to defend, as Chalmers does, the commentary of Newton, nor is it necessary to accept in detail the partially outmoded apologetic with which he buttresses the trustworthiness of Christ's claim to be the vehicle of a divine revelation. But is there not here in Chalmers' argument something of permanent value, not only in the rebuke to Voltaire for his baseless and unverifiable assertions, but also in the acknowledgment that in different fields of inquiry, different types of evidence are relevant, and different types of verification are to be sought for? All this is not natural theology, nor is there any disguise made of the fact that Chalmers is all the while basing himself on the faith that a revelation has been made in Christ.

The third discourse treats of the 'Extent of the Divine Condescension'. Here, for the sake of argument, Chalmers is willing to accept the unprovable hypothesis that the divine plan of salvation has been put in operation on our earth alone. Is there any thing here, he asks, which is really incredible to the intellect? Surely to hazard a doubt here is to be guilty of a foolish anthropomorphism. If a *man* has a great deal of business to attend to, doubtless the detail of his work will be in danger of neglect. But God is not man, and all the evidence we have goes to show that He is as able to attend to all the details of the life of each man's body, and 'the vegetation of each blade of grass', as to the control of the stellar systems. Chalmers defies his opponents to point to a single mark of God's being oppressed by the multitude of the detail of His creation.

Thus far Chalmers has been refuting the argument that if the universe be as large as astronomy has in fact shown it to be, God, if there be a God, could not be interested in, or capable of, dealing with the destiny and government of the earth and all its inhabitants. Now he turns his own reasoning in a slightly different direction, from the natural to the moral attributes of God. With the evidence before him which nature supplies of the omniscience and power of God, Chalmers finds himself by no means disposed to reject as imposture the claim of a message professing to come from God, and informing him of God's mighty doings for the happiness of our species. Filled with confidence in this God, 'I will not be afraid, for I am of more value than many sparrows.' He then goes on to point out that

while the telescope has given us news about the vastness of the universe, which the infidels have misinterpreted as undermining the Christian faith, so the microscope has given us information about the marvellous skill and construction of the minutest parts of nature, information which goes far to refute the false anthropomorphism of the sceptical argument from the knowledge supplied by the telescope.

At this point we might again pause, and ask: 'Is this at last natural theology?' I would suggest that it does not appear from any of the arguments given here that at any point Chalmers has departed from the ground given him by the special revelation. All the while he stands confessedly as a believer on this ground, and traces in the world of nature certain facts which confirm him in this belief. This implies the conviction that there is such a relevance between the knowledge which the sciences present to us on the one hand, and faith on the other, that the believer may find both confirmation of his faith and difficulties for it in this field. But it would seem again that the most that Chalmers believes himself able to do *vis-à-vis* his sceptical opponent, is to prove the invalidity of the arguments brought forward against belief and the possibility of revelation. If this be natural theology, then the writer of this essay is an unashamed exponent and defender of it, and is prepared to accept the broad lines of Chalmers' argument.

There is, however, a criticism of the detail of Chalmers' position which must be made here. He does at one point seem to stress his argument beyond what is legitimate. This occurs in those sentences (too long for quotation) where, on p. 108 he defies his opponent to point to a single mark of God's being oppressed by the detail of His universe, or some traces of neglect or of carelessness in His management of our world. There are, indeed, wonderful adaptations in the world such as Chalmers points out, and the over-subtle arguments of David Hume against giving weight to these are unconvincing. But there are also puzzling signs of ill-adaptation to ends which might well be fairly adduced by the sceptic as precisely such arguments against God as Chalmers defies him to give. For in the eyes of the sceptic these really are arguments against *the existence* of God. For when he says that the world is so vast that God could not be interested in our tiny lives, or that there are puzzling

maladaptations which show that He could not care about us, he is not really arguing that God is indifferent or heedless, though he puts his objection in this way to his Christian opponent. He is arguing that there is no God at all. It is at this point in the discussion, where Chalmers defies his sceptical interlocutor to point to a single mark of God's being oppressed by the detail of His universe, or to indicate some traces of neglect or carelessness in His management of our world, that he does appear to verge upon natural theology, as defined in the earlier part of this article. And it is precisely here that his argument seems weakest. He continues himself indeed to speak as a Christian believer, from the insight which faith gives him. But he comes very near to arguing that the argument from design is conclusive, and that there is no evidence against it at all.

The fourth discourse treats of 'The Knowledge of Man's Moral History in the Distant Places of Creation'.

In this discourse, Chalmers states that the principal purpose of revelation is not to give us information about far distant places in God's creation, but to inform us of our fearful guilt and danger, and to lay before us God's overtures of reconciliation. So that we should not expect from it detailed and full information about other parts of God's universe and their inhabitants and destiny. Nevertheless, the Bible does give us some knowledge, enough to tell us that the history of the redemption of our race is known in other and distant parts of the creation, and enough to hint to us that the redemption itself may stretch beyond the limits of our world.

But even though redemption were only happening in our world, there is something in its character to draw the eye of the universe to it. The objection from the narrowness of the theatre is grossly materialistic. In the eye of spiritual beings the redemption of a sinful world derives its chief interest from the way in which it reveals God's mind and purposes and glorifies Him. So, even on earth, a great king and conqueror might, by one act of mercy to a single enemy, draw such a lustre round him as would eclipse the renown of his public achievements. A further objection is brought forward by the infidel on the score of the length of time taken to redeem one single world. Chalmers retorts, the argument is utterly absurd.

Has not God all eternity at His disposal? And some day the whole story of human redemption will be seen as a mere short episode in the eternal ages.

The fifth discourse is entitled 'On the Sympathy that is felt for Man in the Distant Places of Creation', and, with the sixth, 'On the Contest for Ascendancy over Man among the Higher Orders of Intelligence', it merely continues the argument of the fourth, underlining and developing it. The fifth discourse starts with a contrast of infidels with angels, to the detriment of the former, who think that, because the universe is wide, God cannot care for men. But the angels, Scripture tells us, are intensely interested in us, and 'desire to look into' the mystery of our salvation. On which of these two characters do we see the impress of heaven? Chalmers has hitherto been appealing to our reason; now he will appeal to our hearts. Surely, as men grow in benevolence, they approximate to the angels. This benevolence comes from heaven; is it surprising that the denizens of heaven feel it too? Think what happens in a human family when one member is in peril or sick, and his destiny undecided! Wonder not, if all in your destiny being in the balance and uncertain, the angels look on you, and pray!

In the sixth discourse Chalmers brings to his aid the powerful illustration that in warfare some small and even insignificant piece of land may become a symbol of honour and prestige to contending empires such that immense treasure and life are expended to ensure its conquest from the enemy. May it not be that our earth, tiny and insignificant as it is, has such a value in the vast struggle between the powers of light and the powers of darkness? Such a battle, the Bible tells us, is in progress on the earth. It is not finished yet, though Christ has overthrown Satan in single combat. To infidels this will sound wild and visionary, but is it not in harmony with our own human experience? How much the temptations of the world are with us! Whence comes its power? Does our own heart not tell us something of the allurement and desperation of the devil? But the day hastens when the struggle will be over, and on that last great day, how vain will appear the presumptions of infidel astronomy!

The last discourse is entitled 'On the Slender Influence of Mere Taste and Sensibility in Matters of Religion'. This

discourse has perhaps not very much to do with the main theme of the course, but it is none the less very significant. Chalmers begins by picturing the impression made on a sensitive person by the splendour of religious music or oratorio. Feelings are here awakened, which bear a very close resemblance to those of religious devotion, and yet the hearer may leave the place where this has happened as dead in trespasses and sins as when he entered. It is not the emotion, but the will, which counts in such a situation. And Chalmers goes on to consider the splendour of the theme which he has been expounding, and the wide vistas in the universe of nature and the universe of grace which have been opened up. Though modesty makes him talk slightingly of his own reasoning and eloquence, he cannot but have been conscious of the power of the latter and its dangers. So he closes with an appeal that his hearers will not remain in the sphere of delighted aesthetic appreciation, but asks them what progress they are making in the modest work of prayer and study of God's word and in Christian living. Without the power of eloquence, but full of trust in God's power and saving word, men like the Moravians have been the channels of saving divine power to whole benighted communities. While men of quick aesthetic sensibilities and lively reason in the affairs of this world, have shown themselves utterly blind in the understanding of God's word and the province of His grace. 'With a religion so argumentable as ours, it may be easy to gather out of it a feast for the human understanding. With a religion so magnificent as ours, it may be easy to gather out of it a feast for the human imagination. But with a religion so humbling and so strict, and so spiritual, it is not easy to mortify the pride, or to quell the strong enmity, of nature . . . or to invest faith with a practical supremacy, or to give its objects such a vivacity of influence as shall overpower the near and hourly impressions, that are ever emanating upon man from a seducing world. It is here that man feels himself treading upon the limit of his helplessness. It is here that he sees where the strength of nature ends; and the power of grace must either be put forth, or leave him to grope his darkling way without one inch of progress towards the life and the substance of Christianity' (p. 249).

On reading this, one feels that only a man who is thus aware

of the limitations of apologetic should venture to undertake it. It is probably the instinctive feeling that the apologist is trying, by virtue of his superior skill and knowledge, to *reason* another man into the faith, that makes so many people doubtful altogether of the legitimacy of the apologetic task.

But that task is essential for the Church, for there are genuine difficulties in the way of believing, and some of them are due to intellectual errors and confusions. Perhaps the most that apologetic can directly do, is to remove some of these difficulties. But when they have been removed, then we must not assume that the man with whom we have been reasoning has been made, by this process, a Christian. All that we can say is that certain difficulties and misunderstandings in the way of his faith and our own, have been removed. Here then are the limits of apologetic. It is not only that the wills of men are stubborn and sinful, even when their minds have been freed of misunderstandings. The further and more important limitation is, that God has reserved it within His own power to give faith to men. Just as the preacher must remember this and can only preach with power when he does so, so also the apologist must remember it, if he is to do his own task effectively. The remembrance will awaken in him a due humility, and this will make his reason and his person a tool fit for the work to which God has called him. Then God may bless the work of the apologist by doing His own work of grace in and through, but also beyond it.

SOME NOTES ON THE OLD TESTAMENT ATTITUDE TO PRAYER[1]

by The Rev. D. R. AP-THOMAS

The aim of the following paragraphs is to say something which, without exhausting the topic or even examining anything like every instance of prayer recorded in the OT, will yet permit us to form some opinion of what the Hebrew thought he was doing when he turned to God in prayer. I had better make clear at the outset that I am confining myself almost exclusively to prayer as between man and God, for until I started looking around I had no idea how indefinite are the boundaries of prayer; one writer even includes remarks on the musical instruments of the Bible! Inclusions more easily justified are the ascriptions of praise to Yahweh; but I have thought it better on the whole to confine myself to the field of petition and intercession, i.e. where the pray-er *asks for* something since, on the whole, prayer—at least on the more primitive level—might be defined without being too wide of the mark as *man's attempt to get God to meet a particular need*—a need very often, according to the ancient view, brought about and inflicted upon him as a punishment for some dereliction of duty.

It was the constant assumption of the Israelite that happiness was the condition intended by Yahweh to be the normal state of the good man:

> Blessed [i.e. happy] is the nation whose God is Yahweh. (Ps. 33.12)

'Good men' includes, naturally, only those who share the writer's own religion; but this happiness might be upset by Yahweh for one of two reasons: the first and commonest being sinfulness in man or nation:

> Make me to hear joy and gladness;
> That the bones which thou hast broken may rejoice.
> Hide thy face from my sins,
> And blot out all my iniquities. (Ps. 51.8-9)

[1] The substance of this article was read to a meeting of the society for Old Testament Study at London in January, 1956.

The second reason for the eclipse of happiness may be called a lack of due care and attention on the part of the Most High, as the Psalmist complains after listing the diverse catastrophes from which the nation suffers:

> All this has come upon us; yet have we not forgotten thee,
> Neither have we dealt falsely in thy covenant.
> . . . . . .
> Awake, why sleepest thou, O Yahweh?
> Arise, cast us not off for ever.
> . . . . . .
> Rise up for our help,
> And redeem us for thy devotion's sake. (Ps. 44.17, 23, 26)

Again it may be that Yahweh's anger has just run on from earlier times, and that the present generation are suffering from a sort of 'follow through' of the punishment first inflicted for the sins of the previous generation:

> Remember not against *us* the iniquities of our forefathers,
> . . . . . .
> How long, O Yahweh? Wilt thou be angry for ever?
> Shall thy jealousy burn like fire?

and then this touch:

> Pour out thy wrath upon the heathen that know thee not,
> And upon the kingdoms that call not upon thy name.
> (Ps. 79.8, 5, 6)

Lastly, such anger may be inexplicable to the sufferer, and must be due to some sudden whim—one might even suggest the word 'perverseness'—in Yahweh. In spite of the present reaction against such theories, I would still maintain that we must recognise in OT theology the presence of an element of arbitrariness—almost, we might say, *ex hypothesi*—in the delineated character of Yahweh. This has been brought out by several writers in the past, especially by Volz, and there is no need to enlarge on the theme here.

The author of Ps. 73 eventually changed his mind, but at one stage in his life his feeling was—and no doubt others agreed with him:

> Surely in vain have I cleansed my heart,
> And washed my hands in innocency;
> For all the day long have I been plagued,
> And chastened every morning. (Ps. 73.13f)

The classic example of injured innocence is of course Job, and his attitude is summed up by Elihu:

> For Job hath said, 'I am righteous,
> But God hath thwarted my just case
> Notwithstanding my right, I am [accounted] a liar;
> My wound is incurable, [though I am] without transgression.'
> (Job 34.5f)

Elihu's statement is based on Job's words in such places as 9.20f and 27.2ff, and certainly does not misrepresent Job.

But suffering, whether deserved or undeserved, is unpleasant, and I am going to define prayer further for the purposes of this paper as *a request to God with regard to a specific unsatisfactory state of affairs affecting the pray-er, which has been caused by, and so is remediable by Yahweh, at His discretion.*

Unless it is too elementary, I would just comment on the definition of suffering as *caused by* Yahweh, that the psalmists and others may sometimes interpose what we would call the direct or proximate cause of the suffering, e.g. personal or national enemies:

> For strangers are risen up against me,
> And violent men have sought after my soul. (Ps. 54.3)

or,

> Their enemies also oppressed them,
> And they were brought into subjection under their hand.
> (Ps. 106.42)

But however blameworthy the immediate agent of suffering, the Hebrew always saw the real cause in Yahweh. We have just quoted Ps. 106.42 which says: 'Their enemies also oppressed them.' We may now note that the preceding two verses say:

> Therefore was the wrath of Yahweh kindled against his people,
> And he abhorred his inheritance.
> And he gave them into the hand of the nations;
> And they that hated them ruled over them. (Ps. 106.40f)

The *locus classicus*, of course, is Amos 3.6:

> Shall evil befall a city, and Yahweh hath not done it?

So much in explanation of what I mean by 'caused by Yahweh' with regard to the suffering complained of; I should now like to draw attention to the necessity in the definition of

the phrase 'remediable by Yahweh *at His discretion*'. These last three words are of the essence of the definition, because they mark the difference between prayer and spell. The Israelite might indeed seek to bring 'moral pressure' to bear on his God by painting his own distress in the most sombre colours:

> But I am a worm, and no man;
> A reproach of men, and despised of the people.
> . . . . .
> My strength is dried up like a potsherd;
> And my tongue cleaveth to my jaws;
> And thou hast brought me into the dust of death
> (Ps. 22.6, 15)

or by pointing out the advantage to Yahweh of his deliverance:

> Rescue my soul from their destructions,
> My darling from the lions.
> I will give thee thanks in the great congregation:
> I will praise thee among much people (Ps. 35.17f)

or, of course, it may be the disadvantage to Yahweh of not rescuing him:

> What profit is there in my blood, when I go down to the pit?
> Shall the dust praise thee? shall it declare thy truth? (Ps. 30.9)

But in all these there is absolutely no tinge of compulsion, and the enlightened Yahwist never entertained any thought of compelling Yahweh's aid; in fact more than one passage suggests that it was better not to try. As I have tried to show elsewhere,[1] there are different theologies implicit and even explicit in the story of the Israelites bringing the Ark of Yahweh into the camp at Ebenezer; the elders of Israel say 'Let us fetch the ark of the covenant of Yahweh out of Shiloh unto us, that it may come among us, and save us out of the hand of our enemies' (1 Sam. 4.3) and the suggestion certainly is that bringing the ark in will force Yahweh's hand. But the sequel just as clearly shows that that kind of trick does not work and does not pay:

> And Israel was smitten . . . and there was a very great slaughter; for there fell of Israel 30,000 infantry-men. And the ark of God was taken. (1 Sam. 4.10f)

That the capture of the ark was interpreted as Yahweh's deliberate action is proved by what happens next, when the

[1] *The Teacher's Commentary 1955*, p. 178.

ark reaches Philistine soil (1 Sam. 5.1-7.1). Compulsion and spell-binding were decidedly not the thing in Israel, as even Saul knew, and there is hardly a sadder picture in the Bible than that of Saul reduced by the misery of his God-forsaken plight to consulting that old fraud the witch of Endor, and the palpable way in which he is hoodwinked by her (1 Sam. 28. 3-25). For real spellbinding we must leave the OT and go to the Apocrypha, e.g. the book of Tobit, where we have the description of Tobias, on the instructions of Raphael, acting as follows:

> . . . he took the ashes of the incense, and put the heart and the liver of the fish thereupon, and made a smoke *therewith*. But when the devil smelled the smell, he fled into the uppermost parts of Egypt, and the angel bound him. (Tob. 8.2f)

That sort of thing, I maintain, is quite foreign to the religion of the OT. Even if we were prepared to admit with Mowinckel[1] that the *pô'ălê 'āwen* of the psalms were spellbinders, or with Hans Schmidt[2] suppose that the psalmist was to be put on trial by ordeal at the instigation of his enemies, that does not alter the case, the psalmist's response and confidence is *prayer*, though at the same time, the prayer might be accompanied by the customary ritual acts.

Supposing, therefore, that a pious Israelite finds that he has something to pray about, what does he do? Taking for granted for the moment that he is going to do his own praying,[3] what happens? First of all, *where* will he pray? If it is an emergency, he will pray wherever he is at the moment; Jonah, for example, feels he has cause to complain of his travelling accommodation, and we are told 'Jonah prayed unto Yahweh his God out of the fish's belly' (Jon. 2.1). If this example be objected to on the grounds that Jonah's whale is really an allegory, the objection is invalid, because the author is making the story as realistic as possible, and therefore if the prayer was not actually offered full fathom five by Jonah in the flesh, it must have been a natural thing in the minds of the readers of the book for a prayer to be offered in comparable circumstances. If anyone is unconvinced, we can add David's prayer as he 'went up by the ascent of Olives. . . . O Yahweh, prithee turn the counsel of

[1] *Ps.St.I*; cf. *Offersang og Sangoffer* pp. 197f and 560f.

[2] '*Das Gebet der Angeklagten im A.T.*', in *Old Testament Essays*, 1928 pp. 143ff, and its revised and enlarged form, under the same title, as BZAW xlix. 1928.

[3] Cf. Mowinckel, *Offersang og Sangoffer* pp. 372-5.

Ahitophel into foolishness' (2 Sam. 15.30f). Both these pray-ers might be regarded as being allowed special privileges owing to their office—the one a prophet, and the other a king—but prayer could also be offered by the layman, such as Abraham's servant—anonymous unless he be the same as the Dammesek Eliezer of Gen. 15.2—who prays for guidance and a successful issue at the well outside the city of Nahor when seeking a wife for Isaac (Gen. 24.12-14, JE). That is not very much of a prayer, however, so let us add also for good measure the more polished butler, Nehemiah. There is insufficient evidence to prove where he uttered the prayer of ch.1; but his prayer in ch.2 was certainly offered up (though silently, without doubt) at the very dinner table of Artaxerxes and in the presence of that monarch. Not only the layman, but the laywoman, too, was allowed to pray, as we see from the example of Hannah (1 Sam. 1.10-12).

In spite of, or even accepting, the cultic view of the Psalms as a whole, the Psalter is full of references to prayers uttered extempore just where the need has overtaken the sufferer—as, if you will forgive the simile, we may sometimes find a swallow's or starling's egg laid on the garden path or out in a field; but the natural place for the egg is the prepared nest, and the natural setting for the prayer is the sanctuary, i.e. the spot chosen by Yahweh, as proved by a theophany, for the revelation of Himself to His worshippers. In this connexion it is interesting to note that David's prayer mentioned above begins to be answered, as pointed out by Hans Schmidt (*RGG.* II. 875) 'when David was come to the summit where God was wont to be worshipped' (2 Sam. 15.32). Furthermore Jacob on his flight to Haran from Beersheba does not think to pray at Bethel until he has had the theophany (Gen. 28.16-22). Hannah, who could just as well have prayed at home—and, no doubt, did so—evidently regarded the temple at Shiloh as the most propitious place to pray with a view to being heard. Prayers by the experts—the priests—will naturally be offered at the sanctuary, as will communal and national prayers, e.g. the prayer of Solomon on dedicating the new Jerusalem temple:

> And Solomon stood before the altar of Yahweh in the presence of all the congregation of Israel, and spread forth his hands towards heaven.
>
> (1 Kings 8.22)

That will have to suffice now concerning the place of prayer, though we should at least mention the famous passage in Trito-Isaiah 'for mine house [i.e. the temple at Jerusalem] shall be called an house of prayer for all peoples' (Isa. 56.7).

One of the points about the Psalter which may strike us as surprising is the comparative scarcity in it of words properly meaning 'to pray'. The reason certainly is not that there are no prayers in the Psalter. On further consideration the reason is found to be simply that, in the Psalter we have people actually praying, and not talking about it, so that there is little scope for these words. Such indirect prayer-words as 'call', 'cry', etc., are of course quite common here, as we should expect; so, too, are admonitions to praise, but not the technical verbs for praying. One verb, however, which does appear is *nādar* and its noun *néder*. In a way, this verb is the complement of *'ātar*, or a different approach to prayer. Whereas the verb *'atar*, which is nowhere used in the Psalter, meant 'to entreat with a sacrifice', i.e. the sacrifice was offered in the hope of receiving a favourable response, with *nadar* it is the other way round: a sacrifice or other gift is promised on condition that the favourable response is received.

At first sight, therefore, the vow (*néder*) seems to be the canny worshipper's approach to prayer: no cure, no pay! But it is not really as bad as that. Though it is a bargain, it is in many cases the very destitution of the vower which makes an IOU the only possible return the honourable worshipper can offer in his hour of need. Where the covenant idea of mutuality was so strong, the *néder* or vow seemed to offer the destitute worshipper the opportunity of keeping his own end up. Of course, Hebrew religion, like all others, knew the sort of man who would try to bamboozle God by offering large rewards without any intention of keeping to his word; and so the psalmist enjoins all such: 'make your vow, and then pay up unto Yahweh your God' (Ps. 76.11, cf. Ps. 50.14, etc.).

But however unpromising it might appear at the start, it is, in fact, in connexion with the *néder* that the most spiritual interpretation of the relationship between man and Yahweh appears:

> Will I eat the flesh of bulls,
> Or drink the blood of goats?

Offer unto God the sacrifice of thanksgiving,
And pay thy vows unto the Most High:
And call upon me in the day of trouble;
I will deliver thee, and thou shalt glorify me.
(Ps. 50.13-15)

After all, it is not so much *when* the worshipper offers his gift, as *what* and *how* he offers; for there is only one acceptable sacrifice, and it, too, is the only acceptable vow:

For thou delightest not in sacrifice; else
would I give it:
Thou hast no pleasure in burnt offering.
The sacrifices of God are a broken spirit:
A broken and a contrite heart, O God,
thou wilt not despise. (Ps. 51.16f)

BOOK REVIEWS

Christian Theology and Natural Science. By E. L. Mascall. Longmans, 1956. Pp. xxi + 328. 25s.

By discussing a certain number of matters in which both theology and science have an interest, Dr Mascall has tried to show that it is possible to be an orthodox Christian without either ignoring or repudiating the discoveries and theories of present-day science. He has produced a big and satisfying book (and an inexpensive one into the bargain) which is a delight to read and will take its place as an unrivalled guide for adult thinkers who are trying to come to terms with the relations of Christianity and science. The form of the treatise is well conceived; the matters selected for discussion are chosen with unerring skill; enough information is provided to make the issues completely clear; and the judgments offered seem to me thoroughly sane and sound. Christians can learn from this book how matters stand in the sciences, including the matters of philosophical dispute about the nature of scientific theories. How matters stand in theology is conveyed more casually and, I feel bound to say, less acceptably. Dr Mascall knows the limits beyond which he may not speculate on the tide of his Thomist traditionalism, and when he chooses to take his stand on theological ground less arbitrary than some of the Thomist 'principles' he reveals great theological stature. But the fascinating *tours de force*—even the business-like ones which he conducts in the wake of St. Thomas—are in some danger of dissuading his readers from taking theological judgment seriously. It is unfortunately not the case that the sole and irresistible paradigm of Christian rationality is to be found in St. Thomas. It may even be the case that St. Thomas was misled, on matters like the the conflation of *creatio* and *preservatio* or on the conception of angels and the hierarchical relationship in which human beings stand to angels. I am inclined to agree that Christians can adopt an attitude of extreme detachment towards arguments which purport to establish truths of theological conviction from theories currently held by scientists, but I do not think that theology is quite as invulnerable to developments of scientific theory as Dr Mascall makes it out to be. It is the treatment of 'the body and the soul' and of 'man's origin and ancestry' in chapters 6 and 7 which leaves me slightly uneasy with Dr Mascall's kind of theological assurance, though I

hasten to add that his conclusions are unexceptionable. What he has to say about cosmology and indeterminacy is extremely satisfying as is his final chapter on 'The Purpose of Creation'. The great service which the book renders is that it displays the more disturbing findings of modern science in a perspective which robs them of their power to disrupt Christian faith and sets them free to enrich it. The power by which this is achieved is in part the power of a notably clear and well-informed mind, but in part it may be attributed to the fruitfulness of Dr Mascall's 'Thomist realism', in which I do not dissent from him, however much I wish he were able sometimes to see things as Kant saw them philosophically and as Protestants see them theologically. 'That the *theories* of the physicist are models or maps I should be ready to admit, but I would not conclude from this that what they are models or maps of is simply the sensible characteristics of our experience; I should wish to add that they are models or maps of a real intelligible world which we, as intelligent beings, perceive through the medium of our sensations. . . . The paradigm of a real world is not its sensible imaginability but its intellectual apprehensibility' (p. 174). True to his convictions on this point, Dr Mascall has done a responsible job of making the world which scientists talk about intellectually apprehensible as, a world created, governed and redeemed by the God whom Christians worship.

W. A. Whitehouse

Christ and the Church. By L. S. Thornton, C. R. Dacre Press, 1956. Pp. 151. 18s.

This third part of Dr Thornton's treatise on *The Form of the Servant* 'presents a series of fundamental unities exhibited in the Bible' through which the 'single divine-human mystery' which is Christ and His Church may be apprehended. The biblical imagery, of the two creations (with the Church as the new Eve), the City of God, the transfiguration, and the resurrection of man, is displayed in all its complexity to drive home the truth that 'the Church by virtue of her identity with Jesus in the one flesh is, in her present low estate, the earthen vessel which not only conveys the whole substance of the Christ-mystery, but is also mysteriously one with it in life, character and destiny' (p. 44). In the preceding volume the author explored the apostolic conviction that Christ is the sphere in which the secrets of creation become manifest; and the truth corresponding to this is that the Church visible here on earth is the 'effectual sign' of our Lord's present glory and of man's true home and destiny. The question which is systematically pursued throughout the study is: In what sense can we believe that the obedience of Christ as head of creation becomes effectual in mankind through the agency

of the Church (p. 24)? Powerful summaries of the biblical answers can be found on pp. 34, 83, 112, which make it particularly clear that Dr Thornton is sensitive to the distinctions which have to be made in affirming the identity of 'the whole New Man, the dedicated Servant of the Lord, Jesus in His Church'. The Church's identity with her Lord and Saviour 'involves total dependence upon, and correspondence with, all that He is'; but 'as His mystical complement she is, in this world, His representative and embodiment, and that in two senses; first, as setting before the Father the response of man to God in Christ, and secondly as setting forth before mankind that same response which is "the obedience of the Christ" '.

The consummation of this new-creation mystery includes the mystery of the resurrection of man and the discussion of this topic in the last chapter is of outstanding merit. In Christ 'there is renovation and fulfilment, not only of sanctified persons, but also of the whole creation; and this transformation takes place within a new world-order whose outward form is vitally significant since it manifests the new organism of the Christ. To that outward order belong the risen bodies of the saints; and to its single pattern the mystery of resurrection in all its aspects corresponds. So, for example, the apostolic writers do not . . . ignore the gulf which separates the flesh and blood of our present physical frame from the future body of glory. They show, however, that this deep disjunction is, for those who are in Christ, included within a much vaster mystery. Jesus conquered death by taking it into His own life, by making it (so to speak) a function of that life which is itself deathless.' Those who 'put on Christ' are already 'being conformed in their whole being to that organism whose sacrificial character makes dying to be an integral factor in life itself' (p. 135).

This book, like its predecessor, is packed with sound theological nourishment. Dr Thornton is an outstanding servant of the Word. There are occasions, less frequent here than elsewhere in his work, where one is moved to object that his use of a scriptural passage perversely distorts its principal bearing. Further, it requires some effort not to lose patience with what might be termed the self-contained imperialism of his exposition. This I believe to be the mark of a powerful mind combined with Christian ἁπλότης, a quality of which he gives a most penetrating account on p. 46f; but at times its manifestation can be only a hair's breadth removed from arrogance. It should also be said, perhaps, that this superb piece of work does not serve to answer all the questions which it broaches. It sets Scripture free to heal and to restore the believing imagination and prepares the way for fruitful work in other theological disciplines. Its theses have to be tested in use within more

open inquiries and their commanding exposition here may be a menace to the impressionable who turn to this book for indoctrination. But as meat for the relatively mature the book is wholly to be welcomed. W. A. WHITEHOUSE

The Early Church—Historical and Theological Studies. By OSCAR CULLMANN, Ed. A. J. B. HIGGINS. S.C.M. Press. 25s.

Dr A. J. B. HIGGINS has put us in his debt by editing and, with the help of Mr Stanley Godman, translating a collection of studies by Oscar Cullmann most of which have appeared in Continental journals during the past few years. The papers are well selected and give a valuable insight into Cullmann's approach to many important topics in Early Church theology. Professor Cullmann's outstanding contributions to theology on the problem of Christ and Time, the place of St. Peter in the Church, Baptism, and Early Church creeds and worship are already known to us in English. This further selection of shorter studies will enhance his reputation in this country and America. It has been one of the many good offices of the S.C.M. Press under Ronald Gregor Smith, that they have done so much to make Cullmann's work known to the English speaking world.

His first study on 'The Necessity and Function of Higher Criticism' already published in *The Student World*, outlines Cullmann's wise and balanced acceptance of the necessity for philological and historical exegesis. His emphasis particularly on the necessity for a historical interpretation of the New Testament, as opposed to a theological interpretation, leads him rightly to see allegorism and demythologising as kindred aberrations.

This is followed by an interesting study on the origin of Christmas, in which we are very properly cautioned against acquiescing in the popular predilection for Christmas as against Easter. There is a useful paper on the 'theological justification' for having more than one version of the Gospel, although this presented what appeared to be a problem of harmonisation in patristic times. Also among the shorter studies are papers on the relationship between our Lord's Ministry and that of John the Baptist, on the connexion between the Hellenists led by Stephen, and the Samaritans, and a very useful contribution on 'Early Christianity and Civilisation'.

But the main substance of the collection is contained in an important essay on 'The Tradition' and three related studies on 'The Kingship of Christ and the Church in the New Testament', 'The Return of Christ', and 'The Proleptic Deliverance of the Body according to the New Testament'. Cullmann's treatment of 'The Tradition' will be familiar in part at any rate to readers of

this journal, since in its present form the essay is an enlarged revision of two articles which have already appeared in the *S.J.T.* under the titles of 'Kyrios as Designation for the Oral Tradition concerning Jesus' (1950) and 'Scripture and Tradition' (1953). But this is in effect a new work since it takes into account the Roman Catholic reaction to the question of tradition, raised in Cullmann's book on St. Peter.

Cullmann's thesis is that Paul was able to accord a higher place to the *paradosis* he had received, despite the fact that Jesus had denounced the high place accorded to *paradosis* in Judaism, because Jesus as *Kyrios* and as the fulfilment of the Law replaced all 'tradition of men' with a new type of tradition which was conditioned by the fact that the exalted Lord was the transmitter. Paul can therefore speak of the revelation he received on the Damascus Road and the tradition he received from the apostles as being on the same level.

But this tradition was entrusted to a unique apostolate at a particular time in history. Church tradition between then and now must be checked against the testimony of the apostles in Holy Scripture. Ecclesiastical tradition must not be confused with apostolic tradition. This is the danger in Catholicism which ignores the fact that the Church itself by establishing an apostolic canon and an apostolic faith drew a firm line between the apostolic age and subsequent history. The conflict between Catholic exaltation of tradition and Protestant exaltation of the scriptures is not by any means solved, but Cullmann sees helpful signs of a *rapprochement* in a greater interest on the part of Protestants in the Fathers and of Catholics in the study of the Bible.

The essay on 'The Kingship of Christ and the Church in the New Testament' is based on an analysis of the difference between the Kingdom of Christ and the Kingdom of God. Cullmann argues that the Kingship of Christ is the period from the Ascension to the time when the Son surrenders His authority to the Father, beyond which point the Kingship of God is supreme. The Church is not identical with the Kingship of Christ, since it had its origin at Pentecost, but its end is like that of the Kingship of Christ after the present age has given place to the age to come. Further, the Kingship of Christ extends over the whole cosmos whereas the Church finds its place within the cosmos as the witness among men to the reality of Christ's Kingdom over all.

Both the Church and the *Regnum Christi* experience the necessary tension which comes from belonging entirely to the present but also belonging entirely to the end. The failure of the cosmos to recognise the Kingship of Christ, as also the failure of the Church to subdue the sin within itself, comes from the fact of this dual existence.

The demonic powers which Christ overcame by His Death and Resurrection are still hostile, and until their final subjugation can still wreak havoc. The Church's task is to extend its area within the *Regnum Christi* at a cost of suffering but never at the cost of its confidence in the ultimate outcome.

The climax of this age in the Return of Christ forms the subject of a lecture originally delivered to Swiss theological students. Cullmann castigates the sects for perverting the truth of the Second Advent by making it a question of When? He rightly emphasises the place of hope in the Christian scheme of salvation, but some of us will question his assertion that the ultimate victory of Christ necessarily involves the return of Christ to earth. The New Testament evidence, as Cullmann admits, is by no means decisive. He appears to argue that because Cross and Resurrection took place on earth the Saviour must return to the same earth in glory surrounded by His own to inaugurate the new age. If the theological truth of the Parousia was not vitiated in early Christian times by its failure to materialise as expected, surely the same is true if we make equal allowance for the place of Jewish Messianic imagery in the biblical language.

The final essay on 'The Proleptic Deliverance of the Body' in which Cullmann argues suggestively if not altogether convincingly for a recognition of the redemptive effect of the sacraments upon our physical bodies, rounds off a stimulating series of glimpses into the rich mind of this notable Continental scholar. Would that all theologians from across the Channel were as orderly and lucid in the presentation of their material! Both translators have achieved an extremely smooth and readable rendering of the originals. There is a misprint on page 152, line 8.

WILLIAM NEIL

Christian Belief Today. Mowbrays. 15s.

THE volume published under this title consists of four series of lectures delivered by Bishop Wand, Dean Matthews, Canon Demant and Canon Dewar in the school of religion arranged in the London diocese in Lent 1952. The first two are concerned with doctrinal questions under the heads The Scheme of Salvation and Problems of Christian Belief; the two latter with ethical, under the heads Man and the Social Order and Personality and Human Relations. The courses were not given consecutively to the same audience. It is therefore only in the looser sense that they form a whole, for there are considerable differences in length and treatment. But if there is no more than a very general unity and progression, there is very little overlapping. And the four sections all

maintain that high standard of thinking and expression which we should naturally expect from their authors.

In a book of this kind, which does not move to any particular conclusion, it is difficult either to commend individual sections or to dissent from individual statements or judgments. To do so would be to wander into specific questions which do not affect the more general quality or value of the book. The most that can be done is to attempt certain very broad generalisations which are open to the objection which can be urged against all generalisations: that they do not work out at every particular point. Yet a reading of the whole work does leave the following impressions: first, that it is not sufficiently biblical, either in conception or in detailed outworking; second, that, with the exception of the opening section by Bishop Wand, it moves too much on the frontier between faith and thought in general; and third, that there is a distortion of emphasis in giving so much space, relatively, to ethical questions, the more so as they do not proceed necessarily from the dogmatic sections, as in the New Testament.

In short, the volume is not unrepresentative of what has become a typically Anglican approach to the Christian faith. It is scholarly. It shows a good knowledge of theology past and present. But it sets the Christian faith within a general incarnational understanding of the world, which inevitably gives to the particular revelation and redemption in Jesus Christ a wider background, and justifies a comparative and apologetic approach. That the school had a real value cannot be doubted, and we are indebted to the lecturers for their informative and stimulating discussions. But it would have had a greater value, surely, had it been more directly in the apostolic succession of New Testament proclamation and instruction.

G. W. Bromiley

New Testament Christianity. By J. B. Philipps. Hodder and Stoughton. 10s. 6d.

The name of the author is now well known in all the Churches for his interpretative translation of the greater part of the New Testament and for half a dozen helpful books besides. It is all work of first-rank quality, and it has all been accomplished in the midst of the duties of a busy rector in a congregation. No better preparation than his work as translator could be conceived for a study of the essence of New Testament Christianity; and so the book starts with a fairly full explanation of what he has discovered anew, by translating the documents. This was nothing less than 'a minor miracle'. He was filled with wonder and wistfulness of 'the sheer spiritual zest and drive of the New Testament', and overwhelmed again by

the sense of the supernatural in it all, 'the supra-human truth, and a supra-human way of living', and how it is all dominated by 'a Figure of far more than human stature and quality'.

Mr Philipps is confident that, if only people would read the New Testament not in short snippets but in its overall sweep, they would find themselves in the presence of a new kind of truth, offering a light by which to live, and opening before us the dimension of Eternity and the timeless life of God. After a fascinating chapter on the idea of the earth as 'A Planet Visited', the bulk of the book is given to an examination of the New Testament themes of faith, hope, love and peace. This is a conventional enough outline of the subject; inevitably so—but it is all fresh, concise, and set forth with ease, clarity and point. Much that is in the book is familiar to many, all of it is familiar to some; but everyone will be indebted to the writer for putting it so well.

There is much penetrating comment on the spiritual predicament of mankind in our time, and this is often done in a few terse sentences, as on pages 30, 32, 38, 48, 50 to 54, 73, 90. The conviction is vigorously recorded that there is a great longing today on the part of many people in the Churches for a new contact with the power which is at work changing lives in the Acts and the Epistles where there is so much evidence that 'the thing works'. What the book says as to the practical steps which are necessary to maintain the Christian Life will encourage and inspire many.

All will agree with Mr Philipps in what he says of the supreme need for a rediscovery of the faith that God is Love, in its full New Testament sense, with its dynamic implications for the exercise of love in our life; and he offers a good analysis of the temptations which meet those who try the way of Christian love. Equally valuable is his insistence on the need for a Church as outward-looking as the New Testament Church was. His statement of how modern man with all his knowledge, invention and speed is missing the clue to true life deserves to be publicised in words of undying fire.

One guesses that Mr Philipps has been somewhat ruffled by certain types of evangelism, especially that form of it which makes fear and denunciation its chief weapon, and not positive love. The danger of all efforts to frighten people into salvation is ever present, and yet the Gospel cannot be fully presented without reference to the right kind of fear, which is a friend and not a foe; and it was Jesus Himself who spoke of the things of which we ought to be afraid. Also, it is almost certain that he over-estimates the concern about the divisions of the Church; for one of the most anxious aspects of that subject is precisely the want of any great upsurge of

feeling about it in the rank and file of the Churches. Strangely, too, this careful scholar falls into the common error of ascribing to Christ the great two-fold commandment of loving God and one's neighbour as oneself. This, of course, is the highwater mark of the Old Testament law, and Christ's new commandment, to love as He has loved us, is higher still.

Readers who already know their New Testament thoroughly will recognise this book as an excellent living statement of the very core of the Christian religion, whereas those who know little of the sources will be encouraged by it to go back to these sources with quickened expectation. GEORGE S. GUNN

The Biblical Doctrine of Sin. By C. RYDER SMITH. The Epworth Press, 1953. 20s.

THIS painstaking book falls into three sections. The author discusses the doctrine of sin in (*a*) the OT; (*b*) the Apocrypha; (*c*) the NT. The work is so detailed that one can only point out the main trends in the book. Dr Smith is convinced that the predominating concept of God in these three fields of sacred literature is fundamental to an understanding of their doctrine of sin.

In the OT God is pre-eminently King and, therefore, Judge. He judges good and evil men and declares them to be righteous or wicked; and according to His judgment rewards them in the present and in the future. After a discussion of the many OT terms for sin the author has many pertinent things to say on the OT concept of 'societary' sin, while his psychological analysis of OT sinfulness is illuminating. The author finds no doctrine of original sin in the OT. The principal reaction to sin within the Divine nature is anger rather than hate and, therefore, God punishes sin though He also pleads in grace with the sinner.

In the Apocrypha, Dr Smith considers that the emphasis is on Divine beneficence, but still God sees moral differences among men and judges accordingly. While He gives His verdict now, the execution of the sentence awaits a fulfilment in the future. The concepts of the universality of sin and of 'societary' sin are present in the Apocrypha, but the only writer who comes close to a doctrine of original sin is Second Esdras, though what he seems concerned to teach is not hereditary sinfulness but hereditary weakness, which, of course, is not itself sinful. The author finds no doctrine of Divine vengeance or Divine curse upon sin in the Apocrypha. The most that God does is to rebuke or convict the sinner.

In the NT there is an altogether different emphasis. There sin is rather a question of belief or disbelief in Christ. On the whole,

judgment is postponed until death, and Christ will be the judge. The basis of judgment will be belief or disbelief in Christ. In the NT sin is universal, but the author finds neither a doctrine of total depravity nor of original sinfulness in the NT. What he finds is a doctrine of original weakness. Man, therefore, is born 'weak' not 'sinful'. It is interesting to notice that this agrees well with the doctrine of the Qur'an. This means that it is inevitable that men should sin—not with the inevitability of nature but with the inevitability of history, yet still inevitably. This position is significant for the antinomy between Divine sovereignty and human freedom, pp. 175f. In the NT the sin of sins is that of rejecting Christ. And there too the punishment of sin is underlined. It may take place in history but future punishment is especially emphasised. In contradistinction to the OT and the Apocrypha God's pleading with the sinner in grace is everywhere prominent in the NT.

The author's exposition of the doctrine of justification by faith (126ff) is particularly good, and many will find his discussions of the numerous biblical terms for sin very helpful.

J. G. S. S. Thomson

Studies in the Johannine Writings. By Daniel Lamont. James Clarke and Co. Ltd. 10s. 6d.

All the former students of Professor Lamont and the hosts of friends he made in his congregations and far beyond them will be grateful to Dr George R. Logan, minister of Dr Lamont's former congregation in Helensburgh, both for the memoir and for the articles which form the main part of the book. This may be taken as the last contribution from the pen of a man who was great as preacher and teacher and who abounded in Christian spirit. The memoir has been written with diligence, judgment and affection. It is live and interesting, and opens several windows upon the period of Dr Lamont's active years. There is an excellent photograph.

The brilliant all-roundness of this man is properly emphasised. He was essentially 'the scholar merged in the evangelist'; and, though his supreme greatness was as a preacher, it is significant that the project of a volume of sermons did not appeal to him—probably an indication of his exceptionally sound judgment. Dr Lamont may well have been the finest example in our time of a man who blended sound scholarship in more than one field with passionate evangelism, and yet found time for a large and leading share in the Church's administrative work which some men affect to despise.

It is salutary to read what Dr Lamont held on the subject of Christian apologetics as set forth in his Inaugural Lecture at New

College. He regarded it as still of capital importance, and this is notable in a teacher who had such a thoroughly biblical doctrine of Revelation as his sheet anchor. His unparalleled resources of ministerial experience, over a long period before he became professor, doubtless accounted largely for this combination of emphases. No one rejoiced more in the revival of biblical theology than did this 'golden-voiced Moderator'. He tended to be conservative on questions of criticism, but he was not in sympathy with mechanical fundamentalism.

These studies on the Johannine writings are simple and almost devotional. They were written in 1944-5, his final year as professor in Edinburgh, and were designed for the Bible School articles which appear in *The Life of Faith*. They were not published there till 1950, and two on the Parousia of our Lord appear now for the first time. Dr Lamont knows well the difficulties of the Johannine authorship of the Gospel, the three Epistles and the Apocalypse, but he is prepared to accept it, and he sees no contradiction between 'apostle of love' and 'son of thunder'. The background of the thought of both Gospel and Epistles is helpfully described for readers who cannot be expected to have fuller access to this. He will not 'waste time' over those—far fewer today—who would excise entirely the apocalyptic element from the teaching of Jesus. He would date part of the Apocalypse as early as A.D. 70, and he regards its real aim as the interpretation of our Lord's apocalyptic utterances which so many in the early Church had misunderstood. As a preacher, Dr Lamont never allowed the austere, awakening word to be absent, but always associated with the winsome pleading note. The last chapter expounding his view of the Parousia which is not the Judgment Day—a view dealt with more fully in his earlier book, *Christ and the World of Thought*—is most characteristic.

GEORGE S. GUNN

Plotinus, A Volume of Selections in a New English Translation. By A. H. ARMSTRONG. Allen and Unwin, 1953. Pp. 174. 10s. 6d. net.

THE series of which this attractive little volume forms part is designed 'to place the chief ethical and religious masterpieces of the world, both Christian and non-Christian, within easy reach of the intelligent reader who is not necessarily an expert'. That the Enneads of Plotinus deserve to be included admits of no doubt in view of their influence with the intelligentzia during a tragically hungry period of human history. Professor Armstrong has selected and translated, with useful summaries and explanatory notes, the significant passages of the Enneads, and rearranged them in an

order that makes the Plotinian system appear clearly. His three transcendent Hypostases are first described; then the situation of man 'here' in this world; finally 'The Return of the Soul' to mystic union with 'The One', an experience which Porphyry claims to have enjoyed but once, in his 68th year, but which Plotinus attained four times while Porphyry was with him. In a 32-page Introduction Professor Armstrong tells us all that is known about the life and writings of Plotinus, sketches in masterly fashion the philosophical and religious background of the Enneads, and luminously expounds the thought of Plotinus himself. The book is to be commended as an admirable and authoritative guide to this difficult thinker.

JOHN H. S. BURLEIGH

Vedanta for Modern Man. Ed. C. ISHERWOOD. Allen and Unwin. 1952. 25s.

A BULKY and important volume with this title has recently been published to which no fewer than 20 writers contribute, the majority bearing Indian names. Separate phases of the philosophy and technique of Vedanta—the divine nature of man, the Godward purpose of life, and the essential unity of all religions—are treated in 60 odd brief chapters. These include essays on related subjects, such as art and religion, religion and the world crisis, the religious novel, notes on personalities such as William Law, Emerson and Sri Ramakrishna and some poetry selections. The contents are varied in subject and style, but all converge on the same idea. Contrary to Kipling's dictum it is contended that East and West can meet and are not irreconcilable. 'The cosmic mind projects values in ways that human minds are unable to fathom.' 'Every faith is the language that God speaks in different countries and different epochs. It is lack of understanding of that language that creates want of comprehension.'

Syncretistic forms of religion tend to become nebulous and ineffective for practical purposes. It takes an oriental metaphysical mind to grasp the import of such subtleties as this: e.g. 'Brahman is not conscious; Brahman *is* consciousness. Brahman does not exist; Brahman *is* existence. Brahman is the Atman (the Eternal Nature) of every human being, creature, and object. Vedanta teaches us that Life has no other purpose than this—that we shall learn to know ourselves for what we really are; that we shall reject the superficial ego-personality which claims that "I am Mr Smith; I am other than Mr Brown", and know, instead, that "I am the Atman; Mr Brown is the Atman; the Atman is Brahman; there is nothing anywhere but Brahman; all else is appearance, transience, and unreality." ' The human self is thus apparently to be absorbed

in some infinite 'ultimate Reality' and this robs the Christian of the conception and comfort of a personal universal Father-God.

This quotation comes from the Introduction by Mr Christopher Isherwood who edited a similar work a few years ago (*Vedanta for the Western World*). He has chosen twelve collaborateurs as exponents of the cult, termed 'Swanis', a higher grade of a monkish order who devote themselves to 'Yoga', a mode of profound solitary contemplation leading to intimate communion with the divine being, 'the one Self in all beings'. They profess to have discovered a philosophy that postulates an acceptance and an understanding of all religions. They cannot expect to have the assent of those who remain convinced of the uniqueness of Christ's personality and power and His faith which has done more than any other for the uplift and redemption of mankind.

The Vedantists, however, are deeply in earnest. They seem determined to plumb 'the abysmal depths of personality' and in the same breath they exhort you to 'put off your own ego' and remould yourself. It is not easy to check or eliminate obtrusive egoism and Gerald Heard, a critical authority on Vedantism, confesses that we still find private suspicions, miseries, complaints and hidden hatreds remaining and lurking in the corner of the mind with irrational worry, over-sensitiveness and mind-body distress. It involves a long struggle with ourselves, and in St. Paul's experience like countless others, it is Christ who helps to win the victory when everything a man can do for himself fails, when he sinks into the gulf of utter darkness, when he is assailed by doubt, denial, hatred of life and black despair, he can escape from them only if God lays His hand upon him. The very consciousness of our imperfections and sin betrays the pressure of the Divine on our hearts. The vision of God widens our horizon and takes us beyond our earthly tumults and sorrows.

The English contributors write with most clarity and are best understood by ordinary readers. Aldous Huxley among them offers some suggestive 'Reflections on Progress'. He seems to regard science as the only progressive branch of knowledge but recognises its limitations. 'Except for the human species, evolutionary progress would seem to be at an end.' 'Human beings are never quite so clever as they think they are.' 'The dogmatists of progress imagine that they can be insolent with impunity. And their faith is so strong, that it has been able to survive two world wars, and several revolutions of almost unprecedented savagery, and remains flourishing in spite of totalitarianism, the revival of slavery, concentration camps, saturation bombing, and atomic missiles.' He reaches the conclusion that 'in this war-tormented world of today

the most useful people are those whose concern is with daily bread—those who produce and conserve food for the bodies of men, and those who permit themselves, and who teach others to permit themselves, to be feed by the bread of grace that gives life to the spirit.'

In his tribute to Ramakrishna, Nehru, the Hindu leader, claims a tradition of tolerance in Indian thought, seeking to include truth in all religions. He repeats what is now a commonplace 'that man's mental and spiritual growth has not kept pace with his technical and scientific advance, and this is a very dangerous thing, because science and technology are weapons of tremendous power'.

The main value of this cult is the stress it lays on less active material motives and the need of western people for more spiritual contemplation, prayerful thinking and patient acceptance of the inevitable in life's conditions. 'The things that are seen are temporal but the things that are unseen are eternal', and this is a lesson still to be learned with humble submission to a higher will and faith in a wise living purpose which runs through all human history and experience.

G. R. S. Reid

Thine is the Kingdom. By J. S. Stewart. The Saint Andrew Press. 2s. 6d.

One of the very few tests of true success which a minister may safely apply to his congregation is the extent to which it is becoming increasingly missionary in spirit and outlook; and in this regard there is great room for improvement in every congregation. The Duff Missionary Lectures by Professor J. S. Stewart will enormously assist every minister who wishes to put this matter before the people in the most clear and compelling light. Should he desire to supplement this book by further reading, he could not do better than take Dr Max Warren's recent book *The Christian Imperative* or Dr P. T. Forsyth's historic sermon on Missions which is of timeless value (published as a pamphlet by the Independent Press, and well worthy of reissue, if it is out of print).

Professor Stewart is not concerned with the anxious problems of contemporary mission—any policy and strategy, which so rightly and urgently engage the attention of missionary administrators. After all these all deal with the changing framework or mould into which the unchanging missionary endeavour has to be poured. Even if in certain areas these changing conditions were to terminate for a period the entire opportunity to carry on missions, that would make no difference to the character and the imperative of the Gospel which at its core is as unalterable as God Himself. This book confronts us with the essential centralities, and the spiritual glow

which illumines all Dr Stewart's preaching and writing shines on every page of these fourteen compact but living chapters.

The only argument for mission is 'the total action of God in history, the whole revelation of God in Christ', and all partial motives are examined in the light of that basic conviction. 'The constraint of Christ upon the individual life' and 'the Kingship of Christ over history' intertwine to constitute the essential motive. The tart comment of Dr Denney is quoted—'they have no right to believe in missions; they do not believe in Christ.' New Testament redemption is expounded as 'in three tenses'—the past, declaiming mighty acts that have taken place once for all; the present, holding forth an immediate experience of a living Lord; and the future with its sure hope of final triumph.

The supreme argument of the book is that there is 'always a veiled imperative at the heart of this basic indicative'—'Go ye therefore' because 'All power has been given to Me'—and this is worked out most helpfully in several chapters. The closing chapters deal with the issue which bids fair to be the most debatable theological issue of the modern period—the nature of the Kingdom of God, and the hope of its establishment on earth through the impact of the Gospel. Present prospects and ultimate goal are examined, and it is finally claimed that in the Bible these dwell together in unresolved paradox. What Dr Stewart says on this subject must certainly be the starting point of all discussion upon it.

GEORGE S. GUNN

What is a missionary? By DOUGLAS WEBSTER. Highway Press, 1955. Pp. 60. 2s.

GOOD, sane, practical, biblical common sense, with an incredible understatement at the bottom of p. 44 and a misprint on p. 57! But will it produce any results? I ask a few questions: (1) Isn't the prophetic tradition wearing very thin today? (2) Will the missionary cause revive without a great symbol again gripping not the conscious thinking of our people but their subconscious imagination? (3) Isn't it the lack of this grip upon the 'soul' which makes such excellent booklets as this produce such few 'vocations' to the mission field? Where the call is intellectually clear and rationally presented it does not fire the imagination or grip the soul: where it grips the soul and fires the imagination, it is neither rational nor intelligible! Is this a gross over-simplification? J. E. FISON

The Anglican Pulpit Today. Ed. F. D. GIFFORD. Mowbray. 15s.

THIS book of sermons is a pleasure to handle and to look at. I doubt if it will convince a Presbyterian of the necessary doctrinal

substance of a typical Anglican sermon! More than half its contributors come from the Protestant Episcopal Church of the U.S.A. and alas, only one from an Asian or an African Christian Church. It is this last fact which touches the vital question-mark of our day: how far are extensions of national churches overseas expressions of political expansion or of ecumenical catholicism?

J. E. Fison

The Living Church in the Parish. Ed. Frank Colquhoun. Church Book Room Press Ltd., London, 1952. Pp. 134.

This small volume, the second in the series of *Living Church Manuals* discusses in successive chapters six aspects of Pastoral Theology, namely the Worship of the Parish Church, the Administration of the Sacraments, Parochial Evangelism, the Teaching Church, Training for Confirmation, and the Fellowship of the Church, and thereafter in the Appendices the Parish Prayer Meeting, Parish Church Music, and the Parish Magazine. It is a symposium by eight authors, the editor contributing two articles. While intended for the clergy of the Church of England, it will be helpful to ministers of any denomination. The whole presentation is thoroughly evangelical, and there are many useful and wise practical suggestions which if followed should help towards a more vital and effective parish life. The bibliography, though limited to elementary books, will be found useful, as also will be the suggested subjects for preaching and teaching courses. Few will read this book without profit.

John A. Lamb

The Ecclesiastical History of the English Nation. By The Venerable Bede. Everyman's Library. 6s.

A new edition of Bede's History, with the Lives of St. Cuthbert and the Holy Abbots, is now available in Everyman's new larger format of crown octavo, with an excellent introduction by David Knowles. The translation is that of John Stevenson (1870) revised with notes by L. C. Lane (1903).

The Monk of Jarrow was a genius. He lived in the great day of Northumbria when the western Church was bounded by heathern Germany and Islam on the Pyrenees, and the Danes had not yet come to Britain. He wrote in the peace of his monastery on every branch of knowledge—a non-specialising don of infinite capacity—but his *Ecclesiastical History* alone would have given him fame, for it is almost our only authority for the period from the Saxon invasions and for the early Christian history of Scotland. Bede's work too marks the confluence of the two streams of western Christian culture, the Roman and the Celtic, and he was fair in

assessing the influence of each. Theologically he was fundamentally orthodox, castigating Arianism and Pelagianism in the strongest terms.

As 'the father of English history' he was painstaking, sincere and responsible to his love of truth, and if his method was that of Eusebius rather than of Thucydides with its deep insight and reflection, the clarity of his style and his imaginative understanding of his characters make his book easy to read and men like Augustine, Chad, Aidan, Wilfred and Cuthbert far more than merely eponymous saints.

Bede was critically careful to give his sources, and if he was perhaps too willing to accept and use miracle stories, he was a son of his time and even in this a true historian of the Church of his day. One regrets the probability that he was deceived in accepting the validity of the delightful Gregorian rescripts, by the monks of Canterbury.

A. J. Dunlop

Dean Colet and his Theology. By Ernest William Hunt. S.P.C.K., London, 1956. Pp. x + 142. 30s.

John Colet has attracted not a few biographers, and short treatments of his work abound. There is something fascinating about a man indebted to two stark opposites, whose mind was awakened by the Renaissance and whose soul was kindled by the Pseudo-Dionysius. This English Pico della Mirandola is a fascinating figure. Mr Hunt has given us the first full study of his theology in which every extant scrap of his writing has been diligently and lovingly searched out and pondered.

In his four main chapters he considers him as reformer, preacher, exegete and mystic. It is all very relevant and painstaking. But Mr Hunt's eyes have been too closely and exclusively occupied with the actual text in front of him. Rarely is there a hint of the European context. There is no mention, e.g., of Jacques Lefèvre whose work in France was so closely parallel both chronologically and developmentally and who had in 1512, the same year as John Colet's sermon to Convocation, given expression, in the preface to his commentary on the Pauline Epistles, to a similar programme for the reform of the Church. But all the materials are here for an appreciation of one of whom Erasmus could write: 'he has greedily absorbed the mind and spirit of Saint Paul', and 'Christ was always in his mouth, Christ always in his heart.'

The printing, as one expects from the Church Historical Society, is almost impeccable, but there are occasional lapses like *Convenant* on p. 68, *Perfection* on p. 104 n.3, and *Engima* on p. 113.

Hugh Watt

P. T. Forsyth: Prophet for Today. By R. McAfee Brown. Westminster Press. $3.50.

In this small and readable book Professor Brown of St. Paul, Minnesota, has given us an introduction to the writings and theology of P. T. Forsyth. He is well qualified to do this, for he has devoted some considerable time to a study of Forsyth's work, and written a doctoral dissertation on the subject from which parts of the present book are taken. As far as possible he allows Forsyth to speak in his own words. He also gives us a complete list of the books written by Forsyth, and a selection of his more important articles.

Inevitably, a book of this kind takes for the most part the form of an exposition. Within the limits of space this is well done. It certainly conveys something of the originality and grandeur of Forsyth's thinking. It stimulates the reader to a reading of the original, which is avowedly one of the main purposes of the author. It gives us in short compass a statement of the main teachings of Forsyth, with an assessment of their contemporary relevance.

Two questions remain to be answered. First, is it really the case that Forsyth is a prophet for our own time as the author supposes? Certainly, much that Forsyth says is illuminating and helpful. Indeed, we are constantly surprised that Forsyth could in fact be saying these things at the time that he did. The works of Forsyth have a far more contemporary ring than those of the majority of theologians of his day. But to say that is simply to say that he was a prophet in his own time whose message has only come to be appreciated a generation later. That we can learn from Forsyth is obvious. Whether he has still an independently creative message is another matter.

Second, is this introductory study quite so necessary in this country as it is, perhaps, in the United States, where the work of Forsyth is not so well known? The fact is that the name of Forsyth has been before us for some time now, and his main works have been made accessible by the Independent Press. Abroad, the case is no doubt different, and a popularisation of this kind will fulfil a useful and challenging function. But properly to estimate the value of the study it is necessary to consider it against the American rather than the British scene. G. W. Bromiley

The Life and Writings of Jeremy Taylor. By C. J. Stranks. S.P.C.K., London, 1952. Pp. 320.

The study of the Anglican writers of the seventeenth century reveals much that is of interest, in their literary charm, their theological distinction, and their fondness for controversy. One of these writers is Jeremy Taylor, who yet occupied a peculiar position. He might

be called a Latitudinarian Laudian or a High Church Arminian but no one could doubt his loyalty both to episcopacy and to the monarchy. His personal character was attractive. He was a student, a preacher, a writer of theology and of one great devotional classic. Canon Stranks calls him 'a born Christian, a born priest, and a born preacher' (p. 287). In strenuous days of conflict he lived, so far as records show, comparatively quietly. He had experience of prison, yet, at least in his early days, wrote strongly in favour of tolerance. He was a king's chaplain and a bishop, yet was unspoiled by high office. This biography brings out Taylor's high qualities very clearly.

His many writings are carefully analysed and discussed. Although Canon Stranks feels that in Taylor's thinking there was little that was really original, yet he was a pioneer in some matters, being the first to write a work in favour of religious toleration, in his *Liberty of Prophesying* (1647); the first to write an English Life of Christ, in *The Great Exemplar of Sanctity and Holy Life* (1649); and the first to produce in English a work on casuistry, his *Ductor Dubitantium* (1660). He is perhaps better known for his *Rule and Exercises of Holy Living and Holy Dying*, and for his *Collection of Offices*. But merely to mention such works is to indicate the breadth of Taylor's contribution to his days.

In controversy Taylor sometimes gave an unfair presentation of his opponent's case, and he lacked a truly judicious quality of mind, while there was a certain instability of conviction. But his addresses to his clergy show how concerned he was with their work, and also with their reading and study—the books he recommended in one of his addresses (see Appendix G, p.308f) would overwhelm many of the clergy today.

All in all, this man of courage, knowledge, modesty, serenity and devoutness, will always attract students, and this biography will long remain an indispensable tool, by reason of its completeness, its adequacy and its sympathy, as well as its own delightful literary style. The Church Historical Society is to be congratulated on this fine addition to their list of scholarly publications.

JOHN A. LAMB

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